Inside Politics

Political turmoil and a peace process going nowhere

President Chandrika Kumaratunga Premier Mahinda Rajapakse Special Envoy Erik Solheim LTTE Political Wing Leader S.P. Tamilselvan JVP Leader Somawansa Amarasinghe

By Suranimala 

With the peace talks not expected to start any time soon due to serious differences of opinion within the UPFA as well as with the LTTE,  the government was heading for a major political and economic crisis, the full impact of which will be brought home to bear after the provincial council elections early July.

After nearly two months in government, the policy differences of alliance partners as well as the clash of personalities are such that President Chandrika Kumaratunga has been unable to, leave alone govern, even get the wheels of administration moving with each constituent partner in the alliance pulling in different directions.

The fact that the alliance was hurriedly put together for the purpose of a snap election with no clear thought given to a policy framework was also evident when Treasury Secretary P. B. Jayasundera last week told the funding agencies as well as the donor community to give the government time till late June to submit its economic policy framework.

The prospects of getting donor aid under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) was also to be put on hold with the new government shelving plans for the proposed June restructuring of the People's Bank.

Economic reality

And with prices showing a marked increase in essential items while the government was trying to hold the dam from bursting by controlling fuel, flour and electricity prices due to the upcoming elections, it is a matter of time before the consequences of such actions catch up with the government.

But with provincial council elections due early July, a government that was elected to office on a platform of subsidies, welfare measures, and handouts is just not in a position to face the economic realities of its rhetoric before the elections and is forced to meander along at least until July.

It is after the provincial polls that the government is expected to go in for the price increases, a task it will be hard put to implement given the JVP's insistence on holding down the prices in keeping with the UPFA's election pledges.

The JVP's plan of action is to optimise its numbers at the provincial polls and run a parallel administration by not only insisting on keeping down the prices and doling out the subsidies, but also opposing any move to resume negotiations with the LTTE on the basis of the interim administration proposals, which if Kumaratunga fails to comply with will see the Marxists threatening to pull out.

The Marxists have in addition to opposing any move to recommence negotiations on the interim administration proposals, have also categorically stated the Norwegians as facilitators cannot sit at the negotiating table. Further, the JVP has decided no Norwegian should be part of the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission.

The JVP strategy in government as an opposition is to continue with populist slogans and maximise their electoral base with future elections in mind where it hopes to emerge as the second largest party, and in order to do so it has decided to force the SLFP to abide by the Rata Perata manifesto failing which they will sit in opposition after a while.

And with the President unable to dissolve parliament till April next year, such a situation will compel her to call on the UNF to form a minority government or woo Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe for a national government both of which at the moment are unfeasible. The UNP leader himself eyeing the Presidency next year knows only too well any alliance with Kumaratunga at this stage will be his political death knell.

That could leave Kumaratunga with no option but dance to the JVP tune and take the country down the path of disaster lest her dream of mustering 113 MPs to form a constituent assembly and keep open a lifeline for political office evaporates. That afterall was the whole purpose of the April 2004 election and she was not about to let that dream die on her, anarchy or no anarchy.

Under strain

And if Kumaratunga is to play by the JVP agenda, then the US$ 4.5 billion pledged in Tokyo which is linked to progress in the peace process is also doomed making it impossible for the new government to take any meaningful steps towards development, reconstruction and rehabilitation.

It would also necessarily follow that the failure to get the peace process started and channelling funds for the reconstruction of the north-east would over a short period of time put the ceasefire agreement under serious strain, which would in turn force the government to increase defence expenditure in anticipation of an outbreak of war.

Preparing a budget in such an environment where welfare measures, subsidies, increasing defence expenditure and lack of donor funding for development activity is the order of the day is going to be a nightmare and one that a minority government will just not be in a position to carry through especially in the backdrop of serious policy clashes between Finance Minister Sarath Amunugama and Treasury Secretary P. B. Jayasundera, not to mention the JVP.

It thus seems that the President and the UPFA have dug themselves a hole and are just unable to find a way out with the hole getting deeper by the day.

Somersault

Unfortunately for Kumaratunga there is not even a semblance of a feel good factor which normally follows the election of a new government with the UPFA bogged down by scandal, uncertainty and confusion from the very inception, largely due to the sharp policy differences within. And last week's developments only helped underscore this unfolding tragedy for the country.

Initially, the President held out the hope at least the peace talks would resume mid 2004 which would have seen the monies pledged in Tokyo at least trickling in and agreed to go along with the LTTE proposals to get the show on the road.

Not only did the President do a somersault on the UPFA manifesto by agreeing to recognise the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamils, but also gave her assent to resume negotiations on the basis of the LTTE's interim administration proposals, as well as do so in an European capital, with Norwegian facilitation to boot. She also agreed to honour the much maligned ceasefire agreement to the letter.

This turn around saw LTTE's Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham a fortnight back stating dates for the talks would be announced by the Norwegians "in a day or two," but with two weeks passing by there is no likelihood of dates being announced any time soon.

On the contrary, the differences of opinion between the President and the LTTE are widening by the day with little prospect of the peace process getting off the ground despite the Norwegian anxiety to put some show on the road.

It is pertinent to note here that the LTTE while welcoming Kumaratunga's invitation to resume talks told the Norwegians as well as the host of other foreign visitors that called on Kilinochchi they will judge the President not by her words, but actions given the bitter past experiences of negotiations with her.

The LTTE had in particular drawn the attention of the Norwegians and other foreign dignitaries to the conflicting positions taken by the JVP and Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar and stressed the importance of the government having a consistent position.

JVP pressure

And true to form, Kumaratunga has once again started wavering under pressure by the JVP and is now insisting the core issues form part of the agenda for talks, having earlier agreed to put it in the backburner upon rejection by the LTTE.

In fact, the Norwegian special envoy Erik Solheim and Ambassador Hans Brattskar who met LTTE's Political Wing Leader S. P. Tamilselvan on Wednesday, May 26 had reportedly indicated Kumaratunga's position on the core issues forming part of the overall agenda which the LTTE had rejected.

According to the LTTE, Solheim had informed Tamilselvan the President's view that, "The discussions on ISGA proposals should take place parallel to the discussions on core issues," which Tamilselvan had said was unacceptable to the Tigers.

The response of Tamilselvan according to the LTTE was, "constitutionalising the ISGA should take place first so that we can demonstrate to the people that their urgent humanitarian needs would be effectively met by the ISGA and will help to build confidence among the people who are the real stakeholders in the peace process."

CBK's bona fides

He is also reported to have told the Norwegians, "the Tamils" thinking is loud and clear in that the overwhelming mandate on the implementation of the ISGA proposals is a verdict that cannot be ignored."

Given this impasse, the Norwegians who are keen to have some statement issued reflecting at least the areas of agreement had informed Tamilselvan they "will proceed to prepare a statement reflecting rest of the procedures connected with the recommencement of the peace talks."

Solheim whose Tuesday appointment with the President was rescheduled for Thursday had further said he would convey to Kumaratunga, the LTTE position on her proposal for parallel talks on core issues and revert in due course.

Interestingly, the very day, Tamilselvan was articulating the LTTE position to the Norwegians in Kilinochchi, civil groups in Jaffna who met with Director General, Northern Rehabilitation, Reconstruction and Reconciliation, Harim Pieris handed over a memorandum outlining their position for restoration of normalcy.

This memorandum reflecting the LTTE thinking as well specifically called on the government to remove the High Security Zones in Jaffna which prevent thousands of internally displaced families currently in refugee camps from resettling in their houses and lands.

It was also once again a clear indication what the LTTE would demand of the government at the outset as a show of Kumaratunga's bona fides on her stated commitment to the ceasefire agreement, which the President will be hard put to comply given the fact the talks itself are to only focus on the ISGA and the JVP's objections thereto.

And this dilemma of the President was brought to bear on Solheim when he met with her Thursday evening where the Norwegians were told the government would not be in a position to agree to an agenda which only had the ISGA proposal up for discussion.

With the LTTE also calling for the implementation of the ceasefire agreement where the internally displaced persons should be allowed to return to their homes and lands, Kumaratunga decided to play for time by asking the Norwegians to work out a compromise with the LTTE, outlining the difficulties faced by her.

It was after the meeting with the President that Solheim met Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe and former government chief negotiator G. L. Peiris at the residence of Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar for a briefing over dinner.

The mood of the Norwegians on this occasion was not too upbeat and indicated the likelihood of talks starting at some point, but not in the near future.

That the JVP had insisted the Norwegians as facilitator will not be allowed to sit at the negotiating table also surfaced during the course of this dinner, but the Norwegians were of the view such a position was not only untenable, but would not find approval from the President.

Thus for, now with the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speaker concluded and no urgent legislation up for debate, the urgency earlier felt to neutralise the TNA in parliament was no longer a factor for Kumaratunga, the provincial polls being more of consequence.

Given these factors and the tough line taken by the JVP, the President was quite happy to have the Norwegians shuttling between her and the LTTE and keeping the semblance of a peace process going, at least until the provincial polls are over without having to take any hard decisions which would effect the UPFA's electoral fortunes. Hence the decision to ask the Norwegians to revert to the LTTE for a compromise on the agenda.

And the JVP made its own contribution to this situation by timing its statement on the Norwegians' role as facilitator.

Indian factor

In fact, just the previous week, the JVP egged on by the Indian High Commission top notchers made its intentions clear on this score, informing the government in no uncertain terms it will oppose any move to resume negotiations with the LTTE based on the ISGA. It is significant to note here that Indian High Commissioner Nirupam Sen was a key player in the Indian High Commission in Colombo in the late 1990s, which facilitated the hurried illegal exit of JVP Leader Somawansa Amarasinghe from the country before the long arm of the law got to him.

Thus, with the pressure turned on, Kumaratunga was forced to back pedal on the agenda for the talks, with the JVP going so far as to lobby constituent members of the alliance against the process.

It was the previous Friday, May 21, a JVP delegation headed by Somawansa Amarasinghe met with Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapakse as well to lobby support for their cause, hoping to use him as a foil against the President.

The Prime Minister for his part told the JVP delegation led by Amarasinghe, the SLFP central committee had taken a policy decision on the ISGA and issued a statement and that there was no change in the party stance.

Having said so, Rajapakse pointed out, any change in the stance would have to be endorsed by the central committee and that no such decision had yet been taken.

Still in the dark

Prime Minister had further said, the peace process was in any event handled directly by the President and it was best for the JVP to discuss the issue with her.

Undeterred by this rebuff, the JVP team inquired from Rajapakse whether they could as a party have a weekly dialogue with him to sort out differences of opinion which arise within the alliance, but once again, possibly sensing it a manoeuvre to drive a wedge between the President and himself, the Prime Minister said he had no objections provided it had the blessings of the President.

But Rajapakse though distancing himself from the peace process also kept his lines open and asked for Indian support when he called to wish the new Indian Premier Manmohan Singh.

Having congratulated the Indian Premier on his appointment, Rajapakse said he hoped India will continue to support Sri Lanka's peace efforts.

Singh responding in the positive said he would be meeting with his foreign policy advisers shortly to discuss the issue and that Sri Lanka can be assured of continued support from India.

Be that as it may, on June 1, the co-chairs, USA, EU, Japan, Norway will meet in Brussels to discuss the progress of the peace process and the workings of the new government which upto now has not earned many brownie points.

The co-chairs are expected at this meet to issue a statement calling for a clear cut economic policy from the government and progress in the peace process for the disbursement of funds.

The co-chairs' ambassadors in Colombo were in fact given a briefing by the Norwegians on Friday followed by a meeting of a larger group of donors including the IMF, World Bank, ADB and UNHCR where stock taking was also done on the progress made so far by the new government.

For the nonce, the report card is not anything to write home about and given the political quagmire Kumaratunga finds herself in, there is little chance of seeing that light at the end of the tunnel.