|
The
Wages Of Lethargy
When the LTTE
announced its unilateral ceasefire in December 2001, the nation’s sigh
of relief was audible across the globe. What high hopes we had then!
After more than 20 years of war, at last it seemed there was a real
chance for peace. Not only were the irascibly belligerent Tigers
seemingly yearning for peace, but the newly-elected UNF too, despite a
deeply flawed election, had won a clear mandate from the electorate to
sue for a peaceful solution to the “north-east problem.” Within days
the roadblocks and barriers came down, and Sri Lanka breathed the air of
freedom.
The
UNF government lost no time in reciprocating the ceasefire, sitting down
earnestly to talks and signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with
the LTTE. In having decided to make war for their rights, the Tigers had
sacrificed a whole generation of youth in northern and eastern Sri
Lanka, reducing much of the area to rubble: no industries, no
employment, no welfare and a massive occupation of civilian property by
the armed forces. In seeking to better their lot, the people of the
LTTE’s Utopian Eelam had made themselves poor indeed.
In
signing the MoU, the government committed itself not only to a specific
set of goals, but also to disengagement. Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe was quick to warn that a final solution would not be
quick in coming. It was first necessary to rehabilitate the north-east,
resettle refugees in their homes, and make the Tamil people true
beneficiaries of the “peace dividend.”
For
its part, the LTTE began singing an altogether different tune to that it
had chorused for the previous quarter-century; it was ready to reject
the idea of a separate sovereign state and embrace a federal solution.
Music to many Sinhala ears. And while there have been incidents of
violence during the past 16 months, none of these have brought the two
sides in the least bit close to actual warfare. As ceasefires go, this
ceasefire has been exemplary.
The
Tigers’ sudden withdrawal from the talks last week then though
anticipated by ringside observers of the peace process came as something
of a shock to a complacent nation. It seemed at first that the LTTE’s
grievance was its omission from the aid talks in Washington on April 14.
The government’s argument is that the LTTE continues to be a
proscribed organisation in the United States and there is no way the
Bush administration could, short of lifting the proscription, recognise
the organisation officially in its capital city. As far as the Americans
are concerned, the Tigers are yet to prove their bona fides: they
are just another terrorist organisation, much the same as al Qaida. The
LTTE’s response to this argument is that the talks could have been
held in a country in which their organisation is not banned.
But
the Tigers’ real grievance has little to do with pique: to the
impartial observer, the LTTE has every right to be bitter and frustrated
by the UNF government’s inability to deliver on its promises. Almost
half of Anton Balasingham’s four-page letter to Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe takes careful aim and hits that nail on the head: the UNF
government’s programme of national reconstruction (Regaining Sri
Lanka) has completely diluted the acute problems of the north-east in
the chronic backwardness of the south.
Balasingham
rightly points out that the poverty of the south should not be equated
to the poverty of the north-east. The north-east has been a war zone for
two decades. Business, industry, construction, roads, schools,
hospitals, houses, hotels — you name it, it no longer exists. By any
yardstick, the north-east is a disaster area. It is in urgent need of a
massive infusion of aid, and it is in urgent need of demilitarisation.
The
poverty of the south is quite different. The south has been afflicted by
neglect by successive corrupt and uncaring governments, whether UNP or
SLFP-led. Balasingham makes this painful and embarrassing point leaving
no holds barred, and it is a point we have repeatedly made ever since
this government took office.
The
suspension of the talks is largely the responsibility of the Prime
Minister. As well intentioned as he undoubtedly is, good intentions are
insufficient for effective governance of a country — certainly not Sri
Lanka. His laissez faire and lackadaisical attitude to political
discipline is having tragic consequences. The rehabilitation and
restoration of the north-east cannot be entrusted to the likes of
Jayalath Jayawardena, whose honesty has been publicly questioned, with a
wealth of shady deals being exposed. It requires visionary zeal,
dedication and integrity. What the north-east needs is a special
commissioner who is at the same time close to the Prime Minister,
efficient and completely above board: the names of Bradman Weerakoon,
Malik Samarawickrama and Charitha Ratwatte spring to mind.
The
government also needs urgently to address the issue of Tamil homes still
occupied by the army, displacing thousands of people: 16 months have
passed, and the UNF has done little indeed. Wickremesinghe also needs to
start seriously addressing the political opposition and behaving as if
he has an actual mandate from the people. He needs to read the riot act
to the armed forces commanders and get them to play ball. He needs to
tell President Kumaratunga just where she gets off. Unless he stands up
for his principles — and is seen to do so — it will continue to
appear as if he is simply trying to slip one by the people and the
opposition.
With
the barriers coming down, tourists flooding in and the economy taking
off, the south has begun to feel the “peace dividend.” What of the
north-east? What peace dividend for them? No investors, no industry and
no infrastructure. The frustration the Tigers feel at being unable to
deliver something, anything to the people is palpable in Balasingham’s
letter. Government’s argument is that unless it panders to the south
by diverting most of the aid there, it will not be able to carry the
south into supporting a deal with the north-east. The problem is that by
doing so at the expense of the north, the government risks alienating
not just the LTTE but also the Tamil people.
As the months of
peace wear on, the Tigers’ ability to fight diminishes steadily. The
regular routs to which they used to put the Sri Lankan army, looting
tonnes of arms and ammunition, are a thing of the past. Improved
international surveillance of the seas around Sri Lanka and the
international safety net Wickremesinghe has put in place has made their
arms smuggling operations and return to war more difficult than ever.
And all the while, the Sri Lankan armed forces continue to modernise and
train. So long as the war was on, governments argued that development
money was needed for defence. Now that the peace is here, the defence
budget has hardly been cut. Wickremesinghe has succeeded in depriving
the Tigers of their principal weapon while at the same time giving
little indeed to the people of the north-east, thereby frustrating and
alienating the very people he wants so much to bring back to normalcy.
As
much as the Sinhalese like to ignore that reality, the fact is that the
LTTE does have widespread grassroots support among the Tamil people of
the north-east, especially the Tamil Diaspora in Europe and North
America. It promised them Eelam, and now it is settling for an obscure
and nebulous deal involving federalism. Sixteen months into the process,
what has been there for the people of the north-east but an absence of
war? Is that all Wickremesinghe has to offer? In that case, it is simply
not enough.
The
LTTE’s disappointment at Wickremesinghe’s inability to control his
corrupt and inefficient ministers, engage in plain talk with the
President and stand up publicly for his convictions, is entirely
understandable. After all, many in Wickremesinghe’s own party share
that frustration. This is a problem that only Wickremesinghe can solve,
rising above the ring of bureaucracy with which he has encircled
himself, and his obsession with policy and principle rather than action.
The
people of Sri Lanka are faced with Hobson’s choice: a warmongering
President on the one hand, and a peacenik Prime Minister who cannot find
a way to deliver development. As Balasingham’s missive hit the news
stands last week, one could almost hear the palms of arms dealers
rubbing against each other in glee. But the LTTE has made it clear that
they are committed to a negotiated political solution, and to the peace
process. There is no talk of war: only pain and frustration at
Wickremesinghe’s slowness to deliver meaningful benefits to the north
and east.
By
suspending the talks, the LTTE has sent a clear message to the Prime
Minister; indeed, the same message that many who voted for him in
December 2001 would like to send him now — ‘buck up, or you will be
forced to pack up.’
And
the tragedy of it all is that Wickremesinghe is the only real hope Sri
Lanka has at present to deliver peace and prosperity.
|