ISSUES

Thailand talks and the Tamil Eelam demand “The LTTE doesn’t operate according to the concept of a separate state. We operate according to concepts and categories that are entirely different. We operate according to the concept of a homeland and self-determination. Homeland doesn’t mean separate state as such... Saying that the LTTE is fighting for an independent state has no relevance.” — Anton Balasingham at Sattahip Press Conference (IPS September 18)

By  D.B.S. Jeyaraj

Every dark cloud has a silver lining. True, but then, only the foolhardy optimist would strive to elongate that lining excessively to cover the darkness of the entire cloud. The desire by sections of the national and international media to paint a rosy picture of the preliminary round of talks between the United National Front (UNF) government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Thailand has led to sunshine stories of a colossal scale about Sattahip’s outcome.

While the Sattahip parley certainly proved satisfactory, nothing sensational occurred. Everything went off predictably well because both sides scrupulously avoided deep discussions about contentious issues.

Chief among the sunshine stories from Sattahip is the one about the Tigers giving up the Tamil Eelam demand. Different organs have outlined that aspect differently using terms like ‘scaled down,’ ‘toned down,’ etc. The point however, is unmistakably clear. The LTTE apparently is not keen on a separate state — Tamil Eelam — for which dream thousands of youths  laid down their lives and paid countless sacrifices. It seems highly unlikely that a movement like the LTTE after waging a relentless struggle for decades and establishing a position of strength in the politico - military sphere is now prepared to jettison its secessionist demand at this premature stage.

If the Tigers have really stated explicitly and unambiguously that they are dropping their Tamil Eelam demand at this juncture, then it goes against the grain of all what they have stood and fought for in the past. Only the ignorant, naive and incompetent will believe, let alone project the viewpoint that the LTTE has entered talks after abandoning the Tamil Eelam demand particularly because of the powerful politico-military position they are in right now. Thus, if the Tigers have indeed stated that the Tamil Eelam demand has been dropped, any serious student of politics can only arrive at the inescapable conclusion that the LTTE is insincere in claiming so.

Eelam demand stands

In fairness to the LTTE, the simple truth is that the Tigers have never stated that they have given up the Tamil Eelam demand. In that context, it is indeed remarkable that much publicity is being given to a non-existent stance of the Tigers. Various people have commented publicly on this so called  “positional shift” by the LTTE and the imaginary move is currently churning up a heated controversy. The reality however, is that the Tigers have never declared that the Tamil Eelam demand has been dropped. Moreover, it is not necessary for them to drop the demand as a pre-condition or prerequisite for entering talks. It is perfectly normal and even logical for an organisation to enter talks of such a nature without dropping the relevant demand.

 Incidentally, the Tamil Eelam demand is not a brainchild or whimful fancy of Velupillai Prabhakaran. The proposal was mooted by several other leading Tamil politicians of a bygone era. It was not created in a vacuum but evolved gradually as a response to Sinhala chauvinist hegemonism masquerading as democratic majoritarianism. The Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) contested the 1977 July elections seeking a mandate for Tamil Eelam and obtained a preponderant endorsement by winning 18 of the 19 Tamil majority electorates in the north - east.

The  fact that the Tigers have entered talks without giving up Tamil Eelam does not necessarily mean that they would want to confine the agenda for talks to that demand alone. It has been made very clear that the current talks are about finding a reasonable alternative to the Tamil Eelam demand. So the Tigers or any rational entity will not and cannot enter talks of this type while sticking uncompromisingly to the original demand. They are only discussing alternative solutions without abandoning their stated position. Distorting this reality with either bona fides or mala fides motives is not only foolish but can also be dangerously counterproductive.

In any case, it was self evident that the entire peace process got off the ground because it was implicitly understood that talks could not be about Tamil Eelam. When Norwegian special peace envoy Erik Solheim met LTTE Leader Prabhakaran on November 1, 2000 at Mallavi and returned to Colombo, he told the press that the process was aimed at finding a solution within ensuring the unity, territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. Responding to a pointed question, Solheim said then that the Tiger leader was well aware of this and was proceeding on that premise.

After the UNF government came to power, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe has constantly emphasised that all things except secession were negotiable. The unity and territorial integrity of the country were non-negotiable. The government delegation head, Prof. G. L. Peiris in his inaugural address in Thailand reiterated this position. In defining the parameters of the talks, Peiris stated very clearly that the unity and territorial integrity concepts were sacrosanct and elevated them to a maximal irreductibility.

Explore alternatives

Against that backdrop, harping constantly about the LTTE fighting for a separate state and going ga ga over imaginary acts  of dropping the Tamil Eelam demand etc., can only be exercises in futility. This perhaps explains Balasingham’s comment that “the LTTE doesn’t operate according to the concept of a separate state” and “saying that the LTTE is fighting for an independent state has no relevance.” The LTTE at this point of time, is prepared to explore alternatives to Tamil Eelam. It may be amenable to giving up that demand only if as G. L. Peiris optimistically asserted those aspirations could be addressed within a united state.

Again, this flexibility and the preparedness to consider lesser solutions is nothing new. The LTTE along with the TULF and four other Tamil groups entered the Thimpu talks in 1985. Prabhakaran and Balasingham went to Bangalore in 1986. The Tigers went along with the 1987 Indo-Lanka accord for a while. It entered into a dialogue with the Premadasa regime in 1989-1990. When Kumaratunga came to power the LTTE entered  peace talks again in 1994  and adhered to a short lived ceasefire in 1995. When the Norwegian facilitated peace process began the LTTE declared a unilateral ceasefire and was ready to sign a memorandum of understanding. It was the Kumaratunga - Kadirgamar duo that obstructed peace then. Even with Wickremesinghe, it was the LTTE that took the lead in matters like declaring a unilateral ceasefire, signing the ceasefire  agreement.

Of course, all peace processes of the past failed. There is much debate on what caused these failures. While successive governments lay the blame at the door to the Tiger den, the LTTE in turn blames Colombo. The important thing however, is to take into account the continuing phenomenon of the LTTE participating at talks. All such exercises have been undertaken with the implicit understanding that the efforts involved were to identify an alternative and not demarcate the boundaries of Tamil Eelam.

While Sinhala hardliners may say that Tamil intransigence was the cause for peace bid failures in the past, a  brief examination of recent history will reveal that Tamil political leaders have always been prepared to compromise on their original demands in the interests of a settlement. It had been Sinhala intolerance and bad faith in implementing even minor concessions that fuelled Tamil resentment to the stage of secession.

Even though Amirthalingam became opposition leader on the strength of parliamentary seats acquired through a mandate for Tamil Eelam, the TULF stalwart was always ready to negotiate for something lesser. The TULF stance then was that if the government proffered a viable alternative to Tamil Eelam the party would present it to the people, gain their consent and then disavow separatism. It was on this basis that the TULF opted to accept even the District Development Councils (DCC), a feeble caricature of a separate state. But, J. R. Jayewardene was unwilling to let even the DDCs work.

No compromise

While the TULF was ever ready to negotiate for something less it was not prepared to drop Tamil Eelam because of a ban on it. So when Jayewardene brought in the aftermath of the 1983 July anti-Tamil pogrom, the 6th Amendment to the constitution that disallowed separatism, the TULF took the honourable course of forfeiting their seats rather than take the oath of allegiance.

Thus, when the LTTE says it is prepared to participate in the search for a settlement short of Tamil Eelam, a familiar strand in Tamil politics is visible. Once again, the dominant Tamil political force of the day like the TULF of yore is ready to accept a viable alternative to Tamil Eelam opposes its core principles of homeland. The analogy ends there.

The LTTE unlike the TULF has reached this dominant position through force of arms and is in a far more powerful position vis a vis the government in Colombo than the TULF ever was. This position of strength and its ideological make up will not let the LTTE compromise for something far, far less than Tamil Eelam. So any viable alternative that the Tigers would be ready to accept has to incorporate the core principles of self-determination, homeland and nationhood. That simply put is the bottom line.

This was directly and effectively conveyed to the world at large by LTTE chief negotiator Anton Balasingham at the press conference in Thailand. Reiterating that the Tigers were not in negotiations to pursue Tamil Eelam, Balasingham emphasised that the Tigers were operating at a different level with other concepts such as self-determination, homeland, etc. There was however, an explicit warning. If the three concepts were not enshrined in any forthcoming settlement or if oppression continued, the Tigers will use the right of ‘self - determination’  as a last resort and secede launching if necessary a separatist war again.

It is somewhat puzzling as to why an unnecessary controversy about the LTTE dropping the Tamil Eelam demand is on when all evidence available indicates everything to the contrary. Also, it would be myopic on the part of the south to lull itself  into a  sense of false consciousness that the LTTE is dropping Tamil Eelam when it really  has not. What is of utmost importance is to realise that the LTTE really means business when talking about the core principles and other matters related to jettisoning the Tamil Eelam demand. It is imperative therefore, for South Sri Lanka to explore ways and means of evolving a viable alternative incorporating these principles instead of harping on the Tamil Eelam demand. The international dimension in this respect could cut both ways if the Tigers take their case to them.

Three core principles

The three core principles are not something extraneous in Tamil perception. They are perceived as the inherent rights of the Tamil people and not concessions. The Tamils would therefore, want these rights to be recognised as their right rather than treat them as concessions. The challenge at hand is to work out a solution incorporating these principles in a manner acceptable to the Sinhala and Muslim people also. These are issues that have to be addressed and not glossed over or ignored. These matters will not form part of the agenda in the earlier rounds of talks but addressing and hopefully resolving becomes inevitable at some point of time. Unless and until these problems are overcome and a radical re-structuring of the state and re-orientation of dominant ideology is effected, hopes of a final settlement are bleak.

The worry from a Sinhala perspective about the LTTE’s bona fides regarding peace must be noted too. The nagging doubt fuelled by Sinhala hard-liners is that the LTTE will not quit its separatist agenda and opt for a settlement within a united Sri Lanka. In the absence of a national media campaign to combat, contain or clarify this scepticism there is no doubt that this trend of thought will gather momentum in the coming months. Kumaratunga, the fallen peace angel, is likely to spearhead this anti-Tiger and by extension anti-UNF campaign. Kumaratunga has failed to distinguish between the LTTE’s genuine commitment to the search for peace and its dedication to the ideals that led to the birth and growth of the movement.

It is important to recognise that Velupillai Prabhakaran and his companions are firmly convinced that the Tamil national question cannot be resolved within a united Sri Lanka. There is no reason to doubt that the Tigers are not of this mindset even now. The difference now is that unlike in the past where the LTTE felt negotiations were useless because of its conviction that the Sri Lankan state could resolve the problem and therefore shunned talks, the Tigers re-oriented their approach and opted to enter talks. This change of heart cannot be because the Tigers had abandoned Tamil Eelam or even felt that Colombo could award them a satisfactory solution. It is more of a tactical shift. Instead of staying away from negotiations and being blamed as intransigent, the LTTE participates in the peace process to show that it is not averse to a negotiated peace.

Even if that state of mind prevails in the Tiger psyche, the talks need not be affected. However much the LTTE desires Tamil Eelam, the Tigers are yet willing to cooperate and participate fully with Wickremesinghe in the peace process.

The challenge

The LTTE approach must be viewed rationally in  balanced fashion. Extreme perceptions should be avoided. Just because the LTTE has not abandoned its liberationist ideology of Tamil Eelam, there is no reason to say that no talks should take place because of this. The challenge therefore is to continue talks as much as possible and seek avenues of a negotiated settlement.

Even though the LTTE may not be in a position to openly state so, it is not entirely impossible that it may opt for a settlement within a united but not necessarily unitary Sri Lanka. If the essence of Tamil grievances can be redressed and aspirations accommodated within a re-structured state, then the Tamil Eelam demand may not be stressed upon. The state should be re-invented. In the words of  the late Professor Alfred Jeyaratnam Wilson, “a  settlement ensuring, ‘separation without secession’ could be achieved.” Such a solution is highly imaginative and bold. What is envisaged here is an ‘associative structure’ between the two ‘solitudes.’

Hoping for such a solution within the next few years seems unrealistic. But temporary arrangements could be made while negotiations go on. Provisions like an interim administration for the north - east where pride of place is given to the LTTE or parties favoured by it should be established. The important thing is to prevent the peace process from collapsing and relapsing into a state of war. Whatever the ups and downs of the peace process, the country should be kept in a no war state. This is imperative if the economic fortunes of the island are to be revived or resurrected.

It is against this backdrop that the LTTE stipulation of core principles need to be viewed. It is in the interests of the country and peace at large for those concerned to discard their blinkers and face up to the situation. Unless Tamil aspirations are accommodated, the demand for Tamil Eelam will not be abandoned. If a viable alternative to it is to evolve then the core principles of homeland, nationhood and self-determination have to be recognised. Time is of the essence.

Athurugiriya mystery deepens

By Frederica Jansz

The mystery surrounding the controversial military intelligence safe house at Athurugiriya has deepened with a top army commando claiming that it is he who planned the killing of the LTTE’s intelligence chief in the east and not Captain Nilam as claimed by Army Chief, Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle and Director, Military Intelligence, Brigadier Kapila Hendawitharane.

The startling revelations have been made by Brigade Commander, Vavuniya, Col. Sumith Manawadu. According to Col. Manawadu, he planned the secret operation last June to assassinate ‘Nizam’ — the LTTE’s intelligence chief in Batticaloa.

Col. Manawadu was sent to Batticaloa last June to take over the duties of Col. Rohan Anthonisz who was leaving on an overseas study tour. Taking over duties in Batticaloa, Col. Manawadu was informed by military intelligence that the LTTE’s Eastern Chief Karuna was planning to launch a massive attack on a key army base in Batticaloa.

Wanting to counter this attack, Col. Manawadu  planned a pre-emptive strike against the LTTE, by planning a covert operation to murder three top Tiger leaders in the Eastern Province including the LTTE’s Intelligence Leader, Nizam.

Summoning three LTTE surrendees who had been enlisted by the Directorate of Military Intelligence to spy on the rebel organisation, Col. Manawadu outlined his plan to kill Nizam and two other key LTTE leaders based in the east.

The three Tiger surrendees were given two claymore mines each in order to carry out the operation and told to penetrate Tiger territory and assassinate their targets.

The plan almost backfired when one surrendee actually went back to the LTTE with the two claymore mines and divulged details of the plan to assassinate three top LTTE cadres.

The other two Tiger surrendees known as ‘Nithi’ and ‘Prabhakaran’ were however committed to carry out the special operation. Nithi in fact was the leader of this small group and had enlisted Prabhakaran as well to this outfit.

Karuna the target

A tough character, Prabhakaran’s target was to have been the LTTE’s military leader in the east, Karuna, but he managed to lure Nizam instead and killed him. The eastern based LTTE intelligence chief was assassinated on June 12, 2001.

Nizam, according to military intelligence was responsible for planning the attack on the Sri Dalada Maligawa, the Twin Towers in Fort and for assassinating SSP Sahabandu of the STF in Batticaloa. Sahabandu was posthumously promoted to the rank of DIG.

Before carrying out this attack on Nizam, Col. Manawadu got the approval of General Nanda Mallawarachchi who was the 233 Brigade Commander for Batticaloa.

After the killing of Nizam, Col. Manawadu withdrew Rs. 25,000 from funds available at the brigade headquarters in Batticaloa and paid Prabhakaran.

A few days later, Col. Manawadu once more withdrew another Rs. 25,000 and handed this money too over to Prabhakaran. Since the killing of Nizam was considered a massive victory for the Sri Lankan armed forces, Col. Manawadu was of the view that Prabhakaran should be paid at least Rs. 100,000 for having carried out the operation successfully.

He also believed Prabhakaran was vital for military intelligence and should be well looked after and financially reimbursed.

Col. Manawadu thereafter made a claim to the DMI and to Brigadier Kapila Hendawitharane and requested the DMI chief to pay Prabhakaran an additional Rs. 50,000.

It was only at this juncture that Hendawitharane was informed that Nizam was dead. Determined that he take the credit for such a vital killing, Hendawitharane was furious that the entire covert operation had been planned and carried out without his knowledge by Col. Manawadu.

Contacting intelligence officer Major Sunil, Hendawitharane yelled at him as to why he as DMI chief had been kept in the dark about this operation and why LTTE surrendees contracted by the DMI had been “lent” to Col.  Manawadu and his brigade command to carry out this operation. Be that as it may, Hendawitharane thereafter ordered Col. Manawadu to send Prabhakaran to Colombo. He promised the LTTE spy would be paid an additional Rs. 50,000 for his efforts.

Col. Manawadu however, by this time had got wind of Hendawitharane’s plan to take credit for this operation and undermine the work of the LTTE spy, so he refused to send Prabhakaran to Colombo.

Hendawitharane thereafter personally sent Captain Nilam from the Athurugiriya safe house to Batticaloa to bring Prabhakaran down to Colombo.

Never sent back

Prabhakaran was promised by Nilam that if he came to Colombo he would be paid another Rs. 50,000 and for this reason the man finally relented.

He was paid the money but Hendawitharane made sure that Prabhakaran was never sent back to the Eastern Province.

The initial Rs. 50,000 paid in two instalments by Col. Manawadu to Prabhakaran out of the brigade fund at Batticaloa was later reimbursed by the DMI which in turn is serviced by the secret service vote of the army.

Col. Manawadu’s success in this quarter was subsequently applauded by General Mallawarachchi at a brigade command conference where Col. Manawadu’s achievement was appreciated and other officers instructed to also serve in a similar manner.

Col. Manawadu was in command at Batticaloa for a period of one month from June 12, 2001 to July 12, 2001.

Later, the LTTE got confirmation that it had been ‘Nithi’ who had even enlisted Prabhakaran to betray the Tiger movement and assassinated Nithi in Batticaloa town.

A female suicide bomber was sent to kill Nithi. Soon after Nizam had been murdered by the LTTE spy, Nithi had been in Batticaloa town and about to get on his bicycle when he had spotted the human bomb. Drawing his pistol, he shot her but the explosive jacket she was wearing exploded killing him also on the spot.

This is the factual tale of how the LTTE’s Nizam was killed. Captain Nilam only rode to Batticaloa to bring Prabhakaran down to Colombo after the operation had been concluded. Nilam nor Hendawitharane had anything to do with planning or executing this killing and that they have falsely claimed to have done so calls for a full inquiry from Defence Minister Tilak Marapone.

Million rupee driver's licence scam

By Frederica Jansz

A multi million-rupee fraud was busted last week at the Registrar of Motor Vehicles (RMV), where it was detected that an assistant comm issioner in cahoots with a rogue owner of a driving school has defrauded the government by 30 million smackers and issued driving licences illegally.

Assistant Commissioner, Driving Licence Branch, RMV,  Mohamadu Lebe Mohamadu Anvarally is in charge of the green channel for issuing licences for applicants from Colombo, Kegalle and Kandy.

Sleuths from the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) have found that Anvarally together with Ranjith Udithakumara who is the owner of Dharshana Learners, have been sharing a loot of thousands of rupees, as they partnered a scam to issue driving licences - by accepting bribes.

Dharshana Learners is conve- niently situated opposite the RMV at Elvitigala Mawatha, Colombo 5. Two years ago, both Udithakumara and Anvarally connived a plot to earn big money - quick. The CID found that hundreds of driving licences have been issued in this manner over the last 24 months. Investigators are probing 84 cases where driving licences have been secured in this fraudulent manner - convinced there are many more to be detected.

Two data process- ing employees at the RMV, known as Mansoor and Rafeek, were also roped into the scam and prom- ised a pay-off. B. G. N. Amarasiri, a clerk at the RMV, became an accomplice, acting as broker in this surrepti- tious deal - picking up 'easy money' as they haggled with applicants to pay thousands of rupees for driving licences issued minus any test.

Ranjith Udithaku- mara has confessed to the police that he collected Rs. 10,000 from each applicant seeking a driving licence and evading the procedure. Of this amount he has said he handed out Rs. 5,000 to Anvarally.

Rs. 3000 Anvar- ally's pay-off for each licence while Rs. 2,000 was handed out to Mansoor and Rafeek.

Even this amount is enhanced depend- ing on the urgency of the applicant. For instance applicants who are seeking migr- ation and are in a hurry to get their driving licence for work purposes ove- rseas, were asked to pay as much as Rs. 15,000 to Rs. 25,000 for each licence. Udith- akumara has confessed to sleuths that these monies were divided with Anvarally and his two employees, Mansoor and Rafeek.

The official fee for a driving licence issued under the regular channels is only Rs. 1,050 while Rs. 1,750 is charged for a licence of priority. Applicants by law, are required to sit a written and practical test.

Anvarally and Udithakumara offered a more lucrative package to their clientele. For Rs. 5,000 anapplicant could forgo the written and practical test and be issued a driving licence pronto with no effort whatsoever on the part of the individual seeking a driving licence. Anvarally in his position as assistant commissioner held the key to this entire plot. He alone is the final authority when a driving licence is issued.

Anvarally personally issues a coded password known as a DIN number for each licence.

Once the DIN number is issued the particulars of the applicant is transferred electronically to a private printing company along with supporting documents with a photograph of the applicant. This is where the printing of the licence takes place. The complete set of papers is thereafter returned via courier to the RMV to be stored in their records  division.

However, these particular records where driving licences have been illegally issued by Anvarally - have all been destroyed. As a result, there are no checks and balances maintained, which would later prove that many applicants have been illegally granted a driving licence. Sleuths have found that two employees at the private printing firm too were involved in this scam. Acting as agents they also received a pay-off of Rs. 200 each for every licence issued in this manner.

The CID have concluded that since this scam has been happening over the last two years a sum of at least Rs. 30 million has been defrauded to the RMV and state coffers. 

Against the 84 names of individuals who have procured their licences in this manner, the CID have found that there are no corresponding files or receipts of payments made. The only details available are basic details of the licence holder referring merely to each individuals date of birth, sex, etc. There are no details of any payments  made for these licences that have been credited to the RMV. The CID plans, to now use the DIN number of each driving licence and check with the records division at the RMV. If the applications are not found the cops will presume that these 84 licences have been procured by illegal means. The licence holders will probably be requested to surrender their licences and face a written and practical test and secure a fresh driving licence or be charged under the Bribery and Corruption Act. A senior sleuth observed that all driving licences issued in this manner will have to be declared null and void.

Although the CID has detected only 84 cases, they believe that hundreds of driving licences may have been issued in this manner within the last two years. 

Anvarally and Ranjith Udithakumara are both in remand after their arrests last week. The CID is expected to file a full report on the matter to court this week. Their investigations into the malpractices at the RMV is continuing.

The Green Column

Rukman appoints`brown cloud' task force

On an initiative by Environment Minister Rukman Senanayake, the cabinet has decided to appoint a six-member task force to report on steps to be taken on the Asian brown cloud and other emerging regional environmental issues. The so-called 'brown cloud' is a haze of industrial pollutant gases hovering at a very high altitude over much of the north-western Indian ocean. Scientists estimate that the extent of the cloud is about five times the size of India.

The haze was discovered in a high-altitude atmospheric study of the area led by the Max Planck Institute of Germany, together with the Scripps Institute of Oceanography, USA and India's National Physical Laboratory. Although the finding was published in the world's most highly-cited scientific journal, Nature in February 2001, it attracted hardly any attention until the United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) publicised the issue in the run-up to the recently concluded World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, South Africa. The brown cloud however, did not feature significantly at the summit, largely because of the low-key attitude of many developing Asian nations, who saw the event as a publicity stunt for western nations to justify their poor environmental performances.

The so-called brown cloud, however, is not a cloud at all in that it is invisible to the naked eye. It is a high-altitude haze of pollutants above the Indian Ocean west and north of Sri Lanka. The level of pollution is not high by the standards on the Earth's surface: according to Senanayake, it is about the same as in a developed-country suburb. While this is not in itself alarming, the minister has voiced concern because the upper atmosphere has pollutant levels that are normally more than 10 times lower than those observed inside the brown cloud.

Regional initiative

Since the initial study in 2000, no monitoring of the cloud has been done. There are no high-altitude aircraft fitted with the necessary instrumentation available for this purpose even in India. As the cloud threatens mainly India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives, all of who are members of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Senanay- ake has proposed a regional initiative. According to Environment Ministry sources, the minister is keen to use his position as chairman of the South Asian Cooperative Environmental Programme to work out a regional strategy in dealing with the brown cloud.

Scientists say however, that there is as yet no cause for alarm. No one knows how long this cloud has been present, whether it is growing in size or density, and whether it is drifting. Claims by some environmental organisations that the cloud will absorb 15% of solar radiation and adversely affect agriculture however, are thought to be exaggerated. In fact, 10-15% of the 'heat' in solar radiation is being absorbed by the cloud. This however, is thought not to be immediately serious given that the atmosphere reflects 31% of received solar energy back into space and absorbs a further 23%: only 46% of the sun's radiation (at most) reaches the Earth's surface. In any case, there is an annual variation of 7% caused by the varying distance between the Earth and the sun, which is normal. Additionally, the cloud is over the sea, and not over Sri Lanka or India (that, at least, was how things were in 2000). The pollutants in the cloud probably originate from as far away as China, with India too, being a major contributor. The gases involved in the cloud are all industrial pollutants. Sulphates account for almost a third of these, a figure typical of industrial and motor vehicle emissions in the region.

Assessment

Senanayake has taken the view that prior to dealing with this issue, an assessment must be made of the seriousness of the problem, and what regional and international initiatives are necessary. On his recommendation, cabinet has appointed a six-member task force on regional environment headed by Dr. Ravi Perera, a professional environmental scientist who is also a director of the Central Environmental Authority (CEA). The ministers of science and technology, irrigation and water management, fisheries and ocean resources and agriculture too, will nominate experts from agencies under their ministries to serve in the task force.

The reason for the inclusion of the latter two ministries in the study group is a second regional environmental problem that Senanayake has informed cabinet is potentially even more serious than the brown cloud. This refers to the growing depletion of oxygen in the coastal waters of the India-Sri Lanka continental shelf.

Dramatic increase

A detailed study by the National Institute of Oceanography based in New Delhi has shown that owing to increased run-off of fertilisers from rivers into the Indian Ocean, there has been a dramatic increase in the growth of algae in the costal seas off India and Sri Lanka. This is particularly noticeable on the western side of the subcontinent, where most of the rivers discharge into the sea, and where agriculture is most intensive.

The study shows that increased algal growth at the surface is depleting oxygen levels in deeper waters. It also shows that oceanic concentrations of the toxic gases H2S (hydrogen sulphide) N2O (nitrous oxide, better known as laughing gas) have increased alarmingly. According to Senanayake however, this is no laughing matter: the degradation of coastal waters could lead to serious impacts on fisheries, coral reefs and, at a global level, an increase in atmospheric N2O, which is a "greenhouse gas."

"Both these problems cannot be managed by Sri Lanka alone," Senanayake told The Sunday Leader. "We do not at present have the technical capacity to deal with these issues independently. As both problems affect India as well, it may be useful to facilitate bilateral information exchange and linkages with the relevant Indian institutions."

The task force has been given a period of three months to issue its report and recommendations to cabinet.

Iraq: what happens after compliance?

By Pia Djem Leichter

The memorial marking a year since September 11 had barely concluded as President Bush addressed the UN Security Council on September 12, discussing the imminent possibility of a pre-emptive attack on Iraq if President Saddam Hussein continues the decade long defiance of UN weapons inspections.

The possibility of a repeat attack on the US has pushed safety and precautionary security measures to the forefront of American politics and concerns. It may also be one of the reasons for Bush’s current demands on Iraq, and partially explains why Bush would choose this time to begin his strike on Iraq. This line of reasoning comes about when suspicions of nuclear weaponry development and the sources of supply to terrorist factions weighs heavy on the US administration. The question becomes how the US will choose to fight the ‘war against terror’: with or without a nod from the rest of the world.

In a clear demonstration of international consideration and solidarity, President Bush agreed to work with the Security Council to press Iraq to meet disarmament commitments made to the UN. This arrives on the heels of global disapproval and an overall negative reaction towards the idea of a US invasion of Iraq.

However, President Bush also stated that if Iraq did not comply with the weapons inspections, it would take the necessary measures to ensure international and US safety despite UN approval or permission. It appears as though President Bush is appealing to the UN and world leaders in search of support in overthrowing Saddam Hussein and stripping Iraq of its weapons of mass destruction, while stating that action, even if by the US alone, will be unavoidable if Hussein does not comply. This type of waffling between the need for international coalitions and US unilateralism continues to complicate matters and send mixed messages to the international community.

A 20 page document entitled A Decade Of Deception And Defiance was released as evidence that it is time for a new regime in Iraq. The document failed to provide new information showing that Saddam Hussein’s government in Baghdad is producing weapons of mass destruction or is in anyway connected to the terrorist organisations that orchestrated the attacks of September 11. Instead, it supplied a mix of fairly dated and in part circumstantial evidence against Saddam Hussein, including reports from weapons inspectors who searched Iraq for illegal weapons programmes from 1991-1998; which is not to imply that this record in itself is not enough. Bush also announced US intentions to rejoin UNESCO, the UN body that promotes global cultural and educational cooperation, which it withdrew from in 1984 at the height of the Cold War. This act further demonstrates the United States’ inclination towards international solidarity.

International perceptions and reactions

China, Japan, India, Russia, Thailand, and the Philippines cautioned the US against military action towards Iraq, suggesting an international consensus be reached, and that the US work closely with the UN on this issue. Australia and Britain welcomed Bush’s moves to involve the UN, and France gradually shifted their position towards Washington. A meeting was held on September 13 between Kofi Annan and Arab foreign ministers, including Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri, in which Annan pressured Hussein to readmit UN weapons inspectors. Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal called on Baghdad to agree to UN weapons inspections to spare Iraqi people a war. In Baghdad, Deputy Prime Minister Tariq Aziz denied again that Iraq possessed or sought to develop weapons of mass destruction, as Bush charges, and accused Washington of using any reason to start a war with Iraq in order to redefine the power structure in the Middle East and to seize control of the oil market.

The international community has come to regard the US as some type of ‘global policeman,’ with Iraq as an old but newly sought ‘enemy number one,’ while the search for Osama bin Laden continues, with some advancement, but no arrest. Perhaps this estimation may hold some truth to it, especially after the crime rate rose to such an extreme degree after the attacks on the 11th.  Since then, the US has offered its support to various countries that face hostile and violent terrorist factions and groups. Sri Lanka is a case in point: once the US declared its war on terror, the attention and aid that was long overdue, was received in the form of trade negotiations and pressure for the promotion of peace.

The reason for this perception is the urgency and swiftness in which the US administration is responding — to protect and insure US security — an exigency that has not existed for years. Although the US plays a paramount role in foreign affairs, they are not alone. Recent events have highlighted their resolve in attaining some international consensus and approval; even if it is done in a vacillating and at times contradictory manner. The question therein lies in how the US will proceed from here.

Swift reply

Iraq’s sudden offer on September 17 to allow readmittance of UN weapons inspectors has left the US in quite a bind. By allowing the return of inspectors, Hussein has effectively agreed to the Security Council resolution 1284 of December 1999, which sets a much lower threshold for inspections than the Bush administration would like. The Bush administration demands that amendments be made to the resolution before the inspections begin and regards Hussein’s actions with suspicion and distrust, calling for a new Security Council resolution. This is met with reluctance from Russia, France, and crucial Arab allies who regard the previous resolution as adequate enough.

Senior Iraqi officials held their first brief meeting on the 17th with the head of the United Nations Inspection Team, Hans Blix  regarding re-entry into Iraq, with no conclusions being made yet. Talks are scheduled to resume during the week of September 30 in Vienna, with no date set as to when the inspections would begin. The US demands more intrusive and unobstructed inspections, claiming Iraq’s track record as reason enough to reformulate the resolution. Iraq claims to be allowing the inspections to resume in order to remove current economic sanctions.

The balancing act

The position and policies of the United States are being tested, and quickly so. The global eyes are watching and it is crucial that it handles the current state of affairs with diplomatic patience and with the strengthened resolve that it recently displayed. The US has taken steps to act in concert and not apart from the international community, and did so willingly last week by its address to the Security Council. Now the sincerity of these actions must be upheld and not prove to be hollow speeches or words.

The sanctity of life and the quest for a global equilibrium in the name of peace is long due — but must be done at a minimal cost. The UN and the US alongside the international community, must press for rigid weapons inspections in Iraq, now that the door has been opened enabling it to do so. It has been four years since the inspections have halted, and the time needed for them to proceed in an unanimous manner will not jeopardise the US anymore than it may already have. The urgency and demand for global security has accelerated the search and conquer of terrorist regimes and factions, especially by the US, bringing us to the current Iraqi predicament.

It seems as though we are racing against time: the US would only be able to wage war in the winter months — for US soldiers would be required to wear nuclear and biological protective gear, and time is what is needed to sort out weapons inspections, consensus, and procedures. In Bush’s address to the Security Council he demanded that weapons inspectors be allowed into Iraq — now that Iraq has conceded — what basis will the US have in waging a war?

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