ISSUES

Ghosts of the past haunt PSD A high level police probe into instances of violence and murder have found that a number of officers attached to the Presidential Security Division (PSD) are implicated in the incidents of assault, arson, murder and robbery. A twelve member team of investigators from the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) headed by Director CID, Lionel Goonetileke have begun probing incidents of assault and murder involving members of the PSD and its former strongman SP Nihal Karunaratne. Nearly a dozen PSD officers were arrested last week in connection with these acts of crime.

Senior police sleuths have already traced links to officers attached to the PSD in connection with an assault on a group of media personnel covering a UNP led protest rally on July 15, 1999, at Dharmapala Mawatha, Colombo 7. The press photographers assaulted in the incident and robbed of their cameras and cellular phones had identified members of the PSD as being the assailants.

The ongoing investigation has found that a stolen cellular phone belonging to a press photographer had been given to a person by the name of Tilakaratne of Nittambuwa. Tilakaratne has confessed to police that this phone was given to him by Sanjeewa, a PSD employee who worked as a peon in Karunaratne’s office.

Previously, Sanjeewa was found guilty when tried by the courts in Nittambuwa for the retention of stolen property.  Sanjeewa in this instance had claimed he was employed as a garage mechanic at Nittambuwa.

The CID have since found that Sanjeewa was not employed at a motor repair garage in Nittambuwa but in reality worked as a peon at the office of Karunaratne. Sanjeewa is now evading arrest and is no longer a member of the PSD.

The CID meanwhile has arrested three persons in connection with the assault and robbery of Rukantha and Chandralekha Gunathilake.  On January 26, 2001, a gang attacked popular singing stars Rukantha and Chandralekha at their home in Mattegoda. Arriving in a vehicle, the gang had threatened the Gunathilake’s, robbed them of cash and jewellery, assaulted them and cut their hair in an attempt to disfigure them. 

During the assault the gang had repeatedly shouted at Rukantha and Chandralekha questioning them as to why they had taken part in UNP rallies.

 The gang also stole Rukantha’s jeep, which was later found abandoned while they stole other valuables amounting to over Rs. 3 million. 

The three persons taken into remand in connection with this incident are PC Bandula, a police officer from the Bibile police station who had been transferred out of the PSD after the Gunathilake incident.  The second suspect PC Nihal continues to be a working member of the PSD and was arrested at the Slave Island police quarters while Ruwan who works as a labourer in the PSD has also been apprehended by the CID.

The investigation reveals that it was Ruwan who had stolen the Pajero vehicle belonging to the Gunathilakes.  The three suspects have confessed that after the incident they drove straight to Auckland House in Union Place.

The Pajero was later found abandoned at Maradana by the Maradana police with all its parts removed, including the seats, upholstery and lights.

The three men have confessed that Sgt. Ratnayake of the PSD had ordered them to go to Rukantha’s house on the orders of their boss, Karunaratne.

Sgt. Ratnayake has been served summons by the CID to make his statement. Top cops are of the view that 14 officers attached to the PSD were involved in this incident.

During the course of conducting this inquiry, the sleuths have stumbled on another incident which took place in December 1999. On December 18, 1999 President Chandrika Kumaratunga was concluding her campaign for the presidential election that year.  Her final propaganda speech at Town Hall in Colombo ended with a LTTE suicide attack on her person.

Soon after, during the ensuing chaos, some members of the PSD are alleged to have rushed to the final election rally of the UNP also being held that day and proceeded to smash the stage and other breakable furniture while destroying the bunting etc. 

Following the confessions of some PSD personnel now under arrest, the CID have since raided and found six plastic chairs that had been hired by the UNP organisers for this meeting in the home of PC Nihal who is an officer attached to the PSD.

The CID is conducting further inquiries into this incident.  A lorry that went missing at the time from the UNP venue has yet not been recovered.

Sleuths are also probing the murder of Satana editor Rohana Kumara. Baddegana Sanjeewa’s name has so far transpired in this investigation. Sanjeewa served as an officer in the PSD and was paid a monthly remunera

Prabha, Rauff on road to harmony

“Furthermore, the agreements reached this week mark the implicit recognition — by the non Sinhala political establishments of the LTTE as  the preponderant political force in the north and east, the latter’s extra-parliamentary notwithstanding. The LTTE’s meeting with the SLMC is particularly important as it promises to defuse latent and long simmering tensions between the Tamil and Muslim communities, particularly in the eastern province. The Mutual recognition of the SLMC and the LTTE as the sole representatives of their respective communities is another important development in that context”.

— Tamil Guardian editorial of April 17, 2002

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

Recent developments concerning Tamil - Muslim relations in the island are extremely satisfying to this column having argued consistently in the past for rapprochement and better understanding between both communities. It has been the position of this column that the LTTE should recognise the SLMC as the authentic representatives of the north - eastern Muslims and arrive at an understanding on resolving inter-ethnic problems. Moreover, this column felt that Velupillai Pirapaharan and Rauff Hakeem the ‘Thalaivers’ of the LTTE and SLMC respectively possessed potential to establish firm rapport that could pave the way for a concrete agreement on immediate problems. 

April 13th this year, would therefore be a significant date in contemporary Tamil - Muslim history as both Pirapaharan and Hakeem reached agreement on some vital issues after a healthy and cordial dialogue. The positive conclusions arrived at Kilinochchi after LTTE - SLMC confabulations were incorporated in a document and endorsed officially by Pirapaharan and Hakeem.

Technically it is not a memorandum of understanding but only an agreement of sorts. It is also not comprehensive and there are a lot of issues that need to be discussed in detail in the future by both parties. Nevertheless the agreement removes some immediate problems afflicting Muslims, sets up a mechanism to resolve possible problems through discussions and guarantees an ongoing dialogue that could ultimately pave the way for a permanent settlement.

  Laudable milestone

It is indeed both amusing and sad to note the reaction among pseudo-national elements towards this laudable milestone in Tamil - Muslim relationship. It was only days ago that so many voices were raucously raised on behalf of the Muslim civilians in the east suffering under the iron heel of LTTE jackboots.

Hakeem was condemned by an assortment of critics for his perceived inaction or inability to stop this. His role as leader of his community was under threat within and outside his party. Hakeem however, refused to be rushed into extremist stances and worked quietly and constructively. Now, his meeting with the LTTE has been successful and there is every indication that the relationship between the Tamils and Muslims will improve harmoniously. Yet, there is very little publicity given in the non-Tamil media to this momentous development. 

The rise of the LTTE as the dominant de facto and dejure entity in the north - east after the ceasefire and its consequences caused great anxiety and apprehension among Muslims. Hakeem’s cautiously responsible moderate approach led to several others trying to usurp his leadership. The ‘old guard’ UNP and PA  Muslim leaders of the south, the anti-Hakeem SLMC faction now in the NUA and eastern segments within the SLMC all clambered aboard the anti-Tiger bandwagon in a bid to devalue Hakeem’s position.

The SLMC leader however worked quietly writing to Pirapaharan and seeking a meeting to iron out differences rather than engage in empty demagoguery. He was however not idle while waiting for a LTTE response.

 Hakeem toured the north and east meeting troubled Muslims and soothing their feelings while promising solid action. He also  worked behind the scenes and exerted pressure on Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe to take necessary steps ensuring the safety and security of Muslim civilians in the east in the aftermath of the ceasefire.

Hakeem also interacted with the diplomatic community particularly the facilitator Norway. It is believed that some statements  by diplomatic circles in Colombo were the results of Hakeem’s quiet diplomacy. 

In the meantime, the LTTE was responding positively to Hakeem’s epistle. The Tiger hierarchy was amenable for a meeting but not with Hakeem initially as he was a cabinet minister. The LTTE felt that meeting a minister may create wrong impressions about a govt. - LTTE dialogue being on. So a meeting between Anton Balasingham and a SLMC delegation sans Hakeem was scheduled in London. This was postponed due to logistical reasons. With Balasingham returning to the Wanni the situation changed. A meeting with a SLMC delegation led by Hakeem himself and the LTTE under Pirapaharan was set up.

A seven member delegation led by Hakeem functioning in twin  capacities as a cabinet minister and SLMC leader helicoptered to Kilinochchi on Saturday, April 13, around 9. 35 am. The delegation comprised Hakeem , SLMC Ministers Athaullah, Mohideen Abdul Cader, Basheer Segu Dawood , Noordeen Mashoor, senior  SLMC Vice President Uduma Lebbe and additional propaganda secretary Mashoor Moulana.

Interestingly, all SLMC delegates other than Hakeem hailing from the Central province were north - eastern Muslims. Significantly, Moulana and Dawood have a history of amicable relationship with Tamil political parties. They were at one time activists of the Federal Party and Eelam Revolutionary Organisation respectively. 

The inclusion of Athaullah in the delegation was a shrewd move as he was allegedly spearheading the eastern dissidents within the SLMC against Hakeem and fomenting agitation against the ceasefire agreement. Athaulla apparently was strongly supportive of Hakeem in the post-Ashraff leadership stakes against Ferial Ashraff. Athaulla helped the SLMC win comfortably in the Amparai district in the last elections but was supposedly disappointed in not getting a cabinet portfolio. By taking him along to meet the LTTE, Hakeem was not only involving Athaulla in constructive negotiations but also binding him to any settlement reached.                                  

The SLMC group was met at the Kilinochchi playgrounds doubling as a helipad by the LTTE chief of protocol Puli Thevan. The Muslim delegation was taken to a newly constructed ‘rest house’ to freshen up. This place with modern facilities had been set up primarily to accommodate the foreign ceasefire monitors and Norwegian delegations. Anton and Adele Balasingham were also staying here when in Kilinochchi. Thereafter, the SLMC team was taken to the LTTE Political Secretariat at Skanthapuram in Kilinochchi. Pirapaharan was waiting at the entrance to receive and greet Hakeem.

After an exchange of pleasantries and partaking of refreshments discussions began in earnest at about 10. 15 am. The LTTE was represented by Pirapaharan, Political Strategist Anton Balasingham,  Political Wing Chief SP Thamilchelvan, Trincomalee special commander Col. Padhuman and Batticaloa - Amparai special commander Col. Karuna Amman. Adele functioned as secretary taking down minutes of the meeting. A conspicuous absentee was the controversial Eastern Province Political Commissar Karikalan. He had been summoned to the Wanni by Pirapaharan for a ‘dressing down.’ Though in the Wanni, Karikalan was not present at the conclave with the SLMC. Some of the sentiments expressed by Karikalan to the media had angered and upset the Muslims of the east.

Respect

The first round of talks ended at 12. 15 after two hours. The LTTE demonstrated great respect for the religious sensibilities of the SLMC and made arrangements for noon prayer known as ‘Luhar’ at 12. 20 pm.

It is well known that among prominent Muslim politicians Hakeem is reputed to be a truly devout practising Muslim. After prayers the SLMC members sat down for a sumptuous lunch. Hakeem evinced some hesitation about the meat being doubtful whether it was ‘halaal.’ Sensing Hakeem’s discomfiture Pirapaharan volunteered the information that slaughter of livestock had been done according to Islamic tenets and cooked also by a Muslim. The cook a native of Mannar was called and introduced. The Tigers had come a long way indeed from the outrageous massacre of praying Muslims at the Kattankudi Mosque.

Conversation at lunch was frank and informal. Pirapaharan reputed to be at ease in casual conversations as opposed to formal meetings opened up and revealed the softer side of his complex personality to Hakeem. He spoke about his children Charles Anthony, Thuvaraga and Balachanthiran to Hakeem and inquired about his family. Pirapaharan beamed as a proud ‘appa’ when talking about his elder children’s educational accomplishments. As is the case in most families there seemed no doubt that the apple of Pirapaharan’s eye was his first born. Charles Anthony was clever in studies, fluent in English and musically inclined being well versed in the “Miruthangam” said Pirapaharan. Also, the son had been very supportive of the current peace process Pirapaharan disclosed. Food for thought indeed!

The second round of talks began immediately after lunch and was quite brisk. The rapport achieved particularly between Pirapaharan and Hakeem paved the way for quick and harmonious results. The contents of decisions reached were incorporated as a single document in the form of a joint statement  by Balasingham in consultation with SLMC members. Both parties particularly the LTTE and SLMC leaders approved of it. Thereafter, Pirapaharan and Hakeem initialled the pages and signed the document. An agreement was born. The SLMC then took leave of the LTTE and departed.

The post-lunch session lasted just about an hour. Helicoptering back  to Colombo the SLMC delegation was in time for ‘Azar’ prayers at 3. 20 pm.

The agreement arrived at in Kilinochchi consisted of several  aspects. The most important one was the assurance by Pirapaharan that Muslim civilians in the north and east will not be harassed by the LTTE demanding donations and taxes sometimes even abducting them for ransom.

Karikalan and Trincomalee Political chief Ainkaran had justified this by saying that eastern Muslims were also inhabitants of ‘Tamil Eelam’ and so were subject to taxes like Tamil citizens. Moreover, Muslim traders and landowners were allegedly exploiting Tamils and so had to pay their dues. This had caused much heartburn among Muslims.

The LTTE leadership displayed much understanding and sympathy towards the Muslim predicament. It was recognised that the north and east comprised a single Tamil linguistic region. The north - east was the traditional homeland of the Tamil speaking people and the Tamil linguistic homeland belonged to the Tamils as well as Muslims. The cultural differences and particular political aspirations of the Muslims were recognised and accepted. So the Muslims would not be pressed for taxes in the future.

At one point, Hakeem interjected and queried from Pirapaharan as to when this provision would become effective. A smiling Pirapaharan replied “from tomorrow. I will show you how my writ runs in the north - east. There won’t be any problems for Muslims from this April New Year (April 14).”

If that assurance provided immediate relief, there were two other decisions that promise much relief in the future. The LTTE leader expressed regret over past happenings to Hakeem and invited the displaced Muslims to return home. This comprises two categories. One is the northern Muslims from Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaithivu, Mannar and Vavuniya who are now dispersed in several parts of the island and abroad. The most destitute among them numbering around 25, 000 are in Puttalam district refugee camps. 

The second component  is in the Eastern province and few are aware of these people. These are impoverished Muslim families essentially farmers and fishermen who lived in hamlets interspersed in Tamil majority areas. Unlike larger Muslim majority villages that mobilised and withstood the rise of armed Tamil militancy these weaker and numerically inferior Muslims were compelled to abandon their dwellings and seek refuge in other larger Muslim villages. Most of them are still in the east but not in refugee camps.

The LTTE leader declared that all displaced and chased out Muslims could return home. There were however practical problems in ensuring that return. For one thing, a more durable peace arrangement was needed. The logistics also had to be worked out and a staggered scheme of return had to be implemented. This was appreciated by Hakeem. So, while the return of Muslims has been accepted in principle actual implementation may take some time. A joint committee of LTTE and SLMC representatives from the north - east will be set up to plan and coordinate the return.

  Returning home

Meanwhile, thousands of Muslims are now undertaking temporary trips to their former homes to inspect the environment. Plans of actual return would be finalised later predicated perhaps on these scouting missions.

The visiting Muslims are  being welcomed with great affection by their former Tamil neighbours. The LTTE also is providing every assistance. The mosques of Jaffna town for instance are now cleaned and cleared and are functioning as places of rest for Muslim women and children while the males rough it out elsewhere. In Kilinochchi returning Muslim traders were overwhelmed by the welcome given by Tamil traders. In Mankumban, Muslims were touched by the conduct of a Tamil family that had regularly cleaned and lit lamps at a Sufi influenced Islamic place of worship for twelve years.

The LTTE has also agreed to let Muslim landowners of the east visit their paddy lands and livestock grazing ranges in the Tamil dominated western hinterland known as ‘Paduvaankarai’ or shore of the setting sun.

A remarkable feature of the east is that many rich Muslims own lands and cattle in the Tamil areas. Most of these lands are now directly under the Tigers or occupied by squatters or are simply lying idle. Now the rightful owners are seeing them after years and depending on ground realities new arrangements will be made. The LTTE however has agreed in principle to Muslims repossessing their property wherever possible and being compensated where it is not possible.

Realising ‘blunders’

Another measure agreed upon was the establishment of a special mechanism to protect Muslims in the north - east. This would be a committee comprising SLMC nominees consisting of representatives from each district in the north - east. These representatives will liaise with both the political and military commanders of the LTTE in each district. They will draw the attention of the LTTE to problems encountered by Muslims in each district and seek to alleviate them. If they are not resolved at a district level, the LTTE hierarchy will be informed through its SLMC counterpart.

In addition, the hierarchy of the LTTE and SLMC will also meet regularly on an ongoing basis to discuss contentious issues as well as future plans. The LTTE also agreed that the SLMC should be represented in the substantive discussions on working out a durable power sharing formula in the future.

Hakeem seemed very happy when addressing a press conference later on the outcome of his meeting with Pirapaharan. “As a result of Saturday’s talks, solutions to several problems faced by Muslims have been found,” Hakeem said. “This will calm the apprehension among our people about the peace process.” Asked specifically about his political rival Ferial Ashraff’s NUA opposing this agreement Hakeem replied,  “We have not conceded or omitted anything to warrant any opposition. The LTTE has given favourable answers to questions and concerns raised by us.” Incidentally, Ferial ashraff had issued a statement prior to Hakeem’s meeting with Pirapaharan that “the ceasefire agreement was a charter of slavery written on the backs of Muslims.”

Later a newspaper quoted Hakeem referring glowingly to the accommodative flexibility displayed by Pirapaharan. Hakeem said that he never expected Pirapaharan to be so generous and concessionary. He had expected the LTTE leader to drive a hard bargain yielding to arrangements only on a reciprocatory basis. Instead, he had recognised the immediate problems instantly and provided relief and suitable arrangements without expecting anything in return.

The crux of the matter is that the LTTE leader and top circles had realised long ago that they had ‘blundered’ in dealing with the Muslims. Balasingham had acknowledged this on more than one occasion but what was required was an explicit response by Pirapaharan.

The ordinary Muslims too expected a comment by Pirapaharan. The phenomenon of thousands of Muslims journeying to their former homes is due to the confidence they gained after Pirapaharan’s public appeal. In the case of Pirapaharan, he was perhaps waiting for the correct time and suitable opportunity to come out openly on this issue. 

It may be recalled that on April 10, at the press conference Muslim journalists requested Pirapaharan to publicly invite the Muslims back. He declined. The reason was that Pirapaharan had planned to do this three days later after meeting Hakeem. If Pirapaharan had announced these measures at the press conference Hakeem would have gained no kudos among Muslims. The whole meeting would have been pointlessly redundant. Instead, Pirapaharan bided his time and with dramatic flair accepted Muslim concerns in his meeting with Hakeem. This has raised Hakeem’s political stock high. The challenges to his leadership both internally and externally are virtually negligible now.

Recognising the bona fides and capabilities of Hakeem and  accepting him as the accredited Muslim leader is no mean achievement for the LTTE. It has revised its earlier stance that Muslims are also ‘Tamils practising Islam’ or ‘Islamiyathamilar’  and instead accepted their unique identity and cultural differences.

The LTTE has also realised that no Tamil party can effectively represent the Muslims just as no Sinhala dominated party can represent Tamils. It now accepts the SLMC as the authentic Muslim representative organisation. The meeting and agreement with Hakeem therefore is a recognition of reality and also an empowerment of Hakeem’s leadership. There is no doubt that when an interim administrative council is formed for the north - east the LTTE, SLMC and UNP will supply the Tamil, Muslim and Sinhala representatives on it respectively.

The rise of Hakeem as the Muslim national leader by the LTTE stems from two reasons. One is that Hakeem stands head and shoulders above any other Muslim leader visible in the political horizon right now. He is not sycophantic towards the Sinhala power elite like UNP and PA Muslim leaders. He is also not emotionally hostile to Tamil aspirations as embodied by the LTTE in the manner of his mentor and predecessor Ashraff. The LTTE also feels that being a Central province Muslim, Hakeem would not take up irrational stances on the Muslim Council concept for the north - east. Above all, Hakeem has come off well as a courageous yet cautious leader acting with responsibility in bettering the lot of his people.

The LTTE feels therefore that it can do business with him and hopes that he would become the undisputed leader of his community without a fractured leadership evolving. So it wants to promote and strike a better relationship with him.

The second reason for Hakeem’s success in the talks was the rapport struck with Pirapaharan. The LTTE leader is only five years elder to the SLMC leader and both being in their forties have no great generational gap. Hakeem is very fluent in Tamil and so converses directly and openly with Pirapaharan. The rare occurrence of Pirapaharan talking about his family was due to this. Incidentally, Pirapaharan also wanted Hakeem to be the SLMC representative at peace talks. This is an indicator of the trust he has in the latter. So now,  Hakeem is likely to participate in official talks. Earlier, he had planned to send a leading Muslim lawyer.

Power sharing

Despite the rapport achieved and the preliminary agreement reached, there is no doubt that much remains to be achieved. The bone of contention is likely to be the power sharing arrangement in a final settlement. Tamil and Muslim aspirations are likely to collide then. But the current reality is that the premier Tamil and Muslim organisations have been able to reach some preliminary agreement that will pave the way for an improved environment where other outstanding issues could be resolved through discussion. On a national level the govt. - LTTE ceasefire has achieved the same result. A peaceful atmosphere is evolving. It may very well be that when substantive talks occur there may rise irreconcilable difference of positions.

This scenario may be true of the LTTE - SLMC relationship too. Moreover, the historical hostility between the communities in the east and the presence in the region of a diabolical third party that has exploited this issue successfully in the past may serve to jeopardise the fragile relationship. Nevertheless, the purposeful action of both Pirapaharan and Hakeem demonstrates that a meaningful process to remedy the situation may be possible.

The LTTE - SLMC agreement is only the first step in what may very well be a long, long journey. What is important however is the fact that Pirapaharan and Hakeem are now on the road to harmony.

Feminist look at literature

Feminism is one critical perspective that has been extremely persuasive in revolutionising the entire discipline of literature: from writing, production, publication, marketing of literature; to the reading, studying, re-conceptualising and restructuring the discipline of literature, particularly in English.

Feminist criticism constitutes a widening range of ideologies and social/political theories; and incorporates many disciplines from psychology to language studies. Apart from which, a wide variety of feminist thought (that centre on such issues as class, liberalism, race, ‘Third-worldism’, essentialism, sexual orientation, etc.,) are also visible in the reading of a piece of literature.

However, the unifying factor in a feminist reading is a deep commitment to the reversal of power imbalances and social/gender inequities between men and women. Thus, an understanding of how women and men are ‘gendered’ become important.

In many feminist theorisations of literary content, this translates itself into concerns regarding systems of representation: how women in particular, are represented in novels, plays, poetic images, rituals, photographs, films, myths, pornography, cyberspace etc. This ‘images of women’ approach through which feminist critics deliberate on how women characters and images are presented in literature is still central to the pedagogy of feminist literary study. This approach is fundamentally occupied with women as content or subject matter of literature.

Prime examples concentrate on how representations of women are constrained by conventional stereotypes of women’s gender roles, responsibilities, characteristics, codes of behaviour, dominant professions, and gender relations and so on.

Next, how women are generally represented as objects in literature: to be discussed, exchanged and evaluated by men. In these instances, women may also be presented in various forms of sexual display designed to satisfy voyeuristic pleasures or bestowed with certain characteristics (such as silliness, helpless, bitchiness, empty-headedness, a caring nature etc.) that subscribe to unequal and indiscriminate gender ideologies. Here, feminist literary theory challenges the dominant literary constructions of women (and men) and through implication, the ways in which male writers see and think about women.

In general, ‘men’, ‘masculine’ and ‘male’ and associated terms are taken to be privileged defining ones, whereas ‘women’, ‘feminine’ ‘female’ and related terms are treated as the ‘other’ of these terms. Accordingly, male is considered to be the norm, and is positive while female is regarded as the abnormal and negative. Through extension, specific attributes of women such as their bodies, their thoughts, their conditioned beliefs and characteristics are taken as negatives to the positives signified by their binary oppositions.      

Thus, there is reference not only to the culturally constructed gender oppositions, but also to the gender sub-divisions through which patriarchal and gender ideologies are channelled into literature. (A literary text might link images of darkness, with primitiveness, with nature, with women’s sexuality, with negativism. On the other hand, images of light might be connected to culture, to male spirituality, to positivism).

These multiple divisions and structures of gender inequality surfacing via representational systems in cultures are not static, and can vary according to other prevalent ideologies, socio-economic and political forces and so on. For example, in Sri Lanka, the construction of binary oppositions and associated cultural meanings might be different to that of western cultures.

The expose of these gender biases then, and the feminist commitment to destabilise these established binary oppositions is a crucial part of feminist critical practice.

Another vital perspective of the ‘images of women’ approach in feminist theory, focuses on the implied readers of literature. Here, it is not merely the reflection of women in the subject matter of literature that is under study, but the examination of the ways in which writers engage with their readers in literary discourses. Through this, feminist critics are able to reveal the extents to which women readers have been ignored or marginalised in the writing of literary texts. Feminist criticism establishes that a preponderance of texts written by men subscribe to the historical convention that the potential or rather, the ‘general reader’ is male.

This manifests itself in a number of ways. For example, male writers might labour under the unconscious assumption that the reader is male, and adopt a tone of camaraderie or machismo or sexism, even, when discussing women. Equally, language might be utilised in ways that marginalise women. For instance, through the use of the pronoun ‘he’ in a text to mean anyone or through false generic terms. Here, the implied addressee of the text is a ‘male’ construct — exploited and manipulated by the writer. In order to read such texts, women readers have either to assume a stance of reading that that accepts the dominant patriarchal ideals or norms; or, alternatively, to adopt the position of resisting readers.

By giving sanction to a position of resistance, feminist theoretical perspectives are able to legitimise the feelings of impatience and alienation experienced by women readers who have hitherto hesitated to question the authenticity and authority of the male writer’s portrayal of women. Thus, in alignment with other strands of literary theory such as Marxism,  Postcolonialism, etc. the writer is held accountable for his/her worldview and judged accordingly.

As part of correlating feminist action, and radical correction of the defects discerned in texts, feminist critics analyse alternative systems of writing that address women readers and explore new forms of gender neutral discourse that can be directed towards mixed gender readerships. This strand of feminist criticism, conversely and interestingly, also investigates the recurrent images and symbols through which women are represented in writing by women, and promotes new and alternative images of women.

At another level, consciousness of gender differences between men and women can also be seen to impact on literary studies.  Abandoning a women-only focus, there have been recent attempts to scrutinise and theorise on both men and women as writers. The way in which men and women use language is itself an issue in of gender politics. For example, do men and women speak and write the same way? If not, why not? Women’s and men’s discourse styles thus come under observation by feminist theorists.

The lively debate on the topic centers on subjects such as ‘gender marking and sex bias in language structure and content, stereotypes and perceptions of language use, and sex differences and similarities of language use, linguistic components, conversational interaction, genre and style, and provide crosscutting perspectives on the gendering of men and women. At the same time, feminist research also centers on the myths relating to the language usage by men and women.

This brings feminist criticism towards the consciousness of thematic deficiencies in the history of literature; in that women themselves, have only rarely recorded women’s experiences — whereas, male experiences and men’s representations of women’s experiences have been the norm. Thus, it is not only the inscriptions of women’s intellectual capacities that are deigned relevant to feminist criticism as discussed before, but also the central experiences of a woman living life in a woman’s body as a socially constructed woman.

This knowledge is identified as unique and requiring specific attention. Therefore, this line of feminist criticism celebrates the instances where women recount their private gender-specific experiences connected to the female body in particular: such as narratives of women’s experiences involving childbirth, menstruation, menopause, etc. which have generally been excluded from literature by the conventions of public discourse.

These spheres are considered to be the wild zones of female experience; outside and beyond male discourse, and are spaces in literary studies that are being filled by feminist critics. The fact that these experiences can only be validated by women writers serve to affirm women’s experiences and subvert assumed male authority in these areas.     

Feminist critical analysis is a multi-disciplinary field of inquiry that has come off age: to the extent that feminist critics are today engaging in the critique of their own feminist and gendered positions.

Consequently, there are healthy debates centered on issues such as the problems of negative criticism, separatism and radical feminist ideologies, the pitfalls of indiscriminate inclusion, and the ‘naturalisation’ of gender divisions.

Various other problems have also arisen apart from the above-discussed paradigms of feminist theory as it has been practiced up to this time. This feminist debate thus gives testimony to the maturity of the feminist literary criticism after nearly thirty years of practice.

East Timor an object lesson for Tigers

Sri Lankan Tamils have every reason to feel envious of the East Timorese: While the Timorese will be savoring the end of their journey to independence on May 20, the Tamils are still many miles away from such a historic juncture.

And that after both communities commencing their struggle for independence at about the same time, in the 1970s - the Tamils agitating for separation from the Sri Lankan government and the East Timorese pursuing the same cause from Indonesia.

More than 60,000 have died during Sri Lanka’s two-decade-old ethnic conflict, which has pitted government forces against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The Tamil Tigers have been fighting to establish the state of Eelam in Sri Lanka’s northern and eastern provinces, home to a large Tamil population in the majority Sinhalese country.

In East Timor, more than 200,000 people are believed to have died during the 24-year separatist struggle by the Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor (Fretilin) against the Indonesian armed forces. Jakarta annexed East Timor in 1976, shortly after the Portuguese left their colony after 450 years.

Recent events provide some clues to why the Tamils will not have it easy in pushing their cause into high gear, a fact that has little to do with Colombo, the traditional nemesis of the Tamils, and more to do with the international community and the international media.

The recent historic elections in East Timor provide one indicator. In the run-up to this vote, the third landmark poll under three years, foreign correspondents were unanimous in who the media darling was among the two presidential candidates — Xanana Gusmao, the former commander of the Fretilin rebels. His charisma and his legendary status as a guerrilla fighter were two factors in his favor.

Likewise, Gusmao was candid and engaging, confessing to the press that he was a reluctant candidate, preferring instead to step aside from politics and spend his time gardening and pursuing photography and poetry. Few, including those in the media, doubted his assurances, upon his freedom after six years in an Indonesian prison in September 1999, that he was committed toward peace and upholding human rights.

By the late ’90s, as the former strongman Suharto teetered from power and formerly friendly governments began to distance themselves from Jakarta, many viewed East Timor as the underdog and one of the last legacies of his three-decade, iron-fisted rule.

By contrast, Velupillai Prabhakaran, the leader of the Tamil Tigers, has not been so fortunate, a fact that has become amply clear after Prabhakaran’s news conference on April 10, his first in 12 years. And if Sri Lankan Tamils were hoping that this media event — including an image makeover as the Tiger leader traded his customary military fatigues and Browning pistol for a gray safari suit — would help their cause, they have been sorely disappointed.

The dispatches filed by the foreign correspondents who attended the news conference in the Tiger-held territory of northern Sri Lanka painted a picture of a rebel leader who was uncomfortable, paranoid and unprepared, a far cry from the descriptions of Gusmao as charismatic and charming.

While some were suspicious of Prabhakaran’s motives, others trashed him. A British journalist wrote about the extraordinary security measures the Tigers put on the media, which were so strict that they compelled one correspondent to ask, “How can you expect us to take you seriously when you give every impression of a military dictator surrounded by goons?”

Indian journalists were as severe. “If it was the intention of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam to boost the image of its leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran, by presenting him to the world media, the all-around verdict is that the strategy failed,” wrote Nirupama Subramanian of the Indian newspaper The Hindu.

There is another realm that should be disheartening to the Sri Lankan Tamils: the international community, where Prabhakaran and the Tamil Tigers are, likewise, woefully short of sympathy for their cause. This is unlike Gusmao and the East Timorese during their separatist struggle, although in the 1980s Timorese resistance leaders such as Jose Ramos Horta felt that too many governments were keen on keeping good ties with Suharto, and thus cared little about the plight of the tiny territory.

Prabharakan’s press conference, in fact, provoked harsh condemnation of the Tigers and its leaders from leading political figures in India, where the LTTE is banned as a terrorist organisation. Other governments, such as the United States’, issued a cautious statement, welcoming Prabhakaran’s commitment toward peace talks with Colombo. The Tigers are also banned in the United States as a terrorist organisation and so too in Britain, Canada and Australia.

On the other hand, Gusmao and the East Timorese had chalked up significant successes internationally by the mid-1990s. In 1996, Ramos Horta, who had lived in exile for almost 25 years, was jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize with Bishop Carlos Belo, leader of East Timor’s majority Catholic population. At the time, the Nobel committee stated that the peace prize should strengthen the independence struggle of the people of East Timor, “a small but oppressed people”.

Changing perceptions of him and the Tigers will not be easy for Prabhakaran, given his brutal record in leading the Tamil Tigers in their separatist struggle. The Indians, for instance, will not let him forget his alleged role in the assassination of former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991.

Equally indelible is the perception of him as “a fiendish monster — a cross between [Cambodia’s] Pol Pot and Osama bin Laden”, as one British journalist described Prabhakaran. Another British journalist, Catherine Philip of The Times, described the Tiger leader as “the only man to rank with Osama bin Laden as the most elusive and deadly terrorist”.

Moreover, since the acts of terror in the United States on September 11, Prabhakaran’s reputation for using suicide bombers has gained more notoriety. Reports in the international media have frequent reminders that the Tamil Tigers invented this form of violence and have sent more than 200 young boys and girls to their deaths in this way.

So while one rebel, Gusmao, has secured sufficient international goodwill and sympathy, the other rebel, Prabhakaran, has been reduced in many circles to a pariah.

Thus on May 20, when East Timorese will finally taste their long-desired independence, Sri Lankan Tamils may want to ask: Is Prabhakaran an asset or liability to the Tamil cause?

— Inter Press Service

Protests hit Colombo

By Amantha Perera

While the dust settled on LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran's press conference and his statements, politicians in the south staged their first rally last week.

While Prabhakaran has moved to consolidate his power and make sure that his demands were clearly heard, a fractured opposition in Colombo made a feeble attempt to create a public outcry, that is yet to manifest itself spontaneously.

Last Monday, the first demonstration to hit streets was organised by Buddhist monks. They had planned to hand over a petition to Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe demanding that the LTTE should not be de-proscribed. However, the protest did not reach the anticipated levels. There weren't enough numbers on the street.

Organisers had hoped that at least 1000 participants would be marching to Temple Trees but nothing close that figure was present in front of the Colombo railway  station when the protest march commenced.

It was stopped by police who had barricaded the road. Police was there in big numbers and behind the police, the Special Task Force had made its appearance with riot gear and tear gas. At least one senior officer of the STF was over heard saying that they would fire tear gas at the marchers if they proceeded defying orders.

The STF was also ultra nervous of the media, they threatened photographers not to take pictures reminding of days when the Presidential Security Division acted the state goon squad.

It was not the march but the behavior of the STF that was news. And coming from the UNF which had promised that it was not going to behave like the PA, it was even worse.

The second public outcry was heard a day later. It was organised by the JVP and several PA parliamentarians too took part. But there was no STF.

It had the required numbers to fill the Hyde Park as the JVP had made sure that supporters were brought in from around the country. They first held a public protest at Lipton Circus and thereafter proceeded to Hyde Park without problems where the rally was held. It was at Hyde Park that the JVP was joined by PA  MPs, Anura Bandaranaike, Dinesh Gunawardena, Ferial Ashraff, Mangala Samaraweera, Arjuna Ranatunga and Janaka Bandara Thennakoon.

Bandaranaike who was given pride of place at the rally told the JVP crowd that he was not sure what his good friend Ranil Wickremesinghe was expecting holding on to the Tiger's tail.

He described the LTTE as an organisation that was akin to Hitler's Nazi party and said that LTTE doctrine was to have total command. Commenting on the Rajiv Gandhi assassination Bandaranaike said that Sonia Gandhi who will be India's next prime minister has demanded that Prabhakaran be extradited.

Referring to media reports that the LTTE was arming itself, the former speaker said that the LTTE was planing to open offices in Wellawatte and the up-country and if the peace process breaks down could destroy Colombo in 12 hours. He also warned Wickremesinghe not to be fooled by Jayalath Jayawardena.

He even took swipes at the media stating that no one had raised issues relating to the murders of R. Premadasa and Gamini Dissanayake at the press conference.

His colleague Dinesh Gunawa- rdena too took off from where he left. He said that the rally was organised to bring together citizens who were concerned about the fracturing of the country and who wanted to live in a united Sri Lanka.

He referred to Anton Balasi- ngham's statement referring to Wickremesinghe as prime minister of only southern Sri Lanka and forewarned that the LTTE was using the negotiations to get the bans lifted in other countries and get hold of frozen accounts.

According to Gunawardena the LTTE was planning to use such funds to invest in state entities like the CEB when they were privatised.

He also said that the LTTE had taken a contract to assassinate the prime minister of Bangladesh and that the organisation had not given up the call for Eelam.

According to MEP leader, the protestors were not against peace but against dividing the country.

It was JVP's front man Wimal Weeravansha that reminded the gathering of a Wickremesinghe-Prabhakaran plot to create an Eelam and one party rule in the rest of the country. Whatever differences the JVP may have with Wickremesinghe, according to its parliamentary group leader the party considered him to be the prime minister of the whole country and that he was not strong enough to reply to Prabhakaran and his mercenaries.

He also said that even plantation based parties which had formerly revolved around government have now resorted to seeking LTTE's support.

Ferial Ashraff reiterated that as members of parliament they were bound to tell the people the negative points of the MoU.

Despite the big show and harsh words, the rally was not complete. There was a gaping hole right in the middle. No one came up with an alternative to the present peace negotiations other than veiled reference to war.

It was same case when the opposition took part in the debate on the MoU in parliament, they failed to come up with an alternative, just kept on hammering at the MoU.

On top of that, the divisions within the opposition are now public and official. All those SLFP members who got on to the JVP stage are opposed to Mahinda Rajapakse's ascendance in the party.

While Rajapakse has been critical of the MoU, he has said that the opposition was going to be critical in a constructive sense and not  scuttle the process for political gain. Soon after the meeting, Rajapakse told journalists that he was not invited for the meeting and that the SLFP would organize its separate protest campaign. He added that the SLFP was not a party that would be governed by few MPs.

The JVP's role in the splintering of the SLFP too is now common knowledge. Led by Weeravansha, the JVP has done everything it can to belittle Rajapakse and promote the rival faction. Even at the rally there were reference to how the government was trying to buy out the opposition.

Though, the rally was supposed to be a public outcry, it was nothing of that sort. It was more a bright flash in the pan. People by and large still seem to be supportive of the peace process. The support however might slacken when the interim council is formed and powers are allocated.

Last week's public protests were more like opposition politicians making a cry, scared of not getting their two bits of publicity under Prabhakaran's glow.

Int. council: problems and questions

By J.S. Tissainayagam

Though the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE have made no official pronouncements on the agenda for 'talks on talks' in Thailand between the two parties, the establishment of an interim administrative council (IAC) is expected to figure prominently in them.

The IAC, as the name suggests, is not a permanent institution, but created for the purpose of carrying out developmental and administrative work in the northeast till a more permanent structure is evolved through negotiations.

The IAC is also an experiment because the LTTE, primarily is a military formation, expressed a desire to enter the political process, but did not contest parliamentary elections. The council is a method whereby the LTTE's demands may be accommodated without getting into legal and administrative tangles.

Substantial autonomy

Thirdly, the body will be, in a way, the prototype of what might eventually be established if a permanent solution to the ethnic conflict is found within a united Sri Lanka. This is because the establishment of the IAC recognises two important matters: substantial autonomy has to be granted to the northeast, and that the supremacy of the LTTE in the northeast has to be acknowledged for the viable functioning of institutions.

The IAC is however not expected to involve itself in any direct political functions. The Tiger's political campaign is to be undertaken by the political offices established by that organisation in the 'cleared' areas.

One of the LTTE's concerns, reportedly, is the massive outlay of finance required for the development, reconstruction and rehabilitation of the northeast in which the council will be engaged. Since such sums are not available with the Treasury of the Sri Lanka government, the Tigers are looking to alternative ways of financing these ventures.

An obvious avenue will be from the generous promises made by the international community to contribute towards the development of the northeast. The question however is the conduit through which these monies are going to be transferred.

The LTTE has reportedly indicated its wish that these monies be channelled directly to the IAC without going through the central government. Both the government of Sri Lanka and the overseas donors have to however accede to this request. The consent of the government will mean a significant step forward in centre-periphery relations.

Control of finances to sub-national units is an issue that has bedevilled centre-periphery relations even in other countries. Certain countries permit direct foreign investment in the sub-national units, while others do not. Finance commissions calculate disbursement of central government grants to the periphery depending on the revenues the sub-national units can raise, the quantum of foreign investment earmarked for them etc.

Centre-periphery relations

The role of the finance commission is to see that the peripheral units having greater access to funding are not allowed in to outstrip the others to the point that there is unbalanced development within the country. Uneven development can in turn lead to distortion of the national economy and affect social and political progress.

In Sri Lanka however, the preoccupying concern is not uneven development, but a convoluted view of sovereignty. In other words, that the jurisdiction of the state will be impaired if foreign sources are allowed to invest in the provincial councils directly without going through the line ministry of the central government created for that purpose - the Ministry of Finance and the Treasury.

In its first draft (1995) of the proposed new constitution, the PA government did permit the regional councils to negotiate funding directly from foreign sources. But in its subsequent draft (1997), the PA had withdrawn that.

The other source of finance that is expected to be absorbed into the IAC will be the decentralised budget (DCB) allocated to members of parliament to the northeast.

This brings us to the question of non-governmental funding. The LTTE has expressed its dissatisfaction over the functioning of international NGOs (INGOs) in the northeast in general, and in the 'uncleared' areas in particular. Some of the implementing agencies have been accused of either not executing their projects, or siphoning off the funding for other uses. The question is whether INGO and NGO funding too will come within the purview of the council, or whether these organisations will enjoy complete autonomy in implementing their projects.

While these are some of the monetary issues that concern the Tigers, there are also the administrative functions of the IAC that needs looking into. It is likely the LTTE will want incorporate, or at least supervise, some of the functions of the administration - at least those which are required for developmental purposes. This would require appropriating or supervising some of the functions of the district secretaries and divisional secretaries in the northeast, who are the representatives of the central government.

Interestingly, the district and divisional secretaries of a number of districts of the area were present when the LTTE opened its political offices in the northeast. This gesture by the bureaucracy could have been through 'goodwill' but if so, it seemed a gesture they were mighty over-anxious to display. Shorn of the tamasha, the opening of LTTE offices was a political act done in government-controlled territory. One wonders whether the gesture indicates the close co-ordination the LTTE will have with government officials through IAC, which was anyway in existence in the past too, albeit unofficially.

Monetary issues

There will be no less ambiguity when the powers of the Northeast Provincial Council (NEPC) are either appropriated or come under the supervisory control of the LTTE. It will be unrealistic to think otherwise because the provincial councils were set up as devolved bodies mainly to undertake development activity. But it will be interesting to see the mechanics whereby this is accomplished because if a school is to be reconstructed co-ordination with the provincial director of education (PDE) will be required as much as the council having to deal with the PDHS to rehabilitate hospitals.

It has to be also noted that the NEPC now functions under the governor, who is a representative of the central government after the EPRLF-run provincial government under Chief Minister A. Varatharajaperumal was dissolved in 1990.

The setting up of the IAC also throws up the question of the transfer of power. When the NEPC was functioning under the EPRLF, one of the biggest obstacles for the effective transfer of power from the central government to the council, were racist bureaucrats who were reluctant to give up power. They were assisted no doubt by the megalomania of President R. Premadasa who was then head of state. Let us hope that Sri Lankan officialdom is wiser today, 12 years later, or that the LTTE has driven sufficient respect into the bureaucrats for them to realise the Tigers cannot be trifled with as the EPRLF.

Bills and debates

Despite speculation the LTTE would make the TNA obsolete, the Tigers have done nothing of the sort. It appears however that parliamentarians of the TNA will not be part of the IAC. They will function as two separate bodies. The LTTE told the TNA, when the latter's members met them in the Wanni that the MPs would be expected to raise in parliament matters affecting the Tamils such as the army not moving out of schools and places of worship and other violations of the ceasefire agreement.

During discussions, the Tiger leadership had also said that the TNA could co-ordinate with S. P. Thamilchelvam, head of the LTTE's political wing, on matters regarding parliamentary affairs such as bills and debates. The Tigers however do not recognise Sri Lanka's parliament.

Finally, the legal basis under which the IAC is to be set up has to be considered. Though the interests the LTTE entertains on this matter is not known, there are at least three sets of ideas that are under consideration by decision-makers in the south regarding this matter. One is to set the IAC up under emergency regulations, but that is inconceivable because its existence will depend on the successful passage of the motion to extend the emergency every month in parliament.

The other two seem to be more stable. One is through the 13th Amendment to the constitution. This will however be unsuitable because the president has the power to dissolve the IAC. In fact under the present set up where President Chandrika Kumaratunga has displayed great animus against the LTTE, any organisation run by the Tigers will have to function under the shadow of such a threat.

Asymmetrical devolution

The other option is to set up the IAC after introducing a new amendment to the constitution. Its setting up will grant special powers to the northeast thereby testing the possibilities of working an asymmetrical system of devolution. A body set up under the 13th Amendment however will not function as an institution within an asymmetrical system because under this amendment devolution to all provinces has to be uniform.

Pushing through another amendment might therefore see the prototype of the setup that might come about if the LTTE and the government reach an accord. It might therefore be worth considering seriously, though it will need a bipartisan consensus between the UNF and PA if it is to be pushed through parliament.

The setting up of the IAC throws up a number of technical problems that have to be sorted out during negotiations in Thailand. And it is best it done to the satisfaction of everyone if the interim administrative council is not to suffer the same fate its predecessor did in 1987, leading to discord and eventually, war.

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