Indian ‘Adoption’ Of Rajapaksa Hegemony

It is, at least it should be, impossible for India and Ceylon to quarrel” is a 1939 quote from Mahatma Gandhi that adorns the official website of the Indian High Commission in Colombo. Nevertheless, 23 years and 8 months ago in January 1987, the Delhi administration trespassed on Sri Lankan air space to air drop what they termed “humanitarian aid” to people in Jaffna. A load of dry food parcels dropped over Jaffna, reflected Delhi’s arrogant protest against the Jayewardene government’s military push in the peninsula.
President Jayewardene called it the 17th Indian invasion of Lanka, counting all Chola and Pandyan invasions in history. For Delhi then, it was possible to quarrel with Sri Lanka ignoring the issue of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty as an independent nation State, to appease Tamil Nadu politics and claim its right to authority in the South Asian sub continent. The Prime Minister was another Gandhi, Rajiv, the elder son of Indira Gandhi.
Passage for such Indian intervention was cleared, or rather, Sri Lankan sovereignty was grossly intruded upon for long term pressure in early 1980, with Prime Minister Indira Gandhi deciding to harbour, train, arm and finance the tiny and fragmented Tamil armed groups from Jaffna. This was clearly highlighted in former UN diplomat Jayantha Dhanapala’s submissions at the LL&R Commission, when he said, [quote] “I talk about the way in which terrorist groups are given sanctuary; are harboured; are supplied with arms and training by some countries with regard to ‘their’ neighbours or with regard to other countries. We know that in our case, this has happened….” [unquote].
He wants this raised in the Non-aligned Movement, even this late, as he firmly believes R2P should include, “culpability of those members of the international community who have subscribed to the situation that has caused injury to the civilians of a nation.” Perhaps Dhanapala has a very strong argument in that. But the fact is, such indecent and rash neighbourly diplomacy of the ‘80s have now reached a totally different stage and a style of intervention, which leaves that bitter past as ignored.
The Delhi administration in itself has changed with the political responsibility of establishing itself as the economic giant in the region in the decade to come, while the Sri Lankan regime of Rajapaksa needs regional support to avoid international pressure over human rights violations and war crimes allegations to its own hegemonic agenda in local politics.
For Delhi, with Rajapaksa’s politics reducing local Tamil politics into submissive grumbling, pushing for Tamil aspirations is no important option any more. They well understand, perhaps for the first time that it is economic dominance that could keep Sri Lanka tied to Indian interests and not coercive defence agreements. Post war Sri Lanka has given Delhi all those openings without much effort, although China is often cited as a security reason for Indian interventions and that part is also taken care of with serious discussions on bilateral security issues. Indian Defence Secretary Pradeep Kumar is next to follow Rao.
There were times when Delhi worked on different options and with different leaders, in manipulating Sri Lankan politics. Delhi which refused to be identified with the international forum that supported the Wickremesinghe government’s initiative of negotiating with the LTTE in 2002, was instead seen flirting with the JVP that campaigned against the CFA and political negotiations. Its not always that the Delhi South Bloc and the Colombo Indian diplomats saw eye to eye and saw it right. Yet they all worked on the premise that its safe to have “fall back options” in chaperoning different Sinhala leaders at the same time.
There were thus Wickremesinghe and Dissanayakes in Gamini and S.B at different times of Sri Lankan politics. Rajapaksa too when Prime Minister, during Ms. Rao’s tenure as Indian High Commissioner in Colombo.
Today, Delhi has no multiple choice to pick from, as in the past. But they now have the advantage of dealing with a single Sinhala leader in Rajapaksa, in the absence of armed Tamil nationalism they were also responsible for. Armed Tamil politics was a stubborn and an uncomfortable factor that always demanded a place in Delhi’s political strategy for Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka for over two decades. With the 18th Amendment to the Constitution almost certain, they know quite well, Rajapaksa is there to stay without threatening Tamil pressure. Everyone knows the UNP with Wickremesinghe is just a pony, not worth a run in the Ascot. With the elimination of the LTTE, Rajapaksa has all Tamil political groups and leaders under his patronage as dependent little “plugs” in his authoritative regime. The TNA which opted to remain outside the Rajapaksa authority, is tattered and torn  with little political clout in a wholly dispersed and suppressed Tamil society that’s left under military watch. With such a political clean up in the North and East, Rajapaksa has removed the type of fiery Tamil nationalism that kept Tamil Nadu politics engaged with Sri Lanka. Delhi is now there for mopping up operations that promises houses, resettlement aid, livelihood projects and a promise to monitor that ‘all’s delivered efficiently’.
Far from earlier promises of a political solution to the “Tamil problem”, this makes the Tamil polity sit a little more comfortable with their unhealed wounds, under the canopy of Indian charity. Foreign Secretary Nirupama Rao’s visit this time shows, Delhi has carefully avoided making promises on political issues. Her meeting with the 10 Tamil groups in the Rajapaksa regime, which raised some political issues including the 13th Amendment, went without any serious comment from her. Delhi does not need such political rhetoric any more.