appreciate eastern Muslims' concerns
"With regard to the Eastern Province,
there is clearly a need to have meaningful and adequate institutional
arrangements for the Muslims there if we are to evolve a durable
solution. There are many options which are being put forward.....there
may be firstly the need to make special arrangements, institutional
arrangements, for the Muslims."
- Dr. Neelan Tiruchelvam (interview with Gamini
Weerakoon for TNL in 1995)
By D. B. S. Jeyaraj
The recent 'crisis' caused by the eastern parliamentary
component of the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) seems to have been
'managed' for the time being. It would be a grave folly on the part of
the powers that be to imagine that the tempest in a tea cup has ceased
and everything will return to normal. Nothing is ever settled unless it
is settled right. The grievances and aspirations of the Muslims
particularly those of the North-Eastern Province have to be adequately
redressed and properly accommodated for this Muslim 'winter of content'
The Sri Lankan Muslims in general and those of the east
in particular have come into their own in recent times. They have
achieved a high degree of political consciousness. They see themselves
as a distinct entity within the island. The Muslims while wanting to
live in peace and amity with the Sinhala and Tamil communities in
regions dominated by both groups, are also reluctant to be dominated by
either. The community wants to avoid being manipulated by the Sinhala
and Tamil ethnicities to their advantage in the protracted ethnic
conflict. They want to ensure their safety and security and also hope to
share power in a meaningful manner in areas where Muslims are
concentrated to a sufficient degree. The desire to share power at the
periphery when new political arrangements evolve has led to an important
demand by the Muslims in recent times.
The Muslims unlike the Tamils have not endorsed a demand
for secession. But like the Tamils the Muslims too want a power sharing
formula when a political solution is achieved. While these objectives
are reasonable and legitimate there is no denying that the issue is
somewhat complex and prickly. This is mainly due to a lack of coherent
unity within the Muslims themselves of what they actually want. Amid
internal confusion, the community has failed to articulate the demand
clearly and unitedly. Compounding the situation further has been the
lack of understanding displayed by the other communities towards this.
Tamil nationalists see the Muslim demand as something which affects
their basic political demand within a united Sri Lanka - a federal or
confederal set up for the merged Northern and Eastern Provinces. The
Muslims particularly those of the east do not favour a merger. If both
provinces are to be separate the Muslims are prepared to accept whatever
devolution is available. But if the provinces are to be merged special
arrangements are needed - South-Eastern Province comprising the Pottuvil,
Sammanthurai and Kalmunai electoral divisions. Another proposal is to
adopt the non-contiguous territorial principle and link all Muslim
majority areas in the north-east into one administrative unit. The
Tamils fear that such a unit will make their unit a
The Sinhala nationalists have an ambiguous' approach.
Muslim demands are useful to support as a device to undermine or thwart
Tamil aspirations. "How can there be a permanent merger when the
Muslims are opposing it?" is a familiar refrain. Another is about
the security and the rights of the Muslims within a Tamil dominated
North- Eastern Province. Special safeguards should be set up they say.
But there is no call for special safeguards to be set up when Muslim
security in the Sinhala areas be it Mawanella, Maradana or Maligawatte
is concerned. Likewise support also diminishes when the Muslims want a
province or district of their own. Furthermore the non-contiguous
territorial principle is also firmly rejected as that could be
applicable in Sinhala provinces too.
The typical responses of the Sinhala and Tamil
nationalists towards the Muslim demand however should not in any way be
allowed to diminish the justifiable position of the Muslim demand. The
Sinhala polity long influenced by an intolerant Sinhala "Buddhist
hegemonic ideology" is only now struggling to liberate itself from
the past and make amends for its historical faults. It may take more
time therefore for the majority community to understand the Muslim
predicament. The Tamils are in a different position. They have felt the
brunt of majoritarian oppression in the past and propounded the
self-rule principle as a desperate alternative. In that context the
Tamils must not block or oppose the Muslims' yearning to determine their
future and seek advantageous arrangements. For this the Tamils must
understand the present Muslim mindset and appreciate its anxiety and
concerns vis a vis the Tamils.
One point that is often misunderstood in Tamil political
discourse is the reason for Muslims
to demand a separate unit only in the north-east and not
elsewhere in the island. This is viewed as blatantly anti-Tamil. What
many Tamils fail to comprehend is that just as the Tamils wanted
federalism, secession or devolution for the regions in which they were
sufficiently concentrated and regarded as their traditional homelands,
the Muslims too seek to emulate them. While Muslims like the Tamils live
in all parts of the island, the relatively larger concentrations are
only in the north-east. Numerically a little less than two-third of
Muslims live in the seven Sinhala majority provinces and the remainder
in the north-east. The east by itself has about one-third and is the
province with the single largest concentration of Muslims in the island.
Just as the Eastern Province is the province with the biggest number of
Muslims, the Amparai or Digamadulla District in the province is the
district with the greatest number of Muslims.
According to the official census conducted in all parts
of the island (1981) the Muslims are 41.6 % there. Apart from this the
1981 census says that Muslims do not number more than 10% in any of the
18 southern districts. The districts with the largest percentages were
Kandy (9.9 %), Puttalam (9.7%) and Colombo (8.3%). In contrast, the
Muslims are 41.6% in Amparai, 23.9% in Batticaloa, 29.0 % in Trincomalee
and 26.6% in Mannar. Thus, the first four districts in terms of Muslim
population are in the north-east.
It is also a fact that when the 'first past the post'
electoral system was in force from 1947-1977 the only single
member constituencies with a 50% plus Muslim majorities were in the east
alone - Kalmunai, Pottuvil, (1947-1960); Kalmunai, Nintavur, Pottuvil
(1960-1977); Sammanthurai, Kalmunai and Mutur(1977). In addition there
were multi-member constituencies ensuring enhanced Muslim representation
in the east also - Mutur, Batticaloa (1947-1960); Batticaloa, Mutur
(1960-1977 ) and Pottuvil, Batticaloa in 1977. Thus, it could be seen
that the largest number of Muslim MPs from a province were always
elected from the east. Incidently the Tamils voluntarily gave up their
representation in the Amparai District in favour of the Muslims. Even
after proportionate representation came in, it was the Eastern Province
that 'elected' the most number of Muslims as opposed to being
'appointed' on the national list. Presently eight of the 16 eastern
elected MPs are Muslims (SLMC-5, NUA-2, UNP-1). If the national list MPs
are taken, the eastern component becomes 14. Of course if all Tamils
living in the LTTE controlled areas had voted, the Muslim MP figure
would have decreased. Nevertheless, the east remains the provincial
factory churning out the largest number of Muslim MPs.
Furthermore, it is only in the east that a Muslim
party like the SLMC can contest alone and win an adequate number
of seats. The importance of the east within the party as well as the
community at large plays a significant role in the current SLMC internal
power struggle. All these reasons indicate very clearly the rationale
behind the Muslim demand for a separate devolutionary unit in the
north-east. It is not possible to form a viable devolution unit in the
southern provinces even with the aid of the non-contiguous territorial
principle. Besides the dependence and inter-twining of the Muslims with
the 'surrounding' Sinhala environment and economy make it impossible for
Muslims to demand separate units there. The Muslim political leaders too
find it difficult to get elected as part of a separate Muslim political
party in the south on a national level (except Hakeem in Kandy). It has
been possible for the SLMC to win significantly in local authorities
where Muslim concentrations are larger - particularly the urban areas.
So the Muslims are trying to set up a unit of devolution in areas where
they are sufficiently concentrated and therefore most practical.
The eastern Muslims are for the most part self-reliant
and self-sufficient economically in their areas. The more affluent ones
have been having lands, livestock etc. in Tamil areas. Some engage in
trade too. The past years of conflict have altered this inter-dependence
drastically. With access to their lands and livestock cut off and
avenues of trade reduced in Tamil areas, the eastern Muslims though
affected, have come up with an alternative economic pattern. This
reduces dependency on Tamils while feelings of anti-Tamil hatred remain.
Moreover the emerging intelligentsia and elite among eastern Muslims are
quite hostile to the concept of Tamil domination and would prefer
Another feature is that the eastern Muslims have been
comparatively more enterprising in trade and manufacture than their
Tamil counterparts. It was the Jaffna Tamils who controlled much of the
Tamil economy and competed with the Muslims. The prolonged conflict has
weakened the Tamil hold on the eastern economy. The Muslim community by
virtue of having adopted a cooperative attitude towards the Sinhala
dominated governments have developed their areas and bettered their lot
significantly. The post 1994 years with M. H. M. Ashraff and Hisbullah
at the SLMC's helm have been quite productive.
In contrast the Tamils adopting a confrontational course
with the center have been increasingly marginalised. The war has
destroyed much infrastructure and economy. The rapacious taxation by the
LTTE has virtually impoverished the sections capable of economic
generation. All this has placed the Muslims at a relatively advanced
position than the Tamils in the east. They are perceivedly more dynamic.
Earlier the Muslims were backward in education. But in
recent times particularly the efforts of Dr. Badhuddhin Mahmood have
altered that too. Very large numbers of Muslims particularly women are
getting educated. A large component gets higher education too. Many are
becoming professionals and academics. With most educated Tamils fleeing
the country, the educated Muslims are filling the vacuum. The emerging
elite in the east is Muslim. Their aspirations are vast and difficult to
be contained within a Tamil dominated unit of devolution. The biggest
fear is that the Muslims who according to the 1981 census were 33% of
the province will be reduced to only 17% in a merged north-east. This is
the primary factor in the eastern Muslims' reluctance to accept a
north-east merger permanently. They do not want their strength to be
diluted and significance reduced further. The eastern Muslims want to
ensure his or her proportion in any new set up.
Furthermore, there is every chance that past changes
caused by the conflict have altered the province's demographic pattern
considerably. The Tamils may no longer be 42% but much less. Likewise
the Sinhala population through external influxes too has increased. The
Muslims with a comparatively higher birth rate and reduced practices of
outward migration may very well be the single largest ethnicity in the
province now. If so it makes sense for the community to resist
submergence in an overwhelmingly Tamil dominated north-east merger and
strike out for a separate province or council or preserve the status
This standpoint of the Muslims may be unpalatable for
many Tamils but efforts should be made to understand and appreciate it.
The causes that impelled Tamils towards separatism can drive the Muslims
too towards a form of separatism in relation to the Tamils. It must also
be realised that the Muslims of the north-east have every right to those
provinces as the Tamils have.
They have lived there for centuries and evolved in some form a distinct
pattern of culture, economy and social order. They share a common
language but vehemently oppose being classified ethnically as Tamils. In
their self-perception they are different and have a separate identity.
This must be acknowledged and respected. The pittu flour and coconut
pattern of inhabitation on the Eluvankarai region can cut both ways. If
Tamils say the Muslims do not have a common territory because Tamil
villages are interspersed then the Muslims too could argue against the
Tamil demand on the same basis.
Despite the prevalent tensions it is imperative to note
that the Muslims are not opposing basic Tamil political objectives. The
Muslim articulation of demands may convey a wrong picture to the Tamils
that they are doing so. Despite Sinhala hard-liners trying to distort
the situation, the reality is that the Muslims are not opposing it. What
Muslims are worried about is Tamil majoritarian hegemony being thrust on
them. Therefore they seek safeguards and/or alternative arrangements.
The present generation of Tamils have often found fault with their
elders for not being able to anticipate what would befall the community
in a post-independence scenario. The Tamils demanded neither a separate
country or federalism from the British. Instead they asked for
"balanced representation" and later were prepared to provide
Subsequent deve- lopments showed that the trust was
misplaced. Under these circumstances can the Muslims be frowned upon for
seeking adequate safeguards and measures when new political arrangements
are evolving? The Muslim demands and timing in that context are
perfectly reasonable and completely justifiable. When a coolly rational
leader like Hakeem articulates the demands, he may be misunderstood by
Muslims but others appreciate it better. When hotheads like Athaullah or
Anwer Ismail express the demands the sentiments may find resonance
within eastern Muslims but convey a wrong impression to others. What
Hakeem has been doing is to steer a middle
path between Sinhala and Tamil interests and ensure a good deal
for the Muslims. His moderate course of not contributing to a situation
where the Muslims could be accused of scuttling the peace process has
been maligned within and outside his party.
Another important, perhaps the most important reason for
Muslim apprehensions in a Tamil dominated north-east is, security. With
the rise of armed Tamil militancy the Muslims were severely affected.
Killings, assaults, abductions, extortion, seizure of property, etc.
were the order of the day. The eastern Muslims who were supportive of
the Tamil struggle in the early stages became worried and alienated.
Earlier many Muslims joined the Tamil movements but now they began
forming their own groups or joining the armed forces and homeguards. The
'third force' exploited this. Tamil-Muslim violence was instigated and
fostered. Tamil groups also retaliated. This made the Muslims more
insecure. Be it the Tamil national army set up by the Indians or the
LTTE or other Tamil groups, the Muslims have been at the receiving end.
No amount of rationalising, denying or underplaying could wipe out the
memories of the most heinous atrocities committed against the Muslims by
the LTTE. The large scale massacre at the Kattankudi Mosque and the
small scale massacre at Sammanthurai Mosque are indelible blots for this
generation of Muslims. Whatever the reasons for it those acts were a
despicable violation of human rights. The massacre in Eravur,
Alinchipottanai, Muttukkal etc. are equally horrible.
Another massacre by a different group was the killing of
Muslims in the civilian volunteer force by Varadaraja Perumal's goons in
1989. It does not matter from a Muslim viewpoint about who killed the
Muslims or why they were killed. What matters from their point of view
is that Tamils did it in the same way that Tamils perceive the
anti-Tamil violence of 1956, 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983. Worse still was
the mass expulsion of Muslims from Jaffna, Mannar, Kilinochchi and
Mullaitivu Districts by the LTTE in 1990. In one sweeping stroke the
LTTE demonstrated that despite the pious Tamil platitudes of Muslims
being "Islamiyath Thamilargal" (Islamic Tamils) and "Thamil
Pesum Makkal" (Tamil speaking people) they were in reality,
separate and different.
If the Muslims were indeed regarded as an integral part
of the Eelam nation such an act could never have been thought of let
alone implemented. By expelling the Muslims the Tigers became vulnerable
to charges of ethnic cleansing. The cruel manner in which the Muslims
were driven away from their traditional homelands is not something that
could be forgotten or forgiven. It also created for Muslims a
nightmarish vision of what life for the Muslims could be in a Tamil
To be continued
Insider dealing fiasco
By Asgar Hussein
The independence of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) has come under a cloud following moves to hush up an
investigation into the alleged insider dealing of its own chairman and
other leading businessmen.
The case has also brought into focus the wider issue of
appointing shareholders and board members of companies to regulatory
bodies, thereby leading to conflict of interest situations. The
implications are so serious that a reassessment of this policy may be
The case in question revolves around controversial share
transactions involving the Aitken Spence conglomerate. A former Chairman
of the group, Michael Mack and two Directors, Norman Gunewardene and
Manil de Mel stand accused of insider dealing.
Their family members have also come under suspicion. They
include Gunewardene’s children Ajit, Ruchi and Otara of Odel fame, as
well as Mack’s wife and two daughters. Despite an opinion by the
Attorney General that there is a prima facie case against the directors,
the SEC is now attempting to drag its feet on the issue.
Evidence unearthed thus far strongly implicates Mack, the
Chairman of the market watchdog, the SEC. Suspicions have also been cast
on Ajit Gunewardene, the Chairman of the Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE)
and senior director of the
John Keells conglomerate. Gunewardene is also a prominent behind the
scenes player in the government, which in turn has raised questions
whether influence is being brought to bear on the investigations at the
SEC. Gunewardene’s father, Norman is one of the Aitken Spence
directors against whom the Attorney General has said there is a prima
An investigation by The Sunday Leader revealed evidence
against most of the accused in this case. Let’s consider the
circumstances leading to these share transactions and the aftermath.
It was on May 22, this year, that the sorry state of
affairs at Aitken Spence was highlighted by its Accountant/Secretary,
Ranjan Casie-Chetty. He submitted a memo to the group’s board of
directors stating that forecasted losses of their troubled subsidiary
— Aitken Spence Garments Pvt. Ltd. — could amount to almost Rs. 125
million. He had also referred to massive fraud and exchange control
Casie-Chetty’s memo also stated that this anticipated
loss amounts to one third of the profits of Aitken Spence Group as disclosed in the draft annual report for 2001/2002
submitted to the board a week earlier on May 14.
The draft annual report which was tabled at a board
meeting on May 14, had reflected anticipated profits amounting to Rs.
354 million. The losses due to the rackets at Aitken Spence (Garments)
Pvt. Ltd. were not reflected in the draft annual report. Those present
at that board meeting included Aitken Spence Chairman Prema Cooray,
Rajan Britto, Michael Mack, R. Sivaratnam, Harry Jayawardana, C.H.
Gomes, Norman Gunewardene and G.C. Wickremesinghe. De Mel was out of the
island in the month of May and there was no board meeting in April.
Casie-Chetty’s memo on May 22 also informed the board
that the banks had expressed concern over the weak position of the
Aitken Spence Ltd., which holds a 50% stake in Aitken
Spence Garments, had submitted corporate guarantees to three banks (HSBC,
HNB and Standard Chartered) to the tune of US$ 2.1 million. Their joint
venture partner, Dennis Day Ltd., (which owns the balance 50%
shareholding) had also given guarantees for the same amount.
The information regarding fraud and exchange control
violations at Aitken Spence Garments, which came under the group
umbrella, were not made known to the public despite Aitken Spence being
a public-quoted company. Had the investing public learnt the true
situation, they would not have paid a high price for the shares during
the subsequent transactions which led to the controversy.
For, if the true state of affairs was known, then the
projected profits of Rs. 354 million of Aitken Spence would have reduced
drastically due to the estimated Rs. 125 million loss of the subsidiary
garment company, which was not reflected in the draft report tabled on
May 14, not to mention the corporate guarantee of US$ 2.1 million.
Disposing of shares
Hardly a fortnight lapsed after Casie-Chetty’s memo,
three members of the Aitken Spence Board, their family members and
family-owned companies disposed of large parcels of their shares.
On May 30, Gunewardene’s children Ajit, Ruchi and Otara
sold 60,000 shares. This was on the very day that Casie-Chetty submitted
another memo to the board providing information on Aitken Spence
Garments and calling for an urgent board meeting to discuss how to
protect the interests of the Aitken Spence Group as a result of the
problems faced by its subsidiary.
The following day, the elder Gunewardene and a private
family company, Nordel Investments Pvt. Ltd., disposed of 600,000
Then on June 10, Norman Gunewardene disposed of another
105,400 shares. On this very day, Michael Mack, his wife, their two
daughters and a private family company called Luckannon sold 1,002,002
The same day, Manil de Mel sold 30,000 shares. He and his
wife disposed of another 2000 shares the following day, June 11, and
another 8,000 shares two days later, June 13. On June 19, de Mel sold a
further 4348 shares. Peanuts, of course, compared to those sold by
colleagues Mack and Gunewardene.
These transactions had aroused the suspicions of the SEC,
which regularly monitors the market. Its Director General, Dr. Dayanath
Jayasuriya then launched an investigation having informed the SEC board.
The matter was thereafter referred to the Attorney General’s
Department seeking an opinion around early September.
The AG’s determination released early November was
damning. It stated that based on the evidence forwarded, legal action is
warranted against Gunewardene, Mack and de Mel. They could be charged in
terms of Section 32 (1) read with Section
51 (1) (a) of the SEC Act.
In the case of the share transactions by Gunewardene’s
children and Mack’s wife and daughters, the AG stated that though
their actions are suspicious, there is insufficient evidence to arrive
at an irresistible inference about their guilt, thus warranting further
investigation. With regard to the transactions executed by the private
family companies Nordel and Luckannon, the AG held that the blame rests
on Gunewardene and Mack respectively if the orders for the share sales
were placed by them. If the orders had been placed by family members or
by any employees of these companies, then further inquiry is necessary
to establish knowledge on their part.
The allegations against Manil de Mel are less tenable
compared to his two former fellow board members. Although he had
disposed of some shares, he had also purchased a similar quantity during
the same month. This would, to a great extent, indicate innocence on his
part. He was also out of the island during the month of May, when the
crisis at Aitken Spence Garments was highlighted in Casie-Chetty’s
memo. It could well be that he did not know the contents of the memo.
Mack and Gunewardene have privately defended themselves
in this case by arguing that they disposed of their shares because they
were being edged out of Aitken Spence Ltd., by tycoon Harry Jayawardana
in his moves to wrest control of the conglomerate.
However, there exists circumstantial evidence which
appears to counter this defence.
The Sunday Leader understands that Casie-Chetty, when
questioned by the SEC, had claimed he advised Norman Gunewardene against
selling shares due to the financial imbroglio.
Two letters written by Gunewardene himself are of much
interest in this regard.
In a letter to Casie-Chetty on May 31, (the very same day
he disposed of a large parcel of shares), he says he found a
confidential letter in an open envelope lying on his desk. “I saw it
marked as confidential, and I did not read it as I have put my shares in
the market,” he stated.
He further mentioned that he had informed Chairman Cooray
he would not be standing for re-election as director at the annual
general meeting on June 26. In stating thus, Gunewardene probably wanted
to claim he didn’t read the letter marked
confidential, as a defence should problems arise.
But by May 22, the latest, he did know the true state of
affairs due to Casie-Chetty’s memo of even date to the board.
On June 4, he wrote another letter to Chairman Cooray
stating he had received a memo marked ‘private and confidential’
that morning which referred to Aitken Spence Garments. Gunewardene
informed Cooray that it would be returned to him, as was done with the
earlier memo on May 31. “I have to do this because I have put my
shares in the market, and don’t want to be privy to any sensitive
information good or bad,” he had stated. The letter itself was opened.
Here the question arises as to how Gunewardene knew that
the memo was in relation to Aitken Spence Garments in the first place,
and how he knew it contained sensitive information good or bad? As such,
it may even be inferred that the memo was opened and read by him.
It is also pertinent to mention that Gunewardene was
present at the board meetings on May 14 (when the draft annual report
was tabled) and May 22 (when the first memo by Casie-Chetty on the
status of Aitken Spence Garments reached them). At the time he put his
shares in the market, he was therefore privy to the sensitive
information forwarded by Casie-Chetty.
Following press reports on this insider dealing case last
Sunday, the SEC said they are considering the matter with the utmost
seriousness and are proceeding with their deliberations. They added that
in view of the continuing investigations, SEC Chairman Michael Mack had
taken leave of absence. Others, however, felt that he should have
After all, the SEC is the watchdog body responsible for
stock transactions. Any conflict of interest situations and allegations
of this nature can damage its credibility and erode public faith and
confidence in the market.
The Colombo Stock Exchange (CSE) also reacted to the
press reports. They stated that Chairman Ajit Gunewardene had informed
them that he has not been notified by any authority of any misdemeanor
on his part regarding the controversial transactions. In his case, and
that of his brother and sister, further investigation will be required
before a prosecution is launched.
Nevertheless, the whole issue is an indictment on the
manner in which our corporate affairs are conducted. The government may
perhaps have to reassess the policy of appointments to top posts in
regulatory bodies to ensure that conflict of interest situations do not
arise. This can be done by compelling appointees to first resign from
all boards in which they serve and sell their shares in companies before
they assume such duties. It is imperative that public faith and
confidence in our institutions be maintained.
What the SEC Act says
Insider is an offence under the SEC Act. Any person found
guilty shall be liable on conviction after summary trial by a
magistrate, to a sentence of imprisonment of either description
for a period not exceeding five years or to a fine not exceeding
Rs. 10 million or to both such imprisonment and fine.
Section 32 and its subsections deal with the prohibition
on trading in listed securities by insiders. An insider is not
permitted to trade in shares of a company to which he is connected
if he knows he has access to unpublished price sensitive
The term “insider” can refer to a director, officer
or employee of a company or related company. It could even be
applied to a professional advisor who has a business relationship
with the company.
The act also states that an individual who is, or at any
time in the six months immediately preceding the appointed date
has been connected with a company shall not trade in listed
securities of any other company if he has information which is
unpublished and price sensitive in relation to those securities of
that other company.
Section 32(3) states, where —
individual has information which he obtained, or has reasonable
cause to believe he obtained, whether directly or indirectly, from
another individual who is connected with a particular company, or
was at any time in the six months immediately preceding the date
of obtaining of the information so connected and who the former
individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe, held the
information by virtue of being so connected; and
(b) the former
individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe that, because
of the latter’s connection and position, it would be reasonable
to expect him not to disclose the information except for the
proper performance of the functions attaching to that position,
then, the former individual —
shall not himself trade in listed securities of that
company if he can reasonably be expected to know that the
information is unpublished price sensitive information in relation
to those securities; and
shall not himself trade in listed securities of any other
company if can reasonably be expected to know that the information
is unpublished price sensitive information in relation to those
securities, and it relates to any transaction whether actual or
contemplated, involving the first mentioned company and the other
company or involving one of them and securities of the other or to
the fact that any such transaction is no longer contemplated.
There is also a clause which states, an individual who is
for the time being prohibited by any provision of this section
from trading in listed securities shall not counsel or procure any
other person to deal in those securities, knowing or having
reasonable cause to believe that person would trade in such listed