History And Sarath Fonseka

By Ravi Perera

I often think it odd that it should be so dull, for a great deal of it must be invention” – Catherine Morland on History.
If what is reported in some newspapers is correct, it seems that the career of one time presidential hopeful and former army commander Sarath Fonseka would be erased off army records as well as historical records, as represented by the local chronicle the Mahawansa. Of course, we are not certain of the veracity of these newspaper reports. Generally, an institution like the Army may have the discretion to undo records in the name of its good name and cohesion. Its appointed role in a given society demands discipline and the preservation of prestige which may sometimes override the need for accuracy of record.
But when it comes to a historian’s recording of history, particularly of contemporaneous events we are surely justified in expecting fastidious standards of accuracy in addition to scholarship. A true historian must endeavour to be objective. While the historian should explore the cruelties of the terrorists he cannot be blind to the iniquities of the victorious. If this is not forthcoming history can well become fiction. It ceases to be meaningful and the historian becomes a comic entertainer.
In studying history we are accustomed to expect a certain solidity of facts, however much the interpretation of those facts may vary. People and events as historical facts do not cease to exist nor change their complexion to suit the taste of readers of history.  No historian can deny for example, that J. R. Jayewardene was elected Prime Minister of Sri Lanka in 1977. We accept as a matter of record that his government introduced the second Republican Constitution of Sri Lanka. It is a fact that  A. Amithralingam of the TULF was the Leader of the Opposition in that period. These are facts, rock solid, and unchanging.  A political   history of that era which does not refer to these cardinal facts is no history.
Of course, when it comes to interpreting facts of history the field opens up tremendously. For example there could be any number of opinions as to the goodness of the J. R. Jayewardene Constitution. Many learned commentators have opined its undesirability for a young democracy. Some may challenge the justice of A. Amithralingam in the seat of the Leader of the Opposition when the SLFP, also in the opposition, had polled many more votes but had fewer seats in parliament; as a result of the first past the post system of elections we had then. Historical facts cannot be changed as the event had occurred and now cannot be enacted again. But the motives, reasons, effects and other developments thereon and from historical events, can be argued endlessly.
No one can deny that Sarath Fonseka was appointed to the position of Army Commander and that he held that position for a number of years. It was said that he was bestowed with high rank, hitherto rare in this country. At the time of the final defeat of the outlawed terrorist outfit, the LTTE, and its feared leader Prabhakaran, Sarath Fonseka was commanding the army. Subsequently he, perhaps in a fit of megalomania, a condition not uncommon among our leaders, left the army to contest unsuccessfully the Presidency of the country. It is also perhaps a historical fact that he was then arraigned   before a court martial and was dishonourably discharged from the army.
Now these are facts that no serious historian can lightly ignore or change. Integrity of record demands that at least the basic facts of history are left unsullied. But as to the interpretation of these facts there can be wide challenge and discussion. Was Sarath Fonseka a good commander? Did he deserve the high rank he was promoted to?  Or in light of the subsequent unravelling of his standing were those honours bestowed on an unworthy person and if so why? Here the historian can swim wide and deep in the murky waters of contemporary Sri Lankan society  to look for explanations and   interpretations  of the era as well as  the  principal personalities shaping these times and events.
For example, it is fairly obvious that in numbers and fire power the army held an overwhelming edge over the LTTE. In such a situation the LTTE decision to hold territory while indulging in what was essentially a positional battle of attrition seems absurdly short-sighted. It maybe that in years of sporadic hostilities prior to the final battle, it had come to think of itself as a small State and thus blundered into a style of fighting unsuitable to its actual battle front strength. It also maybe that modern technology makes it difficult for armed groups to operate clandestinely in small areas of land without detection – even put together the North and East of this island not amounting to much in size. Even Bin Laden gave up hiding in the  disputed territories  of North West Pakistan which are relatively large and inaccessible, opting for the safety of living incognito,  hiding  instead in plain sight as it were. Therefore maybe the only real choice for the LTTE in 2009 was to stand and fight or be hunted down in small packs. Ultimately they decided to fight it out and were totally destroyed.
But given the spirited battle it put up and the large number of casualties suffered by both parties, the army   had found it hard going. Many of the great battle commanders of the past in actual fact led smaller armies to defeat larger enemy forces. This is often true of legendary leaders from Alexander the Great, Hannibal, Julius Caesar and Napoleon to Rommel during World War 11. They achieved greatness due to their brilliant handling of armies and  innovative tactics adopted, enabling them to rout larger enemy forces by surprise and critical concentration. Today, battle tactics have evolved so much that NATO was able to bring the relatively well equipped Libyan army to its knees purely with air power. They did not have to land a single NATO soldier on Libyan soil. In the context of modern military capabilities why did it become so hard for a land army of our size and what did the individual commanders do that merited such honours and rank? Were such appointments and honours decided on the basis of sound knowledge of military history and objective assessment? Or were all this mere flim-flam our society seems so adapt at?
Whatever it may be, even the humblest of people deserve to have their history, full of sham and deception as it maybe recorded accurately. We can only hope that our historians do not attempt to turn history into a fiction or a shameless panegyric of the powers that be. The temper of this era is such that we have no assurance even on such a matter.