ISSUES

An insight into the real JVP

The imminent infiltration of the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) into political parties, trade unions and student bodies in the recent past has triggered off alarm bells within the government camp, which has laid its hand on an intelligence report on the former militant group, with emphasis falling on five members who are former militants.

Interior Minister John Amaratunga placed the report, filed by top intelligence experts in the country, before  cabinet last week, an action precipitated by the announced formation of an alliance between the main opposition -  the SLFP and the JVP.

The JVP that entered mainstream politics in June 1994 is led by its leader in exile, Somawansa Amarasinghe whose recent most visit to the island was upon a request by the People's Alliance to campaign for his party in 2001.

While Amarasinghe remains the only surviving politburo member of the original JVP outfit led by late Rohana Wijeweera, four out of seven current politburo members were members of the JVP's infamous Military Wing during the turbulent period of 1987/1989 according to the report.

The former militants include party General Secretary Tilwin Silva, C.D. Wijesinghe (Educational Secretary),  G. Kularatne (Organisational Secretary) and Wimal Weerawansa ( Spokesman, Propaganda Secretary and Parliamentary Group Leader).

Amaratunga's report based on intelligence reports traces the rise of the JVP since its entry into mainstream politics and how each of its committees functions.

Following is the report.

Current position of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna

The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) which held the country to ransom by bringing the civil administration to a virtual standstill, suffered severe setbacks towards the latter part of 1989 with the capture of its hierarchy. However, towards late 1990 the JVP was once again revived by its middle rung leadership.

2. The first phase of the revival process was carried out on the following lines.

2.1 Directing its unidentified cadres to infiltrate political parties, allied trade unions and student organisations in the universities. They were adviced to win over the confidence of the infiltrated organisations by way of lending support towards domestic concerns and agitations and thereby procure controlling positions on such organisations.

2.2. Directing its unidentified cadres possessing the required academic and physical specifications  to infiltrate the armed forces and the police. Those who have joined are not the hardcore types, but belong to the peripheral category.

2.3. Regrouping of cadres arrested by the security forces and subsequently released after rehabilitation.

2.4. Regrouping of its political and military cadres who went into hiding to evade arrest.

3. The present leadership

A. K. Somawansa Amarasinghe, the only surviving member of the politburo of the Rohana Wijeweera era  is now heading the party. He is in self exile in France, having left the shores of Sri Lanka in February 1990 in a clandestine manner through Thoduwawe Beach in Negombo. The present office bearers of the JVP who are from the politburo appear at (Annex A). It is noteworthy to mention here  that out of the seven politburo members who are presently leading the party, four had been members of the JVP military wing during the 1987/1989 turbulent period. They are M. Tilwin Silva (General Secretary), C.D. Wijesinghe (Educational Secretary), JVP), G. Kularatne, (Organisational Secretary) and Wimal Weerawansa (Propaganda Secretary).

4. Entry into political mainstream

4.1 Since its return to the democratic process towards June 1994, the JVP has been engaged in a relentless  reorganisation process ,  endeavouring to erase its violent past and thereby to convince the masses that  it is the only surviving left force in the country which could address the grievances of the underprivileged society.

4.2. On 01.06.1994, the JVP formed an election alliance with the Sri Lanka Progressive Front (SLPF) of Ariya Bulegoda which was termed the National Salvation Front (NSF). Attempts made by the two leaders of the NSF to get it registered as a recognised political party were not entertained by the commissioner of elections as the date of the general election had already been declared. Hence the JVP was compelled to field its candidates at the general election of August 1994, under the SLPF ticket. This alliance was assessed as a marriage of convenience as it was too soon for the JVP to go before the masses, with the lingering memories of its violent past.

4.3 The JVP/SLPF coalition polled a total of 90,078 votes, where only Janith Priyantha Vidyatilake Vipulagune of the JVP  succeeded in winning a seat in the Hambantota District. He eventually had to step down as instructed by the coalition leaders, in order to facilitate the appointment of Nihal Galappaththi as its representative in parliament. However the JVP/SLPF alliance ran into a conflicting situation towards August 1996, which culminated in the expulsion of Nihal Galappaththi from the SLPF on an unanimous resolution adopted at its  eighth  convention held in Matara on November 30, 1996.

4.4 Despite the expulsion of its candidate Nihal Galappaththi from the SLPF, the JVP decided to establish electoral committees and contest future elections under its own symbol - the bell.

4.5. After the breakaway from the alliance, the  JVP opted to contest the local government elections  held in March 1997, and polled a total of 258,545 votes. They were successful in winning 101 seats in various local bodies including Colombo, Kotte and Dehiwela - Mt. Lavinia Municipal Councils. Subsequently they contested the provincial council election in 1999 and secured 25 seats in the provincial councils, having polled 417,168 votes. Again in the same year the JVP contested the presidential election where they polled 341,961 votes. In less than a period of one year at the general election held on  October 10,  2000, they polled 518,477 votes,  registering an increase of 176,813 votes. They secured 10 seats in parliament including two bonus seats.  After one year, the JVP contested the general election held on December 5, 2001 and polled 815,353 votes and secured 16 seats in parliament including three bonus seats. When comparing the results of the general election held on December 10,  2000, there is an increase of 296,876 votes by the JVP at the general election held on December 5,  2001. It is significant to note that out of the 16 JVP members of parliament, five members have served in the military wing of the JVP during the 1987/1989 tribunal period. They are Wimal Weerawansa (Propaganda Secretary), C.D. Wijesinghe (Educational Secretary), Ramalingam Chandrasekaran (National List  MP), K.D. Lal Kantha (Central Committee Member) and Anura Kumara Dissanayake (Politburo Member).

4.6. The JVP contested the last local government election and secured 214 seats from 247 local bodies and polled 479,411 votes.

4.7. It is significant to note that the JVP for the first time, secured power in a local government body i.e. Tissamaharama Pradeshiya Sabha by obtaining 11,584 votes and winning six seats.

4.8. When comparing the results of the elections contested by the JVP since 1994, it is clearly visible that they are gathering momentum and gradually becoming the third political force in the country.

5. Front organisations  of the JVP

5.1. Since  February 1996, the JVP has revived its following front organisations.

a. Socialist Workers Congress 

b. Socialist Students  Union

5.21 The Socialist Workers Congress (SWC)  is the main trade union machinery of the JVP which functions under the command of the central committee of the JVP. K.D. Lal Kantha who is the national organiser SWC (List of office bearers is in Annex B) constitutionally by virtue of his position, is a member of the central committee. He is also a JVP member of parliament. SWC which was inaugurated on 27.02.1997 to exploit the unrest prevailing amongst the working class has gradually infiltrated into various work places in the government and private sector. Since then developments have taken place and this review would serve as a prognosis to keep  a tab on the direction in which the pro-JVP trade unions are heading.

5.2 2 During the period leading to the last general election held on 05.12.2001 the SWC made maximum use of the trade union members at the election campaign. Out of the eight  trade union leaders who contested the elections, only, two  were successful in securing seats in the 16th parliament. They are Nandana Gunathilake (President, All Ceylon Trade Union Federation of the JVP) and K.D. Lal Kantha (National Organiser Socialist Workers Congress of the JVP) elected to Kalutara and Anuradhapura Districts respectively. Incidentally Nandana Gunatilake was elected at the 2000 general election to the 15th parliament.

5.2.3. The pro-JVP trade unions under the SWC played a prominent role in the general election. Electioneering was done by these trade unions on a wide scale that included poster campaigns, house to house canvassing and organising of public rallies. Above all, they were able to finance the JVP substantially through the funds collected from the members' monthly subscriptions. They (trade unionists) were the towers of strength behind the success. It is significant to note that such enthusiasm was not observed among the members of the other trade unions  affiliated to political parties in the  election and this is why the SWC has been able to grow from strength to strength over the other trade unions.

5.2.4. In reviewing the results of the general election in 2001, although the JVP trade union activists who contested the election were not able to make an impact as candidates at electoral level, it has certainly paved the way to get MPs to the national list because of its 50,000 strong membership. With the voting of close relatives families etc., the JVP would have at least received a minium of about 100,000 or more votes. It is this block vote that enabled it to secure seats in the national list.

6. Expansion of trade unions

6.1 In the year 2001 there were 29 trade unions which consisted of 27 in the public sector and two in the private sector. The SWC was able to expand upto 37 trade unions in 2002 with the addition of  seven in the public sector and one in the private sector.

6.2. With the expansion of branches, the overall membership in the public sector has been enhanced from 18,031 in 2001 to 26,000 in 2002 with an increase of 7,969 members. A significant rise of membership is observed in the branches of All Ceylon Railway General Employees Union and All Ceylon Teachers Services Union.

6.3. The Inter Company Employees Union (ICEU) is the main hub of the trade union branches in the private sector. It coordinates all matters pertaining to trade union activities. The 158 companies affiliated to ICEU in 2000 have been extended to 222 companies with 69 more companies joining the fold in 2002. Unlike in the public sector, 222 ICEU affiliated companies in the private sector have been successful in getting the employees to join their fold. The membership which stood at approximately 20,000 in 2000 has now been increased to about 34,000.

7. Recruitment drive of the trade union

7.1. The SWC has sent across instructions to the branch trade union leaders of the public and private sectors to recruit members. Each member has been asked to enroll at least five individuals to join the pro-JVP trade unions in their places of work. On this concept, the ICEU is planning to expand its branches to 300 companies by the end of 2003 to accomplish the target. As far as the public sector is concerned,  such recruitments are not predictable.

8. Financial stability

8.1. Funds are collected to the trade unions by selling newspapers, publications (relating to TU matters) till campaigns, donations, etc., but the major share of funds flow through the members' monthly subscription fee of Rs. 10. With a total membership of 52,000 the estimated collection per month is about Rs. 520,000 and yearly collection amounts to Rs. 6,240,000. There is a proposal by the SWC to increase the monthly subscription by Rs. 20 and if this happens the yearly collection would be as much as Rs. 1.248 billion.

9. Role of trade unions in JVP politics

9.1. The JVP political machinery is dependant on and fueled by their trade unions who are providing funds, enhancing membership, raising political and common issues of public interest and propagating party ideologies. The entire political operation of the JVP is dependant on their trade union network whose members are the real work horses.

10. The Inter University Student Federation (IUSF)

10.1. With the re-opening of the universities in January 1990, several politically neutral students unions with common aspirations took control of the main student councils including the faculty councils. However a few months later, the Inter University Student Federation (IUSF) was once again revived by the JVP student activists, who trickled back into the universities, taking refuge under the amnesty offered by the government at that time.

10.2. Though these pro-JVP students maintained a low profile, they gradually banded themselves together and discreetly formed an inter university co ordinating committee towards June 1991. From then on they were seen systematically getting the freshers, who were inclined towards the JVP, to infiltrate the neutral students unions and by canvassing for them from behind the scenes at student council elections, saw to it that they secured controlling positions  in such bodies. At present the IUSF has established its control in the students councils in the following universities. The convenor of the IUSF is Ravindra Mudalige, an undergraduate of the Ruhuna University.

* University of Peradeniya, University of Kelaniya, University of Sri Jayewardenepura, University of Ruhuna, University of Colombo (only the Science Faculty).

10.3 The Socialist Students Union (SSU) is the official student organisation of the JVP. After 1976 the SSU has been able to capture power in the student councils in most of the universities. The branch organisations of the SSU function in almost all universities. Chamara Koswatte, an undergraduate of the Kelaniya University is the present convenor.

10.4. The pro-JVP students have not contested the student council elections under the name of SSU, since its revival in 1996. The pro-JVP faction has contested under different names in different faculties in the respective universities. At present the pro-JVP student factions have been able to capture power in the student councils of Peradeniya, Kelaniya, Ruhuna, Sri Jayewardenepura, Moratuwa (NDT) and Sabaragamuwa Universities.

11. Community welfare work

11.1 Community welfare work appears to be the main strategy of the JVP to capture the hearts and minds of the masses. They spot out grievances of the people of an area and arrange remedial measures with the participation of the people of the area sometimes on a shramadana basis and sometimes with funds drawn from their local councilor's funds. However small the project is, they give wide publicity in order to reap maximum results.

11.2. Accordingly the district and area organisers of the JVP are under instructions to conduct surveys in their respective areas from time to time, and submit such details to the party, with regard to grievances of the masses. There is a "Community Welfare Committee" in the party, represented by three politburo members and this committee reviews each and every such proposal made available to them by the district and area organisers. Thereafter, they decide as to which project should be given priority, mainly considering the propaganda advantages to the party.

In this manner, the JVP has donated buildings and books  to school libraries, drinking water projects for schools, constructed buildings for child and maternity clinics, community centres, children's parks, public wells and renovated roads, culverts, waterways, etc. Though the JVP claims that all funds of local councilors' are utilised solely for community welfare work, the truth is that a little money is released for such work which are done mostly by organising shramadana campaigns, and all the rest ends up in organisational activities of the party.

12. The stance of the JVP with regard to the national crisis

12.1. The JVP is presently engaged in a protest campaign against the ongoing peace negotiations initiated by the UNF government and the LTTE, towards reaching a solution to the national crisis. According to the JVP's  present stance on this issue, the national crises could only be solved on the basis of equality i.e. by granting equal rights to the Sinhala, Tamil and Muslim communities, but they carefully avoid mentioning whether it is within a unitary state or federal system of government.

12.2. On April 20, 2002 at a  discussion attended by Dinesh Gunawardena, MP (MEP), Anura Priyadarshana Yapa MP (SLFP) and the JVP MPs at the JVP headquarters in Pagoda, they had formed a organisation called "The National Movement for Dignified Peace and Against the Partition of the Country," and had decided to organise a series of protest demonstrations and rallies in a number of provincial towns throughout the country to protest against the peace negotiations. The first meeting of this series was held on April 23, 2002 with a protest demonstration at  Litpon Circus, Colombo,  followed by a protest rally held at Hyde Park. About 10,000 JVP, SLFP, MEP and National Unity Alliance (NUA) members and supporters participated in this event.  Kalawelgala Chadraloka (Secretary, pro-JVP Jathika Bhikku Peramuna), Ramalingam Chandrasekeran, Wimal Weerawansa, Dinesh Gunawardena, Piyasena Dissanayake (Secretary, National Joint Committee) and Anura Bandaranaike addressed the rally. Thereafter they held several protest demonstrations and rallies in a number of provincial towns throughout the country including the protest rally held on May 10, 2002 at the Bogambara Ground,  Kandy; on June 17, 2002 opposite Kotuwegoda Public Market Matara; on July 9, 2002 at Ananda Samarakoon open air theatre Nugegoda; and July 20, 2002 opposite the clock tower in Ampara.

12.3. The Norwegian mediation

The JVP sees Norway as an imperialist force, and that its involvment in the Sri Lankan problem, is to appease U.S.A.

They view that Norway has a dubious history as a mediator, and cite its involvement in the Israel - Palestine peace talks, where they allege that Norway was instrumental in giving the advantageous positions to the Israelis. JVP further opines that Norway is here not to bring peace but to help the Western imperialists to widen their weapons market to South Asia and that Norway is also eyeing at grabbing our fisheries industry.

13. JVP in common political programme with SLFP

13.1. On September 21, 1988, the JVP entered into an agreement with the then Leader of the Opposition Sirimavo Dias Bandaranaike and formed the United Front (UF). The other constituent parties of the UF were the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP), Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP), United Lanka People's Party (ULPP), Liberal Party (LP), Muslim Congress (MC), Democratic Workers Congress (DWC) and Tamil Congress (TC). However the JVP demanded that the election be contested under a common symbol and not under the symbol 'hand' of the SLFP or the 'bell' of the JVP. As the SLFP was in disagreement with this demand the United Front became defunct.

13.2. On September 5, 2001, the JVP entered into an agreement with the PA by signing a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU). The general thinking of the people of all walks of life was  that, the conditions contained in the MoU were  difficult to be implemented fully.

13.3. In the recent past too the JVP has had several discussions with the SLFP to form an alliance between the two parties. The final discussion regarding this is scheduled to be held in mid March 2003.

13.4. Though the JVP is attempting to rally the SLFP against the UNF government to sabotage the peace process and privatisation, it appears that they do not wish to see the SLFP taking advantage of this situation.  They only want to use the SLFP as a shield, in the event the government makes a move to suppress the party.

Balasingham - a wielder of influence

By Frederica Jansz

Sri Lanka's staggering peace process, which shook to its very foundation as a result of recent confrontations between the government and the LTTE, is once more back on track following the arrival of Anton Balasingham in Wanni.

How great Balasingham's influence has been in placing the peace process back on an even keel no-one, at least at this end, will probably ever know. The fact remains however that Balasingham wields great influence over the LTTE, both at the negotiating table and with the cadres in Wanni. His authority with Velupillai Prabhakaran, other than being a translator for the Tiger Supremo when he meets with foreign delegates and Sri Lanka's southern based public, is obviously more than that of a mere messenger or interpreter. He is their idealogue. We are often told that the LTTE and Velupillai Prabhakaran are one and the same.  In this context it is then patently clear that Balasingham is in the hot seat in ensuring or even deciding if the LTTE should maintain its credibility in the peace process or don its jacket of martyrdom and pursue with a bloody struggle for Tamil Eelam.

In a move that had the government and international observers heave a sigh of relief, the LTTE last Wednesday finally released from custody Lance Corporal Nimal Kumara from the army and Reserve Police Constable Philip Anandasekara. At another historic meeting in Kilinochchi on Wednesday, March 5, Velupillai Prabhakaran consented to the release when he met with outgoing Head, Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), Trond Furuhovde and his successor Major General Tryggve Tellefssen. The meeting lasted for three hours from 11 a.m. to 1 p.m.

The process was doubtless facilitated by Balasingham whose part in the present peace process is emerging to be more and more of a frontline player and decision maker for the LTTE.

The controversy over the two government security forces personnel began when the LTTE took Nimal Kumara into custody on December 24, 2002. The Tigers charged that Kumara had - while carrying his weapon - trespassed into their area at Manal Aaru. He was later tried by the Tamil Eelam courts in Kilinochchi where the judge ordered that he be remanded indefinitely.

Storm of protest

Philip Anandasekara was arrested by the LTTE on February 20, 2003. The Tigers maintained that Anandasekara had violated the ceasefire agreement by entering an LTTE checkpoint at Muhamalai while wearing his uniform. He too was produced in the Kilinochchi courts and remanded. The two arrests caused a storm of protest from the government. The government claimed that the LTTE was behaving in a manner that was unjust and seriously compromised the peace process.

Repeated references to the two arrests in Berlin at the last round of talks drew a blank. Both Milinda Moragoda and Defence Secretary Austin Fernando attempted to convince Balasingham that the LTTE was acting in a manner that jeopardised the Tigers' credibility and commitment to the peace process. The arguments and counter debate in Berlin - on the surface at least - drew no positive response from Balasingham. He in fact at one stage abruptly halted the discussions citing his weak health as an excuse, and that he had to break for lunch.

Meanwhile, the LTTE's Eastern Military Leader, Karuna attempted to negotiate a prisoner swap. His demand was shot down at the first instance when he made the suggestion in Berlin, and was later condemned by the SLMM. Karuna proposed that the government release six Tiger cadres who had been arrested in the east for carrying claymore mines and other ammunition within government territory.

Karuna had told government negotiators that if the state would release these six cadres, the LTTE would release the one soldier and policeman in their custody. Austin Fernando was later heard to describe this suggestion as "ludicrous and absurd."

The tension that erupted as a result of this incident ended the last round of talks in an atmosphere of dissent and even anger. It appears however that Balasingham has managed to stifle smouldering emotions and 'iron out' a knotty problem as the two men were released unconditionally.

The SLMM later said the LTTE had reacted positively to a proposal that both sides would resort to a release mechanism to prevent prolonged detainment of government security forces or LTTE cadres. 

The LTTE meanwhile has raised concerns about the build-up of the military during a time of negotiations. The government for its part has also objected to the LTTE transporting weapons during the peace talks.

The wrangling and discord has been stemmed or even 'nipped in the bud' in some instances as the by-word in this entire process - federalism - a solution which the LTTE and the government are cautiously toying with as they approach a compromise solution. That a final model will be unique to Sri Lanka there is little doubt. In the meantime however the practicalities and logistics of such a process is arduous, prompting the SLMM to note that a wide range of people from both sides, who are better qualified must now be included in talks at the negotiating table in order to ensure a working mechanism.

A federal solution has been hailed as commendable by the international community. In a statement issued at the conclusion of a two-day official visit to Sri Lanka, Indian Foreign Secretary, Kanwar Sibal said "India supports a peaceful, negotiated settlement that meets the just aspirations of all elements of Sri Lankan society besides ensuring that the principles of democracy, pluralism and human rights are respected."

General Secretary, Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), R. Sampanthan has been quoted repeatedly saying the war-weary Sinhala public want a peaceful settlement and would accept a federal form of autonomy granted to the Tamils. Sri Lanka's former southern rebels, the Sinhala nationalist JVP, suffering from a dose of amnesia, disagree and have rejected the government's move to share power with the northern Tamil rebels. They are joined in their dissent by the All Ceylon Buddhist Congress.

System of devolved power

A federal model when suggested was doubtless done with the idea of dispelling the fears of the Sinhalese that Sri Lanka will be divided. Whether the final compromise will tilt towards a Tamil Eelam state is still uncertain as the LTTE prevaricates and titillates the Tamil masses on this issue.

This is certainly not the first time federalism has been mooted as a corner stone to bridging the ethnic differences in Sri Lanka.  S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, Chelvanayagam and later Chandrika Kumaratunga, all proposed a federal solution.

The Indian model has been cited as being the most conducive to Sri Lanka, while the German, Canadian and Swiss models are all being studiously evaluated for example.

A federal constitution would fundamentally alter the extent of political leverage between the different ethnic communities in the island. It will mean that the LTTE would give up its call for a separate state and is willing to share a system of devolved power with the central government, including the Muslim political parties. The present constitutional framework would of course undergo a drastic change.

There are two sides and a flip side to this coin. One being that LTTE Chief Velupillai Prabhakaran in his Hero's Day message in November last year told his cadres, "the thirst of the Tiger is the nation of Tamil Eelam." The flip side of this coin is of course that any federal solution would need the support of the opposition. The joint opposition last Thursday were threatening to put the government out of office, if it failed to halt the peace process which the opposition reiterates it sees as dangerous.

Anura Bandaranaike told a press conference last week that the opposition would force the government out of office if it did not stop the peace process, which he maintained is farcical and has seriously compromised the integrity of Sri Lanka. He based his accusations on the many ceasefire violations committed by the LTTE and the Tigers' continuance in conscripting child soldiers.

The adoption of a federal constitution would require a two-thirds majority in parliament and at present this support appears to be a catch 22 situation. On one hand the entire country is crying for a peaceful resolution while on the other, it cannot be a peace at any cost or merely one that would satisfy the military and the LTTE.

Civilians in Jaffna and the east in fact have been heard to complain that they are caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. At the butt end of the LTTE's excessive system of extortion and child conscription, these people are neither here nor there. Their trust and confidence in the military is also shaky.

Lent credibility

This is where Anton Balasingham figures. His consistent utterances that a reversion to war would be impossible under the current status of the peace process has helped lend the LTTE a degree of credibility and commitment at the negotiating table.

It is clear that Balasingham is more than just a messenger for Prabhakaran. His positive influence over the LTTE chief has been displayed on more than one occasion, since the talks began last year. Balasingham has even gone so far as to say that he and Prabhakaran speak with one voice - one tongue.

That Balasingham has this time around effectively managed to dispel a lot of the rancour and bitterness at the negotiating table is commendable. On previous occasions both the LTTE and the government found it hard to approach negotiations with maturity and an open mind, willing to listen to each other - caught as they are in a whirlpool of blood and guts, following decades of violence and mistrust.

Fishing rights fracas threatens fraternal links

"While Jaffna's dormant fishing community hopes for relief to come from the ongoing peace moves, across the straits, Tamil Nadu fishermen worry that once the conflict is resolved, their counterparts in Northern Sri Lanka will zealously guard the catch."

- Nirupama Subramanian in Frontline of July 20-August 2, 2002

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj

"Thaayum pillayum aanaalum vaayum vayirum veru" (Even if mother and child, the mouths and stomachs are different) is a Tamil proverb illustrating the hard facts of life about existential concerns superseding even the close bonds of mother and child. Those fisherfolk from Tamil Nadu poaching in the waters of the Gulf of Mannar would have realised the value of this proverbial wisdom in the early hours of the morning of March 3rd, when a flotilla of Sri Lankan Tamil fishing boats encircled and captured them.

The fracas over fishing rights demonstrated clearly that despite the common bond of ethnicity binding both sides, the economics of livelihood was a crucial factor capable of threatening such fraternal links when the necessity arose.

Hundreds of Tamil Nadu fishermen in 415 mechanised boats and trawlers had set off for deep sea fishing together on Monday. At least 75 of the boats were fishing in the territorial waters of Sri Lanka between the islands of Mannar and Neduntheevu in the Mannar Valaikuda (gulf). The fishermen were fully aware that they were violating the law but continued the fishing expedition. Shoals and shoals of "parai" or paraw fish are abundantly available during the months of January-March in these waters.

According to Rameswaram fisherfolk interviewed by Indian journalists a flotilla of Sri Lankan Tamil fishing boats had approached them. It was about 3.30 am. There were about 30 to 40 boats. There were about seven to eight men in each of the fibre glass boats equipped with outboard motors. The Rameswaram men knew that there was going to be an altercation as they were clearly in the wrong. There had been skirmishes before and the Sri Lankans had expressed their objections to this poaching in many different ways before. But what the Indians did not expect was the mid-sea manouevres that ensued.

The boats encircled one trawler very quickly and in a swift move boarded it. They were armed with clubs, swords, knives, rods and crudely manufactured molotov cocktails. Some men say they saw men in the boats having rifles but others are not so sure. In any event no firearms were taken on board by the 'invaders.' The Indian fishermen were assaulted with rods and clubs. Those attempting to resist were slashed and hacked with swords and knives. The trawler was commandeered and steered swiftly in a precise manouevre to divide the Indian fishing craft convoy into two segments.

Thereafter the Sri Lankans began 'herding' together the Indian boats and trawlers in one segment. A few vessels were firebombed. Even though the Indian fishermen outnumbered the Sri Lankans they were no match for the well armed and coordinated activity of the latter. Besides the Indians knew they had illegally encroached. Also the use of firebombs and swords had unnerved them. There was also the fear that the Tigers were involved and that heavy duty weapons could be deployed. With the rest of the Indian  vessels fleeing from the scene the Mannar fishermen took the remaining 27 trawlers and boats along with 76 men to the shore at Pesalai.

Second incident

There was however a second incident. Some other Indian boats mainly  from Rameswaram were involved in prawn fishing in the waters off Kachchaitheevu. While Indian fishermen are entitled to use the islet for purposes like drying their nets, they are specifically debarred from fishing in those waters in the Sri Lankan maritime sector. Kachchaitheevu was ceded to Sri Lanka in 1974. Around 25 Sri Lankan boats launched a swift manouevre like the earlier one. At least three trawlers were boarded and seized. Firebombs were used along with swords and clubs. A further 42 Indians were captured. This incident took place at about 6 am.

The Indians, most of them from Ramanathapuram and Kanniyakumari Districts in Tamil Nadu were taken to Pesalai and then handed over to the police along with the fishing craft. There were 118 men in all, along with 23 boats and nine trawlers. Seventeen Indian and four Sri Lankan fishermen had to obtain medical treatment for injuries sustained. Five Indians were  hospitalised.

The incidents described as "abductions" in sections of the Indian media, naturally aroused the ire of Tamil Nadu fishermen particularly those of Rameswaram - the hometown of most of the captured persons. The fishermen refused to go out to sea for the whole week. They planned a hartal to block transport on all roads, but deferred it on a request made by the District Collector Vijaya Kumar. A shutdown of shops was scheduled for March 8.

Aggrieved feelings

The incidents began inflaming the passions of the people in the Tamil Nadu coastal sector many of whom were fisherfolk. The fact that Sri Lankan Tamil fishermen had rounded up and captured their brethren at sea was a major irritant. While most fisherfolk knew that they were legally in the wrong, the knowledge that fellow fisherfolk had been assaulted by the Mannar  fishermen was a rankling factor. These aggrieved feelings in turn led to mounting tensions against the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees supposedly enjoying Tamil Nadu hospitality. The Mandapam refugee camp in Rameswaram was given special protection.

Tamil Nadu State Minister for Fisheries, Radhakrishnan acted fast and was in touch with Indian diplomats in Colombo as well as officials in New Delhi. Former Chief Minister and DMK Leader Muttuvel Karunanidhi issued a stinging statement against  the powers that be. Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalitha Jayaram wrote a very strong letter to the Indian Prime Minister urging strong action to protect the interests of the affected fishermen. Several politicians began fishing in the troubled waters. Notable among them was the PMK's Dr. Ramdoss who demanded that Kachchaitheevu be handed over to India immediately.

The officials of the Indian High Commission in Colombo also 'burnt the midnight oil' over the matter. Representations at the highest level were made. Efforts at resolving the issue were expedited. So when the matter came up in courts and the Mannar Magistrate, M. P. Mohideen was preparing to remand the Indian fishermen, the Sri Lanka police made an application to the contrary. DIG H. Premaratne presented himself in court and pointed out in the application that the incident was creating turmoil in Tamil Nadu and that the safety of refugees in Tamil Nadu camps was at stake. The Magistrate then remanded 21 boat skippers and trawler owners and released the others. He ordered the seized fishing craft to be handed over to naval custody. With the released men returning home, heated passions began cooling down gradually.

The long suffering Tamil Nadu fishermen - mainly from the districts of Kanniyakumari, Ramanathapuram, Puthukkottai, Nagapatinam and Thananjavoor had been articulately ineffectual in voicing their grievances earlier because of deep divisions. The "kuppan" sub-divisions along with political differences had fragmented a unified voice. The fishermen unions themselves were on the lines of political parties. The DMK and AIADMK affiliated unions were led by Bose and Arulanandam respectively. Now this incident was threatening to galvanise the entire community into united  action. Contending political forces in the state were sure to capitalise on it.

Although the Tamil Nadu fisherfolk had suffered immensely in the past two decades at the hands of the Sri Lanka Navy and at times even the air force, New Delhi had virtually ignored it. The various regimes at Chennai had effectively "crisis-managed" the problems as and when they occurred very often with payment of paltry compensation. At least 80 Tamil Nadu fishermen have been killed and double that number injured. Hundreds of boats have  been seized and even destroyed. Fishermen's catches, nets etc.  have  been confiscated at sea.

Fuel smuggling

All these incidents were denied, justified or glossed over on account of the security situation. It was said that the Lankan navy had mistakenly suspected them of being LTTE men. It was also felt that many Tamil Nadu fisherfolk were helping the Tigers by smuggling fuel and other supplies. Besides Indian officialdom was callously indifferent to the fishermen's plight. It was felt that they had no business to be in Sri Lankan waters. It was only a few years ago that an 'inexperienced' Sri Lankan naval officer blurted out to the media that Indian officials had casually remarked that trespassing Indian fishermen should be "wiped out."

With the hopelessly divided fishing community lacking the strength and skill to lobby their cause effectively few politicians in Tamil Nadu were prepared to espouse it. Thus the Indian central government was able to get away without exerting any real pressure on Colombo to ensure the safety of Tamil Nadu fishermen. The 'LTTE  factor' that continues to 'reduce' India's role here was greatly instrumental in this too. For instance in 1998 the Tamil Nadu fishermen charged the Sri Lanka Air Force of strafing fishing boats and  killing a few men. Some agitation arose and New Delhi was constrained to voice concerns. Nevertheless in a patently insincere response India was "satisfied" at then Foreign Minister Kadirgamar's glib explanation that the SLAF log book had no record.

Against that backdrop the present incident too could have been tided over, but for three reasons. Firstly, it was no longer a time of conflict in Sri Lanka where fisherfolk getting "caught in the crossfire" could be conveniently dismissed as "collateral damage." Secondly, the clash was a 'people to people' one with the Sri Lankans having arms. The hand of the LTTE was suspected. Thirdly, the issue was threatening to unify Tamil Nadu  towards a single demand that Kachchaitheevu be handed over to India. If this demand gathered force the state of relations between India and Sri Lanka - under some strain because of the direction in which the peace process is travelling - could be affected. So it was imperative that the problem be resolved and tensions doused.

No Tiger involvement

While some circles have been quick to implicate the LTTE in this affair the main official representing the Pesalai fisherfolk, Stanislaus, has denied Tiger involvement. Stanislaus in turn has been branded as a Tiger agent by the EPDP but then affixing labels 'pro-LTTE' or 'anti-LTTE' has become meaningless nowadays. The testimonies of released fishermen in Tamil Nadu also rule out any direct Tiger involvement in the attack. They say weapons like clubs, swords and petrol bombs were used but no firearms. Incidently almost all Tamil Nadu fishermen do not deny that they were in the wrong in encroaching but are outspokenly indignant about their fellow Tamils attacking and assaulting them. There is a feeling of betrayal here.

There is however some grounds to believe that the Tigers had planned the militaristic aspects of the manouevre. The entire operation was well coordinated and executed with military precision. The element of terror was used to some degree to stifle resistance. It is possible that some Tigers in 'civvies' could have been part of the flotilla and could have been directing operations. This however can only be a conjecture in the absence of concrete evidence.

If the LTTE was indeed behind the exercise it could be then due to three reasons. One, the LTTE has to protect the interests of the Sri Lankan Tamil fisherfolk most of whom have been severely affected in the past, but continue to be an on going support base. Two, the perpetual presence of Indian fishing craft in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Straits is a source of irritation to the Tigers for other reasons. By this token demonstration the Tigers may hope to dissuade Indian fishing activity in these waters in the future. Three, the LTTE that perceives itself as the de-facto ruling entity of the north-east may like to assert its hegemony in its "territorial" waters. It may be calculating that for any satisfactory resolution of such problems the LTTE's role and authority has to be recognised and accepted.

In that context the LTTE yearning for some Indian acknowledgment of its dominant status may be hoping that incidents of this type could compel New Delhi to take note of it explicitly. The LTTE request for safe passage through India for Anton Balasingham was ignored by New Delhi; the Oslo Summit was treated on a low scale by India. India also pointedly avoided a meeting in Kilinochchi about the repatriation of refugees from India. Thus, while the LTTE strives hard to make New Delhi take even indirect notice of it, India continues its course of supreme disdain often at the cost of injuring Tamil sentiments.

The LTTE could be therefore wishing that India would interact with them directly on this matter at least. It is clear that the fishing rights problem cannot be resolved bilaterally between India and Sri Lanka. There has  to be a tri-lateral effort. The Tigers like some petulant child hoping to attract attention through puerile mischief could be hoping that India would take note at least to minimise an irritation.

It may be recalled that a similar incident devoid of violence occurred in September, 2002. Twenty five Indian trawlers and 111 fishermen poaching off the waters of Talaimannar were rounded up by local fishermen. They were  released after a high level meeting in which Mannar Bishop Rev. Joseph Rayappu and a senior Indian diplomat from Colombo participated. The local fishermen then demanded a written guarantee that there won't be trespassing again. Incidently there was a "request" then that the Indian High Commissioner should visit the Wanni and discuss matters.

An issue of survival

While it may or may not be true of the LTTE being involved in the  incident indirectly, there is no denying that Indian Tamil feelings are hurt by the assault. Given the ties of ethnicity and the fact that a large number of Mannar fisherfolk are refugees  still in Tamil Nadu, this act is perceived as unacceptable. On the other hand the Sri Lankan fishermen also feel strongly about this issue. It is to some extent an issue of survival.

The Sri Lankan Tamil fisherfolk have been severely affected ever since 1984, when former National Security Minister, Lalith Athulathmudali declared a maritime security zone and prohibited deep sea fishing. This situation has continued with brief breathing spaces. The fishing community has been reduced to abject poverty and displacement. It is only now after the ceasefire that it is trying to resurrect itself. The past years has seen Indian fishermen plying their trade without problems in waters that are not rightfully theirs. Now with Lankan fishermen venturing out there are competitive clashes. The Indians with more trawlers and modern nets and gear are at a clear advantage over their Sri Lankan counterparts who are struggling to revive their industry.

What Nirupama Subramanian observed in the Frontline of July 20- August 2, 2002 sums up the current situation - "While Jaffna's dormant fishing community hopes for relief to come from the ongoing peace moves, across the straits, Tamil Nadu fishermen worry that once the conflict is resolved, their counterparts in northern Sri Lanka will zealously guard the catch." So frictitious incidents of this nature cannot be ruled out until the question of fishing rights are satisfactorily resolved. This requires great understanding and tolerance. This ultimately is something that the fishing fraternity on both sides should address and resolve.

Governments and officials can provide frameworks but no meaningful solution can be achieved until and unless the people themselves are willing to adjust in a spirit of 'give and take.' The sea which both sides regard as "kadal amma" (mother sea) has ample resources for everybody's just need, but not necessarily unjust greed.

What the Sri Lankan education system will not teach you

Free education; a historic decision to give anybody and everybody some form of basic education. Great idea. Great initiative. However, after a few decades of the system it doesn't take a rocket scientist to figure out that it has proved to be a colossal failure. Just think about real value-addition to the country, per educated head! Almost nothing.

Its not just the concept of 'free education' that needs to be rethought, its the very core of our educational structure. Are we gearing our future generations to be a bunch of parrots who can do nothing more than memorise incredibly large paragraphs? Are we stifling and paralysing the natural tendency of the young mind to wonder why? These questions beg for answers, and regime after regime have had none. Reform is a strong word, used easily by politicians young and old. Everybody wants to reform things, including the education system. In my opinion, there's not much 'reform' needed. The system already in place is a great foundation. There's just one thing missing: Making students think, which is the critical, fundamental principal on which education is based on.

The chances of you knowing what I'm talking about are likely if you are one of those people who, like myself, came through the local education system. Learning your verbal, numerical and analytical skills are a crucial part of being educated. However, our present education system just does not encourage students to ask why, how or what. Instead, students are made to accept whatever they are told no matter how many questions they may have. This unfortunately is the norm, rather than the exception. Over  time this environment gradually destroys the very premise on which human intelligence and innovation is based on; the power to think.

Take a walk along a street anywhere in the country. All around you are Sri Lankans who have passed their O/L and A/L examinations and even university graduates. So on paper, the system works! Lots of people with an education..certainly does wonders for the literacy rate. But is this the benchmark by which we can gauge how intelligent we are as a nation? There's been recent talk of turning Sri Lanka into an "intelligent island," like Singapore maybe. Again, good idea. But ask yourself this: How is this achievable? How are we going to achieve this status without revamping the entire educational system in the country? Or is it just as simple as giving students across the nation access to computers? I only wish it were as simple as that.

Teach with a purpose

A teacher who sparks a thought in a student's mind is the only successful teacher. I strongly believe that teachers need to be guides and mentors rather than 'lecturers.' Students of all ages should be encouraged to think. Lets take for example the method used in most developed nations. Although the average Sri Lankan student would be far superior to their counter-parts in developed nations in terms of verbal and numerical skills during secondary education, they are taught from an early age to think about what they have learnt as opposed to memorising. Most teachers in the US for example often end their lectures by saying, "think about what I've spoken today."

Also, topics of interest and debate are discussed in the classroom, allowing students to come out with their own assumptions and thoughts. We have all had experiences with teachers who we really enjoyed listening to and learning from. This is because these people found a method of connecting with the class. As a result students would respond positively to whatever was taught. Of course students need to open out their minds as well. As a student, you need to expand your horizons from an early age. Always keep  options open.

Expand your horizons

In this day and age, great test results alone will get you almost nowhere. Don't get me wrong; good exam results are, at the end of the day, what any future employer would look for. The dedication and aptitude shown in your O/L and A/L results are a fair measure of your intelligence. But there are other qualities that need to be developed at an early age in order to be competitive. Remember you have 24-hours to spend each day. That's a long time. Take out eight hours for studying, six hours for sleeping and you're still left with 10 full hours to spend productively. Manage your time and plan out your day and get involved in activities that will help you deal with the challenges of the future. Start a business, work part-time, do anything that will give you the edge when you are at an interview along with 50 others.

The human mind has an amazing capacity to multi-task. Soon you will find that you are far ahead of your peers in many aspects. Strive to be independent and fend for yourself. It doesn't take a genius. The greatest minds are the mediocre minds! Don't just think about it; put thought to action. Ask yourself: What will your potential employer expect? What will the job market be like in a few years? Will I have what it takes to catch the attention of the big companies or am I going to be satisfied with whatever comes my way?

Corporate culture; unforgiving and relentless

On one hand, helping Sri Lanka produce talented young people who will fit in to the workforce is also the responsibility of companies. If progressive Sri Lankan companies look to employ capable young people into their cadre, they need to train young people right from the most impressionable stage in their lives. Companies should certainly invest some of their resources, giving school kids the opportunity to use their holidays to work in their companies. This would give these children invaluable experience in a real working environment and help dispel social stigmas against working while at school.

There's no doubt that once you enter the corporate world, you need every ounce of experience you can garner. This experience will not only give you that edge over competition, but also help you mature faster at the workplace. Corporate culture is something even the toughest struggle with. For some strange reason, working while at school or university is discouraged here in Sri Lanka. It has a lot to do with the fact that the education curriculum is totally exam oriented. The ideal situation should be exactly the opposite. The ideal time to try out your wings is while at school or university. You are bound to fall hard, but who cares? You always stand up a wiser person.

Do send  your comments and views. I will include the more interesting opinions in my future columns. E-mail them to: chevaand@mastsl.com.

• Implementation of air emission standards regulations

 Hot air at Environment Ministry

By Frederica Jansz

The Environment and Natural Resources Ministry is creating a kerfuffle over the implementation of air emission standards regulations.

Despite a Supreme Court order two and half years ago ordering the Environment Ministry to gazette air pollution standards, the court order which came into effect on January 1 was ignored. Instead, the Environment Ministry has illegally changed to a later date the implementation of this process until July 1, 2003.

Having still failed to get their act together, three months after the due date of implementation, the Environment Ministry is now trying once more to postpone the effective date of the air emission standards.

That is not all. Two and a half years after the Supreme Court order, the Environment Ministry has only got so far as to purchase four units for testing of vehicle emissions and considers this sufficient to begin a programme, which is blatantly ad hoc - to test 1.5 million vehicles on a yearly basis.

Director, Environment, Economic and Global Affairs, Environment Ministry, Dr. B.N.S. Batagoda said that the other test units would have to be financed and established by the private sector.

Implementation problems

Asked why the implementation date has been changed in contravention of a Supreme Court order, Dr. Batagoda asserted that since it is the Environment Ministry that gave the court the date of January 1, they are entitled to change it if not ready to effect the process.

It is obvious that Dr. Batagoda's plan or lack of one is full of holes. He even said the emissions regulations cannot be fully implemented as a result of an impending war in Iraq.

Pressed further to explain what exactly he meant by this, he said the implementation programme is not focussed on vehicle emissions only but includes a process of evaluating fuel quality and maintaining a check and balance on vehicle importation.

While there certainly maybe confusion over fuel, there can hardly be any contest over vehicle importation as most vehicles imported are of superior quality than those already in use on our roads.

The need of the hour obviously is to clear Sri Lanka of the smog that emanates from thousands of vehicles plying local highways, polluting not just the environment but also causing a health hazard to the public.

Such simple logic appears to have escaped the attention of both Minister Rukman Senanayake and officials in his Ministry like Dr. Batagoda, whose drafting of the legislation in question holds little practical aspects.

According to the National Environmental Act, the government is mandated to have in place certain air pollution standards, which have to be gazetted. Over the years successive governments have failed to do this.

The Environmental Foundation Limited finally petitioned the Supreme Court and in June 2000 forced the government through a court order to gazette the necessary regulations. The court order stated that the implementation of the air emission standards regulations must take effect by January 1, 2003.

The delay was to enable the Environment Ministry to get organised in order to carry out the required tests. What this involved was that the government would enforce through the Motor Traffic Act a regulation which would insist on a smoke emission certification for every vehicle before annually renewing vehicle revenue licenses.

In Sri Lanka there are approximately 1.5 million vehicles including motorbikes. In order to test every single vehicle all over the island, a programme of this nature would have to be able to accommodate testing a minimum of 100,000 vehicles every month. This would require about 200 testing centers to be established across the island.

Ideas were mooted that motor garage owners could be convinced to purchase the testing equipment, which costs between Rs. 3 to 8 million depending on the level of sophistication of the product.

The government meanwhile, including the Environment Ministry, did nothing to begin establishing even some kind of a working machinery to ensure the Supreme Court order would be obeyed by January this year.

It was only last week that Minister Rukman Senanayake even held a crisis management meeting to hurriedly discuss and ascertain modalities towards implementing this process.

Passing the buck

Trying to pass the buck elsewhere, the Environment Ministry requested the Transport Ministry to implement the programme.

The Transport Ministry initially refused saying they did not draft the gazette notification and threw the ball back into the court of the Environment Ministry, asserting since the latter had drafted the regulations it was their duty to implement the programme.

This was later sorted out and the Transport Ministry has now agreed to implement the programme, possessing little or no knowledge of the magnitude of a project such as this.

Core issues relevant to such a process to date have not even been considered by the Environment Ministry. This is why last Thursday, March 6, Minister Senanayake summoned a crisis meeting with Ministry officials to find out what really is being done. (See box for comments)

Senanayake signed the legislation for the air emission standards regulations and is only too aware of the wide ramifications of establishing and implementing this project.

Clueless

On the other hand, the Transport Ministry, having never been involved in even drafting the required legislation does not have a clue how to even begin this process.

All this, after the Supreme Court gave the Environment Ministry a time frame of two and a half years to prepare the implementation of this regulation, of which in addition another three months have passed since the deadline. The Environment Ministry is still fiddling with possible scenarios.

The Sunday Leader also found that government officials are in the blue as to how to identify the testing equipment or even assess its output. It is impossible to expect some 200 garages around the country to pocket out a minimum of Rs. 3 million and purchase the equipment, which is why the private sector is to be lobbied now.

Other problem scenarios like for example how the Ministry would contest in court the difference in results is yet another issue not addressed. For instance, a vehicle which had been tested at a garage and issued a certificate can contest the test result of a police mobile unit which claims the contrary.

Requirements

Specialised training for staff and cost to vehicle owners for the test as well as quality assurance to prevent vehicle owners from bribing the garages or testing centers to obtain the necessary pass are all necessary requirements.

In addition it would be necessary to standardise the testing equipment and maintain regular checks in its performance.

Advisor, Environment Ministry, Dr. Rohan Pethiyagoda said the vehicle emission limits cannot be enforced as testing equipment for this is not yet available with garages approved by the commissioner of motor traffic on an island-wide basis.

He added that the commissioner of motor traffic and the Central Environmental Authority (CEA) have not yet finalised specifications for the testing equipment that garages or specialised centers should have.

Euro Two specifications

Also, the gazette requires that all new vehicles imported from January 1 conform to Euro Two specifications. This, Pethiyagoda asserts, is also impossible as the CPC's fuel standards do not meet Euro Two specifications. This could in turn lead to problems on the warranty applicable to such vehicles given that they will use substandard fuel.

Pethiyagoda is of the view that rather than attempting to test all 1.5 million vehicles in the country in one go, the project could perhaps be divided into phases. For example public transport for the first phase of year one, and other vehicles in year two etc.

The bottom line, however, is that due to a deep rooted lethargy that ails most public servants, such programmes are rarely if ever implemented to operate smoothly. Instead, the public is inconvenienced to great lengths, all due to the bungling bureaucracy and apathy of idiotic government officials.

Now Emirates fly high under UNF

By Frederica Jansz

There is speculation that the Emirates management at SriLankan Airlines may be looking to extend their management agreement with SriLankan (UL) for a further period of seven years.

The board of directors of SriLankan Airlines has been informed by its Chief Executive Officer, Peter Hill, that Emirates will not be in a position to sell its shareholding at SriLankan Airlines if a fresh lease agreement is signed to finance another four A340-300 aircraft for UL.

In a note to the board of directors on January 31 this year, Hill has stated that Lombard Aviation Capital (LAC) is seeking to impose financial covenants on Emirates, since the Middle Eastern airline is serving as guarantor to the lease agreement of four A340s.

Hill explains that this means LAC would restrict Emirates’ ability to sell its existing shareholding in SriLankan Airlines for the duration of the lease, which would end in the year 2015.  This is why it would be necessary then, for this government to extend the present management agreement with Emirates if this lease is signed with LAC.

The note to the SriLankan directors by Hill asserts that the new lease for another four A340s, would increase a full seven years beyond the expiry date of the Emirates management agreement with SriLankan Airlines. The present 10 year management agreement between Emirates and SriLankan Airlines expires in the year 2008.

The UNP in opposition vowed to abrogate the agreement and reported the privatisation deal to the Bribery Commission with former Attorney General and now Defence Minister Tilak Marapone drafting the complaint. Marapone as Aviation Minister is now heading the government delegation negotiating fresh terms with Emirates.

Meanwhile, four A330-200 Air buses are to be removed from the UL fleet and sub leased for the additional four A340-300 planes.

The phasing out of the A330-200 planes is being done despite Emirates having insisted in 1998 that the former AirLanka lease these A330s for enhanced operational capacity. The foreign management is now using this same argument to sub-lease the four A330-200 aircraft claiming the move would significantly reduce direct operating costs.

For the loss of the four A330s, Peter Hill together with Managing Director Tim Clark has negotiated with LAC to lease four A340-300 aircraft, which he claims will be at substantially lower lease rentals than the four A330-200 on lease at present.

He calculates that the annual net reduction in direct operating costs as a result would be as much as US$ 10.5 million. The four additional A340-300 aircraft leased from LAC would need to be reconfigured to UL specifications which according to Hill, would cost around US$ 1.5 million each. 

The leasing terms would be for a period of 12 years at a rental cost of US$ 450,000 per month. A security deposit of US$ 1 million per aircraft has to be paid in cash.

Emirates is now demanding that SriLankan Airlines pay Emirates an interest bearing deposit of US$ 25 million for the term of this lease since Emirates will provide a guarantee for up to 18 months lease rental payment amounting to approximately US$ 32.4 million.

Not explained

Why SriLankan Airlines should cough out US$ 25 million to Emirates and allow the latter to also sign as guarantors to the lease agreement has not been explained to the government yet by its nominees on the board of directors. Both Peter Hill and SriLankan Chairman, Daya Pelpola were overseas and unavailable for comment at the time this article went to press.

Senior Partner, Varners Lanka Law Office and Director, SriLankan Airlines, Mahinda Haradasa said he is not in a position to comment on this transaction as he is unaware of the details.

Haradasa’s lack of awareness is despite the fact that Hill’s memo to the board is dated January 31, 2003 where he states that following successful negotiations with LAC, a letter of intent would be tabled for approval and ratification by the board at its meeting on February 24, 2003.

Chairman, Union Commodities (Pvt) Ltd., and also a board director, SriLankan Airlines, Chanaka de Silva refused to answer his telephone when told The Sunday Leader wished to speak with him on a matter concerning SriLankan Airlines.

Managing Director, Commercial Bank of Ceylon Ltd., and also Board Director, SriLankan Airlines, Amitha Lal Gooneratne said he is not in a position to comment individually on this transaction without first consulting Daya Pelpola. Gooneratne said, “I don’t know what to say,” when asked if the board at SriLankan had approved and ratified this lease agreement with LAC.

Vociferous critics

The local representatives for the government on the SriLankan Airlines board comprises of these three gentlemen and Chairman Daya Pelpola.

The UNF were vociferous critics of the management agreement between Emirates and SriLankan Airlines while in the opposition and have consistently used this as a platform to sling mud at the former People’s Alliance government while also accusing the Emirates management of corruption and fraud.  

All negotiations with LAC to secure this deal is being done on behalf of SriLankan Airlines by the foreign management namely, its Managing Director Tim Clark and other Investor Directors namely, Gary Chapman, Dermot Mannion, Peter Hill and Captain Dick Hutton. Chief Financial Officer, S. A. Chandrasekera and Senior Manageress Legal Affairs, Priyani Abeysekara will join the negotiators as and when required by the Emirates team.

The Kachchatheevu conflict

Kachchatheevu is very much in the news again. The recent fracas concerning Tamil Nadu fishermen being attacked by their counterparts in Sri Lanka has brought the issue to the forefront again. It has become a common feature in recent times for any furore over fishing rights of Tamil Nadu fishermen to end in the inevitable reiteration of the demand for Kachchatheevu  ownership to be vested with India again.

Former Colombo correspondent, The Hindu, V. Jayanth writing on March 5 about the Mannar gulf fishing rights incident  in the Chennai based Indian daily makes this comment — “Though the Indian High Commission in Colombo is working overtime to sort out the problem, officials here are convinced that the only solution is to prevent Indian fishermen from straying into Sri Lankan waters. Unless this is done, they are afraid the fishermen will want to reopen the whole  issue of giving up Kachchatheevu to Sri Lanka, which was done in the larger ‘good-neighbourly interests.’ Hence the urgency of finding an immediate solution to this tussle.”

Gift of an island

Located north-east of Rameswaram in Tamil Nadu and south-west of Sri  Lanka’s Neduntheevu or Delft island, Kachchatheevu is no more than 1.6 km in length and slightly over 300 metres wide at its broadest point. It was formerly under the suzerainty of the Sethupathy kings of Ramnad. After the princely states were incorporated into independent India, the uninhabited island with a dilapidated church dedicated to St. Anthony, the patron saint of  seafarers, became part of the former Madras now Tamil Nadu state.

The new emperors of India cared little for an insignificant island or islet like Kachchatheevu. “The island is 18 miles east of Pamban. Where Pamban is I do not know,” former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru said in the Rajya Sabha in 1960. His daughter Indira Gandhi gifted the island in the interests of  geopolitical advantage to her island neighbour in 1974. A “sheer rock with no strategic significance,” was how she described it. 

Kachchatheevu however was an issue that never went away as far as the fishing community of Tamil Nadu was concerned. The barren islet was of great importance to the long neglected fisherfolk of the state. The fact that the central government “handed over” the island to its small neighbour without consulting the state of Tamil Nadu remains a sore factor. In a  sense, the disp- ensing of Kachchatheevu was very much akin to New Delhi’s handling of the statelessness issue in 1964. The destiny of the up country Tamils was carved up arithmetically by New Delhi and Colombo without heeding the aspirations and rights of the affected people themselves. Even the consistently pro-Indian Saumiyamoorthy Thondaman described that act as a betrayal by Mother India.

Compared to the gravity of the Sirima - Shastri pact, the issue of Kachchatheevu is certainly of lesser importance. Nevertheless, the fisherfolk of several coastal districts in Tamil Nadu regard it as of paramount importance. Although assurances were given and the agreement itself provided some guarantees, the Tamil Nadu fisherfolk found themselves adversely affected in practice. The escalation of the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka accelerated this process. The declaration of maritime security zones and prohibition of fishing in Sri Lankan territorial waters, affected the Indian fishermen too. Although they were entitled to dry their nets in Kachchatheevu the Sri Lanka Navy restricted this right in practice.

Maritime boundaries 

The bilateral agreements on maritime zones and related issues agreed upon by the two countries on June 26, 1974 and March 23, 1976 seem to have treated the question of the fishermen’s security and their fishing rights as tradable commodities, which can be given or taken away in order to satisfy geopolitical or security considerations.

Sri Lanka and India share a maritime border extending to more than 400 km in the Palk Bay region, in which the island of Kachchatheevu is located and which lies between the coastal regions of Nagapattinam, Than-javur, Pudukottai and Ramanathapuram Districts and Sri Lanka. The Tamil Nadu fishermen’s travails have their genesis in the maritime agreements of 1974 and 1976. The 1974 agreement demarcated the maritime boundary between the two countries in the Palk Strait and ceded Kachchatheevu to Sri Lanka. The 1976 agreement demarcated the boundary in the gulf of Mannar and the Bay of Bengal and barred each country’s fishermen from fishing in the other’s waters.

The 1974 agreement handed over Kachchatheevu formally to Sri Lanka. The island is situated in the Palk Strait at a distance of between 12.8 km and 16 km from the nearest points of Sri Lanka and India respectively. Article 5 of the agreement, which safeguards the rights of Indian fishermen and pilgrims (who visit the isle to take part in the St. Anthony’s festival there), states: “Subject to the foregoing, Indian fishermen and pilgrims will  enjoy access to visit Kachchatheevu as hitherto, and will not be required by Sri Lanka to obtain travel documents or visas for these purposes.” Article 6  states: “The vessels of India and Sri Lanka will enjoy in each other’s waters such rights as they have traditionally enjoyed therein.”

Not discussed

Writing about Kachchatheevu in his book Landscapes And Lives, the Indian author Mukul Sharma noted “This agreement or any of its provisions was neither discussed with the state governments, fisherpeople organisations or political parties, nor debated in parliament before it was enforced. There were other dominant considerations for the then heads of state.” He goes on to observe, “The aftermath of the 1971 insurrection by the Janatha Vimukthi  Peramuna (JVP), witnessed a change of mood with regard to the credibility of the Sirimavo Bandaranaike government in Sri Lanka. The country went through a severe economic and political crisis.” The Kachchatheevu settlement  contributed to a large extent in lifting the morale of the Bandaranaike regime.

The maritime boundary settlement also helped curb the anti-India hysteria in Sri Lanka. In fact, the agreement strengthened the relations between the governments of Indira Gandhi and Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Sri Lanka extended its support to India on some vital issues. While several countries  condemned India’s nuclear explosion in May 1974, Sri Lanka accepted India’s stance on putting its newly acquired nuclear capability to peaceful use. Besides, when Pakistan tried to use the 15-member ad hoc United Nations Committee as a forum to attack India over the nuclear explosion, Sri Lanka in its capacity as the chairperson of that committee prevented the use of the forum for that purpose. Thus, the agreement was a political decision, with no thought or consideration to the fishermen.

The 1976 agreement is entitled “Agreement Between India And Sri Lanka On The Maritime Boundary Between The Two Countries In The Gulf Of Mannar And The Bay Of Bengal And Related Matters.” There was an exchange of letters on the same day as it was signed between India’s Foreign Secretary and Sri  Lanka’s Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministry Secretary. These letters also constituted an agreement. Significantly, this agreement was signed when India was under emergency rule, when no discussion or dissent was permitted.

Paragraph I of the exchange of letters states: “With the establishment of  the exclusive economic zones by the two countries, India and Sri Lanka will exercise sovereign rights over the living and non-living resources of  their respective zones. The fishing vessels and fishermen of India shall not engage in fishing in the historic waters, the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone of Sri Lanka, nor shall the fishing vessels and fishermen of Sri Lanka engage in fishing in the historic waters, the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone of India, without the  express permission of Sri Lanka or India, as the case may be.”

It is the different interpretations of this portion of the exchange of letters and of Article 5 in the 1974 agreement that have led to the controversy over whether or not Indian fishermen have the right to fish in and around Kachchatheevu. The Sri Lankan government argues that the relevant portion of the exchange of letters supersedes Articles 5 and 6 of the 1974 agreement. It also claims that Article 5 allowed Indian fishermen only to dry their nets in Kachchatheevu and not to fish in and around the island.  Since then, India and Sri Lanka have held several meetings to solve the riddle.

A fire fighting exercise

 Former Director, Centre for South and  South-East Asian Studies, Madras University, Prof. V. Suryanarayan, who has studied Kachchatheevu and the problems of Indian fishermen in the Palk Bay region, has been quoted: “It is always a fire-fighting exercise by both the governments, without removing the causes of fire. In fact, who cares in New Delhi and Colombo about the shooting and killing of some hundred poor fishermen?” 

Mukul Sharma also throws some light on the compulsions and motivations of the Rameswaram fishermen in continuing to fish in the troubled waters off Kachchatheevu. This is what Sharma says: “What forces fishermen from Tamil Nadu to the Sri Lankan waters beyond Kachchatheevu, up to the Delft island off the Jaffna coast, even at the risk of being killed? What compels the assistant director of fisheries for the Rameswaram region to say: ‘If fishermen do not cross the border today, tomorrow there will be no fishing in the region?’ One answer is that the ocean currents and sedimentation on the Sri Lankan side of the Palk  Strait have made it a rich field of Tiger prawns, which fetch a high price. Another lies in the massive growth of fishing activity and income-sharing in the region. According to information from the Fisheries Department, the number of trawling boats operating from Rameswaram is about 1,000. In the traditional sector, there are about 1,500 craft. Ramanathapuram ranks first in the total marine fish landing of Tamil Nadu; it accounted for 23.57 per cent during the 1993-96 period. The growth rate of marine fish landings in the district is much higher than that of the state as a whole.

Seeking a good harvest

“The system that is in vogue in Rameswaram also puts pressure on the fisherpeople to seek fishing grounds much closer to the Sri Lankan coast, where the availability of shrimp is high. Unlike other places in the state, where the net income is shared between the boat owner and the crew in the ratio 60:40, in Rameswaram the boat owners pay daily wages. There are special wages for overnight trips, and incentives based on the catch in bottom-trawling. For every 1 kg of shrimp, the driver gets Rs. 20, the second hand Rs. 15 and the deck hands Rs. 10 each. As a result, the crew  want to catch more, even in dangerous waters.” 

The present crisis between the Tamil fisherpeople of Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu was not unanticipated. Nirupama Subramanian in an article on Kachchatheevu published in the Frontline of July 20 - August 2 , 2002  was perceptive enough to discern and predict what was looming. Relevant paragraphs from that article are as follow:

“The bonhomie could not mask the resentment and envy with which the Sri Lankan Tamils, most of them fishermen themselves, regard Indian  fishermen. Jaffna fishermen cannot use mechanised boats, they cannot go out to sea beyond a kilometre, and the fishing hours are restricted. They must cast their nets close to the shore and be satisfied with the small catch.  Bound by the security restrictions, which are still not completely removed despite the ceasefire, the fishermen of Jaffna and its islets have been unable to realise the potential of the Palk Straits, the only source of their livelihood, to its fullest.

Bigger issue

“But all these years they have watched as their counterparts from across the Straits make incursions into Sri Lankan waters with impunity and get away with it most of the time. Notwithstanding the security restrictions, the Indians come not only to Kachchatheevu where their fishing rights are not clearly written in to the Maritime Boundary Agreement, but also poach  in waters around the Jaffna islets, their trawlers dragging and destroying the nets of the local fishermen. It is for this reason that Jaffna fishermen, who would otherwise hold no brief for the Sri Lanka Navy, be of the view that its actions against Indian poachers are fully justified. ‘The Sri  Lanka Navy must protect our waters from Indian fishermen. Already we live and work under so many restrictions. The Indians have only been adding to our problems,’ said S. Vimalanandan, a fisherman from Delft.

“But the Indian fishermen have their own tale of woe. The handful who came to Kachchatheevu were candid enough to admit that they had depleted their own resources and that their livelihood depended now on the catch in the Sri Lankan waters. Not surprisingly, they argued for a pragmatic division of the spoils.

“Indira Gandhi thought she was trading good neighbourly relations when she signed the agreement. No one saw then that less than 10 years later, not only would the ties between the two countries run aground over a far  bigger issue, but that the tensions created by the gifting of an island would continue to affect the people of the Palk Straits on both sides of the maritime boundary.”