Going soft on a paper General
By Frederica Jansz
Stunning disclosures into the horrifying mass murder of ten Muslim youth
at Udathalwinna on December 5, last year reveal that the new United National Front
government is soft peddling the shocking assassinations. Senior cops investigating the
dastardly crime have been ordered to leave General Anuruddha Ratwatte and his two sons,
Lohan and Chanuka - alone.
This is despite the fact that damning evidence the police have unearthed
prove the former deputy defence minister's culpability in the killing of the ten youth.
(see box).
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Not only is the government of Ranil
Wickremesinghe treating Anuruddha Ratwatte and his two errant sons with kid gloves, Leader
of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress Rauf Hakeem is also strangely silent on the issue.
The fact remains that Hakeem entered Parliament in December 2001 over the
ten dead bodies of these Muslim youth who were trying to safeguard his ballots when they
were brutally slain by members of the Army's Vijayabha regiment.
Playing hard to get
Hakeem can no longer be heard on the issue and evades journalists who try
to question him on the progress of the ongoing investigation. Now in a seat of power,
Hakeem plays hard to get. Udathalwinna is fast becoming a distant memory for the new
minister.
Superintendent of Police, K. Udugampola, heading the investigation into
the murder of the ten Muslim youth at Udathalwinna on December 5, last year, was ordered
to desist from pressurising or recording a statement from General Anuruddha Ratwatte. The
general and his two sons remain key suspects in the horrifying massacre while the latter
have opted to hide from the long arm of the law.
Our investigation has found that on January 20, this year, Udugampola had
sufficient evidence to request Anuruddha Ratwatte to present himself in Kandy in order
that the cop could record his statement on the murders which implicated not only his two
sons but Ratwatte senior himself.
Udugampola's request was conveyed via a radio message to the Welikada
police to be relayed to Anuruddha Ratwatte who now resides in the Rajagiriya area. The
summons requested Ratwatte to present himself in Kandy on January 29, 2002.
Udugampola's official request however was overturned. Orders came from the
top were subsequently conveyed to the Welikada police on January 25, 2002, squashing
Udugampola's previous request. A top cop insisted that Udugampola withdraw his summons and
the Welikada police were asked to convey another message to Gen. Ratwatte informing that
his presence in Kandy on January 29, 2002 "was not necessary," in connection
with the Udathalwinna killings.
Assisting a killer squad
The police investigation headed by Udugampola has since been transferred
to Colombo and to SP Sisira Mendis of the Criminal Investigations Department. What 'deal'
Ratwatte has struck with the new UNF government to evade arrest of both himself and his
two sons is the question that now begs answer.
We have since found that top cops are still indebted to Anuruddha
Ratwatte. Having accepted favours from the former PA strongman these policemen are now
bowing and scrapping, twisting the law to hide a man guilty of conniving with a killer
squad from the Sri Lanka Army.
For example, Deputy Inspector General of Police Nimal Mediwaka, under
whose supervision Udugampola is working on the Udathalawinna case, has rented out his
private residence at 82/56 Wickremasinghepura, 14th Lane, Battaramulla to the Ceylon
Petroleum Corporation. The CPC pays Mediwaka Rs. 45,000/- as monthly rental. The two-year
lease was sealed on December 1, 2000 during the tenure of Gen. Ratwatte as Minister for
the CPC.
This is probably why Mediwaka is now calling rank to suppress an
investigation that will finally nail Anuruddha Ratwatte and his offspring.
Police sleuths investigating the case have found hard evidence that
incriminates General Anuruddha Ratwatte in the massacre at Udathalwinna. Today, we will
document in brief some of this evidence and in the nations interest push for justice that
is being denied to the families of the ten murdered young men - all of whom hail from
Madawala in the Kandy district.
Police reports have stated that gathered evidence proves Anuruddha
Ratwatte had assisted the killer squad on that fateful day and withheld information with
regard to the massacre of the ten youth at Udathalawinna.
Senior sleuths state that there is sufficient police evidence to call for
the arrest of General Anuruddha Ratwatte for aiding and abetting the mass murder of ten
young boys.
Prevented from arresting Ratwatte
Angry and frustrated cops say that because they are being prevented from
arresting Anuruddha Ratwatte, they have been also stopped short from taking into custody
Lohan and Chanuka Ratwatte. Witnesses to the horrifying crime are also afraid to come
forward and lend evidence as long as the Ratwatte's remain at large.
Below are some of the statements made by senior army personnel to top cops
investigating the crime including the two Army drivers employed by Gen. Ratwatte who were
present at Udathalwinna and a witness to the massacre of the ten youth on December 5,
2001.
Brigadier Hulangamuwa, in his statement before police has said from the
year 1994 he has worked as Defence Coordinating Secretary to Anuruddha Ratwatte. From
December 1, 2000 Hulangamuwa took over as Ratwatte's Private Secretary.
On November 28, 2001, he says Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte had informed him
that in view of the forthcoming General Election he wanted a Lt. Wijeyratne from the
Vijayabha regiment to report to him for duty in Kandy. Hulangamuwa says that Ratwatte had
told him that he (Ratwatte) knew Lt. Wijeyratne on a personal level and trusted him
implicitly. Ratwatte had also impressed upon Hulangamuwa that Lt. Wijeyratne's presence
during the election was vital as Wijeyratne was familiar with the entire district of Kandy
and knew the area like the back of his hand.
The plot thickens
Hulangamuwa has told police investigators that Ratwatte had told him to
notify the Army Commander to release Lt. Wijeyratne together with a platoon of soldiers to
report to the general in Kandy.
Hulangamuwa claims he conveyed this order to Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle.
Later, Hulangamuwa says he was informed by the Army's Central Commander for Kandy,
Brigadier R. B. Tammita that an army platoon of 15 personnel led by Lt. Wijeyratne were on
their way to Ratwatte's Kandy residence and that they had been told their orders would be
handed out by General Ratwatte.
Brigadier Hulangamuwa there after maintains that as far as he is aware on
December 6, 2001, General Anuruddha Ratwatte had spoken to Lt. Wijeyratne and his team of
soldiers after they had reported back to him following the conclusion of the election on
December 5. Hulangamuwa claims that Ratwatte had then instructed the platoon to report
back to their army base at Kurunegala.
Hulangamuwa has stated that the entire responsibility for this platoon,
which included the their duties and actions and meeting their daily needs was attended to
by Gen. Ratwatte. The 15 man squad led by Lt. Wijeyratne during their entire stay in
Kandy, functioned under the direct command of General Anuruddha Ratwatte, Hulangamuwa told
police.
Army Chief Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle in his statement to police has said
that despite him being the Commander for the Sri Lanka Army he has never had any direct
dealings with Anuruddha Ratwatte. Balagalle claims that all coordination work on behalf of
the former Deputy Defence Minister was handled by Brigadier Hulangamuwa.
On November 29, 2001, Balagalle says Brigadier Hulangamuwa had spoken to
him and informed him that Lt. Wijeyratne and 15 other soldiers should be recalled and sent
with immediate effect to Kandy and told to report to Anuruddha Ratwatte's house.
According to the order, Balagalle had immediately coordinated with
Brigadier N. E. Jayasuriya and told him to find Lt. Wijeyratne and together with 28 other
soldiers they should all be dispatched to the Pallakele Army Base Camp. Balagalle states
that he instructed Brigadier Jayasuriya that from the 28 soldiers 15 of them together with
Lt. Wijeyratne must be sent to Ratwatte's residence. The balance 13 soldiers the Army
chief had said should be deployed for election duty and used as sentries at checkpoints in
the Kandy district.
Balagalle thereafter states that all this information had already been
conveyed to Brigadier R. B. Tammita by Brigadier Hulangamuwa. Balagalle has added in his
statement that he was aware the soldiers were not required to provide additional security
for the Deputy Defence Minister but were wanted for secret work and would follow the
orders of Gen. Ratwatte.
The entire responsibility of summoning these soldiers and handing out
their duties was left to Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte, Balagalle has said. He has reiterated to
police that Brigadier N. E. Jayasuriya and Brigadier R. B. Tammita were also well aware of
this factor.
Balagalle goes on to say that Lt. Wijeyratne during the 2000 general
election worked closely with Anuruddha Ratwatte.
No need to be summoned
Brigadier N. E. Jayasuriya has stated that he was notified on November 30,
2001 by telephone to search for a person called Lt. Wijeyratne and to dispatch him with 28
soldiers to the Pallakele Army Base camp. He had been told that out of these 28 soldiers,
15 must accompany Lt. Wijeyratne to Anuruddha Ratwatte's residence in Kandy.
Thereafter Jayasuriya says he located Lt. Wijeyratne at the Vijayabha
regiment at the Boyagan‚ Army Camp at Kurunegala and ordered that 28 soldiers leave
for Kandy. Brigadier Jayasuriya asserts that he instructed Wijeyratne to take 15 men and
report to Anuruddha Ratwatte's residence in Kandy after they had all reported first to the
Pallakele Army Camp in Kandy.
Jayasuriya says that he informed the soldiers they would get further
instructions of their duties at Ratwatte's residence. The 28 strong platoon left
immediately for Kandy and had on the same day reported to the Pallakele army base.
Jayasuriya adds in his statement that he was fully aware this platoon were not trained to
provide security for the deputy defence minister and that there was no real need for them
to be called out by Anuruddha Ratwatte.
Brigadier R. B. Tammita, Area Base Commander for the Central Province,
confirms that on November 30, 2001 Lt. Wijeyratne with 28 soldiers reported to him at the
Pallakele Army Base Camp. Tammita had thereafter dispatched Lt. Wijeyratne with 15
soldiers to Anuruddha Ratwatte's residence. He notified Brigadier Hulangamuwa of his
actions. He adds that after sending the 15 soldiers to Ratwatte's residence the balance 13
men he ordered to report to the Sinha Regiment 11 army camp at Kandy and take over
checkpoint duties.
Brigadier Tammita says that he has a record of Lt. Wijeyratne's duties
From Nov. 30, 2001 to Dec. 5, 2001. However, on election day (Dec. 5, 2001,) Tammita says
there is no record of any untoward incidents involving Lt. Wijeyratne or any of the
soldiers assigned to that platoon.
On December 6, 2001, Brigadier Tammita states that Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte
had notified him that he had dispatched Lt. Wijeyratne and his team back to base. Tammita
asserts the platoon was duly sent back to the Boyagan‚ base at Kurunegala. Brigadier
Tammita claims that as far as he is concerned he is totally unaware of any incidents
taking place on December 5, 2001, which involved Lt. Wijeyratne and his men.
Dressed to kill
Col. Samaratunge, the Instructing Officer at the Boyagan‚ Army Camp -
Kurunegala has told police that on November 30, 2001, Brigadier N. E. Jayasuriya
instructed him to dispatch Lt. Wijeyratne who had been on holiday after serving time in
Jaffna with 28 other soldiers to the Pallakele army base camp. Samaratunge confirms that
he sent this platoon to Brigadier Jayasuriya and had duly notified Jayasuriya. He
expedited the order fast because he says he was aware that they were required to report to
the residence of Deputy Defence Minister Anuruddha Ratwatte for duty.
Corporal Rajapakse, employed as a driver to Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte says
on December 5, 2001 he drove to Anuruddha Ratwatte's residence in Kandy. On this same day
with some army personnel dressed in civvies he drove them to the Polgolla Cooperative
School at Uyanwatte. A fracas had broken out and the army personnel in this vehicle had
opened fire. One person was killed and another seriously wounded.
Thereafter Rajapakse says they followed the jeep in which Lt. Wijeyratne
was travelling in. The jeep suddenly began to chase a van that had allegedly fired at
them. At Udathalawinna the van had crashed into a lamppost and come to a stop. The
soldiers travelling with Lt. Wijeyratne had opened fire at random killing ten of the youth
inside the van.
Keeping a bloody 'secret'
Immediately after, both vehicles with all the persons involved in the
shooting proceeded to Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte's residence and had reported the incident to
the former Defence Minister. Gen. Ratwatte had instructed them to keep it 'a secret.'
Rajapakse in his statement to the police says that after the massacre he
overheard General Ratwatte congratulating Lt. Wijeyratne saying, "Honda wedek
n‚," (good job done).
Sergent S. Wijeyratne was also employed as a driver to Anuruddha Ratwatte
in April 2000. He has told police that on Nov 10, 2001 he drove his vehicle with Lohan
Ratwatte to Gampola for an election rally. He says they attacked a shop and also
threatened MP Manthilaka.
On December 2, 2001 together with Lohan Ratwatte, Sgt. Wijeyratne says
they had driven to Thalawinna and thrown a bomb at a house. On December 5, 2001, he drove
the vehicle that carried Lt. Wijeyratne. The latter had told him that a van carrying some
youth had fired at them.
He then chased the van followed by another defender (also carrying army
personnel). He says a massacre was carried out. Thereafter they reported the incident to
Anuruddha Ratwatte. They were told to keep the weapons at Ratwatte's residence and keep
the massacre a secret.
The next day (Dec. 6. 2001) he drove vehicle no. 62-3667 to Colombo. They
had removed the front windscreen, which had been damaged the previous day and left it at
Anuruddha Ratwatte's house. This windscreen was later found by police when they searched
Ratwatte's Kandy residence.
Rs. 45,000/-
monthly rental l
Deputy Inspector General of Police Nimal Mediwaka, under whose supervision
Udugampola is working on the Udathalawinna case, has rented out his private residence at
82/56 Wickremasinghepura, 14th Lane, Battaramulla to the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation. The
CPC pays Mediwaka Rs. 45,000/- as monthly rental. The two-year lease was sealed on
December 1, 2000 during the tenure of Gen. Ratwatte as Minister for the CPC. |
Damning evidence on
Ratwatte
Damning evidence which incriminates General Anuruddha Ratwatte in the
massacre of ten Muslim youth at Udathalawinna on December 5, 2001.
The police have established that Lt. Wijeyratne was used in the 2000 and
2001 general election by Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte for his private purposes.
Ratwatte has also provided Lt. Wijeyratne and a platoon of soldiers with
all facilities to stay at his residence in Kandy. The army squad's requirements during
these periods were personally overseen by Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte.
Senior army officers have confirmed to police that this platoon of
soldiers led by Lt. Wijeyratne were not recalled by Ratwatte in order to serve as part of
his security contingent.
Anuruddha Ratwatte had ordered the army men to dress in civvies and patrol
areas in the Kandy district on December 5, 2001.
Ratwatte had allowed this platoon to stay at his residence in Kandy and to
carry out specific orders issued by him in relation to the general election
Ratwatte had given permission to Lt. Wijeyratne to take his (Ratwatte's)
sons to any place where they wish to go and do exactly what they say
Despite being informed that the army squad led by Lt. Wijeyratne had
brutally massacred ten youth at Udathalawinna, Anuruddha Ratwatte had instructed them to
keep it a secret
While knowing that they had murdered ten men he had thanked them Gen.
Anuruddha Ratwatte kept the murder weapons in his house and had them cleaned
Ratwatte informed this platoon to keep all incidents which took place on
December 5, 2001 - 'a secret.'
Ratwatte personally made arrangements to dispatch Lt. Wijeyratne and his
killer squad from Kandy on December 6, 2001
Ratwatte had instructed one driver to remove the windscreen of vehicle GG
9364 and drive the vehicle to Colombo.
Knowing well that his two sons were involved in this incident Ratwatte has
made no attempt to hand them over to the authorities
While knowing the entire incident which transpired on December 5, 2001
Anuruddha Ratwatte has not made any attempt to give evidence or to deny the charges which
have been made against him to the relevant authorities. |
| "There will be
no covering up"
John Amaratunge, Interior Minister, commenting on the Udathalawinna police
investigation denied allegations that SP Udugampola and other police officers are being
pressured to leave the Ratwatte's alone.
He asserted that within the next five days, Gen. Anuruddha Ratwatte's
statement will be recorded by the CID. He said it was imperative that a fool-proof police
investigation is conducted before embarking on any litigation.
He explained that there are several scenarios, which surround this case.
One, he said is the murder of the ten youth at Udathalwinna while the other incident is
the overall design of election rigging and creating violence.
He maintained that police teams assigned on this case are moving
accordingly and within the next week all evidence recorded will be concluded.
He said that in the event Lohan and Chanuka Ratwatte are not found they
will be tried in absentia and punished.
Amaratunge cautioned that it would be unreasonable for the government to
"just rush in with just one or two witnesses, - it is best we do a full scale
investigation and once we are convinced we will proceed legally," he said.
He added that the best possible punishment in his view was to keep the
Ratwatte boys guessing and in hiding. "This is better than them coming out and
getting themselves released on bail," he said.
Strongly denying charges that the government was handling the Ratwatte
case with kid gloves, Amaratunge said, "the public will be assured that they will be
brought to book. As long as I am Minister there will be no covering up. At the same time
there will be no harassment either. We will institute charges according to the evidence
that is available in fairness to the opposition too." |
Cops blocked from
proceeding with investigation
By Frederica Jansz
The untold story in the police raid on an army 'safe house' at
Athurugiriya has surfaced proving that the army officers found at this house were not from
a special forces team of the Sri Lanka Army but an intelligence unit supposed to carry out
undercover operations in the East.
This team does not carry out secret deep penetration operations in Tiger
territory. Instead, the weapons kept at this house are transported for certain operations
to the East where Tamils are enlisted as spies to carry out attacks. The army men per se
do not, unlike those in the special forces team, carry out the operation themselves. They
serve purely as an intelligence unit only.
Why such an intelligence unit is required to operate from Athurugiriya to
carry out such operations in Batticaloa is confusing. Why the army does not use its
intelligence units based in the East has baffled the cops who conducted the raid and began
an investigation.
Meanwhile, reports that the six army personnel who were placed under
police arrest by SP K. Udugampola were physically assaulted have proved to be a lie.
Medical reports issued after examining the six men, state that there has been no physical
assault whatsoever on their person.
Vilified and humiliated over his raid on this house at Millennium City,
Athurugiriya, Udugampola has finally written a full explanation and complaint to Interior
Minister, John Amaratunga. In a letter dated January 28, 2002, Udugampola explains his
actions and the unfair criticism that has been levelled against him. More seriously is the
Army's attempt to humiliate the cops in a matter where the police were justified in
calling for an explanation.
Udugampola initially conducted the raid on January 2, this year after
receiving information that Chanuka Ratwatte, son of General Anuruddha Ratwatte, was
visiting this house.
Obtaining the assistance of the Military Police, Udugampola informed
Provost Marshal Major General S. I. S. Dassanayake who offered the services of Major
Clifford de Soysa with whom Udugampola finally visited the house in question.
Udugampola's chief interest at the time in raiding the house was to try
and gather any clues that might lead him to the elusive Ratwattes who still remain
fugitives from justice. Udugampola has stated that he chose not to inform DIG Mahinda
Balasuriya regarding this operation as the latter had been removed from the investigation
of the Udathalawinna murders.
During his raid on this house, Udugampola says he came across a lethal
cache of weapons. He found 66 LTTE camouflage uniforms, 10 anti-tank mines, four
thermobaric weapons, three T 56 weapons, 418 rounds of ammunition, 17 bomb exploders,
three remote control small antennas, 12 detonators and one cyanide capsule among other
items.
How a cyanide capsule found its way into this haul of weapons is strange
to say the least. What had happened to the three soldiers in the East to whom the three
T56 weapons had been issued by the Army is a question that also remains unanswered.
The army officer inside the house at the time of the raid had been unable
to furnish a comprehensive explanation regarding this curious cache of arms and explosives
including the LTTE uniforms. Udugampola had then summoned the OIC for Athurugiriya, IP
Anura Gunatilake and asked if he was aware of this house to which the latter had replied,
no.
Deeply suspicious as to the nature of the proceedings at this 'Safe
House,' Udugampola in order to begin an investigation into the matter got the suspects
served with a three day detention order by the SSP of the Kandy division. Thereafter DIG
Mahinda Balasuriya applied to the defence ministry for a 90 day detention order on the
suspects.
Ten days after the raid, on January 12, 2002, on a directive by Defence
Minister Tilak Marapone, the suspects were handed over to the custody of the military
police.
Upto this point, Udugampola had recorded statements from the six army
personnel and Director, Military Intelligence Brigadier Hendawitharana.
Udugampola was determined to get to the bottom of the issue. Convinced the
army personnel had been acting in a suspicious manner, Udugampola having first secured
permission from Provost Marshal Maj. Gen. Ivan Dassanayake on January 17, 2002 proceeded
to the Kohuwela Army Camp to record the statement of Major Karunaratne of the Intelligence
Unit.
Karunaratne refused to make a statement saying he needed the permission of
Brigadier Hendawitharana. Udugampola thereafter reported the matter to the Kandy
magistrate's court on January 18, 2002. The court then ordered the Commander of the Sri
Lanka Army Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle to issue instructions to the army officers concerned
to assist the police in the investigation by making their statements.
This court order however has not been carried out. Udugampola on the
advice of another top cop was told to wait until one month had expired since he carried
out the raid. The reason being, the Army had issued a veiled threat to the police that in
the event Udugampola persists in his investigation, the six army personnel who were taken
into custody and later released will file fundamental rights applications against the
police. The one-month period expired yesterday, February 2, 2002.
Udugampola meanwhile in his letter to John Amaratunga has complained that
the Army has posed serious impediments in this instance, in an attempt to hamper the
ongoing police investigation into this detection.
For example, he says after the detection of these weapons and explosives,
he had brought the six suspects and the weapons to the headquarters of the Military
Police. At this stage, Brigadier Hendawitharana had arrived and insisted that he would not
allow the six army personnel and the weapons to be removed for further police
investigation.
Udugampola also cites Major Karunaratne's refusal to give a statement to
the police regarding this matter. He asserts that it is imperative and normal police
procedure to record the statements of the army officers concerned in order to be able to
conclude this investigation.
The matter is now left up in the air as it were -- Udugampola has been
told by Hendawitharana to seek permission from the Army Chief before recording a statement
from Major Karunaratne.
Udugampola responds by saying military protocol prevents him from directly
approaching the army commander to make such a request. A court order to this effect
directing Balagalle to ensure the police are allowed to record statements from the Army
officers concerned has, as a result, been ignored.
Udugampola's
letter to minister.
Following is the letter SP K. Udugampola wrote to Interior
Minister John Amaratunga:
My No: Police Kennels Division,
Asgiriya, Kandy.
28th January 2002.
Hon. John Amaratunga
Interior Minister
Through: Mr. Nimal Mediwaka DIG / CR (West).
MC KANDY B REPORT NO. 12056, DETECTION OF WEAPONS FROM AN
ARMY OFFICER'S HOUSE AT MILLENNIUM PARK, ATHURUGIRIYA ON 02-01-2002.
The above raid was conducted by me on an information received in
connection with suspect Chanuka Ratwatte who was said to frequent this house concerned,
since it was said to be the house of an Army Officer. I thought it best to obtaining
assistance of Military Police. I informed Provost . Marshal Major General S. I. S
Dassanayake who offered me the services of major Clifford de Soysa with whom I visited the
house in question. I did not inform Mr. Mahinda Balasuriya, DIG regarding this operation
as he was removed from the Udatalawinna group murder case by the authorities concerned and
had appointed Mr. Nimal Mediwake, DIG to over look the said investigation.
In the process of my examination of this house with Major Clifford de
Soysa, I came across a catch of lethal arms such as thermobaric and explosives to wit,
anti-tank mines, remote control claymore mines etc. Other weaponry found in the house are
attached at annexure "A".
The officer present in the house failed to furnish with explanation to any
satisfaction regarding the catch of arms, explosives and also had no document from any
person in authority to keep these weapons in his possession. I then summoned OIC
Athurugiriya IP Anura Gunatilake and asked him as to whether he was kept informed of this
house and the catch of arms, ammo and explosives. He answered me in the negative.
2. In the circumstances the presence of a Tamil person, a cyanide capsule
and 66 sets of Tiger uniforms with high powered weaponry made me very suspicious.
It also struck my mind to the complaint made by Mr. Charita Ratwatte, the
Chairman of the United National Party to the transportation of thermobaric weapons by the
Army in order to attack UNP leader's meetings or the bus in which he used to go round
electioneering. I then explained the charges against them under the Offensive Weapons Act
and took them into custody.
3. In order to facilitate investigation, I got the suspects served with a
3 days detention ordered by Senior Supt.. of Police Kandy Division. Thereafter Mr.
Balasuriya, DIG applied to the Defence Ministry for a 90 day D.O. on the suspects. On
12.01.2002, on a directive by the Defence Ministry, the suspects were handed over to the
custody of Military Police.
Certain legal implications have now surfaced regarding the issue of
detention orders on the suspects. Sec. 9 (1) of Act No: 48 of 1979 Prevention of Terrorism
Act deals with this subject, it reads as follows.
"Where the minister has reason to believe or suspect that any person
is connected with or concerned in any unlawful activity, the minister may order that such
person be detained for a period not exceeding three months in the first instance, in such
place and subject to such conditions as may be determined by the minister, any such order
may be extended from time to time for a period not exceeding three months at a time
provided however, that the aggregate period of such detention shall not exceed a period of
18 months."
The minister referred to in this section is the Minister Interior under
whose purview the Police Department comes. By an oversight the application for the
Detention Order was sent to the Defence Ministry by Mr. Balasuriya, DIG/CR (West).
Therefore, it is now required to rectify this error.
4. Up to now only statements of 06 suspects and Brigadier Hendawitharana
have been recorded. I went to record the statement of Major Karunaratne of the
Intelligence Unit, Kohuwela Army Camp on 17.01.2002 with permission granted by Provost.
Marshal Major General Ivan Dassanayake. Major Karunaratne refused to make a statement
saying that he should obtain authority from Brigadier Hendawitharana before doing so. I
reported this matter to Kandy Magistrate Court on 18.01.2002 on a 'B' report and the court
ordered Commander of the Army to issue instructions to the officers concerned to assist
the Police in the investigation by making their statements.
5. The following matters have surfaced from the investigations already
concluded.
(a) The reason for not returning the thermobaric and other high powered
explosives to the Central Armoury after whatever the operations carried out with a
comprehensive report of the respective operations.
(b) As to why these operations were not conducted through the intelligence
unit based in Batticaloa.
(c) The reason why the three T 56 assault rifles were got down from
Batticaloa? Were they got down with proper authority.
(d) Why were these three T 56 weapons only got down leaving the soldiers
to whom these weapons were issued in Batticaloa?
(e) How did a cyanide capsule find its way here and for what purpose?
(f) The manner in which this Intelligence Unit function during
pre-election, the day of the election and in the aftermath has to be established their
daily briefing records.
(g) Rigorous interrogations are called for to establish connections to the
thermobaric weapons referred to by Mr. Charita Ratwatte in his complaint before the
general election 2001 with those found in the Army Officer's house at Millennium Park,
Athurugiriya.
6. The following impediments posed by the Army to hamper the on-going
investigations into this detection is worth probing into;
(a) After the detection of these weapons and explosives, I brought the
suspects officers and the weapons to Military Police Hdqtrs. At Narahenpita. At this stage
came Brigadier Hendawitharana, Director, Military Intelligence and insisted that he would
not allow the suspect officers and the production weapons to be removed for Police
investigations.
(b) In terms of provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code it is required
to record the statements of the Army Officers. When I visited the Kohuwela Army camp on
17.01.2002 to record statement of Major Karunaratne he refused to make a statement stating
that he cannot do so without expressed permission from DMI Brigadier Hendawitharana. This
was conveyed to me through Sergeant Munidasa of Kohuwela Army Camp.
(c) Statement of Army Officers and that of other ranks have to be recorded
to conclude this investigation. I request that arrangements may be made to achieve this
purpose.
K. Udugampola,
Supt. Of Police,
Kennels, Crimes & Ops,
Kandy. |
"Left matter
in the hands of defence ministry"
Interior Minister John Amaratunga said he initiated the police
investigation into the Athurugiriya raid but left the matter in the hands of the Defence
Ministry. Amaratunga admitted that the cops handling this investigation had come under
certain pressures from the defence ministry.
He said however that if the Defence Ministry and its Minister, Tilak
Marapone, is satisfied that the house at Athurugiriya is a bona fide safe house for the
Army, there is nothing more he nor the police can do. "That is the end of the
story," he said, adding that there would be little or no point in telling any police
officer to proceed in such an instance. |
Business on a platter for Prima
By Amantha Perera
Last week's issue of The Sunday Leader revealed how efforts to make a
quick buck through the import of wheat from India under favourable rates, was thwarted.
The deal however might not be the best for Sri Lanka even if the commissions were not
paid. Simply because, instead of flour, the staple need of our populace, the government is
planning to import wheat. The difference would mean a lot when the flour is milled at,
where else? -- Prima.
Prima's price is pre-set according to the sales agreement signed last July
with the PA government. The government buys flour from Prima at Rs. 21.50 per kilo,
subsidises it by Rs. 3 and sells it to the public. In the case of Indian flour, industry
sources reveal that a kilo could be given at Rs. 17, provided no import duty and
surcharges are slapped. Prima does not pay any duty.
One sources said that the government could sell the Indian flour at Rs. 19
per kilo and reduce the subsidy on Prima by half and sell Prima stocks at Rs. 20. The
effect though minimal would give the public a choice. "Prima is obliged to, under the
contract with the government, give flour of a protein value between 9.5 and 10%," a
source close to the Trade Ministry said. Indian flour has a protein content of around 11%,
which means that though cheaper, there would not be a loss in quality.
The moment wheat is imported, it is business in a platter for Prima. And
regardless of from where the imports originate, the Prima agreement stipulates that prices
would be set according to US wheat prices and pacific freight rates.
Furthermore, the agreement does not deal with the bran that is a
by-product of the milling process. In the case of Indian wheat, the yield is 65% of flour,
whereas US or European wheat has a yield of 74 to 76%. What this means is Prima which was
getting 25% bran would get 35% instead.
And importing flour at the given rates would be advantageous to the
country. If flour were to be imported at the value of the contract of US $ 32 million,
200,000 metric tons would be available. If it was wheat, it would go up to 273,500 metric
tons. But here is the catch; given the low yield, only 178,000 metric tons of flour would
be made available. The entity that is going to gain from this whole endeavor is Prima
which would get a higher yield of bran.
If flour were to be imported, given the bran yield, concessions could be
discussed with the Indians, as the deal is government-to-government. "Prima's pricing
for the flour will be based on the current formula they have with the government based on
USA futures and will prove to be more expensive than the landed price of flour imported
directly from India," the ministry source said.
On the other hand, the import of wheat is not going to help the scarcity
in flour stocks as it would take six to eight weeks for the flour to come out of the
Trincomalee mill from the day the wheat stocks arrive. These are the nuances that need to
be looked at.
Prima, despite criticism from the media and the then opposition UNP still
sits pretty with the monopoly and prices set to their own tune. The government has so far
not taken any action to remove the 40% duty that is slashed on any import of flour into
the country. There have been instances when flour was imported to Sri Lanka while Prima
enjoyed its contract. Ironically the last such instance was in 1997 during the PA regime
when CWE imported 12,500 metric tons of flour after calling for worldwide tenders. Prima
did not utter a word.
Meanwhile, the currency is once again showing signs of weakening as
according to some estimates, reserves have fallen to US $ 900 million. With exports not
picking up due to global recession and imports on the verge of rising with the lifting of
the embargo, the pressure would be mounting.
To top off the list is the power cuts. As a remedial measure the
government has embarked on cutting down expenditure in ministries and other departments.
This is an option that the government needs to be very careful of. Such slashing of
expenditure might in fact give momentum to economic contraction.
In this light, the policy statement made by Prime Minister Ranil
Wickremesinghe has not lived up to expectations. "There seems to be no hardcore
policy other than the peace process. They seemed to groping in the dark," one analyst
told The Sunday Leader. In his assessment, the new government is hoping the private sector
would jump-start GDP growth.
According to him, the only way the government can get the economy moving
is by getting big time foreign investors in the form of large infrastructure projects.
However, given world conditions, even smaller investors have not shown any inclination to
return. The BOI under its new management is now finding out the hard way that getting
investments is easier said than done. Unfortunately such a backdrop would create an
impetus for the government to bend over backwards to get investment into the country. As
past experience has shown, such motives have not yielded the best of results in the long
run.
"Certainly the policy statement is honest and courageous about the
current predicament of the country in economic, military and political terms. But it is
virtually empty on what the solutions would or should be. That is, the policy statement is
mostly correct on the assessment of what is the present situation, but unfortunately there
is hardly anything on what ought to be the solutions," assess Dr. Muttukrishna
Sarvananthan, an economist attached to the International Centre for Ethnic Studies.
He observes that the policy statement has not clearly defined key reforms
that need to be administered. "They are the reforms of the bloated public sector,
state-dominated financial sector, inflexible labour market, excessive coverage and false
targeting of the poverty alleviation programme, etc."
Recent decisions taken by the government to fill 5000 vacancies in the
government sector and allow state employees to continue till 60 too do not read well
within this framework. Sarvananthan argues though the government has identified key areas
of concern as education, tourism, health, the state of affairs at CPC, CEB and the CWE,
and the garment industry, the remedies pointed out in the policy statement are vague. In
the case of garments he points out that it would be hardly likely that US and Europe would
allow preferential treatment to imports from Sri Lanka alone.
Sarvananthan's opinion is that the government seems to be moving in the
right direction when it comes to the lifting of the embargo and the energy crisis.
Nevertheless his assessment is that too many cards have been hedged on the peace process
while too little attention is given to the economic woes.
But, it might be too early to judge the Wickremesinghe government. It is
just two months on the job and given the quagmire it found itself in, the benefit of the
doubt goes in the government's favour, for now at least.
"Overall the policy statement is disappointing. We appreciate the
fact that the government may have been constrained by the impending local government
elections for not being forthright in its policy pronouncements in the policy statement,
and look forward to the Budget 2002 for more outspoken policy decisions," opined
Sarvananthan.
BMC in a
sorry mess
A glimpse of the rot in the state sector was revealed when the new
chairman of the Building Materials Corporation, former Deputy Speaker Sarath Munasinghe
assumed duties last week. At the meeting he asked for a clear picture of the state of
affairs. And this is what he got.
The BMC is in debt for Rs 190 million. Of that, Rs 90 million is to the
Sevana Lottery. The remainder is to banks. It carries Rs. 25 million in the form a
permanent overdraft and another Rs. 25 million in a temporary overdraft.
One hundred perches of BMC's four acre prime land at Sangaraja Mawatha
have been sold to the Bank of Ceylon to set off a loan taken during the tenure of Ajantha
Wijesinghe as chairman in the 1980s. The loan and the interest had accrued to Rs. 110
million. In addition, another 17 perches in Ratnapura too was sold to the bank. Now the
bank is demanding the land. If the land is given, BMC would lose its access way from the
road and buildings would have to be demolished to make a new road.
Alos, a further acre at Sangaraja Mawatha has been mortgaged to Hatton
National Bank. The BMC owes the Steel Corporation Rs 30 million. The entire debt is in the
region of Rs. 200 million. To add to the woes, the BMC presently carries stocks worth Rs.
240 million. It comprises of bathroom fittings and other items that cannot be sold at
present market prices.
Seventy percent of BMC sales are made of asbestos and the new management
is now toying with the idea of selling off the excess stock at discounted rates to set off
the debts. Ironically, last week there were reports that the BMC had limited sales of
asbestos at outstation depots. Despite the debt and the languishing stock, BMC has to find
Rs. 20 million to pay salaries and other expenses each month.
The BMC was managed like his little plaything when it was under PA big man
Mangala Samaraweera. Funds were spent lavishly in organising various functions for
Samaraweera's political benefit. In fact, staff were temporarily transferred to Matara
during the election campaign to work for the PA. |
