By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

New Year 2002 has dawned with commendable forward movement in the nation's trek towards its peace destination. The best and most optimistic indicator of this was Norway resuming its intermediary role for peace process five again. The first major step in this respect was the visit of a Norwegian delegation to Britain. A meeting was held on January 4, with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Political Adviser and Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham in London where the Tiger ideologue enunciated his movement's stance on peace related issues clearly. The next phase was the visit of the same delegation to Colombo on January 10.

Oslo's facilitatory efforts had come to a halt last year after Erik Solheim was sidelined in a bilateral move taken by Colombo and Oslo consequent to objections raised by the Sri Lankan government against the Norwegian special peace envoy. The LTTE protested against this joint action by two parties in what was essentially a "tripartite" exercise. The situation was further compounded by elections in Norway and the political crisis in Sri Lanka that ultimately led to fresh elections.

India's blessings

The new United National Front Government led by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe announced that Norway's facilitatory role would resume and took steps to that effect. The Norwegian envoy in Colombo Jon Westborg was summoned for two separate meetings by Wickremesinghe and his Foreign Minister Tyronne Fernando in Colombo where the situation was reviewed.

Wickremesinghe however did not want to move forward on this matter before meeting Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari and other Indian leaders and officials. While Wickremesinghe wanted India's assistance and advice for its efforts to resolve the protracted ethnic conflict Tyronne Fernando went one step further and speculated about India being asked to take over Norway's facilitatory role.

Wickremesinghe accompanied by Fernando undertook his Indian trip from December 22 to December 24. Apart from the Indian Premier Wickremesinghe met several others including Home Minister Advani, External Minister Jaswant Singh, Industries Minister Maran, Opposition Leader Sonia Gandhi and AIADMK leader Jayalalitha Jeyaram.

Seek and you shall find

It was made clear to Wickremesinghe in New Delhi that while India was fully supportive of the peace process in Sri Lanka and was prepared to render required assistance it had no desire to be involved directly as a third party intermediary. Wickremesinghe was advised to proceed on the path to peace by continuing to rely on Norwegian facilitation. New Delhi expected to be kept fully informed of all relevant developments.

After returning to Sri Lanka Wickremesinghe with India's "blessings" moved quickly on the matter . He spoke directly on the telephone to his Norwegian counterpart Kjell Magne Bondevik and requested Norway's facilitatory assistance again. Thereafter a formal request in writing was sent to Oslo. Wickremesinghe also held a news conference and announced that Norwegian facilitation was on. He also made it known that his government had no objections to Erik Solheim being involved in the peace process again. According to Wickremesinghe the inclusion of Solheim was something to be decided by the Norwegian government. The stage was set for resumption of the peace process but for one factor - the LTTE.

Using its unofficial links with the Tigers it established some rapport and requested a formal LTTE invitation also. The LTTE required some time to take stock of the situation. Meanwhile Oslo informed eager press-persons that no forward movement was possible without an official LTTE invitation. There was no question of a bilateral peace process concerning Colombo and Oslo alone. If the peace process was to get off the ground again it had to be clearly a trilateral effort and for this a Tiger request was officially required.

That response came on New Year's day when LTTE leader Velupillai Prabakharan wrote to the Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik and called for Norway's continuous engagement as facilitator. "I am writing this letter to you to seek your government's continuous engagement as the facilitator to help find a stable peace and a permanent settlement to the ethnic conflict" the Tiger chief wrote. The LTTE released a press statement on January 2, outlining the contents of its letter after ascertaining that it had been formally received and accepted by Oslo.

Unbanning the LTTE

The next stage was for a Norwegian delegation led by Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgesson to go to Britain and meet LTTE political adviser and chief negotiator Anton Balasingham in London. Another minor hurdle had to be cleared first. The LTTE wanted the British government to clarify its position on talks first. The British government had banned LTTE activity on its soil. Against that backdrop Balasingham wanted an official assurance that his participating openly in discussions as the accredited LTTE representative would not constitute an offence under the new anti -terrorist laws.

This guarantee was provided by the British authorities and also explicitly released to the media through official spokespersons. It was also implied that even high level talks between government and Tiger representatives could be held in Britain if necessary. In effect a country that had banned the LTTE as 'terrorist' was acknowledging the organisation's pivotal role in the peace process and "unbanning" it in a limited sense to help promote peace in Sri Lanka. Thus Western nations adopting an uncompromising attitude against entities supposedly involved in "terrorism" were differentiating. As far as Sri Lanka was concerned peace was not to be achieved through attempts at annihilating the LTTE but by fostering talks with the Tigers aimed at a negotiated settlement.

Apart from Helgesson other members of the delegation were Erik Solheim and a foreign ministry official Kjirste Tromsdal. Both were old hands in Sri Lanka and involved in all aspects of the previous peace effort. The meeting with Balasingham was cordial and constructive. The LTTE stance on peace was outlined clearly at the three hour meeting.

During discussions in London the LTTE explained its position towards unilateral measures undertaken by the new government in Colombo about resolving the conflict. While welcoming the moves in principle the Tigers also made constructive suggestions. It was accepted that several preliminary measures were necessary to pave the way for regular negotiations. These consist of many like overseeing the removal of the economic embargo, setting up an international monitoring committee, transforming the current temporary cease-fire into a permanent one within mutually agreed terms of reference, codes of conduct to be followed by both parties during cease-fire formulating a joint memorandum of understanding, discussions on de-proscription, formulating the framework, agenda and itinerary for direct talks etc.

The LTTE made it known that it was keenly awaiting the government's moves in lifting the restrictions on transporting essential items and food etc into the LTTE controlled areas. The government had announced that greater inflow of goods would start by January 15. The Tigers expected a meaningful process to commence from that date. Thereafter its scope and scale could be enlarged gradually. The LTTE also awaited government moves in removing restrictions on fishing, agriculture and transport in the Tamil areas. A point emphasised was that mere removal of restrictions on paper would not suffice and that proper implementation of the new measures was necessary.

Balasingham stated clearly that the LTTE's original position about de-escalating the conflict, removing burdens on the Tamil people and creating a conducive climate and congenial atmosphere for talks was very much valid. Only it was not pressing any connected issue now because the new government was approaching the matter unilaterally. This was a welcome feature from the Tamil point of view. Nevertheless the LTTE was monitoring developments keenly and would make constructive suggestions when necessary. It was stressed however that the government should expedite matters as far as possible and usher in speedy normalcy to the Tamil areas.

Ushering in normalcy

The Tigers also reiterated that de-proscription was an essential prerequisite for commencing direct talks with the government. It was accepted however that there was much ground to be covered before the question of negotiations regarding core issues arose. The important issue at hand was to usher in normalcy and stabilise a non-conflictual situation. The LTTE was also willing to examine proposals such as setting up an interim administration for the Tamil regions if and when the opportunity arose. It was important now to devise procedures through which the current cessation of hostilities declared by both sides separately could be transformed harmonised into a durable cease-fire.

Preventing the collapse of the cease-fire

The LTTE welcomed Oslo drafting a memorandum of understanding to that effect. It was willing to sign one along with the Colombo government and set in motion a permanent cease-fire. The Tigers submitted a set of suggestions that would help formulate a framework to govern the cease-fire. Given past experiences where cease-fires collapsed the LTTE was extra -careful this time. The purpose was to devise procedures that would prevent immediate collapse of the cease-fire if an unfortunate mishap occurred and streamline procedures that would minimise opportunities for such mishaps to occur.

In that respect the LTTE made concrete proposals like agreeing on segregated areas of control for both sides in a post - cease-fire scenario and the setting up of "neutral" zones separating both sides physically. Clear rules of passage were to be drafted to govern movement of personnel by either side to the other. This was specifically related to recent tensions in the East where Tiger cadres crossing over to government areas were detained by security personnel.

In a related development, rules of conduct for both sides to follow during cease-fire were also mooted. It was suggested that precise rules should be formulated to clearly define what constitutes a 'cease-fire' violation. This entailed a set of 'do's' and 'don'ts' for both sides. This governed movements and duties of both sides as well as making preparations for war.

A monitoring committee to oversee the cease-fire was also necessary. This could comprise international and local representatives. The LTTE stressed that time was of the essence in evolving a cease-fire. Although it was prepared to extend its unilateral cessation of hostilities further it was quite unhealthy to prolong "temporary" and limited hostility cessations. Some unexpected development could occur particularly in the context of an assortment of forces trying to sabotage peace. Therefore speedy action should be taken by Oslo to bring about a cease-fire.

Going against the tide

The LTTE also objected strongly to statements made by the new Defence Minister Tilak Marapone at the Diyatalawa academy passing out parade. His assertion that the new government was prepared to provide the armed forces with "all the necessary assistance by way of weapons and other means to wipe out LTTE terrorism from this land" went completely against the climate of peace. Moreover there were disturbing reports of military preparations like recruitment, arms purchases, military constructions etc..

It was also pointed out that a more elaborate and comprehensive approach towards the negotiating process could be finalised only after Balasingham meets Prabakharan on a one to one basis. For this the Tigers require Balasingham to communicate frequently and freely with the LTTE leadership based in the Wanni particularly its elusive supremo Velupillai Prabakharan to engage in spadework discussions of a confidential nature before regular bilateral talks commence.

Making arrangements

For this Balasingham cannot rely on current communication modes as at present and needs personal face to face meetings with Prabakharan. It is known that communications between the LTTE hierarchy in the northern mainland of the Wanni and its overseas branches abroad are conducted through satellite telephone, facsimile, electronic mail and "special" couriers. It is against this backdrop that the LTTE made two inter-related requests seeking Indian assistance for talks.

Firstly it wants its 64 year old theoretician Balasingham to reside in Chennai for health and security reasons. The LTTE's accredited chief negotiator is not in very good health as he is a diabetic on daily insulin and also recovering from a complicated kidney transplant operation and suffers from coronary and renal conditions. Balasingham and wife Ad‚le Anne left Sri Lanka clandestinely by ship and made their way to London primarily because of his deteriorating health. The Tigers want arrangements made for Anton Balasingham and spouse Ad‚le Anne now based in the British capital of London to relocate temporarily to Chennai in order to commute easily for regular consultations with the LTTE leadership in the Sri Lankan northern mainland of the Wanni before and during negotiations.

It would be a difficult security risk for Balasingham to undertake periodical trips from London to Wanni via Colombo for this purpose. At the same time his fragile health requires intensive medical care that is not readily available in the impoverished and neglected Wanni region. Security reasons prevent him staying elsewhere in the Island also at this juncture. The Athurugiriya arrests illustrate this clearly. Therefore the LTTE wants permission from the Indian government for the Balasingham's to reside temporarily in Chennai.

The LTTE position is that Balasingham could shuttle back and forth from Chennai to the Wanni by helicopter to assist in finalising necessary matters as a prelude to direct talks. It is hoped, said sources, that through this device it would be possible for the Tiger Chief Negotiator to avail himself of sophisticated medical care in Chennai and also communicate directly with Prabakharan whenever required without security risk.

If Colombo, Oslo and New Delhi agree to this arrangement the second aspect of the Tiger request would become operative. This is to request permission and arrangements from the Indian government for talks between the Sri Lankan government and LTTE to be held in India preferably a Southern city like Chennai , Thiruvananthapuram or Bangalore.

Heartened by the positive responses

The rationale for this request is that a high powered LTTE delegation comprising its military commanders as well as political leaders is required to participate in these talks. The Tiger representatives also need to report back to the Tiger high command for further consultations and obtaining additional input during talks. It would be practically difficult and security-wise risky for the LTTE team to move to and from Sri Lanka to a European destination for talks. It may also be necessary to vary the delegational composition at times for specific purposes. Also the abiding presence and advice of Balasingham is required for talks.Under these circumstances the LTTE would like talks to be held in India to enable its representatives to shuttle freely and conveniently and would like arrangements to be made with New Delhi for it.

It is learnt that Balasingham while explaining this position clearly to the Norwegians last week emphasised that his organisation and the Tamil people were "heartened " by the positive response in New Delhi to Lankan Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe's Indian visit last December. India had promised all assistance and support to the Oslo facilitated peace process and so it was very possible that New Delhi would agree to this special arrangement as a cordial and crucial gesture of goodwill Balasingham reportedly stated Wickremesinghe establishing firm rapport with Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, and other Indian leader is also expected to help immensely in getting Indian consent to this proposed arrangement it was pointed out.

Abundance of goodwill

The LTTE also stated that it had no objections to Indian non-participant observers at the direct talks if and when negotiations are held in India. Although the LTTE does not welcome any country that has banned it including India to be a direct third party intermediary on the grounds of being perceived as partial it is amenable to Indian observers if India hosts the talks. The LTTE remains banned in India from 1992 May onwards. While Norway would facilitate India as "hosts" would observe the talks. It is however possible that the LTTE and its supporters in India would continue their efforts to get the Indian ban reviewed.

The Norwegians were expected to convey the LTTE viewpoint to all concerned in Colombo Forward movement on this issue depends on the response initially of Sri Lanka and later India to these requests. The Tigers have also drawn attention to the fact that given the abundance of goodwill among the Sinhala majority community as well as the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka towards India having an Indian city as the venue for talks should be very welcome in the Island. Security concerns, convenience and proximity to homeland are seen as the reasons behind the LTTE's requests. New Delhi's response will be determined by a number of factors keeping the "enlightened self-interests" of India as the paramount consideration.

Even though the media has focussed extensively on the issue of holding talks in India it is not of immediate importance. What is necessary is that before deciding upon the venue a firm foundation for talks should be laid. This requires a permanent cease-fire as quickly as possible. The Norwegians are likely to concentrate on a MOU regarding a cease-fire as their top priority

By J. S. Tissainyagam

Thursday saw a demonstration by students and staff, both academic and non-academic, of the Eastern University, Batticaloa. They put forward three demands. These focused on issues such as establishing a ceasefire, lifting restrictions on fishing in the north-east and revoking the ban on transporting agricultural equipment to the LTTE-controlled areas.

These are routine demands. But with them was another issue that was put forward not as a demand addressed to the government, but as part of a strategy of advocacy. The demonstrators demanded that the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) -- the umbrella organisation comprising the TULF, TELO, ACTC and EPRLF (Suresh Group) -- be registered as an organisation.

This come in the wake of an election where, for the first time since 1977, political parties were under pressure from the public to present a unified voice in parliament on issues that were of pressing importance to Tamils. The public was giving expression to sentiments that had begun to surface after the October 2000 election and the unilateral ceasefire declared by the LTTE but not reciprocated by the government.

Public demand in late 2000 led to the formation of a loose coalition called the 10-party alliance. The unqualified success of the Ponguthamil Elurchchi and other instances of public agitation such as the demonstration in Jaffna against the EPDP, alleging its responsibility for the murder of journalist M. Nimalarajan, have the same roots.

It was the public once again, this time through various pressure groups and organisations, that agitated for the formation of the TNA as an inclusive umbrella organisation. The relative success of the TNA at the elections demonstrates only too well on its popularity despite both the then PA government and the EPDP sparing no pains to see its (TNA's) defeat.

Today, the public voice that asked for the TNA to be formed is demanding that the it be registered as an organisation. And moves towards this end through the formulation of a constitution and the establishment of temporary organising committees in areas of the north-east are going on apace.

Though but a few weeks since the election was concluded, the sea change in Tamil politics brought about by the TNA is already becoming apparent. The transformation is due to two characteristics that have come to be embodied in the TNA and will be vital to be retained in the interest of Tamil politics.

First, the TNA functions not only as a body that brings together political parties under a single umbrella, but various pressure groups too. As mentioned earlier, it was lobby groups and public organisations that channelled the groundswell of popular agitation leading to the formation of the TNA. Organisations such as the Ceylon Tamil Teachers' Union (CTTU) that has done an immense amount of work regarding the discrimination Tamil teachers face, fishermen's organisations that agitate for fishing rights, mothers' fronts demanding justice for raped and murdered Tamil women, and certain NGOs, are among such groups.

An example of the intimate contact such organisations have with the TNA is the public demonstration scheduled in Batticaloa on Friday focusing on the same demands as those put forward by the students and staff of the Eastern University on Thursday. Though this demonstration, which was to be organised by public bodies in Batticaloa and spearheaded by TNA politicians, was temporarily postponed, its objective is unmistakable.

Similarly, about a fortnight ago, A. Adaikalanathan, MP, (TNA - Wanni District) visited prisons where Tamil political prisoners arrested under the PTA are being detained. He was the first MP to visit the Kalutara prison in three years. Other MPs are expected to follow. This was to find out at first hand the plight of those unfortunate persons, many of whom are totally innocent, or facing charges as flimsy as failing to give information on the LTTE. The pathetic history of these detainees, some of whom have spent up to five years without trial or release, is well known. (See box) Well known, but a matter on which few members of parliament elected from the north-east ever cared to intervene.

Even relatively simple matters such as speaking in parliament on the unconscionable attacks on Tamil political detainees by prison officials and fellow prisoners was never done, till two years ago when the killing of two Tamil prisoners at Kalutara prison allegedly by Sinhala prison officials was officially recorded in the Hansard.

The second characteristic of the TNA concerns the proposed negotiations between the UNF government and the LTTE. Though it is debatable, the LTTE has responded to the government's moves to begin negotiations at a faster pace than it did in 1994 when the PA was in power. In fact, it was the LTTE, despite being a rebel organisation that initiated these moves, which were then reciprocated by the UNF.

This sense of confidence that the LTTE has demonstrated is grounded to a very great extent on the political goals and configuration of the TNA, which was not forthcoming in 1994. In 1994, the EPDP was returned in 10 seats in the Jaffna, which came to power on an avowedly anti-LTTE platform. The TULF, though exploiting the name of the Tigers to come to power, promptly threw itself at the feet of Chandrika Kumaratunga and of course the Government of India.

Today however things are different. For one, the EPDP is still absorbing the defeat it suffered in the hands of the Tamils and its leader whimpers for political sustenance from the government. On the other hand, the 15 seats that the TNA commands were won on a specific agenda that called for negotiations between the government and the LTTE.

The TNA's success demonstrates that the overwhelming public support it enjoys comes from its open advocacy favouring the re-legitimising of the LTTE through lifting of the proscription and agreeing to back the Tigers as the only representatives of the Tamils at the negotiating table. It is something from which the TNA cannot retreat or wriggle out.

The Tigers know that with this mandate from the Tamil people, the TNA, or the more slippery elements within it, cannot try sowing dissension among the Tamils or the Indian and western governments against them (Tigers). In other words, the LTTE's flank that was vulnerable by Tamil parties lobbying against it for narrow and opportunistic gain is closed.

The third characteristic, which might be minor compared to the other two, but has to be acknowledged nevertheless, are the individuals and groups that back the TNA. The backers of this organisation is a stark contrast to the traditional backers of the Tamil parties, nearly all of them wave money bags and by virtue of the fact they 'back' candidates or parties financially, demand various privileges for themselves. This is not to say this move was not totally absent this time around too, but its protagonists had to abandon it due to its unacceptability.

The TNA's importance and the need for its registration in support of which the students of Eastern University demonstrated, is as a conduit to channel popular aspirations to a political level as well as to present a unified voice in parliament that expresses the collective aspirations of the Tamil people. It is vital that such an organisation as the TNA remains stable if the political agenda to the Tamils is to be taken forward.

By D. B. S. Jeyaraj

Positive prospects of a formal and durable ceasefire being declared before the country's 53rd independence day on February 4 have loomed large on the political horizon. The Norwegian peace delegation's meeting with the Tigers in London on January 4 and its visit to Sri Lanka on January 10 have raised hopes in this direction significantly. Even as the facilitator focuses efforts towards this goal, the commendable spirit of co-operation displayed by both sides has strengthened the belief that a permanent ceasefire will very soon be a reality.

The Sri Lankan government headed by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam organisation led by Velupillai Prabhakaran are both likely to sign a formal memorandum of understanding drafted by Norway as a pre-requisite for commencement of direct negotiations aimed at ushering in a viable and durable settlement to the ethnic crisis.Although the draft MOU had not been formulated yet it would incoroporate provisions relating to a permanent ceasefire, a framework governing the ceasefire, codes of adhering conduct for both parties, mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire and an outline regarding the modalities for preliminary negotiations.

The Norwegian delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Helgesson met the LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham in Britain and obtained from him a set of suggestions to be incorporated as part of regulations governing the envisaged ceasefire after due discussions in Colombo. The LTTE was of the view that a durable ceasefire was extremely important and should receive top priority on the path to peace. The Norwegians apparently were delighted to find the same sentiments being articulated in Colombo too.

The Norwegian delegation arrived in Colombo at 7.10 am on January 10. The delegation consisted of Helgesson, Eric Solheim and Kjirste Tromsdal. It was in a sense a triumphant return for Solheim who was shabbily sidelined by the Kumaratunga-Kadirgamar duo last year. This downgrading of Solheim threw the facilitatory efforts of Norway off-gear and jeopardised the peace process. Wickremesinghe however took a refreshingly different approach and emitted positive signals to the question of Solheim functioning as the accredited special peace envoy if Oslo desired it. So Eric rides again.

The Norwegians began their series of meetings in the afternoon of January 10. The first was with the Tamil National Alliance. Thereafter meetings followed on the same and following day with Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, Ministers Karu Jayasuria, G. L. Peiris and Milinda Moragoda on the government side and President Kumaratunga, Opposition Leader Ratnasiri Wickramanayake and National List MP Kadirgamar from the opposition. The Norwegian envoy in Colombo Jon Westborg had also begun meetings to brief other leaders like Rauff Hakeem etc during the week.

The Tamil National Alliance represented by Parliamentarians Sambandan, Anandasangari, Pararajasingham, Vinayagamoorthy, Gajendrakumar, Thangavadivel, Kuganeswaran and Sivanandan emphasised four points in their meeting. These were that restrictions imposed on the Tamil areas should be lifted and normalcy achieved, a ceasefire should come into force, the LTTE be de-proscribed and talks between the government and Tigers commence. The Tamil group impressed upon the Norwegians that these points were part of the mandate they received at the last elections and reflected the feelings of the Tamil people. Urgent emphasis was placed on the ceasefire. The Tamil party was concerned that some unfortunate incident may upset the situation and that a permanent ceasefire was needed to concretise the current hostility cessation situation.

The Norwegians, particularly Solheim and Tromsdal, were pleasantly surprised by the response of Kumaratunga and Kadirgamar. Gone were the hostile undercurrents that characterised their approach towards the peace process in the past. They were full of appreciative praise for Norway and promised full support for the peace process. It was only last year that peace prospects were dashed by the cavalier attitude of the same duo. Now there was a new approach.

The Norwegians found Wickremesinghe focused on the issue with a pragmatic well-planned approach. He and his ministers seemed definite about their goals. Wickremesinghe was fully aware that a ceasefire was the most essential and immediate target. His government had started a parallel process aimed at easing and alleviating the sufferings of Tamil civilians. Simultaneously a ceasefire had to be evolved as the first step towards negotiations. Wickremesinghe declined to delve too much into other aspects and asked Oslo to concentrate on evolving a memorandum of understanding that would bring about a permanent ceasefire. He realised fully well that the current position of both sides adhering to self-imposed cessation of hostilities had to be formalised into a permanent ceasefire.

Contrary to speculation in the media, the issues of Balasingham being allowed entry into Chennai and a South Indian city being the venue for talks etc did not receive much attention during talks with the government. This was simply because the immediate goal was bringing about a ceasefire first. It is only after a ceasefire comes into force that the question of Balasingham meeting Prabhakaran or relocating to Chennai would arise. The request for a South Indian city being a venue for talks is predicated on India acceding to Balasingham coming to Chennai. If that is not granted then the second request will never be made. It is indeed amusing to see sections of the Indian media and political establishment whipping themselves into a frenzy over allegedly "absurd and audacious" requests by the LTTE that have not been made officially yet and may very well be never made.

It is in that context then that the Norwegian delegation's current trip has to be assessed. Its primary goal was to push for a ceasefire. Its role has been made much easy because both parties are co-operating with goodwill and moving on their own towards the same objective. Proposals made by the LTTE on formulating the ceasefire have been communicated to Colombo and responses obtained. These views will be now conveyed to the LTTE by Oslo. It is to be hoped that with quick rounds of shuttle diplomacy, the MOU incoroprating provisions for a permanent ceasefire will see the light of day soon.

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has assigned Economic Reforms Minister and Special Adviser to the PM on Ethnic Affairs Milinda Moragoda the responsibility of co-ordinating and directing all activity relating to the removal of the economic embargo imposed on Tiger controlled regions in the Northern mainland of the Wanni.

Informed sources close to Temple Trees disclosed that Wickremesinghe instructed Moragoda to move to Vavuniya immediately and exercise his responsibilities from the spot in order to ensure the smooth implementation of restriction removals.

The Sunday Leader learns that Wickremesinghe's decision to send Moragoda comes in the wake of reluctance displayed by certain high ranking security officials to remove restrictions in force in a meaningful and constructive manner enabling Tamil civilians to reap the full benefits of the economic embargo being relaxed.

It is expected that Moragoda posessing a progressive outlook towards the resolution of the ethnic problem and also having both ministerial authority as well as the full backing of his premier would be able to provide the political direction necessary to remedy the situation.

The Sunday Leader learns that certain officials had objected to proposed measures like increasing entry-exit points between cleared and uncleared areas thus allowing increased numbers of civilians to travel back and forth.

Objections were also raised to the amounts of essential items a civilian could take personally and also the stocks to be transported in bulk by lorries.

While the rehabilitation ministry under Dr. Jayalath Jayewardene estimated that 120 lorries per week should take in food stocks, security circles had insisted that it should not be more than 60 per week. Given the fact that only one entry-exit point exists presently at Piraamanaalankulam on Vavuniya-Mannar road, the government realises that more points should be set up to allow more people to travel. Also the people should be allowed to take ample quantities personally instead of the 20 kilogram requirement at present, it is felt.

Moreover, unless enough lorries are allowed in the Wanni, Tamil civilians would not receive supplies commensurate to their actual needs.

Thus the entire objective of the government in relaxing the embargo would be thwarted with the civilians not getting the benefits of the embargo being relaxed.

Wickremesinghe is also mindful that despite President Kumaratunga announcing the embargo being removed in 1995, continuing security controls sabotaged that directive leading to an erosion of confidence in her by the LTTE and Tamil people.

Moragoda will function as a trouble-shooter and through adroit interaction with the security authorities implement the government policies in full. The government is committed to relaxing the economic embargo subject to certain conditions by the auspicious Thai Pongal day on January 14.

It is expected that the removal of restrictions will be executed in full force from January 15 onwards and Ministers Moragoda, Jayalath Jayewardene and T. Maheswaran will be in Vavuniya on the 14th to oversee the embargo relaxation. 

By Amantha Perera

One of the biggest task that the new minister of aviation would face is the Air Lanka sales agreement. It was none other than the late Gamini Athukorale who wrote to the Permanent Commission on Bribery and Corruption that the deal should be investigated when he was general secretary of the UNP.

He did so on a directive by party leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, the current Prime Minister.

The UNP when in opposition was hell bent in proving that the Air Lanka privatisation deal reeked with corruption, now the party is morally bound to prove to the nation whether the allegations were mere rhetoric or whether they warranted investigation.

The fact that the PA was not willing carry out a proper evaluation gave vent to further accusations that there was something fishy in the deal.

Athukorale was contemplating how to start on the matter at the time of his sudden demise. Even though the government of Sri Lanka happens to be the majority shareholder of Sri Lankan Airlines, in the decision making board Emirates representatives have the veto power. Such power nullifies the four members representing the government. This is but one vagary in the deal.

UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe as opposition leader wrote to the World Bank and MIGA, stating that a UNP government would investigate into the deal. The new government announced two weeks ago that it was planning to stick to its word, but so far there has been no action on the matter but a deafening silence.

What has happened with Sri Lankan Airlines is that its operations have been totally inter-mingled with that of Emirates and it would be hard for the airline to extricate itself from the dominance of Emirates. The management agreement will run for 10 years commencing from 1998. The business plan drawn up for the 10 years specifically states that Air Lanka, now Sri Lankan Airlines, should benefit from being a partner with Emirates.

So far all the decision making has been left to officials brought in after the privatisation and it would mean that after 10 years the dependence on such officers would be overwhelming.

One of the main problems that was confronted by Athukorale was that Emirates has the capability to totally grind the local airline to a stop. All the operating systems have been intricately connected with the Middle Eastern airline and even aspects like staff training could be disrupted if Emirates decides to drop the contract.

The new aircraft were got through the Emirates umbrella and thereafter leased. Old engines have been sold off under recommendations included in the business plan. The airline has been turned inside out and upside down following the privatisation.

Simply put the once proud national carrier has systematically being cannibalised by its partner.

The business plan envisaged that operating revenue would be slightly above operating cost this year. However given the global market condition in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks it is highly unlikely that the targets would be met. To add to the woes, the attack at the Katunanyake airport to has depressed passenger volumes to and from Sri Lanka. The business plan does not envisage such calamities and since the attacks, the pressure has been on the airline to survive. But even if the airline sinks, the financial loss on Emirates would be minimal compared to the government. The government would be left the job of getting the airline on even keel. As for Emirates they have already recovered their investment and more.

Sri Lankan Airlines was adopting various strategies to minismise the shock effects soon after September 11. In one such move the usual Tokyo flight was diverted to Male and thereafter routed to Japan. How far such cost cut measures have helped has not been clear so far.

The airline itself suffered crippling financial liabilities when it lost four aircraft, in the July attack at the airport. The total damage has been estimated to be in the region of at least US $ 500 million. That is not taking into consideration the loss suffered in market value and customer confidence.

The business plan talks of upgrading the airport and the airline itself to levels attracting high spending travellers, there is no chance on earth that this cane be achieved for the next two years at least.

Despite the overwhelming advantage Emirates enjoys on the board, when it comes to financial stability of the airline, the management has always looked to the government for help. It has began borrowing from local banks with no collateral state. However the business plan says that one of the objectives of the agreement is to ensure there is "minimal government funding, as the principal shareholder." In effect that the government is the largest shareholder, in a sense gives the airline the freedom to negotiate loans on the basis.

When the UNP was in the opposition the situation at Sri Lankan Airlines was one of its top priorities. It in fact demanded a debate on the privatisation deal in parliament. Just a year ago, the fact that Emirates was delaying the payment of US $ 25 million as per the agreement was highlighted by the party.

It was raised in parliament by present minister Ravi Karunanayake and he even went to courts on the issue. The case was ultimately dropped when parliament was informed that the payment had been made. What the incident highlighted was that at least UNP concern over the issue led to the statement in parliament. Now that the party is in power it should really look into the goings-on at the airline.

Recently as last month a luxury Benz was loaded in London for Sri Lankan Airlines Chief Peter Hill. The 280 model is not one that one might be used to seen in Colombo.

However, when contacted by The Sunday Leader Sri Lankan Airlines officials said that when the vehicle was brought down to Sri Lanka, Hill paid the freight charges. They were not specific on whether the charges included taxes as well.

The vehicle is Hill's private vehicle and the company does not have anything to do with it, according to the officials. Even if that is the case there is enough and more allegations against the privatisation that begs for government action.

But there has been a stoic silence on the part of the UNF, other than the solitary burst that they were going to investigate the deal, which was made at a press briefing. Thereafter there has been no communication but silence. Government ministers handling finance have informed that they were not the persons to speak of the matter.

The government can at least take the step to reveal the present financial position of Sri Lankan Airlines, since it and therefore the people of the country are the largest stake holders in the airline.

The deal also involves a third party which happens to be foreign government. The UNF should be careful that it sets the record straight whether the allegations hold water or whether the members were just speaking while in opposition like lose cannons.

The least the government and the new Board of Directors can do is push for renegotiating the agreement and putting some pride back on the local staff who have slaved for the airline only to be dictated to by the new bosses.

By Amantha Perera

A nation's military, especially in a democracy, can endure the hardships of war only if it feels tied to a nation by a sense of common purpose and respect, military author James Fallows wrote in the book National Defense.

Recent events have shown that when it comes to the Sri Lankan Army, the nation, at least part of it does not feel a sense of common purpose or respect where the conduct of the Army is in question.

Take for instance the recent discovery of an arms cach‚ at Millenium City in Athurugiriya. While the Army is adamant that it was a safe house used by the intelligence officers conducting deep penetration operation in LTTE controlled areas, the police which conducted the operation claim that it was in fact an arms cach‚ in the hands of rogue elements in the Army intended to use to harm UNP politicians.

Take for instance the political reverberations that the discovery has had. JVP's Wimal Weeravanasha accused in parliament last week that the discovery was done at the behest of the LTTE and that it has done incalculable damage to Army operations. Weeravansha's argument is that the raid was made possible due to the nexus between the UNP and the LTTE.

UNP's Rajitha Senaratne did not share the same sentiments on the same floor. He argued that the arms and the LTTE type uniforms could have been used to launch a massive attack while the government was engaged in peace negotiations with the LTTE. Such an attack if it happened would have created a public outcry against the government.

The house where the detection was made has now come under scrutiny. Military sources revealed last week that the house was owned by the spouse of the officer arrested along with the cache and that it was rented to the Army.

They questioned the logic of locating a safe house in a public residential area like Millenium City where the security at the gate keeps a log of all vehicles that enter and go out. They argue that if a safe place was to be found for the arms in addition to the numerous army camps, the intelligence headquarters of the Army itself is located in Colombo.

"If you want to use weapons in a covert operation you do not keep them 150 miles from the theatre of operation and in a public place, you keep it in safe house near the theatre, this is insane, keeping the stuff in the city," they said.

If there was even an accidental fire near the vicinity of the cach‚, it would have realised in the thermobarics exploding all over Millenium City, how such a situation would have been handled only those in the Army can explain.

Then comes the issue of what the team of Army personnel and the Tamil man arrested were upto at Athurugiriya. The fact remains that the Army has been conducting deep penetration operation of late with stunning results. Then again such teams and the officer who is credited with leading them remain very close to the operational areas.

They have been using three methods. One using Tamil informants to get information on LTTE higher-ups, two, venturing into LTTE controlled areas on their own, and three, using disgruntled elements of the LTTE. No one is quite clear who has carried out what attack. Military sources revealed that a Tamil operative bribed by the intelligence units carried out the attack on LTTE leader Nizam outside Batticaloa. Nevertheless, other sources were not willing to put a nametag on the assassins.

The team that was arrested, according to the military sources was involved in intelligence operations in Colombo and the environs and that there is evidence that the team was in Colombo well before the cease-fire came into effect. The Army has claimed that the team returned to Colombo soon after the cease-fire. In fact the Tamil who was arrested has been a regular visitor to Army Headquarters.

The weapons that were discovered have also raised huge questions. The thermobaric weapons in the lot will make the temperature within the immediate vicinity of explosion jump to 2000 Celsius within seconds. When the Sri Lankan Army first fired the weapon at an LTTE bunker the officers found LTTE cadres roasted inside the bunker and others rolling on the ground suffocating. The ignition sucks in the oxygen. It is that lethal.

So far as evidence suggests, the Army or whoever it was deploying against the LTTE in Tiger controlled areas have been using landmines and anti-tank weapons for their attacks. It was the modus operandi when both Nizam and Shankar were killed. The weapon that was used was a Claymore mine. The themobaric would have been ideal if the Army was intending to blow up an armored car, in LTTE controlled areas. The thermobaric would blast right through the armor.

So far as available information suggests the LTTE does not use such vehicles to get about. In that case why were the weapons in the possession of the officers arrested. Some military sources say that it was the ideal weapon to take out a bus. Meaning that there is a connection between the allegation that the team was in fact waiting to take out a UNP high ranker travelling in the election propaganda bus used by now Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe.

"When several discoveries were made with Army and PSD men with rocket propelled grenade launchers, the team would have got nervous and hid the weapons at the house. If they took it to the camp then there would have been questions as to what was done with them," they told The Sunday Leader.

The same sources argue that Army Commander Gen. Lionel Balagalle was totally committed to the survival in power of the PA which installed him in the top post undercutting Gen. Janaka Perera at one time. They also bring forth Balagalle's connection with the Army intelligence, which he headed. "During the run up to the general election PA ministers were reading from transcripts of intelligence transmissions at press conferences. The Army reports are classified and they are not used like that," it was said.

The Army Commander has been found wanting when it comes to several incidents. He can not deny that several Army units were in the service of Anuruddha Ratwatte at the time of the elections and there are Army soldiers in custody who have confessed that they were involved in violence in the Kandy District. The Commander has a duty to the people of this country to explain why and how Army units were detailed to such activities and who is responsible for the action. The only fall guys around seem to be soldiers, who do not have the clout of high office.

Nevertheless there seems to be a another interpretation to the discovery. The official line that comes from the Army itself. The story is that the Athurugiriya house was an Army safe house and that it was busted, when elements within the Army intelligence gave information to the police about the arms and their whereabouts.

Sources within the Army told The Sunday Leader that when the discovery was made there were phone calls by such elements to journalists alerting them on the discovery. They further said that all details about the weapons and how they have been released to the unit had been forwarded to police soon after the arrests but so far police has not acted on them.

They charged that the police were directed to the cach‚ by these elements who were just trying to get even on personal jealousies. Nevertheless why the Army which comes under the control of the government cannot explain matters clearly to authorities, and put a full stop to the issue once and for all is baffling, unless the Army is hell bent on adding another military mystery to the long list of such incidents.