He stressed on three main areas. The peace process, the economy and strengthening of democratic institutions.

Wickremesinghe commenced his speech on the devastation caused by the protracted ethnic war. "A total of Rs. 500 billion has been spent on the war during the past 19 years," the premier said. Almost 20% of that had been spent in 2001.

He was right when he said that neither party to the war, the LTTE nor the government forces, had been victorious. Wickremesinghe told the House that September 11 had made a big difference to the war in the country as the LTTE is now under pressure to reach a political settlement.

People's wish

At the same time the government itself had been intimated of international opinion that it too should work for a political solution. "The majority of the people's wish is to work towards a solution through devolution of power," he observed referring to the election.

The UNF government is of the view that if both parties, the LTTE and the government, make a genuine and an honest effort, peace could be achieved. But even if the LTTE does not take the full course to peace, if the bona fides of the government are established, then world opinion would still favour the government, according to the premier.

But the path to peace would be long and arduous. The premier admitted that it would take a long time to alleviate the mental and physical anguish of the people who have lived under the shadow of the war. Nevertheless, in eight weeks an environment of normalcy could be achieved in the north and east.

Wickremesinghe revealed that the government was working towards a permanent cessation of hostilities. But at present, both sides have agreed that they would desist from military action.

On the de-proscription of the LTTE, Wickremesinghe said that it was a fine line between the local ban and bans imposed by other countries and that "deep thought is necessary on the local ban of the LTTE in view of this backdrop."

He rightly highlighted the perilous situation of the economy and said the government was looking at remedying the situation as soon as possible. The government was looking at negotiating tax free garment exports to the US and to Europe and to increase the expenditure on education.

He added that new power projects among which is coal power, seriously being looked at by the new government to free the country from being a 'prisoner of nature.'

Solutions needed

He also outlined government plans to increase tourism earnings and a National Agriculture Policy. Details of the economic policy would be further elaborated during the budget debate set for March 18.

The government is also planning the repeal of criminal defamation laws and the introduction of a right to information act before the year is through.

Constitutional Affairs Minister, Prof. G.L. Peiris, who concluded the debate for the government said that the UNF was pursuing the peace initiative, as it was the wish expressed by the people at the election.

He told the house that the government was looking into lifting the ban on fishing and releasing school buildings occupied by the army.

He further said that there was a lot of dissension among political parties, preventing a viable solution to the war.

The first reaction to Wickremesinghe's statement came from former Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar, who repeating a speech he made in August 1994, said that people had voted at the last election airing their opinion that they wanted a solution to the war.

Kadirgamar's speech was conciliatory in tone. The PA he said agreed with the lifting of the embargo, welcomed the cease-fire and urged the government to negotiate a permanent cessation of hostilities with monitors with provisions that guarantee intervention in case there is arms smuggling.

Kadirgamar said the talks should be held under a definite timeframe, adding the PA was refraining from commenting on substantive issues not dealt in the PM's speech but aired his hope that the government would keep all parties informed of the developments. Kadirgamar informed the house that he was speaking on behalf of the PA and with the full approval of President Chandrika Kumaratunga. The PA he said did not intend to scuttle the peace process for petty political gain. But within hours, the entire tone would change. In fact while Kadirgamar was making the speech, efforts were already in the making to derail the debate.

Justice Minister W. J. M. Lokubandara who followed Kadirgamar said that since the PA had agreed in principle with the policy statement, there was no need for a debate on the statement and what was now required was a review.

But the JVP did not share the same view. The party pulled a stunt of sorts, when it inducted its new Tamil member Ramalingam Chadrashekeran to speak first. The party took to its perennial hobby-horse 'foreign influence,' when Chandraskeran kept on arguing why the government was going ahead with the peace talks at the insistence of international opinion.

"Did you say these things when you went to the polls?" he questioned. Chandraskeran put the JVP as the only party that could usher peace to the country and added that such peace would make sure that there is peace in South India as well.

JVP's Anura Dissanayake argued that the government should not consider the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil people and should not agree to any pre-conditions.

The JVP came under heavy hammering from the TULF for its stance. TULF leader M. Sivasithamparam said that it was the PA's pact with the JVP that put a stop to whatever steps that were taken by Kumaratunga to solve the ethnic issue.

While arguing that the talks should not be delayed unduly, Sivasithamparam raised the issue of Tamil detainees as well. He said that now there were no more Tamil moderates and militants and that both sides had united.

SLMC Leader Rauf Hakeem raised the issue of Muslims in the north and east and read a letter he wrote to LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran urging him to stop his cadres from harassing Muslims. Hakeem later came under fire from the JVP who crticised that cabinet members had already begun to address Prabhakaran as 'Mr. Prabhakaran.'

The whole situation was turned on its head when Nimal Siripala de Silva stood up to talk soon after the lunch recess on Wednesday. By that time President Kumaratunga had arrived in parliament and met with PA members.

The conciliatory tone of the morning was totally gone and the PA had decided to stage a walkout protesting on the continuing harassment of its grassroots members. De Silva went on about the incidents. He in fact spoke for one hour. At the conclusion of his speech the PA members walked out.

The walkout!

The walkout nevertheless was a poorly managed affair. The tone had been set by Kadirgamar and de Silva could not break it. It was difficult for the former foreign minister to convince the press of the reasons behind the walkout the day after. The only thing de Silva managed to do was to send the signal that the PA does not have a cohesive plan when it comes to parliamentary debates.

If the walkout had been staged soon after Kadirgamar's speech it would have given the PA more mileage. It looked as if the coallition was at cross-purposes and rudderless.

Neither, Opposition Leader Ratnasiri Wickremanayake (overseas for medical treatment) nor Chief Opposition Whip Mahinda Rajapakse (in the Middle East) were in the lobby. In their place, Richard Pathirana got up and said that he had been appointed the acting opposition leader by the president. The UNP reacted by arguing that the president does not have any right to do that.

Chief Government Whip Mahinda Samarasinghe requested the speaker not to allow the PA time to be taken by other parties other than when de Silva had used time from the other parties. He had used time from the TULF and the JVP on the basis that the parties could utilise the time the day after.

The state press at the behest of UNP high rankers in parliament gave publicity that the walkout was a sign that the PA was divided, an argument put forward by Samarasinghe. Whether that is the case, or not, what the walkout signified was that the PA is still to master the art of being a powerful opposition.

The day after the walkout there was an announcement that Pathirana was looking after Wickremanayake's duties and Dinesh Gunawardena was looking after the post of Chief Opposition Whip, which in turn gave rise to rumours that Wickremanayake had resigned from the post. It was later denied by the PA.

Time to learn

However, Chairman of committees, Siri Andrahandadi said that Pathirana's appointment had not been conveyed to him.

The policy statement itself did not contain anything new. The speech took place at a time when both the government and the LTTE were playing the publicity game. The LTTE had just released POWs and aired its willingness to do more. Wickremesinghe had to show that the government too was committed while not falling into the same quagmire that Kumaratunga and R. Premadasa found themselves in - that of over commitment. The PA had to play the role of the opposition, not scuttle the process but at the same time making sure that it opened the government flanks for criticism. The PA could have used the debate to outline its proposals and how it felt the UNP sabotaged its efforts when in opposition, that would have gone down well with the voters. No such thing happened. The PA was trying its level best to do that the day after, a bit too late though.

The PA is still learning the ropes of being in opposition. Last time when it took the lesson it took them 17 years to pass the test.

The visit of President Chandrika Kumaratunga over shadowed the debate on the policy statement made by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe. Kumaratunga arrived unannounced, by road, not the usual mode of transport for her when she comes to parliament.

She had met with PA parliamentarian D. M. Dassanayake at her office at the parliament. The discussion had centered on Dassanayake's situation. He is still in remand custody relating to election violence. He had told the president of his plight. The president had told him that she would look into the matter and would take the matter up with the prime minister.

It was soon after the discussion that the walkout was staged. But it is not clear whether the president decided on the boycott when she was told of Dassanayake's plight or whether she had come to parliament convinced of the feasibility of a walkout.

She had presided at a PA parliamentary group meeting the day before where matters relating to the debate were discussed. She had told the meeting that PA efforts to usher in peace were undercut by the UNP and other opposition parties.

At the meeting she had made reference to political violence and how the UNP used it in the past to undermine the SLFP. Nevertheless, why the walkout was staged when it was staged raises questions as to who decides what.

Was Kadirgamar aware of what was coming; then why was he so accommodating, what is the signal that the PA is sending across to the nation and the international community, for that matter to its own party members. Why was more than half of the PA benches empty when the walkout was staged? Question that have made the atmosphere murkier than before.

Speaker unaware of president's visit

Speaker Joseph Michael Perera informed parliament late Wednesday afternoon that he was not aware of President Chandrika Kumaratunga visiting parliament. He made the statement when UNPers Mahinda Samarasinghe and A. H. M. Azwer raised the issue whether the speaker knew of the visit and PSD members coming into parliament.

Perera told the House that he would look into the matter. On Thursday, he informed members that he had called for a full report from the DIG in charge of parliamentary security on the visit. The UNP when in opposition raised privilege issues that PSD members were seen outside the members area. The speaker however said that the president was free to visit parliament whenever she wanted

No time frame on de-proscription

Despite the reference made by Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on the issue of de-proscription of the LTTE, the government has not yet discussed when this would be done.

According to high ranking government members, though the topic has been discussed at the highest levels, so far no one has taken up the subject of when and how.

D. M. Dassanayake's fatherly side

Despite languishing in jail, D. M. Dassanayake makes it a point to attend the sessions of parliament without missing a single sitting. He is transported in a prison vehicle and a prison officer accompanies him wherever he goes in parliament.

Last week, he made the opportunity of the sittings to meet with family members. He was seen in the company of his daughter doting over him. Quite a sight when one considers Dassanayake's violent reputation.

Dessert from Ranga Bandara

The man who created hell for Dassanayake too is carrying the same reputation. Last week, several PA MPs were having a discussion about planning out a trip which would take them through Anamadauwa, Bandara's electorate. One MP said that they could have their meals at fellow member Anura Priyadarshana Yapa's home. "And get the dessert from Ranga Banadara," quipped another.

Problem of cabinet and non-cabinet Ministers

Last week, the JVP had a question to raise at the party leader's meeting. Group Leader Wimal Weeravansha queried on the state of parliamentary sub-committees appointed for various ministries. The question was that such committees can be appointed to ministries coming under cabinet ministers and for the remainder each ministry would need a separate committee. Say all the ministries coming under Thilak Marapona can have one committee while for Karunasena Kodithuwakku's non cabinet ministry, three separate committees need to be set up.

The government told the JVP members that it needed time to look into the issue and thereafter would get back to them.

The JVP also raised concerns about the shortened duration of the budget debate. Last year, the debate was given more than 20 days while this year it has been limited to 17.

Going under Eelam

When journalists visited LTTE controlled areas two weeks ago, they were conducted into a hall to meet LTTE political wing leader Tamilchelvam. While entering the hall, they passed through an arch on top of which was a replica of Sri Lanka.

The difference was that it was two countries. The areas falling under the state of Eelam was clearly marked on the map as a separate country. "Not the best of symbols to convince that they were interested in a negotiated settlement," said a wag who had to pass under.

Eleven bodies and the family jewels

Then there is the story of the wag who telephoned the former PA big man who looked after the media to get his comments on the mass murder that took place in Kandy on election day. While the journalist went on about how state power had been abused, the politico related another story of how UNP thugs had physically assaulted a PA supporter and severed his genitals. The logic was quite lost on the inquisitive media-man who replied, "I am talking about 11 deaths and you are telling me about balls, no."

There was a young lady of Riga,

Who smiled as she rode on a Tiger,

They returned from the ride with the lady inside,

And the smile on the face of the Tiger.

- Ancient Limerick

By S. L. Gunasekara

The LTTE has proved once again that the term 'unconditional talks'' to it, means 'unconditional' as far as the government is concerned and 'conditional' as far as the LTTE is concerned, just as much as 'give and take' to the LTTE means that the government must 'give' and that the LTTE must 'take.' The leader of the political wing of the LTTE Tamilchelvam has now demanded the de-proscription of the LTTE , the recognition of the LTTE as a legitimate organisation and the conferment of equality with the government upon the LTTE as pre-conditions for the commencement of the proposed 'peace talks.' The feeble response of the government to these patently impudent demands has been that de-proscription could be considered once 'talks' begin.

'Proscription' is not like a tap that can be turned 'on' and 'off' according to one's whims and fancies. The reasons for the proscription of the LTTE lie, among other things, in the facts that the LTTE is a terrorist organisation which was founded and exists in order to achieve the manifestly illegal objective of robbing this country of a part of her sovereign territory and establishing a separate state therein, and that it has committed, is committing and will continue to commit the most heinous of crimes known to mankind.

How then can this terrorist organisation be de-proscribed and accorded legitimacy as demanded by the LTTE (and their 'hangers on' like the TULF) merely because they have expressed a conditional willingness to talk with the government ? Talk is cheap. Anybody with a mouth and a functional tongue within it can talk. Any gang of rogues, criminals, cut-throats, thugs, perverts or psychopaths is perfectly capable of talking or entering into 'talks.' The willingness of such gangs to talk, or even the fact of their entering into 'talks' would not render such gangs legitimate. Thus, an expressed willingness (whether genuine or not) to enter into meaningful 'talks' or even genuinely entering into such 'talks' is not, and cannot be, a reason for de-proscription or the conferment of legitimacy upon the LTTE, so long as the reasons for its proscription remain.

The LTTE's objective to rob the country of a part of her sovereign territory and establish a separate state therein remains unchanged and constitutes the basis and/or essential reason for the existence of that criminal organisation. The LTTE has usurped power in and continues to rule illegally about 15 - 20% of the country's territory; it continues to maintain an illegal armed force and to be in the illegal possession of an awesome arsenal of weapons and explosives; it continues to keep thousands of our citizens in illegal captivity; and despite the cease-fire, continues to engage in crimes of murder, theft, robbery, extortion, kidnapping and smuggling and continues to prepare to wage war against the state once the cease-fire is over or abrogated.

There has, thus, been no change whatsoever in the inherently, essentially and the wholly illegal nature of the LTTE. What basis then is there for de-proscription or the conferment of legitimacy?

An organisation which was proscribed because of its illegality can only be de-proscribed if it publicly gives up its illegal objectives and its illegal activities and treads the path of legality. Accordingly, the necessary and unavoidable result of the de-proscription of the LTTE in the absence of the LTTE so giving up its illegal objectives and activities would be an implicit recognition by the government of the sovereign Republic of Sri Lanka that those patently illegal objectives and activities of the LTTE are entirely legal. This in turn would mean that the government recognises the present illegal rule by the LTTE of about 15 - 20% of this country's territory as being legitimate; that the maintenance by the LTTE of an armed force and the possession by the LTTE of its arsenal of modern weapons and explosives is legitimate; that the thousands of citizens now in the illegal captivity of the LTTE are in the lawful custody of the LTTE; that all murders committed by the LTTE including the several murders of unweaned infants were lawful executions; and that the LTTE is not a terrorist organisation but a legitimate organisation with legitimate objectives.

Can any responsible government even dream of conceding any of these demands? Indeed it would not be an exaggeration to state that conceding any of these demands would be an intentional act of treason.

Not content with not 'seeking' but 'demanding' de-proscription and the conferment of legitimacy, the LTTE also has the temerity to demand that they be treated as equals with the government at any negotiations that may follow. The very fact that the LTTE has even ventured to make such a patently ridiculous and insolent demand constitutes eloquent testimony to the utter, total and absolute contempt in which it holds the government.

The government of Sri Lanka (whether we like it or not) is the lawful government of a sovereign state. The LTTE, on the other hand, is indisputably a gang of criminals led by a convicted murderer named Velupillai Prabhakaran. It is only another government of a sovereign state that could be accorded equality with the government of Sri Lanka. Thus, the LTTE could be accorded equality with the government of Sri Lanka if and only if it is recognised as being the government of a sovereign state - i.e. if the government of Sri Lanka recognises those parts of the Wanni and the Eastern province which are now ruled illegally by the LTTE as constituting a separate sovereign state and the LTTE as being the lawful government of that separate state.

The demand for de-proscription, legitimacy and equality is, therefore, not a demand put forward to enable 'talks' to commence. It is self evident that 'talks' could commence and continue without any of the conditions put forward by the LTTE being satisfied. These demands have clearly been put forward with the ulterior objective of causing the government to concede the non-existent right of the LTTE to set up a separate sovereign state in a substantial part of the territory of the sovereign Republic of Sri Lanka even before the 'talks' begin, so that the only matters left to be discussed at the proposed 'talks' will be the boundaries of the Republic of Sri Lanka and of the proposed state of Tamil Eelam, and the relations between those two states!!

The LTTE together with the TULF, PLOTE, EPRLF, TELO and EROS which took part in the Thimpu 'talks' attempted a similar gimmick by putting forward at those 'talks,' four patently nonsensical demands which they termed the 'Thimpu Principles' as non-negotiable demands and pre-conditions for the continuance of those 'talks.' The acceptance of those so called 'Thimpu Principles' would necessarily have amounted to conceding the non-existent right of the Tamils to establish a separate state of Tamil Eelam in the Northern and Eastern provinces. The government delegation to those 'talks' rejected those so-called Thimpu Principles. The Tigers are now seeking to achieve the same end by putting forward similar but more extreme demands as pre-conditions for the proposed 'talks.' Let not the government fall into the trap of the LTTE.

It is evident that despite all the evidence to the contrary, the government, and even the PA believe that peace could result from the proposed 'talks' with the LTTE. The very fact of the making of these impudent demands by the LTTE should, even now, open the eyes of the government and the PA to the self evident fact that 'talks' with the LTTE are doomed to failure even before they begin, and that the only result of such 'talks' would be to prolong the war and bring down more death, more disablement, more suffering, more destruction and more impoverishment among the long suffering citizens of our land.

- The writer is the president of the

Sinhala Jathika Sangamaya

By J. S. Tissainayagam

"I wish to very categorically refute the point Mr. Kadirgamar endeavoured to make out on the floor of this House yesterday that the LTTE played a dubious role during the course of negotiations with Norwegian involvement during the term of the last government. I think it is my duty on behalf of the Tamil people to state on the floor of this House that the role of the government itself at that point of time raised many questions, to which the government could not have given satisfactory answers."

These words were uttered by R. Sampanthan, (TNA, Trincomalee District) and the general secretary of the TULF. It was perhaps the most categorical acknowledgment of the duplicitous role of the PA while in government when dealing with the LTTE through the Norwegian facilitator, and the disgraceful part played the then foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar.

Further, coming as it does from Sampanthan, long considered an uncritical and compromising supporter of the PA and President Chandrika Kumaratunga, it is a statement that has to be taken, at least at the public level, as a former ally being driven to speak the truth.

Sampanthan went on to acknowledge that the alliance he represented in parliament - the TNA - had received an overwhelming mandate from the people based on three issues that had formed the base of its platform. These include that negotiations should take place between the government and the LTTE through a third party, that negotiations should only take place with the LTTE and not with any other Tamil party and that the ban on the LTTE should be lifted for it to participate in talks freely.

While Sampanthan had this to say about the PA, serious developments were taking place among the opposition parties to sabotage the peace process. The Sinhala extremist MEP, a constituent member of the PA, the JVP, which despite its Marxist trappings has displayed a strong ethnic chauvinism and the EPDP that is congenitally anti-LTTE, are expected to launch a campaign against the lifting of the LTTE ban.

This campaign is being supported by the Sinhala Joint Committee, which is an umbrella organisation casting its benign shade on almost 50 Sinhala organisations. It is reported that, even the Sihala Urumaya, an inveterate opponent of the JVP, seemed to be willing to suspend its antagonism in the larger interest of saving the nation. They are supported by sections of the media.

The Island newspapers reported the opposition was not willing to accept the TNA's stance that the LTTE had to be the sole representative of the Tamil people at talks. The implication of this is interesting. It means there is a parallel entity representing the Tamil people with which the government should negotiate. Possibly it is the EPDP, which through fraud and intimidation managed to win two seats from the 31 it contested in the north-east!

On the other hand, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe stated the government's position on the de-proscription when he said it had to be given deep thought. The LTTE's spokesman Anton Balasingham in London and its political wing chief S. P. Thamilchelvam in the Wanni, welcomed the move.

While the lines between the principal Sinhala parties divided thus between government and opposition, the most influential lobby in civil society, the Maha Sangha, seemed uncertain in its responses. The Maha Nayake of the Asgiriya Chapter was first quoted as favouring de-proscription and handing over the north-east to the LTTE as part of an interim administration. But he then retracted from his earlier stance slightly through a clarification.

Finally, the United States ambassador to Sri Lanka added his bit to the confusion. In essence, he seemed to suggest that whoever de-proscribed the LTTE, the US would not. He defined an act of 'terrorism' as something where not only are civilians targeted deliberately, but even those where an operation is undertaken on a military installation where civilians are known to be present.

The ambassador's statement indicates how partisan the US's stance is on the conflict in Sri Lanka. Civilians are present in nearly all military installations of the security forces, either as human shields as in the north-east where camps are deliberately built around schools, hospitals etc., or as clerical hands, doctors or janitors employed in camps elsewhere. Secondly, if the same yardstick is applied by the US on successive Sri Lankan governments fighting the LTTE, the US would have to cease recognising the Sri Lankan state!

While this summarises the different views, an idea seems to have percolated down to the public that lifting the ban on the LTTE is tantamount to resolving the national question. This is totally wrong and to say the least, idiotic. It has come about through the intense feelings being aroused both for and against the de-proscription by the respective lobbies.

The public's perception of lifting the ban on the LTTE is the same as that of lifting the ban on the economic embargo on the north-east. Last week this column dealt with the issue of sending food, medicine and fuel being wrongly construed as granting 'concessions' and 'relief' to the people of the Wanni.

It should be reiterated that for the state to impose a ban on such essentials going to the LTTE-controlled areas was a denial of the sovereignty of the Tamil people living there. The implications of this are obvious: the idea of a separate state has already formed in the minds of these people, though it might not have been declared de jure.

This week however, the story of 'concessions' hovers over the de-proscription of the LTTE. Balasingham put the issue succinctly when he was quoted by TamilNet as saying, "The de-proscription of the LTTE will be a recognition of the legitimacy of the Tamil people's struggle. It is not a concession (by the government) but an acknowledgment of our position as the authentic representatives of the Tamil people."

It is important that the Sri Lanka public is told categorically that the LTTE represents Tamils at the talks. The ambiguity over this matter in the last round of negotiations caused a grave problem. Photographs of the two negotiating parties with their pennants on the table brought about a furore in the south with outraged people questioning how the LTTE, a rebel group, dare arrogate to itself a position of equality with the Sri Lankan state.

This was to translate into other things too such as comparatively low level officials from the government meeting senior ranks of the Tigers. The exercise seemed more a demonstration of status rather than a genuine effort at negotiation.

This time however, the platform on which the TNA was elected, is sufficient proof that whether the south likes it or not, whether the international community is in favour or otherwise, the Tamil people of the north-east have voted for negotiations to be conducted only with the LTTE. Therefore, any talk that the Tigers are not the representatives of the Tamils is not only superfluous but patently false.

What is more, unlike the US, which includes names of rebel groups or strikes them off its list of terrorist organisations depending on whether it perceives them as 'terrorist' or not, the Sri Lanka government is in no position to follow suit.

Regardless of whether the government likes it or not and whether its constituency acknowledges it or otherwise, the government's act of de-proscribing the LTTE is first and foremost a recognition of the aspirations of the Tamil people, which they (Tamils of the north-east) expressed through the ballot. As much as majority of the Sinhala people stated categorically that they were supporting a resolution of the war through negotiations by voting the UNF, the majority of the Tamils in the north-east said they wanted the de-proscription of the LTTE is part of getting the negotiations on course.

What is more, even if negotiations were to break down and war begins, the LTTE will remain the Tamil people's choice of representatives for talks until they state otherwise at an election. Therefore, unlike in the case of the PA, which after bungling negotiations with the LTTE began flirting with the EPDP and the TULF, the same cannot be on be done now. The earlier this is understood and acknowledged the better it would be.

Sri Lanka's Police Force has for the last two decades earned a reputation of being slow on the take. Their zeal to solve any issue remains at rock bottom. This is only too apparent in the case of Lohan and Chanuka Ratwatte. Wanted as suspects in connection with the massacre of ten Muslim youth at Udathalawinna, the cops appear remarkably slow on the uptake. Reluctant to go hard on Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte whose offspring are now fugitives from justice, the cops for some reason will not take the general in or hold him in any way accountable for continuing to hide his sons from the long arm of the law. This is despite a police investigation having found hard evidence to prove that both Lohan and Chanuka Ratwatte were most certainly involved in the brutal slaying of ten youth on December 5, 2001. Now, damning evidence has surfaced implicating General Ratwatte himself with the incident.

Top cops who are afraid of being named whisper that surveillance teams are on the track of both Lohan and Chanuka Ratwatte. The sleuths swear the two boys are in Sri Lanka. Why they still roam free then is a question that is somehow mind-boggling and has eluded the intelligence of Sri Lanka's police.

Special treatment

The cops after all have earned a reputation for arresting and holding hundreds of Tamil parents whose children are suspected of having links with the LTTE. The cops use the Prevention of Terrorism Act under which law they commit such atrocities professing that it is all in the name of the game and their valiant fight to curb terrorism.

To get to the point we are trying to make here - why police sleuths like SSP Sisira Mendis from the Criminal Investigations Department and SP K. Udugampola who are handling this investigation do not hold Anuruddha Ratwatte or interrogate him hard enough until he spills the beans and reveals the whereabouts of his two sons is confusing to put it mildly.

Turning a blind eye

Not only is Anuruddha Ratwatte a free man - enlisted army personnel continue do his bidding. As The Sunday Leader highlighted in its issue of January 13, 2002, two army personnel, Ajantha Wickremasinghe and Corporal Jayaratne on January 11, 2002 carried a cheque signed by Anuruddha Ratwatte for the amount of Rs. 60,000 and collected a three series BMW which belongs to Ratwatte's son, Chanuka from Precision Motors. The army men were carrying out orders by Gen. Ratwatte who in turn was acceding to a request made by his son Chanuka who is in hiding. (See box for details).

All this, while the cops blissfully looked the other way. What on earth are Mendis and Udugampola doing that up-to-date they have not seen fit to question Gen. Ratwatte and demand that he reveal the whereabouts of his sons with whom he is certainly in contact. Surely, the car deal at Precision Motors was a golden opportunity for the police sleuths to follow up on?

Alas! gone are the days of Inspector Morse and Hercule Poirot! Anuruddha Ratwatte though culpable in the massacre of ten Muslim youth at Udathalawinna still enjoys a privileged life-style. Surely, Udugampola can act in similar zest as he did at Athurugiriya when he bulldozed his way into an army safe house and threw heroes of Sri Lanka's Army into a dungeon on the suspicion they were up to no good? Why not do the same with Gen. Ratwatte and refuse the former defence minister a mattress as he is laid bare on a cement flow behind bars?

Irregularities in the army

The police appear clueless and rudderless despite five army personnel having confessed to the murder of ten youth at Udathalawinna on December 5, 2001. Statements by senior army personnel have also asserted that Army Commander Lt. Gen. Balagalle had given them specific orders to report to the private residence of Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte in Kandy a week before the general Election.

More damning statements by some top brass of the Sri Lanka Army to investigative police officers have reiterated that the army commander's order was 'highly irregular' and violated army regulations. The shocking disclosures have been revealed as police continue with their investigation into the horrifying murders of the ten Muslim youth.

Brigadier N. E. Jayasuriya has said that on November 30, 2001 he had been on vacation when the army commander had contacted him and spoken to him. Balagalle's orders were clear. He instructed Brigadier Jayasuriya to find Lt. Wijeyratne and with his platoon of 15 men to report to the Kandy Army Area Commander and thereafter, report to Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte's house. Brigadier Jayasuriya says that accordingly Lt. Wijeyratne with a 28 strong army platoon had reported to army headquarters in Kandy.

Brigadier Jayasuriya in his evidence adds that Lt. Gen. Balagalle had told him, Brigadier Hulangamuwa, Coordinating Secretary to Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte had contacted the army chief and stated that Gen. Ratwatte required a platoon of army personnel headed by Lt. Wijeyratne of the Vijayaba regiment to report to him a week before the general election on December 5, 2001.

Refuting charges

Brigadier Hulangamuwa had added that Ratwatte's instructions must be conveyed to Brigadier Jayasuriya and the Army's Central Commander for Kandy, Brigadier R. B. Tammita.

Brigadier Tammita has denied receiving any instructions to this effect directly from Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte.

Brigadier Hulangamuwa in his statement to the police last week has refuted all charges that have been levelled against him and Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte. Hulangamuwa has denied that he connived with the killer army platoon and attempted to conceal evidence that linked the army personnel to the ten murders. Hulangamuwa has further claimed that both Lohan and Chanuka Ratwatte are also innocent of this crime.

Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle in his statement claims that he released the army platoon in question for election duty in Kandy and had been unaware that they had reported to Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte at his private residence in Kandy.

The well known 'secret'

Amidst all the denials and counter allegations, the fact remains that a 28 member platoon of army officers led by Lt. Wijeyratne had reported to Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte in Kandy.

Statements made before the Teldeniya Magistrate by army personnel have said that both Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte and his son Lohan, had willingly connived with the killer army officers to keep the dastardly crime 'a secret.'

M. K. I. Indika Wijeyratne had been a driver for former Deputy Defence Minister Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte. Wijeyratne has confessed that on December 5, 2001 he drove jeep no. GB 9367 to Polgolla. Inside the jeep with him he says were army officers from the Vijayaba regiment. He has confessed that they followed the van, which carried Muslim youth - and shot at them at random and killed ten Muslim boys at Udathalawinna.

Describing the revolting incident Indika has said that on December 5, 2001, they (together with the army officers) had been patrolling the Polgolla area. They were dressed in civvies. Three army officers attached to the Vijayaba regiment and another by the name of Mahinda were in this vehicle bearing no. 52 -1977. Assault rifles, he says, were hidden on the floor of the vehicle.

At about 10 a.m. on 5.12.2001, they arrived at the Science Faculty of the Polgolla Cooperative School at Uyanwatte. A fracas had broken out and the army personnel in this vehicle had opened fire. One person was killed and another seriously wounded.

Thereafter, Indika says they followed the jeep in which Lt. Wijeyratne was travelling. The jeep suddenly began to chase a van that had allegedly fired at them. At Udathalawinna the van had crashed into a lamp post and come to a stop. The soldiers travelling with Lt. Wijeyratne had opened fire at random killing ten of the youth inside the van.

Immediately after, both vehicles with all the persons involved in the shooting proceeded to Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte's residence and had reported the incident to the former Defence Minister. Gen. Ratwatte who had instructed them to keep it 'a secret.'

Ratwatte then acted. He gave instructions to take the jeep in question to Colombo. The army officers followed his orders and left Kandy the next day on December 6, 2001. The murder weapons were cleaned at Ratwatte's Kandy residence.

Corporal Nimal Dhammika Siriwardena, working as a driver for Lohan Ratwatte, drove vehicle no. 52-1977. His vehicle too carried army officers from the Vijayaba regiment. Siriwardena in his confession has said that he can identify Lt. Wijeyratne as having been involved in the murders but cannot identify the other army officers. Siriwardena has stated that the army officers in the vehicle he drove had broken shops and houses, causing extensive damage to property belonging to civilians who had been identified as supporters of the United National Front. Siriwardena has said that the army officers in his vehicle also looted polling cards, forcefully cast votes and set fire to ballot boxes.

Siriwardena has further confessed that Lohan Ratwatte changed the number plate of the vehicle he had driven and which was on the scene of the murders at Udathalawinna. Lohan, according to Siriwardena, changed the number plates from 52/1977 to 62/3048. Siriwardena has said that he does not know the names of all the army officers who were in his vehicle other than Lt. Wijeyratne but that he is in a position to identify them.

Siriwardena further states that after the incident, he went with Lt. Wijeyratne to General Ratwatte's house whereupon Lt. Wijeyratne spoke to the minister in English. He further states after Lt. Wijeyratne spoke to Ratwatte, the minister said "Waday hondai" and shook hands.

Immediately after that, Siriwardena states in his confession, Lt. Wijeyratne walked up to him and said the minister wanted the issue kept a secret.

Later that night, he adds, another soldier, Karunadasa, told him the minister wanted the damaged windscreen of the vehicle removed and kept at his (minister's) residence which was duly done.

The police subsequently recovered the windscreen from Ratwatte's residence.

Siriwardena is now to be made a witness for the prosecution.

Soldier Indika Wijeyratne bearing No. 5768227 and Corporal Nimal Dhammika Siriwardena bearing No. 575040 were taken into police custody at Lunugamwehera and produced before the Teldeniya magistrate on December 31, 2001.

The chase continues

Neither of the two men have stated officially that Lohan and Chanuka Ratwatte were present at the scene of the crime. Senior cops however told The Sunday Leader that they have sufficient evidence to prove the two Ratwatte boys were physically present at the scene of the massacre.

The police investigation into the ten murders at Udathalawinna have also stated that Army Commander Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle violated army regulations when he initially ordered a 15 strong army platoon to report to Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte in Kandy days before the last general election on December 5, 2001. Balagalle later ordered 28 men from the Vijayaba regiment at the Boyagane Army camp, Kurunegala to report to Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte in Kandy.

Army soldier Kaluarachchige Gunasiri Rajapakshe was taken into custody at Colombo on 28.12 2001. Captain Upul Aluvihare also from the Boyagane Vijayaba camp was produced as a suspect in this case before the Teldeniya Magistrate on January 4, 2002 for identification. Six army officers are being held in the remand prison at Bogambara, as police continue to hunt for Lohan and Chanuka Ratwatte who remain key suspects in the murder of ten youth at Udathalawinna.

General Anuruddha Ratwatte meanwhile is on record as having stated to the media soon after the murders were committed that he is willing to surrender his sons to prove their innocence in this crime. We can only surmise that Ratwatte has now got sufficient proof which seriously implicates his two sons in these murders and that is why he is unable to surrender them and they remain fugitives on the run from justice.

Top sleuths confided to The Sunday Leader that they are confident of catching Lohan and Chanuka Ratwatte. Two or three surveillance police teams are already on the track of the Ratwatte brothers who the cops say have not left the country and have been spotted in Colombo.

General Anuruddha Ratwatte in his statement to the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) has continued to insist that he is innocent and does not have the blood of the ten Muslim youth on his hands. Ratwatte has also defended his sons, claiming they too have been falsely implicated.

The cops tell a different story. Confident of finding the Ratwatte brothers, the sleuths say justice will soon be delivered. They have sufficient evidence they say to arrest both Lohan and Chanuka Ratwatte.

"The main issue for the commencement of talks with the LTTE is the international and local ban on the LTTE. The LTTE has stated that if it were to come for talks, the ban imposed on the organization locally should be lifted. On the other hand international opinion stresses on the need to commence talks towards achieving a political solution.............We have no right to play around this last chance we have to achieve peace in Sri Lanka. We also have no right to indulge in narrow political aims making use of the ban on the LTTE...........We are not prepared to let go of this last chance for peace.Deep thought is necessary on the local ban of the LTTE in view of this backdrop."

- Ranil Wickremesinghe in policy statement of January 22, 2002

By D. B. S. Jeyaraj

More than 40 years ago in the mid - fifties, the Island of Ceylon was torn apart politically by the Sinhala as sole official language issue. The opposing viewpoints found symbolic expression in the 'Sri' issue. The old system of motor vehicle licenses based on the colonial method of using letters from the word Ceylon was done away with. Instead of using 'alien' letters from the English alphabet, a national substitute was envisaged. It was going to be the letter 'Sri' and numerals on new number plates .

But whose Sri? The rising tide of supremacist consciousness that deemed the Island as the sole - exclusive preserve of the Sinhala majority saw to it that the 'Sri' in question was from the Sinhala alphabet. The Tamils resented and protested. There is no 'Sri' letter in the authentic Tamil alphabet of 247 letters. There are however some Sanskrit derived 'grantha' letters in use. 'Sri' was one of those. So the Tamils demanding parity of status for their mother tongue also wanted equality in 'Sri's. When the newly formed Ceylon Transport Board sent buses with the new 'Sinhala Sri' number plates to the North - East the Federal Party protested and commenced a tar brush campaign against the 'Sinhala Sri'. Southern extremists reacted by tarring Tamil letters in signboards in the Sinhala areas. This saw Tamils tarring all Sinhala letters in official nameboards.

Burning Issue

The situation deteriorated and the conflict became literally and metaphorically a burning issue when large scale violence erupted in 1958. Tamils were burnt alive and so were their residences, businesses and places of worship. A notorious example being the immolation of the Brahmin priest at the Panadura temple. The tragic incident was discussed with horror by Tamil people in all parts of the Island. It was this event that had a profound impact on a four year old Tamil child growing up in the coastal town of Valvettithurai.That boy grew up into a leader of an armed Tamil movement seeking justice for the Tamils and became a legend in his lifetime. He acknowledged in later interviews that it was the impact of the Panadura incident that instilled into him an avenging consciousness against sinhala tyranny. That boy was none other than Velupillai Pirabakaran .

The passion and fury generated by the 'Sri' conflict may have created an impression that this was one issue where no compromise was possible at any point of time. The 'Sri' like the constitutional clause about a 'unitary' state was entrenched in Sinhala nationalist consciousness and any attempt to amend it would result in the Sinhala people exploding again was the feeling. Yet what happened? After more than three decades there emerged a common man of the sinhala masses as executive president of Sri Lanka. Ranasinghe Premadasa had no qualms about changing the vehicle number plate system from the existing 'Sri' formula. No volcanoe erupted and no river of blood flowed. A seemingly intractable issue of the past became totally irrelevant in the present.

More heat than light

Many of our current problems too would no doubt suffer the same fate as that of the 'Sri' controversy with the passage of time. What is required is a bold, imaginative and sincere political leadership on both sides of the ethnic divide. The people must be informed correctly that unless a typical course of action however unpopular in the present was adopted, the future would be disastrously bleak.The entrenched unitary constitution clause for example may seem sacrosanct at present. Nevertheless the unitary state has to go if the state is to be restructured on federal lines to ensure the durable unity of the country in the future. Likewise another 'symbolic' issue like the 'Sri' generating more heat than light is the problematique of proscription.

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe dealt with this issue in the policy statement made by him in parliament on January 22 . Some comments articulated by Wickremesinghe in this regard suggested that he was prepared to consider the de - proscribing of the LTTE at a point of time when it became definite that continuous proscription would jeopardise the peace process. "The main issue for the commencement of talks with the LTTE is the international and local ban on the LTTE. The LTTE has stated that if it were to come for talks the ban imposed on the organisation locally should be lifted. On the other hand international opinion stresses on the need to commence talks towards achieving a political solution........We have no right to play around this last chance we have to achieve peace in Sri Lanka. We also have no right to indulge in narrow political aims making use of the ban on the LTTE........We are not prepared to let go of this last chance for peace.

Deep thought is necessary on the local ban of the LTTE in view of this backdrop." he said.

Encouraging sign

Wickremesinghe's sentiments evoked a responsive chord in the ranks of tuscany. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam political adviser and accredited chief negotiator Anton Balasingham welcomed the decision to review the ban imposed in Sri Lanka on the LTTE. Balasingham referred to Wickremesinghe's comment "Deep thought is necessary on the local ban of the LTTE in view of this backdrop." as " an encouraging sign of the new government's commitment to end the ethnic conflict". Speaking to the 'Tamilnet' website, Balasingham stated "The de - proscription of the LTTE will be a recognition of the legitimacy of the Tamil people's struggle. It is not a concession by the government but an acknowledgement of our position as the authentic representatives of the Tamil people".

Balasingham also had a harsh remark about ex-foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar who warned Wickremesinghe in parliament that "on the question of de - proscribing the LTTE any precipitate action should be avoided and the government should bear in mind international practice in the face of impending talks with banned organisations". Balasingham pointed out that the Oslo facilitated peace process collapsed last year after Kadirgamar "out of personal dislike for the then special envoy now special adviser to the Norwegian foreign ministry Erik Solheim successfully insisted on his removal". Balasingham went on to say " Mr. Kadirgamar wasted his career by obsessively pursuing this single issue of proscribing the LTTE. In doing so he has contributed considerably to the intractability of the ethnic problem. More concerned now with his personal pride than what is best for the people of Sri Lanka, Mr. Kadirgamar seems determined to thwart the brightening prospects for negotiations".

Kadirgamar was not alone in expressing opposition to anticipated de - proscription. His leader Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga is also harping on the same issue. There is every possibility that the People's Alliance will exploit this issue for narrow political gain in the future. The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and Sihala Urumaya are already doing so. Wickremesinghe was obviously referring to these opportunistic elements with no thought of the future wellbeing of the country when he said, " We have no right to play around this last chance we have to achieve peace in Sri Lanka. We also have no right to indulge in narrow political aims making use of the ban on the LTTE". Whatever the opposition may say, there is no disputing the fact that the question of de- proscription is symbolically emotive rather than being of practical value.

The issue of banning the LTTE first arose in 1978 when the Tigers sent a public letter to the Colombo Tamil daily Virakesari claiming credit for several exploits, including the killing of CID Inspector Bastianpillai. The proscription of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and other simliar organisations ordinance was passed. This was repealed in 1979 when the Prevention of Terrorism (temporary provisions) Act was passed. Initially in force for three years the PTA was made part of permanent law in 1982. In 1983 the 6th amendment to the Constitution outlawing separatism was passed. These laws along with emergency law provisions became the instruments through which repression was unleashed on the Tamil people.

The oppressive measures only succeeded in driving the Tamil people into the hands of the Liberation Tigers. Contrary to misguided expectations in the South that legal banning and military persecution would destroy the tigers the opposite happened. The LTTE numbering only 30 full time cadres in July 1983 has expanded considerably. Today it is one of the most formidable guerrilla organizations possessing attributes of a conventional army and navy. Recent developments like the 'Pongu Thamil Eluchchi' (Tamil upsurge demonstration) and the mandate obtained by the Tamil national alliance have shown that the LTTE is now the premier politico - military organization of the Tamil people. This phenomenon is proof enough that legal proscription by an oppressive regime cannot undermine a national liberation movement.

The LTTE was formally banned on October 11, 1987, when the truce brought about by the Indo - Lanka accord broke down. Thereafter the ban was revoked when Premadasa initiated a political dialogue with the LTTE in 1989. The LTTE registered its political front as an approved political party. Soon hostilities resumed. The ban however was not reimposed despite the raging war. Kumaratunge also did not impose proscription when the 100 day ceasefire collapsed and fighting commenced on April 18th 1995. The ban was imposed in 1998 January when the Dalada Maligawa was attacked. This was not the first time the tooth temple was attacked. The JVP did so in the late eighties but it was already banned then. The 1998 ban was of a political and symbolic nature than militaristic.

Proscription politics

Kumaratunga continued to play poscription politics when she tried to prevent opposition parties ganging up against her in parliament last year. When the emergency extension seemed doomed as a result of changed political configurations, she tried to exploit Sinhala fears by saying that the LTTE ban would cease if the emergency lapsed. As a last resort, she utilised PTA regulations and banned the LTTE again just as the emergency lapsed because of non - extension. Some lawyers have said that such a ban was not legally permissible. The ban however has not been challenged on those grounds so far. Thus it is obvious that a politically bankrupt PA and its cronies are trying to prop up the proscription issue for political oxygen.

The proscription issue acquired a further dimension when Kadirgamar tried to play to the Sinhala gallery over this issue. Realising that there was a growing International trend against global terrorism in the post - cold war world, Kadirgamar shrewdly and unscrupulously hitched his wagon to that star. He bagan to pursue a single item policy of urging international bans on the LTTE as the chief ingredient of his foreign policy. Kadirgamar began pandering to the domestic constituency by propagating an image that he was responsible for getting the LTTE banned on foreign soil. Soon Kumaratunge also got on to the same bandwagon. The PA bereft of any tangible achievement in governance was reduced to the sorry plight of proclaiming triumphs abroad in combatting the LTTE.

This international trend against terrorism has received fresh impetus after the September 11 events. The LTTE banned in the USA in 1997 and Britain in 2001 now faces restrictions in Canada and Australia too. Other western nations may also ban the LTTE. Hopes are raised in Sri Lanka that these bans could eliminate the fund raising capacity of the LTTE in these countries. The simplistic expectation is that the tigers would be starved of funds in due course.

The reality is that while such bans may affect fund raising to some degree it will not extinguish it. New, covert methods and devices would come into force. Also expatriate funds are not the sole money supply for tiger coffers. After the Afghanistan war some Sinhala hawks indulged in flights of fancy about western nations bombing the jungles of Mullaitheevu into ashes. These elements are of the misguided belief that if Sri Lanka relaxes the ban the international community would also relax the ban. Curiously some Tamil circles also share this belief.

There has been an unfortunate tendency among Tamil circles to swallow Kadirgamar's propaganda. They think that the western nations have acceded to Kadirgamar. So there is a simple hope that if the ban in Sri Lanka is relaxed then western nations would also follow suit. On the other hand some Sinhala circles believe that hasty action in removing the ban could affect western approaches. The fear is that if the peace process collapses and war erupts Colombo would have foolishly foreclosed the option of enlisting active western support against the LTTE on the pretext of fighting global terror. If Sri Lanka removes the ban then this resource would dry up forever is the nagging doubt.

Simple logic entails that it would not be so. Colombo can always re-impose the ban if necessary. The truth however is entirely different. Despite Kadirgamar's propaganda and the naivete displayed in believing it, western nations have banned and may ban the LTTE for reasons of their own and not for Colombo's sake. This is something that even the LTTE has not grasped fully, if the 'great heroes' speech by Prabakharan is any indicator. Western nations concept of terrorism and the policy imperatives in banning terrorists on their soil is dictated by their self interests and not by developments on foreign soil. A case in point would be Canada issuing a security certificate and deporting a former bodyguard of Yassir Arafat some years ago at a time when the PLO had become respectable and acceptable as legitimate rulers of the Palestinian authority.

Instead of buying into Kadirgamar's propaganda the western powers have a different agenda smacking of double standards for Sri Lanka. The LTTE is banned on their soil as 'terrorists' but the advice proffered to Colombo is negotiate with the tigers. The USA and India came down heavily on the Kumaratunge regime when it bombed Pooneryn instead of continuing the peace process last year. As far as the west is concerned, it is a case of 'no compromise' with the 'Islamic terrorists' but exerting pressure on Sri Lanka to talk to its own 'Tamil' terrorists. The underlying reasons for this is, international awareness that the root cause of the Sri Lankan crisis is Sinhala hegemonism and that the nature of the Tamil cause is just. It is only some of the methods employed by the LTTE that is 'terroristic'. Moreover, the west knows that there can be no overwhelming military solution when the motivating force of the Tamil struggle is the goal of national liberation.

Difficult questions

So the 'big' guys who have bankrolled this long South Asian war want both sides to jaw - jaw and not war - war. Puzzled Sinhala hawks query, "why ask us to talk to the same people who you say are terrorists on your soil?". Likewise perplexed tigers ask, " why ban us on your soil, when you are urging Colombo to negotiate with us as representatives of the Tamil people? ". Difficult questions indeed to answer. The redeeming factor however is that the perceived double standards are for peace and not war. Thus, the overal good possible through this approach negates the blatant hypocrisy. In any case it's time that the Sinhala and Tamil people stop this internecine warfare and arrest the downslide to self-destruction.

All this brings us therefore to the negotiating table. The LTTE wants de - proscription as a pre - requisite and not pre - condition. There are three reasons for this. The first has something to do with Kadirgamar. When Britain was contemplating a ban on LTTE Kadirgamar started a high profile campaign urging that proscription. The tiger ideologue Balasingham conveyed a simple message to the erstwhile foreign minister through Erik Solheim. "If you persist in pursuing this course of action we will demand that Sri Lanka remove the ban if and when talks take place" was the essence of that message. The point was to deter Kadirgamar. It would be incongruous for Sri Lanka to lift the ban after urging Britain to ban it. If Colombo persisted there would be no talks. So if Kadirgamar had any sense he would stop urging the ban.

But no one judged Kadirgamar and his government correctly. The PA was not keen on genuine talks at all. So if proscription would prevent talks, so be it and let the country go to hell. Another underestimated factor was the extent of Kadirgamar's vanity. He simply wanted to reap undeserved kudos. Any government worth its salt would have simply dissociated itself publicly from the international banning saying it was not its concern. It could have advocated it discreetly. Instead Kadirgamar chose to trumpet his campaign. Several diplomats in Colombo advised him not to do so pointing out that his government would have to talk to the Tigers at some point and that the proscription issue would be a problem then. But to no avail, as Kadirgamar was determined to prevent talks and also gain cheap popularity in the process.

So when the British ban came into force and the peace process progressed, the LTTE raised the issue of de - proscription as it had warned earlier. It remained consistent on this and even during the interregnum between peace process four and five reiterated that notwithstanding any regime change all future dialogue would be possible only after de - proscription. The other two reasons for this insistence are inter - connected and related. In an international environment where the LTTE in its perception is being labelled as terrorist for different reasons the organisation has no choice but to insist that at least on its native soil it must be de - proscribed. The more the international community bans the LTTE, the more the Tigers will demand de - proscription.

State terrorism

This course of action will be backed completely by the Sri Lankan Tamils regardless of political persuasion. This then is the third reason. As far as the Tamils are concerned their biggest problem in the past has been 'state terrorism' and not 'LTTE terrorism'. If the state can be regarded as pure as snow despite the bloody track record, then the LTTE can also be absolved. No self - respecting Tamil will submit to a position where talks begin between a 'legal' government and an 'illegal' LTTE. Due to a variety of reasons the LTTE has emerged as the accepted representatives of the Tamil people. Therefore when talks begin there must be parity of status. So the LTTE must be de - proscribed. The Tamil struggle for equality will not allow the people to accept anything less.

This therefore brings us to a position where the LTTE must be de - proscribed for talks to begin. Let us remember that the PA refused to ban the LTTE even while asking western nations to ban it. This was because it knew that talks were not possible with a banned entity. The LTTE was not banned in Sri Lanka when the US designated it as terrorist in 1997. The PA ban, that too an executive order and not a legislative enactment came only in 1998. The main concern therefore should be for the country at large to stop making a fetish out of proscription and relax it to pave the way for peace talks.

• How an attempt by the brother of an official of the PM to make a quick buck in the Lanka-India wheat deal was thwarted

By Frederica Jansz

A government-to-government, multi-million dollar wheat deal between India and Sri Lanka almost turned into a lucrative money-spinner for some local businessmen close to the Premier and only timely intervention by Ranil Wickremesinghe prevented the first major scandal of the new government.

The new government was saved red-faced embarrassment at the eleventh hour when Wickremesinghe's confidantes brought the issue to his notice.

The contractual deal involved a monthly supply of 25000 tons of wheat to Sri Lanka from India, for a period of 12 months at an approximate cost of US $ 32 million. Smelling potential 'deals,' some businessmen close to Premier Wickremesinghe have already begun moving in for the kill.

D. K. Walsan, businessman and personal assistant to Wickremesinghe has already got into hot water trying to sniff out financial possibilities to benefit his family. Walsan recently tried to swing the Indian deal in favour of his brother Vasan, and if the stars had been kind to the Walsan brothers, Vasan would have picked up a commission of US $ 600,000 even as the poor Sri Lankan is called to pay an increased price for his daily bread.

The seeds of the multi-million dollar deal was planted in New Delhi when Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe made an official visit to India days after he took office as the prime minister of Sri Lanka. Minister of Economic Reforms, Science and Technology, Milinda Moragoda, together with D. K. Walsan, were part of Wickremesinghe's official delegation to India in addition to Foreign Minister Tyronne Fernando.

During the PM's visit to India a joint statement was issued in New Delhi stating that "India will provide 25000 tons of wheat per month for the next twelve months to Sri Lanka on terms and conditions agreed to by both sides." Following government-to-government discussions and consultations among the various agencies involved, the Government of India confirmed that it is in a position to supply 300,000 tons of wheat to Sri Lanka.

The terms and conditions were conveyed to Milinda Moragoda by India's High Commissioner to Sri Lanka, Gopalkrishna Gandhi in writing. The transaction of supplies will be handled by the National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India (NAFED), Gandhi wrote to Moragoda. NAFED indicated that the price of wheat would be at Rs. 5,000 per metric ton and at Rs. 6,500 for per metric ton of wheat flour. Among the other conditions stipulated, the repayment period is to be for 15 years inclusive of six years moratorium. The interest rate, Gandhi wrote, would be at LIBOR varying six monthly, depending upon LIBOR movement.

Gandhi in his letter to Moragoda sought confirmation of these terms and conditions seeking clarification as to whether in principle, the Sri Lanka Government is satisfied. He added that after the Lankan government had accepted these terms, India would proceed to the next step and draw up a contractual agreement that could be signed between the two governments for the supply of wheat to Sri Lanka.

Walsan's brother Vasan on hearing of this prospective multi-million dollar deal meanwhile, acted fast. Seeking a meeting with the Indian officials, Vasan at this meeting indicated his keenness to serve as the agent in Colombo for NAFED. Vasan also lobbied his brother Walsan. The Indians were not averse to the suggestion.

The latter in turn told Milinda Moragoda that his brother Vasan was keen to be the middleman in this deal and to try and work it out. Moragoda was hesitant and asked Walsan to wait a while.

In the meantime, Treasury Secretary Charitha Ratwatte, considered scrupulously honest, got wind of the Vasan manoeuvre and acted fast. Not a man to mince his words or ethics for that matter, Ratwatte lost no time in telling Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe that Vasan was on the prowl for monetary benefits he could secure via the good offices of the new government.

Moragoda too by this time decided to inform the PM. Meeting with Wickremesinghe subsequently, Moragoda discussed the embarrassing proposition the Walsan brothers were pushing for when it is meant to be a government-to-government contract.

Wickremesinghe was astounded. Summoning Walsan, Wickremesinghe told him in no uncertain terms that such a 'deal' would deeply embarrass the government and under no circumstances was it possible. The agreement with India to purchase wheat, the PM explained, was a government-to-government contract and no middlemen were even necessary.

Ticking Walsan off, Wickremesinghe reiterated that commissions and wheeler-dealing was the last thing the PM needed on his plate at this moment in time. The Premier sternly asserted that business in his administration would not encourage quick bucks to pass hands -- even if businessmen like the Walsan brothers are strong and ardent supporters of the United National Front government.

The prime minister said it was particularly bad since Walsan was part of his delegation to India.

The Indians too have breathed a sigh of relief. After being approached by Vasan, the Indian High Commission in Sri Lanka was placed in a spot and had hoped that the PM would intervene and prevent middlemen of this nature from operating in agreements that had been negotiated directly on a government-to-government basis.

The Walsan brothers are owners and Directors of Hotel Nippon Limited.

The very fact that Walsan broached the subject with Minister Moragoda on behalf of his brother, having himself been part of the prime minister's delegation in itself is scandalous and calls into question not just his judgement but also ethics in dealing with issues concerning good governance.

Contacted by The Sunday Leader, Walsan said he had nothing to do with the deal and his brother acted independently but that he dissuaded him from proceeding further after the prime minister spoke to him.

Walsan however conceded he informed Moragoda of his brother's interest in being the agent for NAFED.

Nevertheless, the very fact Walsan discussed the issue with Moragoda is damning. What would be the situation if Moragoda concurred and the deal went through without the prime minister's knowledge?

Would this new administration then not be tainted by corruption from the very outset at worst and cronyism at best?

Walsan of course is a very affable man but he is not so naive as not to know given his very close relationship with Moragoda and the prime minister that, when he conveys to a minister of his brother's intention of being an agent for a multi-million dollar deal, it tantamounts to influence peddling.

More so considering it transpired from an official visit of the prime minister to India in which he himself was a delegate and the wheat itself was meant to alleviate the burden of rising prices on the poor masses.

In such a situtation even considering promoting a business arrangement for a family member for commission on what was essentially a government-to-government contract is to say the least, shocking.

By Amantha Perera

From the time vast sections of land in the North-East province became inaccessible to the Colombo administration due to LTTE control, those areas have been by and large left out of the economic picture of the country.

"Some economists have argued that Sri Lanka's much touted economic resilience would come undone if the abject situation in the uncleared areas was factored in. The negative growth areas such as the North-East Province are conveniently left out of the national income accounting system," Dr. Muthukrishna Sarvananthan, an economist with the International Centre for Ethnic Studies said in a paper presented recently.

But Sarvananthan has been a lone voice in raising this concern. Most of Colombo's research houses took the easy way out and left the uncleared areas out of the picture. It was easy as hardly any economic data was coming from them.

But now that the new UNF government has lifted the economic embargo for all but seven goods, the time has come to take a long hard look at what the uncleared areas hold for the national economy.

Though it is premature to predict what is going to happen, knowing very well the LTTE's track record and the reaction of past governments, there are signs that a permanent cessation of hostilities would be in place before February is over.

"Certainly, the lifting of the economic embargo on the 'uncleared areas' of the North-East province has the potential to stimulate overall economic growth in the island," Sarvananthan told The Sunday Leader last week just as the goods began to flow to the North-East.

Estimates are that around 500,000 people inhabit the areas under LTTE control. The economies of these people are agro-based. And it has continued, albeit amidst interruptions and not on full potential. Nevertheless, the government or the LTTE need not trouble themselves of getting the farmers back to field as they have been there all along.

The agricultural produce, if they start moving towards the South, would have a telling impact on the prices as well as the agriculture index of the national economy.

For example, a stretch of land under LTTE control in the Batticaloa district is believed to have produced 12% of Sri Lanka's entire paddy consumption at one time. And this area is still under cultivation.

Other than the agro products, the sea that borders the war zone is the most fertile in the country. However, fishing has been banned due to security considerations. In certain areas, inland fishing too has not been allowed for the same reasons. If the catch reaches Colombo, the same effect could be felt in the prices. But for all that, there should be unheeded free flow of goods, and that would take some time in realising.

Even after the announcement of the lifting of the ban, there have been problems. Agricultural equipment is still not allowed to get into the uncleared areas in the Batticaloa district.

On the other hand, if rehabilitation and reconstruction begins in the war ravaged areas, it would be a burden on the economy while attracting a lot of foreign aid.

It would be a burden as there is no infrastructure in the most rudimentary levels and all that needs to be put in place. The road network has been set back by a century and there is no electricity and running water. Schools, hospitals and other amenities have to be reconstructed from scratch. Such expenditure would be lethal for an economy recovering from a minus 0.7% growth but vital to win over the people.

But such an effort would attract foreign help in no small measure. As it is, there are several non-governmental organisations working in the uncleared areas whose efforts have been directed to develop facilities like water works, roads and others. The World Bank last year said it too would like to extend its programmes to reach the entire country soon after Country Representative Marianna Todorova visited Jaffna.

On the other hand, the people in the uncleared areas embody a huge potential for the economy. "There is a huge pent-up demand for consumption goods in the 'uncleared areas," Sarvananthan observed. Such demand would give the economy the much needed kick-start coupled with the sentiment generated by the opening of the region.

But such a scenario has its victims as well. Mainly the bureaucrats and others who thrive off the informal economy that has developed due to the embargo. The pass system has created so many desks to be passed that each stop is a potential bribe.

Even after the lifting of the embargo such situations prevail. For example, if a motorcycle is to be transported to the uncleared areas, clearance is required from the Vavuniya Kachcheri as well as the Registrar of Motor Vehicles.

"All these restrictions would involve additional transaction costs to consumers in terms of consumption of additional time taken and/or in terms of payment of bribes to speed up the issuance of necessary documentation," observed Sarvananthan.

Nevertheless the government has indicated that it wanted the goods to flow unhindered. So far it has mainly been one-way, from the South to the North. But it should give serious consideration to two-way traffic, if it is economically feasible.