25th May,  2003, Volume 9, Issue 45

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POLITICS

Dealing with an interim set up

Inside Politics

By Suranimala

While the devastating floods swept away President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s attempts to take over the Development Lotteries Board (DLB) from the political agenda, the government and­­­ the LTTE moved closer last week to breaking the deadlock over the peace talks and the Tokyo donor conference following shuttle diplomacy to establish an administrative structure for north east development and reconstruction.

It was Prime­­­­ Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe who first mooted the idea of an interim administration for the north east in his election manifesto and secured a mandate from the people to move in that direction, but with the commencement of talks in September 2002, there was a shift in direction as a result of perceived legal obstacles.

The birth of SIHRN

This led to the birth of a Joint Task Force for Humanitarian and Reconstruction Activities at the first session of talks in Sattahip, Thailand, and the task force later came to be transformed into the Sub-committee on Immediate Humanitarian and Rehabilitation Needs (SIHRN) during the second session.

It was SIHRN that was to deal with the rehabilitation of the Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), the humanitarian mine action programme, reconstruction of roads, health facilities, schools and related issues but in reality, hardly any progress was made on the ground to give the people in the north east a peace dividend, largely due to bureaucratic red tape and legal hurdles compelling the Tigers to rethink their strategy.

The Tigers also realised the Prime Minister was constrained due to roadblocks placed by the opposition in general and the President in particular in arriving at a speedy solution, primarily in the backdrop of a slim parliamentary majority.

But under immense pressure on the ground, the LTTE leadership finally suspended its participation from the peace talks pending implementation of the decisions already reached during the earlier rounds of talks and has now reverted to Prime Minister Wickremesinghe’s original proposal in a bid to break the deadlock.

Having fought a separatist war for over 20 years and in addition to the devastating economic and social consequences, sacrificed the lives of 17,000 cadres on the premise they can no longer live with the Sinhalese in one country, the LTTE had some tough explaining to do on their decision to embrace a federal solution within a united Sri Lanka and the lack of progress after one year of talks did not help their case in so doing.

For the Tigers, there was therefore no point in attending the donor conference in Tokyo or peace talks for that matter unless an effective mechanism was in place to handle the funds received for development and reconstruction of the north east and saw an effective administrative structure being in place as the only way to overcome this hurdle.

This issue was exhaustively discussed between LTTE Leader Velupillai Pirapaharan and Chief Negotiator Anton Balasingham prior to the latter’s departure to London and the LTTE leadership came to the conclusion all institutions handling rehabilitation, reconstruction and development activities in the north east should be brought under one umbrella if effective progress is to be made and that only an interim administrative structure could do so.

Such a structure, the LTTE decided, was the only way the people can be afforded a peace dividend to move the peace process forward and justify their position of the need to continue the search for a political solution.

The LTTE leadership which also discussed the southern political situation came to the conclusion that as long as Chandrika Kumaratunga remained President and the UNP lacked an effective majority in parliament, there can be no final solution on the lines envisaged in the Oslo declaration and that it was another important reason for an effective interim administrative structure to handle the development and reconstruction work of the north east.

And unlike the 10 year offer made by President Kumaratunga, it was a period of about two years the LTTE was now looking at in terms of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s manifesto pledge.

This thinking in fact came to be reflected in Anton Balasingham’s letter on May 21 to Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, Vidar Helgessen in the following terms:

“The LTTE leadership is of the view that a permanent political settlement to the Tamil national question can only be actualised in a supreme constitution instituting a radically new policy, an endeavour that cannot be realised under the current unstable political climate. Since a permanent political settlement is not feasible in the immediate future, the Tiger leadership proposes an interim administrative structure with greater participation of the LTTE in both decision making and delivery of the tasks of rebuilding the war damaged economy and restoring normalcy in the Tamil speaking homeland.”

This column last week exclusively reported the LTTE’s thinking on this issue and the decision to call for an interim administrative structure to handle north east development and reconstruction.

The first official intimation of the LTTE wanting to look at an interim administrative structure came when Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen, accompanied by Deputy Helgessen called on Pirapaharan last week and it was duly communicated to Prime Minister Wickremesinghe.

In fact it was to convey this very message that Pirapaharan met with Petersen despite the sudden departure of Balasingham, with the LTTE Chief Negotiator insisting he meet with the Norwegians and convey the LTTE thinking, notwithstanding Balasing-ham’s inability to be present.

Heightened activity

And this proposal by Pirapaharan to revert to Prime Minister Wickremesinghe’s manifesto pledge saw heightened activity by the Norwegians with Helgessen doing some shuttle diplomacy between Colombo and Kilinochchi where three documents exchanged hands. The three drafts were an agreement between the government and the LTTE, a paper on elements of a strengthened and expanded mechanism for reconstruction and development of the north and east, and a letter proposing the local bodies be used as a basis for development activities, all of which were drafts prepared by the Norwegians. The government of course made its own observations on the drafts before the Norwegians took their proposals to the LTTE.

And on Saturday, May 17, Helgessen met with LTTE Political Wing Leader Tamilselvan and Head, Tiger Peace Secretariat, S. Puleedevan, where these documents were handed over and the Norwegian deputy was informed they would revert to him after consulting the LTTE Leader and Balasingham in London.

At that meeting, Helgessen said he could return to the Wanni on Monday, May 19 if further discussion on the documents were necessary but was told by Tamilselvan they would inform him Sunday night if that would be necessary.

Thus, having got Helgessen’s draft proposals, the LTTE leadership immediately communicated with Balasin-gham with instructions to prepare a suitable response thereto. Pirapaharan spoke with Balasingham via satellite phone and explained his thinking on the proposals and having discussed the issue decided what form the reply would take. At the same time, Erik Solheim too had e-mailed the proposals to Balasingham making his own comments thereon.

Given the serious nature of the documents received, Balasingham required further time to study them before making his response and as such, LTTE Peace Secretariat Head, Puleedevan on Sunday called Second Secretary of the Norwegian Embassy, Tomas Stangeland and informed him the LTTE needs to give Balasingham more time on the documents and a Monday meeting would not be feasible. Helgessen thereafter planned to leave the country on Monday.

These developments also gave lie to the speculation in some quarters that Balasingham has been sidelined in a power struggle.

In the meantime, back in Colombo, on Sunday a Tamil National Alliance (TNA) parliamentary delegation comprising R. Sambandan, Gajan Ponnambalam, P. Joseph and N. Raviraj at the request of the government met with a team of officials, namely, Treasury Secretary Charitha Ratwatte, Defence Secretary Austin Fernando, Ambassador Bernard Goonetilleke and Treasury official Pathmanathan where the development work in the north east was discussed.

At this meeting, the TNA delegation told the officials, SIHRN was a failure and the LTTE was looking for an administrative structure to handle development of the north east in order to make their participation in Tokyo meaningful.

If there is no such structure in place, the monies pledged in Tokyo will be meaningless as far as the people of the north east are concerned. That is the LTTE position, the TNA delegation pointed out.

Asked Defence Secretary Austin Fernando, “What sort of a mechanism is the LTTE looking for? Is it prepared to come under the constitution?”

In response, the TNA members said the LTTE was looking at an interim arrangement where effective decisions can be taken to carry out development activity and that it did not have to be a constitutional arrangement.

It was Ambassador Goonetilleke who posed a pertinent question at this stage, and one which would be the obvious battle cry of the opposition.

Asked Goonetilleke: “Interim to what? Is it to a separate state as claimed by the opposition?”

Replied Sambandan, “Not at all. That argument no longer holds water after Oslo where a declaration was made to pursue a federal solution based on internal self determination within a united country.”

Interim administration

With that said, a broad framework for an interim structure was discussed and the following day, Monday, May 19, the same TNA delegation with the addition of MPs Vinayagamoorthy and Thangavadivel met with Prime Minister Wickremesinghe, where once again the same issue was the subject of discussion.

The Prime Minister at this meeting agreed SIHRN was not adequate to handle the complexity of the problem but inquired from the TNA what ideas they had for an interim administrative structure.

“It can’t be done by a mere law. Constitutionally too it is difficult because of the parliamentary equation. One way could be to have an authority under an administrative order like the Mahaweli Authority.  Will that be okay?” the Prime Minister asked.

The TNA delegation which was scheduled to leave for the Wanni the following day, Tuesday, May 20, to meet with Tamilselvan said they would bounce the idea off the LTTE, which they in fact did.

On so doing, Tamilselvan said the LTTE has already received a similar proposal through the Norwegians and was studying it.

However, Tamilselvan said while the general thinking on the administrative structure was okay, it must necessarily have the power to deal with the issue of reconstruction and development.

At this meeting Sambandan also told Tamilselvan while Sinhala leaders cannot be trusted given their past experience, he was convinced of Prime Minister Wickremesinghe’s sincerity and that the proposal should be approached in a manner which will not cause him serious problems in the south.

At the same time, Helgessen prior to leaving the country Monday, met with the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Nirupam Sen where a full briefing of the latest developments was given, after which the Norwegian deputy left for India to brief the Indian government.

In the meantime, Balasingham was busy preparing the LTTE’s response to Helgessen’s proposals and having finalised it Tuesday night sent it to the LTTE Leader for approval and having got the green light, despatched it Wednesday morning.

Having so done, the LTTE later in the afternoon released the letter to the media, thereby placing the proposal for public discussion in a spirit of transparency.

Interestingly, the LTTE as reflected in the letter was calling for an interim administrative structure to undertake north eastern reconstruction and development activities without pushing the issues of High Security Zones (HSZ) or the Nambiar report to the forefront, thereby giving the government a window of opportunity to seize on the proposal and revive the peace process and also give new life to the Tokyo donor conference, the outcome of which was going to benefit the country in its entirety.

Tokyo donor conference

The government also realises that without the LTTE’s presence in Tokyo, despite claims by the opposition to the contrary, the donor conference will not attract the same attention and a stalled peace process as reflected by the World Bank representative recently will before long see the foreign investors losing interest in Sri Lanka, taking the country back to square one.

At the same time, for the LTTE too, the Tokyo conference was of the essence since a missed opportunity would not only set the clock back by years as far as reconstruction of the north east is concerned, but also considerably lose for it international goodwill it has been striving to regain.

Thus, the proposal for an interim administrative structure if worked to the satisfaction of both sides was going to be a win win situation for both sides and the country as a whole given the new impetus it would give the peace process and with it the economy.

And what was significant in Balasingham’s letter was the reference to the Indo Lanka Agreement which not only provided for such an arrangement where the LTTE was to have majority representation but one that was accepted by Chandrika Kumaratunga and her SLMP at the time.

Furthermore, unlike President Kumaratunga’s proposal to the LTTE where the Tigers were offered exclusively an interim administration for 10 years, Balasingham’s letter envisages wider participation as stated in his letter to Helgessen. “In this context we wish to point out that the government of India proposed an interim administrative mechanism following the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 providing LTTE with a dominant participatory role,” Balasingham wrote, indicating thereby there was a role for the others too in the interim set up.

Within a hour after the LTTE released the letter to the media stating their position on the interim administration, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe was in possession of a copy and immediately discussed the issue with his negotiators, G.L. Peiris and Milinda Moragoda.

The thinking of the Prime Minister was, in principle he had no objection to the proposal but that it would have to be structured in a manner acceptable to all parties concerned, that is the Tamils, Muslims and Sinhalese.

No sooner this consultation concluded, Minister Moragoda went in for a meeting with the diplomats from the donor nations to prepare for the Tokyo conference while Prime Minister Wickremesinghe and Minister Peiris went into discussion with a TNA delegation comprising R. Sambandan, Gajan Ponnambalam, N. Raviraj, Suresh Premachandra and P. Joseph.

And at the very outset, the Prime Minister told the TNA delegation the LTTE had officially announced its position on the interim administrative structure and the government would after studying the proposal respond constructively.

Wickremesinghe said in principle he had no objection to an interim administrative structure to handle reconstruction and development in the north east having got a mandate from the people on the issue, but queried what exactly the LTTE had in mind, particularly in relation to the Muslims and Sinhalese of the east.

At the same time, Minister Peiris inquired where the interim arrangement would lead, which saw Sambandan explaining the LTTE thinking as discussed with the TNA.

Sambandan said the interim arrangement was to be in place until such time a permanent solution is found based on a federal structure within a united Sri Lanka based on the principle of internal self determination.

United Sri Lanka

There is, therefore, no question of it being a basis for separation since the very foundation is based on accepting the position that Sri Lanka will be united, the TNA delegation said.

Elaborating on the issue, Sambandan said the sort of composition contemplated would be on the lines of the 1987 proposal where the 12 member committee was to have seven representatives of the LTTE, of which one was to be a Muslim, two from the TULF and three from the government, of which two would be Muslims and one Sinhalese.

He further said the LTTE had no objection to there being Muslim and Sinhala representation in the administration.

This led to the next question of opposition in the south, particularly by the JVP and the PA.

Said Sambandan, “No way can President Kumaratunga object to an interim administration. In 2000, when the President brought her proposals, she provided for an interim arrangement. It provided for six Tamils, two Muslims and one Sinhalese, so how can she oppose it now? There is no way either the President or the PA can oppose it.”

Added he — “Even the Muslim Congress cannot oppose it because Ashraff agreed with President Kumaratunga when this composition for an interim administration was proposed.”

Continuing, Sambandan said the government should have no worries about the President opposing it since she offered an interim administration to the LTTE exclusively for 10 years without elections.

“Not only did she tell Time magazine she offered the LTTE an interim administration to run the north for 10 years, she told all the Tamil parties she was willing to hand over the entire north east to the LTTE for 10 years. I was personally present when this was said,” Sambandan said.

Agreeing with Sambandan was EPRLF Leader Suresh Premachandra, who said he too was present when the President made the statement.

This in fact is how Time reported Kumaratunga’s interview in its issue of February 9, 1998, which to date stands uncontradicted:

“The President told Time she promised Prabhakaran an autonomous package and also said if he stopped fighting he could run the northern province using his police force, without having to face elections for upto 10 years. She says the Tiger Chief didn’t respond.”

It is significant to note here that the President did not call for the decommissioning of the LTTE to give it a 10 year interim administration but simply to “stop fighting,” which in effect is a ceasefire.

Further, by asking the LTTE to use its police force, Kumaratunga has also acknowledged the Tigers had a fully fledged police force during her tenure, to which police she was prepared to concede law and order in the area.

Be that as it may, the following day, Thursday, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe further discussed the issue with Ministers Peiris and Moragoda and his officials where a draft response was worked on.

One problem the Prime Minister faced in so doing was that he had even on Thursday not been officially informed of Balasingham’s letter by the Norwegians since Helgessen was away in Brussels and not got the letter himself.

But given the media release, the Prime Minister started preparing his response subject to how the Norwegians meant to handle the communication.

Norwegian position

And on Thursday night, the Prime Minister together with Ministers Peiris and Moragoda also discussed the issue with Norwegian Ambassador Hans Brattskar, who indicated the facilitators would be meeting in Oslo Friday morning to discuss the issue after which an intimation would be made to the Prime Minister.

The Norwegians it transpired were deliberating among themselves whether they were merely going to be a postman or make their own proposals in forwarding Balasingham’s letter to the Prime Minister. The question which arose here was that Balasingham’s letter was addressed to Helgessen and not Wickremesinghe, setting out the LTTE position on the proposals submitted by Helgessen and the organisation’s own position on an interim administrative structure to handle north east development.

In that context, the Norwegians had to decide whether they were simply going to forward to Wickremesinghe a letter addressed to Helgessen where proposals submitted by Helgessen were commented on or write to the Prime Minister based on Balasingham’s proposals seeking a response and dialogue on it.

In the meantime, the Prime Minister in preparing his response subject to what the Norwegian’s were going to do decided to be constructive, and draw attention to his manifesto pledge for an interim administrative structure to handle north east development as well as speeches made after his election reiterating his commitment to the pledge.

Simply put, the Prime Minister, who on Wednesday also spoke with the Mahanayake Thero of Malwatte on the issue was agreeing in principle to the establishment of an interim administrative set up subject to the modalities being worked out.

At the same time, ground work for the Tokyo donor conference was also done and it was all systems go by Friday, with Moragoda scheduled to visit Tokyo later this week to finalise arrangements.

It of course remains to be seen whether the LTTE will attend the donor conference after the government sends a constructive response to Balasingham’s letter, but all indications were that the Tigers would make their presence felt in the Land of the Rising Sun thereby holding out a ray of hope for the revival of the peace process and with it the country.


LTTE’s potboiler for the south

By Dilrukshi Handunnetti

The recent demand by the Liberation Tigers for the immediate setting up of an interim administrate in the north east “affording them legitimacy” seems to have raised a hornet’s nest, though in truth, it is rather an old demand accepted in principle by the two main political parties in the country.

But like the present weather conditions, the political climate too grew bleak when the LTTE decided to unilaterally suspend peace talks in April, piqued ostensibly by the US’ decision to exclude them from a vital preparatory donor conference in Washington. While withdrawing, the LTTE also blamed the government for its failure to implement decisions reached at the discussion table and delays in resettling refugees.

In this backdrop, Japan’s visiting special peace envoy Yasushi Akashi’s attempts to convince the Tigers that their presence was vital at the crucial Tokyo donor parley proved futile. Akashi sought to impress upon the guerillas that if they were keen to demonstrate their interest in playing a participatory role in rebuilding the north east, they should reach Tokyo where over 40 countries would gather to pledge assistance to rebuild Sri Lanka.

For a while, it appeared that the Tigers would eventually return to the table, pressurised as they were by the international community and their own cash strapped situation. But, three weeks before the donor parley, the guerillas are linking their possible presence in Tokyo to a previous demand for an interim administration.

Formal request

LTTE Leader Velupillai Pirapaharan last week formally requested visiting Norwegian Foreign Minister Jan Petersen to initiate the establishment of a “new and innovative structure for the northeast with adequate authority and legal status for rapid implementation of humanitarian and development activities.” On Thursday, Tiger Political Wing Leader S.P. Tamilselvan declared that their presence in Tokyo would essentially depend on “the government’s response to their suggestions that should be concrete, trustworthy, honest and not based on verbal pledges with regard to the setting up of an interim administration for the north east.”

Openly critical, he told the media in Kilinochchi that the government should go beyond the parameters of the constitution and not be held prisoner by it. “It would give our organisation legitimacy and authority over the north east,” he added.

Whether it would establish the LTTE’s authority or not, it appears that the Tigers are demanding the space for ‘transition.’ The call for an interim administration, however, seems to cause much heartburn to the majority of the people who feel that the LTTE cannot be trusted as yet and need to prove their credentials before they are allowed to exercise administrative powers over two provinces. And such powers they feel would effectively wipe out all other political expressions from the north east landscape.

Practising its own brand of diplomacy, the Tigers last week sought the Tamil National Alliance’s (TNA) assistance to pursue the demand. A TNA group met American Ambassador Ashley Wills on Thursday to explain that such an interim administration was mandatory to effectively rebuild the war ravaged areas and rehabilitate the displaced families.

The group also briefed Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe on the outcome of the talks they had with the LTTE leadership following it up by meetings with envoys of Norway and Japan.

Origins of the demand

According to senior Tamil politicians, the call for an interim administration is nothing new. “It was understood that we would have to look at such a structure when the militant parties require a period for transition,” says V. Anandasangaree.

“People should understand that a militant group that has not engaged in politics would definitely require some time to transform itself from a military movement into a political one,” asserts Lands Minister Dr. Rajitha Senaratne.

This concept, according to Anandasangaree has been touted for at least 15 long years.  Following talks between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and President J.R. Jayewardene prior to the brokering of the Indo Lanka pact,  it was agreed that an interim administration could be set up, which would be headed by the LTTE.

“The LTTE was supposed to nominate three persons as possible leaders and due to some misunderstanding, it did not materialise,” asserts the TULF President.

The need for such a structure was first recognised in the Indo Lanka Peace Accord of 1987, under which the north east was temporarily merged. 

Buried in the sands of time, focus next fell on the issue of an interim set up when President Chandrika Kumaratunga who came into office by pledging extensive power sharing with the LTTE, offered the Tiger Leader 10 years of self-rule in 1998.

According to the Time Magazine of February 9, 1998, “she promised Prabhakaran an autonomy package and also said if he stopped fighting he could run the Northern Province, using his guerillas as a police force, without having to face elections for up to 10 years.  She says the Tiger Chief did not respond.”

Kumaratunga was bitterly attacked by the opposition UNP “for offering the north east to terrorists on a platter then” and two years later, when Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe offered an interim administration to the LTTE for two years, the UNP was at the receiving end of a vituperative government attack for “compromising sovereignty.”

However, it is interesting to note that Kumaratunga who called upon the Tigers to “stop fighting,” when making the offer, did not urge them to give up arms.

Threshing ground

Prime Minister Ranil Wickreme-singhe who offered an interim administration in the UNF manifesto of 2001, reiterated that such a set up would be a perfect threshing ground for the Tigers.  “We are willing to discuss extensive internal power sharing without dividing the country. There is no compromise on the sovereignty of our state.  Presidents Premadasa and Kumara-tunga both attempted to discuss core issues at the discussion table. We have to take the discussion forward and in the near future, we should be able to discuss the modalities on how to share power,” he noted.

Addressing a public rally following the Jana Bala Meheyuma (people power campaign) in September 2002, he noted that President Kumaratunga had offered a much longer administration to the guerillas.

Despite the official positions of both the main political parties here, the issue of sharing power has often posed a dilemma to the south who fail to see it as a measure falling short of dividing the nation.

However, the Tamil political parties feel that the two main political parties should reach a compromise on the matter soon. “There is no way that they could back off now. It is what the PA leadership promised the Tamil population earlier and now that the party is in opposition, they should not attempt to go back on their word,” says General Secretary, TULF, R. Sampanthan.

UNP Chairman and Power and Energy Minister, Karu Jayasuriya told The Sunday Leader that the LTTE should not link their participation at  the donor parley to the issue of an interim administration, though the government definitely understood and accepted that the talks would eventually lead to the establishment of such a set up.

Opposition gathering momentum

PA Spokesman Dr. Sarath Amunugama who has been campaigning for extensive power devolution as a means to end ethnic strife told The Sunday Leader that the PA saw no reason to give into the demands of the LTTE at this juncture.

“We cannot accept a settlement outside the present constitution. According to the 13th Amendment, such a decision has to be taken by the President. Therefore, the Prime Minister cannot take a decision single-handedly even if he wished to,” he said.

Amunugama defended the PA’s original offer of 10 years of self-rule, stating that Kumaratunga merely “suggested” the creation of an interim administration and any salient proposal she created would have fallen well within the ambit of the constitution.

 Lands Minister Dr. Rajitha Senaratne sees this as a political move aimed at whipping up communalism for political mileage. “There is no way for either party to renounce its stance. We are committed to a position. But there is no need to get excited as it is only a suggestion with modalities yet to be worked out.”

Dr. Senaratne said that there were two schools of thought. Some feel that presidential sanction is necessary to move the necessary legislation while some believe cabinet sanction is adequate. “Many things need to be worked out. But the Tigers should not link this to the Tokyo aid conference,” he said.

Questions

Why not, seems to be the question raised by most Tamil politicians. “We have pursued our cause with commitment. What is the purpose of attending donor conferences to seek money to rebuild the north east, if we have no measure of control over how the money is utilised in our areas?” questioned  Sampanthan.

President, Sihala Urumaya, Tilak Karunaratne finds nothing original in the demand. “Kumaratunga made her first pledge on those lines prior to the 1994 presidential elections and had this gazetted in August 1999.”

The election manifesto of the UNP in 1999 had Ranil Wickremesinghe pledging a similar administration. After all these offers, the Tigers are now demanding their pound of flesh, he noted.

Karunaratne rejects the entire concept as one that seeks to permanently divide the country and a total sell out. The position of the Sihala Urumaya and the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna are similar. They feel that the Tigers have received much more from the peace process than what they have fought and captured during 20 years of warfare.

Noncommittal

 However, other Tamil political parties like the Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC) remain noncommittal. “It is only at a demand stage. No discussions have been held and decisions are not even thought of,” says Party Leader, Minister Arumugam Thondaman.

ACTC member, Gajendrakumar Ponnambalam encapsulated the need for the south to come together if the problem is to reach a final solution.  “We believe that the request is not unfair.  There is a great need for the formalisation of such a set up if we are to pursue rehabilitation and resettlement goals. After all, nobody feels the pain as much as we do,” the parliamentarian said.

Ponnambalam believes that such an administration could help streamline the present structure such as the pradeshiya sabhas that exist in the northeast. “Why should there be unnecessary fear? It is part of a process of transition for the Tigers,” he asserted.

As such, the Tamil politicians feel that there is a silver lining in the seemingly hardcore stance adopted by the LTTE.  “The LTTE no longer believes in a military solution. As reiterated by Tamilselvan at a recent media briefing, the Tigers no longer feel that a military solution is feasible.”

“They are slowly passing that phase of militancy. The modalities should be worked out for a set up that is acceptable both to the north and the south, but this opportunity to transform themselves into politicians, a chance we allowed the southern militants of the JVP, should be offered to the Tigers as well,” said Minister Rajitha Senaratne.

UNF agrees to interim administration

The ruling UNF declared its official position on the interim administration in their 2001 election manifesto.

The manifesto declared that “we will set up an interim council in the north and east for a limited duration.”

Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe addressing the final Jana Bala Meheyuma rally at the Colombo Town Hall on September 9, 2002, declared that there indeed was a need to take up the issue of setting up an interim administration by the LTTE in the north east.

“The LTTE has functioned as a military outfit and hence demand an interim administration to complete its transition into a political organisation. This is the thinking behind the demand for an interim administration,” he said.

With no particular reference to the setting up of an interim administration, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe in his May Day speech too reiterated that “any matter that does not seek to divide Sri Lanka could be taken up at the discussion table.”

 

 

 

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