Minister Vidar Helgeson on January 4, that it desired India to extend its good offices to help resolve the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict by acceding to its two requests.

Firstly, it wanted India to allow the LTTE Chief Negotiator and Political Adviser, Anton Balasingham and wife Adele Anne to relocate to Chennai temporarily and secondly, for Norway facilitated talks to be hosted by India in a South Indian city like Chennai, Thiruvananthapuram or Bangalore. The second was predicated on receiving a favourable response to the first.

Requests

The Norwegian peace delegation visiting Britain on January 22, informed the Tigers that the two requests made by it have been forwarded through appropriate channels to the government of India for due consideration by New Delhi.

It was stated that the details of the requests had been conveyed to the Indian government through the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Gopalakrishna Gandhi and also formally communicated by letter from Oslo to New Delhi.

The Norwegian facilitator team comprising special adviser to the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, Erik Solheim and Foreign Ministry official Kjirste Tromsdal informed the LTTE Chief Negotiator and Political Adviser Anton Balasingham of action taken so far on the matter when it held a three hour meeting at the latter's London residence.

The Norwegians were carrying out their duty in 'postman' like fashion as mutually accepted facilitators entrusted with the task of ushering in a peaceful settlement to the Sri Lankan conflict. The LTTE requests had been communicated to New Delhi in that capacity without any extra recommendation by Oslo. The Sri Lankan government was non-committal to the Tiger requests and took up the stance that discussing modalities governing envisaged discussions like venue etc. was 'premature' at this point of time.

Colombo however, had neither approved nor rejected the choice of a South Indian city as venue for talks.

When particulars of the LTTE requests were revealed in the media on January 8, New Delhi maintained a studied silence on the matter on the grounds that no such requests had been officially communicated to the government of India. That position was factually correct then as the Norwegians visited Colombo only on January 10.

Closed chapter

Reports in the Indian media however stated that "informed discussions between the ministries of external affairs and home on the subject were held and that the dominant view was to keep the LTTE at bay from the Southern states." Apparently, the home ministry felt that "the matter was a closed chapter." There was however, a possibility that "the decision could be reconsidered at the highest level in the government."

The facilitator Norway with concurrence of both parties is focussing on the goal of bringing about a cease-fire between both sides as its immediate priority. Once that hurdle is cleared, it would address issues like formulating the modalities for envisaged negotiations. A Norwegian delegation trip to New Delhi to officially acquaint India of related developments has also been planned though not finalised.

It is very likely that some discussions would centre around the LTTE requests if the proposed Indian trip materialises. It is then that questions like the venue for talks etc. would become important. If and when such a situation dawns India may be constrained to respond officially to the LTTE requests.

Even as some progressive movement is being registered in Norway's facilitatory efforts, the LTTE continues to press forward its viewpoint that India should accede to its twin requests. Security concerns, convenience and proximity to homeland are projected as the reasons behind the LTTE's requests. Anton Balasingham has stated in an interview given to a newspaper in Sri Lanka that India should treat the requests on a 'humanitarian' basis. When Colombo newspapers speculated that Kathmandu was a possible choice as venue Balasingham promptly reacted and dismissed that possibility. He told the TamilNet website that Nepal was out of the question for logistical reasons.

Indian hysteria?

It is apparent however, that LTTE circles are unhappy over the vehemently hostile reaction in India in general and Tamil Nadu in particular towards the requests made by it. The Tamil Guardian weekly published in London noted in its editorial commentary that "the Liberation Tigers' request to India to provide a venue for future negotiations between them and the Sri Lankan government created controversy on an unexpected scale."

The journal known to reflect the LTTE point of view observed that "the matter of a venue will prove a key consideration before any talks." Urging India to respond positively it went on to say "geopolitical obligation must supersede domestic hysteria" and that "New Delhi should seize the chance despite the short-sighted domestic cacophony."

Despite the characterisation of protests to the LTTE plea as a cacophony there is no denying that the Babel of voices have sent out a clear, definite message so far. The dominant overtones amidst the polyphony of voices that reacted negatively to the Tiger proposals were somewhat uniform in content. Be it the spectrum of newspapers and magazines - national and regional - or the cavalcade of political parties that opposed the LTTE requests there was a harmonising quality amounting to a well orchestrated symphony. The exceptions were the parties and organisations in Tamil Nadu regarded generally as being sympathetic to the LTTE.

'Limited' support

This reaction particularly in Tamil Nadu has no doubt disappointed the LTTE greatly. Arguably the Tigers may have expected the southern state to extend full support to the proposals as they were 'limited' in nature. The LTTE was not demanding a repeal of the proscription imposed on it in India. The ban came into force in May 1992 and was extended bi-annually thereafter.

The Tigers were asking India only to 'host' and not 'facilitate' or 'mediate' talks. From the LTTE perspective it was only requesting 'humanitarian assistance of a logistical nature' and nothing more.

India had committed itself to supporting the peace process in Sri Lanka and this provided an opportunity for New Delhi to go beyond verbal assurances alone. Moreover, it also gave India a pivotal role in the island neighbour's peace process without compromising on its established positions.

The 'unofficial' political reaction has demonstrated that Indian public opinion is neither prepared nor willing to forget the recent past. The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in particular continues to rankle Indian conscience. The legal culpability of LTTE Leader Velupillai Prabakharan as chief conspirator in the killing remains a formidable obstacle at this juncture to any hopes of rapprochement.

The rationale for both requests is that Balasingham and the negotiating team are required to shuttle back and forth to brief, confer and obtain instructions from none other than Prabakharan himself. That eventuality can only be galling to the collective Indian psyche at present. In that context the LTTE proposals are viewed as 'audacious' in the Indian media.

Adding to this state of mind are the earlier experiences in getting actively involved in Sri Lankan affairs. The IPKF fiasco still lingers in memory. There is also acute suspicion of the LTTE's ulterior motives. The requests are not perceived at face value and are scrutinised for signs of a hidden agenda. Relenting at this point could pave the way for the LTTE getting a firm foothold in the country it is feared. Also the case for reviewing and possibly repealing the ban on the Tigers get strengthened.

Dilemma

Conceding the LTTE requests can also send the wrong signals in New Delhi's approach towards "global terrorism" in the post September 11 scenario. Another factor is the adverse demonstration effect the move could have on fissiparous and anti-systemic elements in the country. Some of these fears may be unrealistic but remain issues hard to dismiss easily.

Notwithstanding LTTE discomfiture, the Indian government too faces an uncomfortable dilemma in rejecting the Tiger requests. It may be perceived as not wanting to contribute constructively towards the Sri Lankan peace process beyond pronounced verbal platitudes. This in turn could disillusion the vast majority of peace loving people in the island who regard India with great esteem and affection. It may also affect India's future role in issues concerning Sri Lanka within both global and regional contexts.

India played a significant role in both preventing the LTTE overrunning Jaffna in 2000 and also in getting the Tigers banned in Western nations. Thus, an effective countervailing factor to the regional protests can be the overall national interests of New Delhi prevailing over domestic pressures.

The LTTE points this out and rests its hopes on such a possibility in the future. This itself is bitterly ironic for the LTTE. It would have been natural to expect Tamil Nadu on account of shared ethnicity to agitate and pressurise the centre to heed LTTE requests. Instead, the opposite has happened. It is that state which is spearheading the opposition to such a move and is virtually warning the central government not to let the Tigers in. This ironic situation is best illustrated by a comparison to an incident 17 years ago.

Thimpu talks

Former Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi, reiterated over the failure of Thimphu talks and expelled Anton Balasingham from India in 1985. This resulted in a massive uproar in the state. Political parties and the mainstream media demanded that Gandhi re-consider the decision.

After some months, Rajiv was compelled to relent and Balasingham returned. Today the situation is totally different in contrast. Instead of Tamil Nadu demanding that New Delhi consider LTTE requests favourably the state with 55 million Tamils is trying to preempt the centre from conceding the demands even before they were formally communicated.

The fact that the LTTE is constrained to appeal to the centre to override state pressure indicates an abysmal failure of its supportive sections in Tamil Nadu. It cannot be said that elements biassed against the LTTE are creating an illusion of opposition because there seems to be no outward public sympathy for tiger proposals.

The past years have seen various Tamil Nadu personalities undertake trips abroad and address Tamil expatriate audiences in the west. A recurring theme has been an assurance to LTTE supporters and sympathisers that there was massive support in the state for the Tigers. The Indian mainstream media was accused of distorting this reality due to ulterior motives. Media outlets controlled by these sections also project this viewpoint.

There has been a tendency for LTTE circles to believe this self-serving propaganda and those dissenting have been charged as 'traitors' and 'stooges.'

That bubble has now burst. Recent events in the aftermath of the LTTE requests being publicised have illustrated clearly that there is no sub-terranean support for the Tigers in Tamil Nadu. Even requests that are reasonable on a prima facie level have not earned support. The pro-LTTE sections are vocally articulate but practically marginalised. There are no signs of any grounds well of support manifesting vociferously for the LTTE.

Instead of facing pro-LTTE demonstrations in Tamil Nadu the central government faces protests fuelled by anti-LTTE sentiment if it agrees to LTTE proposals.

Isolated and exposed

The Tigers stand isolated and exposed in the state. The pro-LTTE elements like Vaiko seem helpless in influencing the government on this matter. Likewise, supporters like Nedumaran are powerless to organise even a mass demonstration in support of a Tiger request that is overtly humanitarian. The harsh reality in the state is that while there is widespread dormant sympathy for the plight of Sri Lankan Tamils those sentiments cannot be automatically translated into support for the LTTE.

Given certain geo-political realities, the necessity to retain its leverage in the island and the need to satisfy the peace loving silent majority of different ethnicities of its sincerity in helping Sri Lanka achieve peace New Delhi may be compelled somewhat reluctantly into granting LTTE requests. This may particularly be so if it is demonstrated unambiguously that there is no way for talks to proceed unless and until India consents to the logistical arrangements suggested by the Tigers. It is possible to define a tight set of rules and procedures for this and thereby prevent any anticipated harm to Indian interests by giving in to Tiger proposals.

A significant development is the fact finding mission underway to assess the Tamil Nadu mood. It is also said that a top emissary from New Delhi has met both Jayalalitha and Karunanidhi in this respect. On the other hand, there may be domestic turmoil if the LTTE plea is heeded favourably. This too can be contained if proper explanations are proffered. Some Tamil Nadu parties could change positions if the centre is perceived to be on a different wavelength.

The vibrant press in the state could be eternally vigilant and monitor LTTE activity during this period. There is also the possibility of resorting to the other southern states and union territories. The consent and cooperation of Opposition and Congress Leader Sonia Gandhi is vital for this.

'Mother' India

The Tamil majority union territory of Pondichery, the Malayala majority in Kerala state and Kannadiga majority in Karnataka are all governed by Congress dominated administrations. Only Telugu speaking Andhra Pradesh is ruled by the Telugu Desam of Chandrababu Naidu. The Telugu Desam in the past has evinced some support for the Tamil cause and there was a time when a former stalwart P. Upendra addressed LTTE meetings.

The Bharatiya Janatha Party led government owes its existence to the Telugu Desam which supports it from outside. It remains to be seen whether the Indian government tries to use these regions in preference to Tamil Nadu if and when it decides to accommodate LTTE requests in the interests of peace in Sri Lanka. The Tigers too may not be averse to such alternative arrangements even though their first choice is naturally Chennai.

Despite the initial reaction there is a school of thought contending that 'Mother' India cannot let herself be portrayed as deliberately sabotaging the prospects for peace in Sri Lanka both nationally and internationally. New Delhi may remain non-committal at this stage but will definitely be forced to decide conclusively if and when the peace process develops to a level where Indian logistical assistance becomes absolutely essential for its continued success. New Delhi has to go beyond verbal assurances of support it is felt.

In spite of all these great expectations, New Delhi's ultimate decision will be determined by a number of factors keeping the 'enlightened self-interests' of India as the paramount consideration. Whatever the decision there is no disputing the fact that India would continue to maintain its legitimate interest in the island's affairs and keep itself fully informed of the Oslo facilitated peace process even if it desires no active role it at present.

A person's identity is made up of his or her gender, age, race, caste, class, religion, profession, political affiliations, sexual orientation and so on. For example, a person might be a Muslim, young, female, migrant worker; or a Sinhala, Buddhist, SLFP, retired headmaster; or a Tamil middle-class, female doctor; or a 12 year old, Sinhalese, Catholic schoolboy; or a Sinhala, Karawa, middle-class, male engineer; or a middle aged, English speaking, businesswoman.

At a basic level - one's identity is perceived based on biology or nature, in that a person's identity is determined by her or his biological characteristics. Sex marks an individual as a man or woman. Depending on your biological features in the form of sexual endowments, you are identified as female or male at birth. This classification into male or female based on sexual difference is designed by nature. (Biological differentiation between members of the species homo sapiens who have XX and those who have XY chromosomes. Of course, it must be noted that with the aid of modern science people are in a position to change their sexual characteristics).

Gender

Gender, though not the sole factor in the construction of a person's identity, is the next basic, strongest, and most visible feature in a person's identity. It can be seen as the social/cultural amplification of the sexual difference, and the social/cultural power, meanings and values that are attached to that difference. Here, the concept of gender is used to describe those characteristics of men and women that are socially/culturally determined in contrast to those that are biologically determined. It refers to the essential notion of one's particular sense of being a man or a woman in a particular context and is reliant on an individual's own concept of what is acceptable as a man or a woman.

The concept of what it means to be a Sri Lankan woman differs from what it means to be a woman in Ethiopia or Germany. The concept of what it means to be a man in Papua New Guinea differs from what it means to be a man in Brazil or Iceland.

Consequently, sexual designation must not be confused with gender division. The gender identity is constructed both consciously by the individual and unconsciously by the forces that have conditioned her or him throughout his/her life. Therefore, a person's gender identity pertains to the identity that is assigned to a person, and assumed by that person due to influences of her or his parents, family, relatives, friends, through schooling, the community, race, religion, wider society, the media, etc.

". our basic social identities as men and as women are socially constructed rather than based on fixed biological characteristics. In this sense we can talk about the historical differences in masculinity (femininity) in a given society, as well as the differences in them between societies." Kate Young

Gendering or socio-cultural conditioning

What is of particular importance here is the fact that the gender identity of an individual is an artificial construction - in other words 'made up' by the individual and society in which he or she lives. On the basis of their sex, men and women are assigned different gender roles, different behavioural characteristics, different dress codes, different standards of conduct, different professions and so on. Thus, an individual is socialised or gendered or indoctrinated from childhood into constructing his or her gender identity according to the accepted standards and conceptualisations of gender identities around her/him. For instance, a girl might be brought up to think that her purpose in life is to be a good mother and housewife.

According to Ruth Hartley, gender socialisation of children takes place via four processes. Firstly, through manipulation and moulding - in other words the way you handle a child, particularly in early childhood. For example, a mother might fuss over a baby girl's hair, dress and tell her how pretty she is in a simpering tone. Boys might be spoken to in a more matter of fact tone with the use of a gruff voice. Girls dressed in frilly dresses, boys encouraged to be independent.

Next, through canalisation - which involves directing the attention of female/male children to objects or aspects of objects. Examples include giving girls dolls and pots to play with and encouraging boys to play with guns and cars, graduating on to gender differentiated chores within the household where girls might be asked to sweep or wash up or look after a younger child while boys might be sent to work outside the home: going to the boutique or looking after cattle. Through this kind of differential treatment, the interest of girls and boys are channelled in different ways.

"Consequently, they develop different capabilities, attitudes, aspirations and dreams. Familiarity with certain objects, (and situations) direct their choice." (Kamla Bhasin)

Verbal appellations are also another means through which boys and girls are treated differently. Again, girls might be admired for their beauty while boys are praised for their strength and size. Thus, girls and boys are made to think of themselves according to dominant gender characteristics and codes of behaviour, and made to identify with other males or females.

Activity exposure - the type and frequency of activity that girls and boys are exposed to gender them according to the roles and responsibilities required of them in a given context. Girls are not encouraged to accompany their father outside the home, boys are not asked to cook and sew, resulting in the acquisition of differing skills.

Masculine and feminine

It is through these processes that children imbibe the meaning of masculine and feminine, and internalise them almost unconsciously. However, this does not mean that an individual is a passive recipient of the process of social conditioning involved in the construction of his/her gender. The psyche of each individual is unique, and people respond in different ways.

There are many people who do not conform to commonly accepted gender identities in societies. There are many people who reconstruct gender identities according to their own wishes and priorities in life. For instance, a man might cook for his family even though prevalent notions of masculinity do not dictate it.

Nor are the norms governing the gender identities of men and women identical everywhere. In fact, the gender identities of a man and woman may differ greatly on account of time and place, according to the accepted models of gender found in different ideologies and social structures. Therefore, the actual construction of gender identities might differ according to the variables of time, age, race, religion, caste, class, geographical location, personal ideologies, etc.

Prioritising gender

At the same time, people may prioritise and identify more with gender and certain other components of identity under certain circumstances or during certain periods in their lives. For instance, a woman who is hitherto identified as a conservative housewife might decide to take to provincial politics. Or a carpenter who is approaching his eightieth birthday might be identified solely as an old man. There might be heightened awareness of race between lifelong friends during times of ethnic crisis.

The gender identity of an applicant may influence the decision as to who is selected for a job. As such, the fluid nature of a gender identity or for that matter, of an individual's overall identity itself needs to be recognised.

"Gender then refers to a whole set of expectations held as to the likely behaviour, characteristics, and aptitudes men and women will have. It refers to the social meanings given to being a man or women in a given society." Kate Young

The gendering of a person is not solely reliant on their upbringing or socialisation. It must be noted that even as adults, individuals can face strong social/political/familial controls which might prevent them from deviating from the accepted male-female 'characterizations' or identities. Sanctions and self-censorship in the form of pubic scrutiny and comment/'moral' disproval or social expulsion/public ridicule/economic penalties/fear of gender specific violence/notions of shame can restrict the purview of gender roles, responsibilities, sexual orientations, dress codes, characteristics/behaviours and professions.

Gendering men/women

There are examples of parents who refuse to financially support children who deviate from set norms and practices, women might refuse to travel alone at night for fear of rape, a boy might feel ashamed to wear a dress, etc.

Consequently, it is evident that there are many socio-cultural and other factors that influence the construction or making or gendering of a man or woman. Nature is only responsible for the primary biological differentiation between men and women. Gender based roles and responsibilities within families, individual sexual preferences of men and women, separate dress codes, what are considered to be masculine and feminine characteristics as well as behaviours, and professions are all insisted on by society in different ways to construct women and men.

- Ms. is indebted to work carried out by CENWOR researchers for this article.

By Third Eye

The UNF's attempts at de-escalating the conflict through lifting the ban on goods travelling to the Wanni and other areas held by the LTTE, has ushered in a different culture on dealing with the ethnic issue to that which prevailed in the past six years.

The UNF has also pledged to defuse tensions between the state and Tamils by giving assurances that thorny issues that have irked Tamils such as the PTA, the pass system in Vavuniya and registration of Tamils in Colombo will be addressed. These issues will however only be the background to negotiations with the LTTE and the government, which, if everything goes well are expected to commence later in the year.

The announcement by the government on approaching peace talks has changed the way the state represented the problem of ethnic minorities in this country. Political parties have off and on made strident comments on the minorities, while on other occasions they have targeted them militarily.

President D. B. Wijetunge said the minorities depended on the majority as the creeper did on the tree, while President Chandrika Kumaratunga said she was waging war for peace but launched military operations to crush Tamil aspirations. But today both the rhetoric and the military offensive are suspended.

The other component of the UNF's agenda is economic. Obviously there is privatisation (or de-regulation) on the cards and freeing prices from artificial constraints such as state intervention, thereby allowing forces of the market to operate with less restrictions. The move to set the local price of fuel in keeping with that of international prices, is a case in point.

The twin agendas of beginning negotiations with the LTTE and de-escalating violence on the one hand and pushing economic reform on the other, have prompted different reactions from other political formations. This includes the left parties.

The left which has never looked upon the UNF (or UNP) as a friend, is faced with the problem of responding to the latest gestures by the government. Till 1994, the left criticised the UNP as an organisation that bore all the characteristics that define the ultra-right party, which is the curse of many third world countries.

The left said that the 1983 ethnic pogrom was part of moves for Sinhala domination of the state to help capitalist expansion. A pogrom was needed to propel the Sinhala business classes to monopolise certain businesses that were traditionally controlled by the Tamils, such as the wholesale business in the Pettah or the jewellery business on Sea Street.

Similarly, the left was critical of the privatisation programme that was pushed by the UNP and President R. Premadasa. It asserted that this would lead to mass poverty and an economy that was dependent on imports even to fulfil its basic needs. What is more, it was also said that there would be unemployment and industrial unrest due to restrictions placed on the movement of labour.

Finally, there is the issue of good governance, The left criticised the UNP because it had a record of rigging elections starting from the referendum in 1982, to politicising the public service and governing according to the dictates of astrology rather than on the basis of rational discourse.

When the UNP was routed in 1994, it was seen as the just deserts to a capitalist party that had misgoverned, paved the way to increasing poverty and permitted state-sponsored terrorism. The public was told to expect a new culture where human rights would be respected and democracy and good governance restored.

But what a dismal failure it was! For one the LSSP and CP joined forces with the SLFP to form the PA. This meant that there would be no critique of the SLFP-dominated PA from the traditional left. The privatisation programme not only went on apace, but gathered momentum under the PA with the free floating of the rupee etc. The LSSP did make a few noises about work stoppages in the event of privatisation, but that was mostly through the initiative of Vasudeva Nanayakkara. When he went his way, the LSSP became a pious follower of the SLFP in the coalition.

There was nothing progressive at all in the way the PA handled the war. Discrimination against the Tamils increased, while war mongering reached heights that the UNP could never have dreamed of. The slogan of 'war for peace'; was never opposed by the LSSP and indeed when the LTTE declared a unilateral cessation of hostilities in November 2000 one of the most vociferous opponents of the move was LSSP leader Batty Weerakoon.

Similarly, even on democracy issues Weerakoon made a public statement that suggested that even if the UNF had a majority in the elections, the president was not obliged to form a government with that party.

But with the UNF government in power, there is a belief among left forces that new space has opened up to criticise capitalist development. There are two areas that have been seen as yielding good potential for attack.

One is the peace process. There has been a criticism that the UNF trusts the LTTE too much. The argument is that as in the past the peace process might collapse leaving the country vulnerable to the LTTE. It calls for adequate safeguards so that even if the government is taken for a 'ride' it will be resilient enough to recover.

The other issue is that of privatisation. The left argues that in the era of globalisation, the UNF's agenda is to integrate Sri Lanka better with the world economy by encouraging trade, foreign investments and cash crops, while neglecting issues that relate to the poverty-stricken rural household.

The left has also been critical of the UNF for the unrestrained actions of the JSS and has said that the programme of good governance cannot be credible with trade unions emasculating the public service with their actions.

The left has to understand that its role has to be more than mere words. Not only now, but even in the past, when workers were thrown out during successive privatisation deals, the left basically kept quiet or made token noises. What has it done for those whose jobs have been gobbled by multinationals?

Secondly, while criticising the UNF for not demanding for reciprocation from the LTTE to carry forward the peace process, the traditional left's principled position on Tamil demands - that of self-determination - is no longer articulated. It has watered down its position to the point that it is a PA position, which is no more than a joke. Wickramabahu Karunaratne's NSSP articulates the demand for self-determination but nothing more.

This lacunae has permitted rumps like the JVP to masquerade as 'progressive.' The JVP's ideology on socialist centralisation with a strong dose of Sinhala nationalism shows that it lives in the past and uses ideology to appeal to its vote bank rather than bring genuine transformation of society.

In contrast, progressive forces elsewhere in the world have displayed much greater combat-prowess than the Sri Lankan left. The repeated demonstrations against globalisation such as at G-7 summits or WTO conferences show a commitment that goes beyond mere words.

The left forces in Sri Lanka should understand that their credibility will be acknowledged only if they can mobilise forces which withstand the exploitation of ethnic groups, workers or gender. If they cannot withstand them, at least they have to provide a safety-net that will give some sort of succour to the victims. It is commitment that wins adherents, not mere words.

"The national press that screamed dire warnings to the central government would rather Delhi shied away from its obligations as the regional power to assist the resolution of this South Asian conflict - and thereby risk the ridicule of its global peers - than secure the kudos that come with hosting peace efforts. As Delhi appreciates there are many countries that would welcome the opportunity but few have the required geographical proximity or geopolitical weight (or crucially Indian support) to do so. As most observers of Sri Lanka's conflict are increasingly aware, the matter of a venue will prove a key consideration before any talks. India arguably has first refusal on hosting negotiations (the ban on the LTTE is incidently irrelevant - Norwegian peace efforts are progressing unhindered on British soil). Delhi should seize the chance - despite the shortsighted domestic cacophony."

- Tamil Guardian editorial of January 16, 2002

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

Anton Stanislaus Balasingham wrote an official letter to Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and handed it over personally to the Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister Vidar Helgeson on January 4, 2002. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam organisation's political adviser and chief negotiator outlined two requests to New Delhi on behalf of the LTTE in that missive. Firstly the Tigers wanted India to allow Anton Balasingham and wife Adele Anne to relocate to Chennai temporarily; secondly the LTTE wanted Norway facilitated talks to be hosted by India in a South Indian city like Chennai, Thiruvananthapuram or Bangalore. The second request was predicated on receiving a favourable response to the first.

Twin requests

When details of the twin requests were first publicised in the Indian media, a storm of protest erupted. The Tamil Guardian weekly published in London noted in its editorial commentary that, "the Liberation Tigers' request to India to provide a venue for future negotiations between them and the Sri Lankan government created controversy on an unexpected scale." The journal known to reflect the LTTE viewpoint expressed its disappointment over the turn of events and urged that the final Indian response should be positive despite the initial negative reaction of Tamil Nadu political parties and the press. An important paragraph excerpted from that reader depicts this line of thought clearly -

"The national press that screamed dire warnings to the central government would rather Delhi shied away from its obligations as the regional power to assist the resolution of this South Asian conflict - and thereby risk the ridicule of its global peers - than secure the kudos that come with hosting peace efforts. As Delhi appreciates there are many countries that would welcome the opportunity but few have the required geographical proximity or geopolitical weight (or crucially Indian support) to do so. As most observers of Sri Lanka's conflict are increasingly aware, the matter of a venue will prove a key consideration before any talks .India arguably has first refusal on hosting negotiations (the ban on the LTTE is incidently irrelevant - Norwegian peace efforts are progressing unhindered on British soil). Delhi should seize the chance - despite the shortsighted domestic cacophony."

There are however signs that notwithstanding the hostile reaction at a popular level, the Indian government at a higher level had not shut the door on the LTTE proposals firmly as yet. A news report in 'The Hindu' of January 20, stated that "informed discussions between the ministries of external affairs and home on the subject were held and that the dominant view was to keep the LTTE at bay from the southern states." Apparently, the home ministry felt that "the matter was a closed chapter". Yet the well informed newspaper held out a silver lining in the same report. There was however a possibility that "the decision could be reconsidered at the highest level in the government" noted 'The Hindu'.

Low - key visit

A major development in this regard was the low - key visit to Tamil Nadu by Indian union minister Vasunthara Raje. She is of royal lineage and is the sister of Gwalior Maharajah Madhavarao Scindia who died in an air crash recently. Her political credentials however are quite high at this point of time as Vasunthara Raje is reputed to be a very close confidante of Prime Minister Vajpayee. She is one of his most trusted and loyal deputies. Her visit to Tamil Nadu and consequent meeting with Jayalalitha Jayaram is perceived as a significant move under the present circumstances. Jayalalitha is the leader of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazgagham that rules the state now. Compelled to relinquish the chief ministership by a Supreme Court decree Jayalalitha has now removed the legal barrier and awaits election to the legislature via a by - election in Aandipatty. Thereafter she will become chief minister again. With or without the CM post Jayalalitha still remains the most powerful person in the state as it is openly acknowledged that the present Chief Minister Panneerselvam is a mere puppet dancing obediently to his 'Thalaivi's' tune.

Details of the Vasunthara Raje - Jayalalitha meeting are not known but political analysts speculate that two matters were discussed. One was about a possible shift in political alliances. The AIADMK is now isolated with all erstwhile allies who contested along with the party last year breaking off the relationship. At the same time the chief opposition DMK that is nominally aligned with the governing party at the centre - Bharatiya Janata Party - is straining at the leash. It is only a matter of time before the DMK splits from the BJP led alliance. There are several influential personalities in the state who are pushing for BJP - AIADMK rapprochement. Thus, Vasuntara Raje's visit could have been to sound Jayalalitha out on this.

The second reason is supposedly the LTTE issue. Both the AIADMK chief minister and Jayalalitha have come out strongly against the centre agreeing to Tiger proposals. It is well known that the non - committal attitude of former chief minister and DMK leader Muttuvel Karunanidhi is due mainly to fear of Jayalalitha branding him as anti - national on the issue. He has said that it is a matter for the central government and that he will abide by whatever decision taken by New Delhi. It is Jayalalitha who has openly warned New Delhi against concessions to the Tigers. Therefore if Jayalalitha could be made to change her stance on this then the DMK too will fall in line. If the two most powerful parties in the state agree then the central government would have no difficulty in agreeing to the LTTE, if it so desires. The other parties in Tamil Nadu do not matter. So it is quite possible that Vasuntara Raje may have been exploring possibilities of making Jayalalitha change her position if necessary in the future.

There is another hurdle on the national level even if the AIADMK and DMK agree. This is the Sonia Gandhi led congress which though insignificant in Tamil Nadu, is powerful in the country. Sonia is the opposition leader in parliament and a prime minister in waiting. Besides the party is in the saddle in the southern states of Karnataka, Kerala and Pondicherry, the union territory. Given the backdrop of Rajiv Gandhi's assassination it is expected that Sonia and the congress will object vehemently to the LTTE being granted its requests. There are however countervailing factors also.

Sonia Gandhi has a better grasp of foreign policy imperatives than most parties in Tamil Nadu. In recent times she has established a good relationship with Vajpayee. The expulsion of her estranged sister - in - law Maneka Gandhi from the cabinet is attributed to this. It is also important to note that Sonia has displayed greater magnanimity towards Nalini the Indian woman sentenced to death in the Rajiv murder. When her minions and minor parties were urging that Nalini should be hanged along with her husband Murugan, Sonia Gandhi urged the president that clemency should be shown because the couple's child born in prison would be orphaned. This plea helped greatly in getting the death sentence commuted to life imprisonment. It is also noteworthy that when interested parties were raising a furore about the LTTE targeting Sonia, the lady herself maintained a dignified silence. Ever since she took up active leadership of the congress, Sonia Gandhi has been chartering a course looking to the future instead of harking back to the past. She has nothing to lose and much to gain by being magnanimous. So there is a chance that Vajpayee may be able to persuade Sonia to agree to the centre acceding to the LTTE's requests if and when the opportunity arises.

This does not mean that Vajpayee himself is prepared to grant the LTTE its requests. It only means that the government is exploring all its options and is not prepared to be guided by the ill - informed and misguided passions of Tamil Nadu. It means in the words of 'The Hindu', that the decision of not granting the requests could be reconsidered at the highest level in the future. The LTTE hopes that such a reappraisal will occur and that as the 'Tamil Guardian' suggests "Delhi should seize the chance despite the shortsighted cacophony". The LTTE's optimism is based on a certain line of thought.

The LTTE perspective is two - fold in this. On one level the requests particularly relating to Anton Balasingham's health are 'humanitarian' . On another level they are political in nature. The truism about no man being indispensable is not applicable in the context of the peace process and Balasingham's role in it. It is he who almost single - handedly initiated it on behalf of the LTTE. It is he who persuaded the LTTE hierarchy into remaining committed to it despite all the negative tactics of the Kumaratunga - Kadirgamar duo. Balasingham is in a unique position of being trusted to a great extent by his leader Velupillai Prabhakaran on this issue. Having brought the peace process to this level he now needs to confer with Prabhakaran in confidence on a one to one basis. Also his abiding presence is needed for the talks to progress. Balasingham's role therefore, is crucial for the peace process as far as the LTTE is concerned.

It is well known that Balasingham's health is in a delicate state and that extra care is needed medically. It is also known that the same situation prevents him from travelling longer distances on a regular basis. At the same time the impoverished Wanni does not have any proper medical facility to 'house' Balasingham even for a short period. The security situation in the south, given the rising opposition to talks and also against the backdrop of incidents like 'Athurugiriya' prevent his staying in Colombo. Also his particular ailments need sophisticated attention not so easily available in Colombo. Whereas they are readily available in India like for instance in the reputed Apollo hospital where former foreign minister Kadirgamar himself underwent a kidney transplant. Thus it is clear that a South Indian location is suitable in practical terms to resolve Balasingham's predicament.

The Balasingham factor and security related problems also deem it necessary that a South Indian location is accepted as venue for talks. Notwithstanding the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the LTTE requests, the reality is that the Tiger position can only be constant on this. Thus the progress of the peace process could at some stage be affected by this issue. If the process collapses on this point and war erupts those opposing the conceding of the Tiger requests would have to share some of the blame at least. This is likely to place India in an embarrassing situation.

Constructive role

On the other hand the talks commencing at an Indian venue with Indian observers gives that country a firm yet non - controversial direct role in the island's affairs again. It would regain the role it has temporarily abdicated to Norway while Oslo remains in the picture still. India is not required to be the intermediary but only give logistical aid as hosts. There is no question of revoking the LTTE ban. If New Delhi accepts this position and grants the LTTE's requests it would once again be playing a constructive role instead of uttering verbal assurances. If India does not agree then it will disappoint the silent majority of peace - loving people in the island. More importantly it will lose its moral right to involve itself in the island's affairs. This could have far reaching implications in the future.

This then is the rationale behind the LTTE's line of thought. It seems optimistic that New Delhi will review the situation and compel Tamil Nadu to veer around in the future. Many Indian analysts however disagree. It is certain that New Delhi faces a dilemma on this. Only time will tell whether Tiger expectations would be fulfilled.

By The Insider

The UNF Government's stated commitment to delivering the preliminary results of its administrative success in just 100 days was devised to capture the public's imagination. The implication was: "Many of the problems that face our society are amenable to simple solutions. Here, watch us. This is how easy it is!"

A hundred days is not a long time, but it does represent 4.56% of the government's six-year term. A reminder, if nothing else, that the clock is ticking. But tick it ever so loudly, it is now clear to all but the blissful few with green blood in their veins that something has gone badly wrong with the UNF. The promise of a self-disciplined, clean efficient government led by young professionals has gone badly awry. Electors who just two months ago braved all odds to sweep Chandrika Kumaratunga's mouldy, disintegrating PA out of office are now wondering aloud if they have not fallen from the frying pan into the fire.

Class monitor -Wickremesinghe

With fifty-something ministers tooting, flashing and shoving their weight about the nation's streets, Ranil Wickremesinghe's dismantling of Colombo's roadblocks seems to be little more than eyewash, with sins of commission being swapped for sins of omission. Declining to act the role of class monitor, Wickremesinghe has bestowed on his ministers the freedom of the wild ass. If ever the UNF had an agenda for development and progress, it is already dead and buried, unheralded and unsung. The promise of the 100-day programme has evaporated, and an increasingly disillusioned public finds itself torn between the corruption of the People's Alliance and the slothful inactivity of the UNF. Of course it must be pointed out that contrary to last week's report, Minister M. H. Mohomed has not ordered a new Volvo but is using an old one from his ministry albeit with CC number plates leading to the impression it was a new purchase.

A cursory examination of the government's 100 day programme is sufficient to predict that when it expires (mind you, no one says when the countdown started, though one presumes it was on December 12, when the cabinet was sworn in) on March 21, Sri Lanka will be barely a better place than it was on December 5, last. For the most part, the programmes of the various ministries have nothing whatever to do with why people voted for the UNF as opposed to the PA or JVP. The 100-day programme's promises are largely vacuous, irrelevant and have nothing whatever to do with the urgent reforms that are needed to kick start the economy and get development activity fired up.

Karuwala Jayasuriya

One of the most pressing problems the UNF inherited was the power crisis. Hot on the heels of being sworn in, Power and Energy Minister Karu Jayasuriya's promise to illuminate or depart (in the Royal College idiom, one might say illuminar‚ aut discede), for which he wanted a full 180 days, sounded serious. His following this up by sending a monk to do the rounds of the hydro reservoirs uttering mantras did not. When this was followed by the re-introduction of power cuts, Jayasuriya himself was constrained to joke that his first name was short for 'Karuwala' (Sinhala for darkness). Notwithstanding the minister's droll sense of humour, if religious platitudes could have solved Sri Lanka's pressing problems, we would be a developed country by now.

Adding fuel to this fire has been a speculation of Jayasuriya's support of former army commander and Chief of Defence Staff Rohan Daluwatte, a fellow Anandian, whose nomination by President Kumaratunga as Sri Lanka's first ambassador to Brazil was said to have received Jayasuriya's (and hence the UNF's) unstinted support. This in turn has led a section of the public to question whether it is the mystic link Jayasuriya and Daluwatte share as devotees of the deity Satya Sai Baba, or the bond of their alma mater, Ananda College, that has led to the disgraced general's nomination being endorsed.

Only the flies are different

Jayasuriya for his part has vehemently denied the allegation and stated categorically he had nothing to do with Daluwatte's appointment.

Minister Jayasuriya it has however now surfaced was instrumental in bringing back DIG Nimal Mediwaka to the central province having persuaded Minister Rauf Hakeem not to raise objections. Mediwaka as revealed elsewhere in this newspaper has rented out a house in Battaramulla to the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation through the good offices of the former Minister of Power and Energy Anuruddha Ratwatte for a princely sum of Rs. 45,000 per month. The CPC is which is now under Jayasuriya's purview. It is the same Mediwaka who has prevented the recording of Ratwatte's statement and arrest for the Udathalawinna massacre.

And the way things are going, as one wag put it, "it is the same s**t with different flies."

As Deputy Leader of the UNP, Jayasuriya was heralded as the party's engine of reform. The country as a whole reposed enormous faith in his credibility and honesty. While we have no reason to question either, the minister's slumberous inactivity in keeping the promises he made while in opposition is bewildering.

Take the case of Chief Justice Sarath Silva, against whom the UNP brought an impeachment motion barely six months ago. It was none other than Jayasuriya who spearheaded the movement against Silva, ably supported by Lokubandara, Ravi Karunanayake and Rajitha Senaratne. All four are now ministers in the UNF Government, and there is not a whisper from them as to what their stance on this issue is now. Their silence in turn has led to the public entertaining dark suspicions that a deal has been struck.

The office of Chief Justice however, is a sacred one.

It is not a place from which deals are made. The allegations against Silva were serious indeed: Jayasuriya et alia claimed not only that he was morally unfit to hold the post, but that he was guilty of judicial misconduct. They recited chapter and verse of the Chief Justice's alleged transgressions. To this day, Silva has not answered these charges. Neither have Jayasuriya and the UNF retracted them.

What then is the Chief Justice's position vis-…-vis the UNF Government? Is he fit to hold office? If so, why are the charges made against him not retracted? If he is not deemed fit to hold office, why is he not removed by impeachment?

Charity towards Ronnie Peiris

Likewise the UNF's criticism while in opposition of Bank of Ceylon Chairman Ken Balendra, who was sufficiently guilty in the eyes of Ravi Karunanayake, Rajitha Senaratne, Karunasena Kodituwakku and Bandula Gunawardena to actually be reported to the Bribery Commission. He was, claimed these ministers when in opposition, responsible for waiving Rs 15 million in interest as a favour to President Chandrika Kumaratunga's crony, the well-known commission agent, Ronnie Peiris. Balendra never answered the charges, and has never denied responsibility for his actions. What is more, he has also failed to disclose whether he was requested to do this favour by Kumaratunga, his appointing authority. In that case, it would be a gross abuse of power on her part and certainly an impeachable offence. If not, what motivated Balendra's charity towards Peiris, to whose notoriety he can hardly have been oblivious?

Most importantly, Bank of Ceylon chairman did not reply his accusers. Could it then be that Finance Minister Cassie Choksy was unaware of the serious charges that had been levelled against Balendra by his fellow ministers, Karunanayake, Kodituwakku, Senaratne and Gunawardena? The UNF's deafening silence on this issue is a telling indictment of the transparency it professes to espouse. Ministers Karu Jayasuriya, Lokubandara, Ravi Karunanayake, Karunasena Kodituwakku, Bandula Gunawardena and Rajitha Senaratne should be honest enough to either retract their indictments of Ken Balendra and Chief Justice Silva and apologise to them, or to press for their removal. There is no middle ground on this issue. Or is it that the Rahula College mafia is simply being replaced by a Royal College mafia, given that Wickremesinghe, Karunanayake, Balendra, Treasury Secretary Charitha Ratwatte and even UNP Chairman Malik Samarawickrema are alumni of the latter?

As reported in the Suranimala column on page 8 of today's issue, since the prime minister and Minister Karu Jayasuriya have already agreed to give President Chandrika Kumaratunga time on state television and radio to make a statement on charges levelled against her and the PSD of a criminal nature, the least these ministers can do is also ask time from the prime minister and make similar statements of explanation on the issues of Balendra and the CJ's impeachment. Especially since serious aspersions have been cast on their credibility over silence on these issues.

Against all odds

For his part, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe is staying focused entirely on the peace initiative, working furiously to balance the LTTE's sensitivities against those of Sinhala chauvinist elements in the south. Whether this is a strength or a weakness is yet to be seen, for Wickremesinghe has in effect distanced himself from his government, which has been left to its own lackadaisical devices. The prime minister has thus effectively separated his image from the numerous suspect appointments made by the UNF and cut for himself the figure of Mr. Clean in his own cabinet.

His anxiety to keep criticism at bay is evident from the manner in which he has chosen to interact with the media. While we moved for a monthly US-style stand-up news conference where the prime minister would face unrehearsed questions from a broad section of the media, Wickremesinghe has opted to have monthly off the record in camera meetings with editors. This is hardly cricket. For one thing, wining and dining a handful of newspaper editors (even if it were to include the editor of this newspaper) and chatting with them off the record is almost tantamount to bribing them into silence. How could an editor eat the prime minister's bread and then go on to criticise his actions, especially if everything the prime minister has told him is off limits?

With the help of some booze

Sadly, for their part the editors have hardly established themselves as a paragons of virtue. At Wickremesinghe's first meeting with the Editors' Guild two weeks ago, it was not just for greater governmental accountability or transparency that they asked; it was not candid exchanges at frequent press conferences they sought; put simply, they told him they wanted a Press Club complete with a licensed bar. The reputation of newspaper editors as tipplers and soakers was firmly entrenched in the public's mind by Mangala Samaraweera, who said journalists could be bought for a bottle of Arrack. The editors' request to Wickremesinghe for a respectable tavern then, would come as music to Samaraweera's ears. What is more, Wickremesinghe has now received a clear message from the Editors Guild in writing as to where its priorities lie: that editors thirst not so much for truth as for Arrack. True enough, these were references to media reforms but introducing a whole section calling for bar facilities in a written document to the prime minister signed by no less a person than the President of the Editors Guild, was to say the least nauseating.

Both Wickremesinghe and the news editors, whether state or private, must come to terms that the media represent a distinct estate of the nation, equal to the executive, the legislature and the judiciary. A licensed bar should be on the priority lists of none of these. The job of the media is to report the truth, especially when relevant to the public interest. Likewise, there should be nothing politicians have to say to the media off the record: that tradition is for officials and spin doctors.

The public never knocks twice

Wickremesinghe should have the courage to face the press squarely, with a clear conscience and a brave heart. No doubt he will have awkward questions to face, but these are questions to which the public who elected him have a right to expect answers. By dodging them and keeping the editors in bread and water, Wickremesinghe will only do himself and his legacy untold damage, damage he may well not be equal to repairing come the next election. Read our lips, Mr. Prime Minister: it is far better to face up to controversy now, with a clean slate before you, than months hence when your government may well be weakened through intrigue, defections, an aggressive opposition and public antipathy. Like the postman, the public never knocks twice.

Blamed for inaction

It is also imperative that Wickremesinghe spells out a clear political, economic and development agenda, and identifies the mechanisms by which these will be implemented and monitored. The peace process, we grant, requires diplomacy, tact and secrecy; Wickremesinghe's pledge that any deal he strikes with the LTTE will be put to a referendum should be sufficient to assuage public apprehensions about what is going on behind the scenes. For our part, we will do nothing to derail this process.

But it is abundantly clear that the day to day business of government lacks an agenda. What is the UNF's stance on the impeachment of Chandrika Kumaratunga? Will it bring the killers of Kumar Ponnambalam, and their accomplices, to book? What is its tax reform policy? How does it intend fuelling infrastructure development? This ought to be the government's agenda, and the UNP had seven whole years to think of the solutions. Nevertheless, it is yet to articulate any of them.

Put your mind back to 1994-95 when, in the wake of the far less ignominious defeat the UNP suffered, it withdrew into introspective silence. Criticised for inaction then, Ranil Wickremesinghe said the opposition ought to give the PA government a chance to prove itself. Well, the UNF has no such luxury now. As Nimal Siripala de Silva demonstrated so ably in parliament following the prime minister's policy statement, the PA's fighting spirit is very much intact.

What is more, the opposition is gearing to elect a new leader and take the UNF on headlong, 60 days not yet having elapsed since its election defeat. Add to this the spectre of the all-powerful Chandrika Kumaratunga manipulating the UNF leadership like putty in her hands, and the picture of weak government is complete. The moment this weakness becomes evident to the LTTE, one can be sure they will stall on the talks: no one wants to truce or parley with a loser. Could this be why the Tigers have started a new recruitment drive in the East? That is the question a sober editor should ask. As for the UNF government, it must understand that first impressions count and count hell of a lot.

By Frederica Jansz

Ranmal Kodituwakku, Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) and son of the Inspector General of Police, Lucky Kodituwakku, on Tuesday January 22, this year, was involved in an ugly incident at an official inquiry being held at the National Human Rights Commission in Colombo.

Nimal Punchihewa, inquiring officer at the NHRC says that Kodituwakku behaved in an ugly manner and had threatened him before ordering the three cops who were present at the inquiry to leave with him.

On that day, Nimal Punchihewa was conducting an inquiry into a complaint of illegal arrest against three policemen of the rank 'Officers in Charge of Police' (OICs).

Punchihewa says that ASP Ranmal Kodituwakku (who had been called as a witness) had entered the room, disrupted the inquiry, used abusive language against the inquiring officer and walked away with the three police officers facing the inquiry.

Earlier, the NHRC had ordered these police officers not to interfere with the complainant as there was no criminal charge against him. The three officers, however, proceeded to arrest the complainant in defiance of the NHRC order.

Kodituwakku later made a complaint at the Borella police station against the inquiring officer and tried to summon the inquiring officer to the police station for a 'policy inquiry'. This, however, had been resisted by the NHRC.

Meanwhile, the car license number of Nimal Punchihewa was taken down by ASP Kodituwakku and the inquiring officer has now been forced to change vehicles to avoid possible harm.

Faisz Musthapha, Chairman of the NHRC said the matter has been brought to his notice by the inquiring officer concerned. The Commission members he said would meet shortly and decide on what steps should be taken. "We are keeping an open mind. However, if we are satisfied that the events took place as the inquiring officer says they did, we will then take very serious action and may report Kodituwakku for contempt," Musthapha said.

J. C. Weliamune, Attorney-at-Law, said this incident, can cause tremendous discouragement to the people seeking redress against human rights violations, in a country where very grave violations take place in great numbers.

Commenting further on the incident, Weliamune said, if the commission's authority is allowed to be undermined by such open abuse and insult, there will be serious harm to the public image as well as, more importantly, public confidence in this institution.

Given the stature of ASP Kodituwakku, members of the NHRC said it is unlikely that any serious action will be taken against him by the police.

Incidentally, there is also a pending inquiry against ASP Kodituwakku for maintaining a torture chamber.

ASP Ranmal Kodituwakku in his statement to the Borella police following the incident says, that at approximately 12 p.m. on January 22, 2002, he had arrived at the NHRC along with CI Sisira Fernando, IP Rohan Perera and IP D. Elvitigala for a complaint regarding an unlawful arrest made by CI Sisira Fernando.

"When we arrived at the Human Rights Commission we first met the investigative officer Mr. K. T. K. P. Arampath. He informed us that our matter will be taken up shortly. After over forty five minutes of waiting we were summoned by Mr. Punchihewa. In addition to the above mentioned officers, K. T. K. P. Arampath and a female clerk were present. After reading the charges against us Mr. Punchihewa asked me what I had to say."

Kodituwakku goes on to say that after giving a description of what their duties are as police officers he informed Punchihewa that as an inquiring officer he had no authority to decide if a criminal case entertained at the Special Crimes Investigation Bureau was of a civil nature or not. Kodituwakku then states that Punchihewa began shivering in a fit of rage and started shouting at him stating that he was out of line to tell him anything like that and that "I should know I am before the Commission on Human Rights."

Kodituwakku had also brought up the issue of rank, saying he is a high ranking officer and Punchihewa had no business to speak to him in that manner. Kodituwakku has alleged that Punchihewa also referred to his father, the IGP, in a manner that was insulting, unprofessional and biased.

Kodituwakku adds that Punchihewa had also threatened him with assault before asking him to get out. Kodituwakku reiterates that he has visited the Human Rights Commission many times before but never encountered such an 'ugly incident.'

The NHRC of Sri Lanka is a national institution based on the Paris Principles (agreed international guidelines for national human rights institutions. It was inaugurated in 1994 under heavy national and international pressure in response to the colossal number of human rights abuses taking place in the country since the late 1980s. Since its inception, it has been under heavy pressure from the perpetrators, who are mostly law enforcement officers, and from politicians. These pressures have hindered its development. ASP Kodituwakku's open defiance of the NHRC occurs within this context.

Meanwhile, Basil Fernando, from the Asian Human Rights Commission has written to President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe about the incident.

Fernando says, "This is a shocking act of abuse against an inquiring body working under the powers vested in it by law; it is a grave abuse of the legal process. That it has been done by a police officer of high rank makes things much worse. This undermines the National Human Rights Commission and weakens its powers to investigate abuses in the country."

He has urged the government to ensure the interdiction of the alleged culprit, ASP Ranmal Kodituwakku, pending an investigation; to hold proper and open inquiries into the incident; and to take serious disciplinary action against the culprit.