LEADERSHIP – a la Sri Lanka

Ranil Wickremesinghe

Mahinda Rajapaksa

  • UNP’S Leadership Conundrum

By Faraz Shauketaly

Ranil Wickremesinghe

As much as the leadership qualities of Nick Clegg – the leader of the British Liberal Democrats – has come into its own and become almost a case study for students of political leadership, so indeed has the leadership skills of Sri Lanka’s own politicians.
Sri Lanka’s vibrant democracy 62 years in the making and indeed one of South Asia’s oldest democracies, has over the past four years caused international concern especially in the West who were clearly piqued at the flat refusal of President Rajapaksa to pander to Western ideas in solving the terrorist problem in the north of the island. For a rather liberal, left-leaning politician who supported the various human rights causes with greater enthusiasm than actual success, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s refusal to have nothing other than a home grown solution to a home grown terror problem raised many an eyelid both at home and internationally.

At home, Mahinda Rajapaksa had to initially overcome the battle of all battles with the lame duck incumbent President and Leader of the SLFP at the time, President Kumaratunga. Kumaratunga’s distaste to nominate Rajapaksa as the presidential candidate from the SLFP was such that she actually preferred that Wickremesinghe from the UNP win the poll. After an almighty battle in which Rajapaksa had to call in every favour and gave as many promises, he secured the nomination but not before the President had attempted to nominate her brother – Mahinda’s confidant – Anura to the position. The candidate then staved off an extremely close campaign which saw Ranil Wickremesinghe come to within a cat’s whisker of securing the elusive top job.

Mahinda Rajapaksa

Installed with the slimmest of majorities possible as Sri Lanka’s President, Mahinda Rajapaksa immediately set off by playing the numbers game. An essential tool in the Presidential war chest in Sri Lanka, Rajapaksa started wooing MPs from all sides. Not only did he realise the benefits of cultivating the MPs within his own alliance but recognised the critical benefits of encouraging opposition MPs to cross the political divide and sit with his team. He presented the opposition MPs with a  “chance” as he put it, to join hands with him and secure peace and development for the country.

Try as he may to have encouraged the Leader of the UNP he failed though he admirably and remarkably, secured the support of the deputy leader of the UNP Karu Jayasuriya. In a moment of madness perhaps Jayasuriya joined hands with the President in the mistaken belief that he can make a difference. He may well have been able to had he been dealing with Wickremesinghe as a UNP president not an SLFP one who was focusing only on the numbers and who had no intention of relinquishing his position as captain of Sri Lanka’s destiny.

The Presidential manoeuvring saw the installation of possibly the world’s largest cabinet of ministers. However, the makeup of the parliament gave the President very little choices. He entered into the most unlikely of alliances but somehow managed to keep his band of men happy. Almost every one of his MPs had a ministerial role with the attendant fringe benefits like security and vehicles and perhaps most important of all in a country that has a penchant for “position” – kudos.

Comfortable in the knowledge that he had a working majority in parliament, the genuine support of his ministers – occasionally ticking them off in language that very few could not take, save perhaps Karu Jayasuriya – the President sought to deliver what he had been elected on in the first place: peace.

The UNP and nearly half of the country considered that ticket nothing but a joke. The unachievable dream of a southerner who really had won, they claimed, by doing a deal with the devil himself Prabhakaran of LTTE fame.

The long and tall and short of it all was that the President’s insistence and focus had paid off handsomely and as the President of the country took full credit for the ensuing war victory. His attempts to shower praise on the Army Commander backfired rather famously but otherwise his popularity travelled to new heights.

The President now having got even more popular than he was, found his role had been reversed. From being in a position where he needed the MPs to keep him in power, he saw that the nexus of power had changed and that the MPs now needed him to secure their own places. Starting of with the provincial elections, the President moved time and again relentlessly selling the war victory and ensured that each province was controlled by his party – all of course legitimately elected by the people who appeared ever grateful.

Taking a blip in popularity now and then of course, but overall the Presidential support had widened and his hold on popularity far eclipsed those in the opposition.
Calling for general elections and the results confirmed what everyone already knew.

That in spite of “everything” – take that to read General Fonseka and Ranil Wickremesinghe together with Mangala Samaraweera – the single most popular personality politically of course was none other than the President. The President had finally proved his point. That either you are popular yourself with the majority of the electorate or you surround yourself with MPs who enjoy the support of the people.

The presidential election showed a healthy majority for the President which in spite of allegations of rigging still stands. Even the opposition admits that there is little real evidence to prove rigging and that the court action initiated is rather academic at best.

The results at the general election is far more impressive as there are no allegations and it is accepted that the Presidential team won and won well. It is interesting to note that amongst the highest personal choices obtained in the entire elections belonged to the same family: Shasheendra Rajapaksa in the Uva Provincials, Basil Rajapaksa in the Gampaha District and Namal Rajapaksa in the general elections.

Supporters of the Rajapaksa Firm will no doubt also add to this the President’s own majority at the presidential election. Is it then fair to say that the President’s strategy, of gaining for himself the popularity has now given him the strength to minimise the Cabinet, to control his parliamentary colleagues better in order that he fight the next battle on the horizon – the economic battle.

The challenge for the Rajapaksas now is to win the war on the economic front. The President has displayed a take charge attitude with his cabinet and his new found strength comes with the knowledge that the parliamentarians themselves are more than aware that it was the “Sir” who made it all happen for them. “Sir” is appreciated not just by his own parliamentarians but by – whom else but – the Leader of the Opposition no less.

Soon after the election results were announced Ranil Wickremesinghe was invited over to meet the President. The President suggested that Chamal Rajapaksa be appointed Speaker. Wickremesinghe, the leader of the UNF accepted readily. This almost insignificant act is in reality rather more significant. Wickremesinghe did so without conferring with his working committee, without conferring with his parliamentary colleagues, without conferring with other opposition parties. He acted as though his position as Leader of the UNP was his personal fiefdom. Most strangely, no sooner than he had agreed to the eldest Rajapaksa being appointed Speaker – there was not much to quibble about in any event as Chamal is well liked by all sides of the House – Wickremesinghe found that he was accepted as Leader of the Opposition by the government.

The role of Leader of the Opposition is not one enshrined in the Constitution of Sri Lanka – it is a position that has evolved through tradition. It would also have been tradition for RW to at least confer with his working committee and parliamentary colleagues if not the opposition parties. The question doing the political rounds is this: were both President Rajapaksa and Wickremesinghe uncomfortable with engaging the only occasion when members of parliament are able to vote with their conscience and by secret ballot? Was RW embarrassed that if he were to nominate a challenger to Chamal, that even members of his own UNF would have voted – secretly – for Chamal, thereby embarrassing and exposing the unpopularity and ineffectiveness of the UNP Leader?

What is clear and relevant to democracy in Sri Lanka is that the man from nowhere, who was thwarted initially by his own party leadership,  got elected and then through playing the system in Sri Lanka – that has been available to every Executive President – has completely routed the leadership of the United National Party and annihilated the aspirations of the JVP and completely destroyed the LTTE at the same time creating for himself a position as the most electable politician in the country.

The lack of vision, courage and yes, integrity, of the Leader of the Opposition, who has stifled leadership and frustrated popular parliamentarians within his party – who given half the chance could have made a substantial difference to democratic governance in the country – has meant that Sri Lanka now faces the real and worrying prospect of constitutional changes being made while having the most lethargic, ineffective and irresponsible opposition in the history of the country.

1 Comment for “LEADERSHIP – a la Sri Lanka”

  1. Reality

    One can never compare a Macho with a Poof.

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