ISSUES

Tigers may do a "Thimpu" again

"We will make several changes and soon send to the government a version that will fulfil aspirations of the Tamil people. We can re-start the talks if the government accepts this ...........We will submit our counter proposals to the UNF government which could satisfy the  expectations and reflect the interests of our people.  We are prepared to  recommence peace talks if the government accepts our counter proposals."

- LTTE Political Wing Head, S. P. Tamilselvan

(Tamil Guardian, July 30, 2003) 

By D.B.S. Jeyraj

Hope springs eternally in United National Front (UNF) circles about resumption of direct dialogue with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Ranil Wickremesinghe's government has been showing a brave face to the world from the time of the Tiger pull-out from talks in April this year.

Even as prophets of doom predicted the imminent outbreak of war,  government leaders feigned blindness to the looming dark clouds and instead focussed only on the silver linings visible. The LTTE's display of remarkable patience in not resorting to war despite several instances of "casus belli" strengthened UNF convictions that war was not just around the corner.

In recent times government optimism seems to have increased further by what is being perceived as a shift in LTTE strategy. The Tigers after reiterating their demand for a north eastern interim administrative structure had maintained a seemingly intransigent position on the issue. The LTTE spurned Wickremesinghe's endeavours to resume direct talks and insisted that the government provide in writing the parameters of the envisaged interim administrative mechanism. The UNF's invitation to discuss the concept even on the basis of a redefined agenda was dismissed. The Tigers also refused to commit themselves in any way by submitting their own proposals on the subject.

The LTTE's Chief Negotiator and Political Strategist, Anton Balasingham summed up this Tiger position succinctly some months ago in his response to the much publicised address to the nation by Ranil Wickremesinghe. Balasingham stated thus - "Ranil's administration is reluctant to offer anything substantial in the form of an interim administration. Instead, the government is calling upon the LTTE to come up with a practical solution to draw up a mechanism. It is not prudent on the part of the LTTE to present a structure or a mechanism for an interim administration without any idea of the scope of and extent to which the government could offer politico-administrative powers to the LTTE. It is precisely for this reason that we are calling upon the government to come out with its ideas."

Internal discussion

If that was the LTTE stance a while ago, its response to the "discussion document" submitted by the government through Norwegian good offices last month is somewhat different. Instead of rejecting it outright, the LTTE agreed to examine it carefully. The Tigers also want to conduct an internal discussion on the paper and draft a proper response. LTTE Political Wing Chief, S.P. Tamilselvan announced this position publicly during his recent tour of the Eastern Province. "We will make several changes and soon send to the government a version that will fulfil aspirations of the Tamil people. We can re-start the talks if the government accepts this ............. We will submit our counter proposals to the UNF government which could satisfy the expectations and reflect the interests of our people. We are prepared to recommence peace talks if the government accepts our counter proposals," the Tamil Guardian of July 30, 2003 reported.

Superficially a simple explanation for the Tigers' positional shift is available. After several attempts to avoid sending written proposals, the government had now sent a formal outline of the interim structure. It had also stated that it was not a final version and that more discussions were required for further improvement. The government was now playing ball. Moreover, international opinion wants the Tigers to respond positively. Under these circumstances the LTTE has no choice other than to react reasonably and responsibly in this manner .

This apparent flexibility by the LTTE has sent government hopes soaring. Constitutional Affairs Minister, Government Chief Negotiator and Cabinet Spokesperson, Prof. G.L. Peiris expressed confidence in resumption of talks to press persons for two weeks in succession. Come September, and talks will commence is the belief. "It is our expectation that in the course of September these discussions will resume," Peiris said. After the rebels made their reply, a face to face meeting was needed. "The issues are such that they cannot possibly be resolved by unilateral declarations or by a continuing correspondence," Peiris further said.

Unrealistic expectations

The situation however is not so rosy as calculated by the government. Whatever expectations by the government there seems no indication that the LTTE is simply going to submit a set of counter proposals and then follow it up with direct talks. It does seem too unrealistic to expect the LTTE to resume talks so easily and simply against the backdrop of its firm boycott of Tokyo. Whatever criticism one may have of the LTTE's neo-fascist ideology and intolerant methodology, one can only marvel at the organisation's firm resolve in withstanding international opinion on the issue and achieving a temporary 'victory.' Three principles of ancient Indian statecraft and diplomacy namely "saamam" (entreaty or soft talk) "bhetham" (threats or hard talk) and "thaanam" (gifts and reward) were practiced by Norway, USA and Japan on the LTTE. The Tigers however did not waver.

It seems highly improbable therefore that the LTTE after maintaining such unrelenting tenacity in the face of formidable international pressure was now willing to resume direct talks simply because the government had sent a skeletal document on the interim structure. Such an assumption would also run contrary to the covert power play both sides were engaged in through overt exchanges of views on the theme. Pro-Tiger opinion in the Tamil media as well as statements made by LTTE leaders on various occasions also suggested that a scenario as visualised by the government was highly unlikely.

Most illuminating in this respect was the revelatory address made in Jaffna by former Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS) and present LTTE 'shadow' cabinet minister Velupillai Balakumar at the ceremonial release of a book of poetry written by Tiger cultural commissar Puthuvai Rathnadurai. The local and foreign media have spotlighted the comments Balakumar made about India but have largely failed to take note of his pertinent and contemporarily relevant views on the current situation and interim administration proposal.

'Sweet revenge'

"Before submitting amendments to the government document on an interim administration, we will convene a meeting of legal and constitutional experts to discuss and obtain advice. Our Leader Pirapaharan has instructed us to produce a comprehensive legal and constitutional reply (satta reethiyaana, arasiyal reethiyaana pathil). We will utilise the government's two page interim draft and formulate a response that will help turn the pages of our 2000 year old history," Balakumar reportedly said.

Continuing further Balakumar said "we are now extracting sweet revenge (iniya palivangal) on the Sinhala politicians. We are taking political revenge on the Sinhala rulers of Sri Lanka. We are prepared to discuss a political settlement. The government is not ready to do so. Give us a solution we demand but the government is unable to deliver. Our Leader decided to suspend talks and boycott Tokyo. The entire world was shaken. The international community asked us to continue with the talks. So we changed our stand slightly. After many attempts the government has now given us a two page draft. The government is desperately hoping that we will come for direct talks even for discussing the spelling mistakes in that document."

Outlining the LTTE stance Balakumar said "in keeping with our Leader's directive to draft a legal and political response, the Political Wing Head will convene a meeting of legal and constitutional experts in a foreign country soon. He will explain to them the ramifications of our problem. The political commissar will request these experts to write a proper reply to the Tamil problem. That reply should be able to change the fate of the Tamil people."

Balakumar's comments cannot be treated lightly as being that of an individual only because of the close relationship he enjoys with LTTE supremo Pirapaharan. It can be safely assumed that Balakumar is voicing Pirapaharan's thoughts and that he would not venture any opinion on his own without clearance from "thamby."  A clear example was in March this year, when the navy blasted a Tiger ship in international waters . At a time when everyone expected the Tigers to launch war, it was Balakumar's lot to explain the LTTE position at a meeting in Jaffna. He categorically ruled out a resumption of war then. Furthermore, Balakumar also said then that the "then nilavu" (honeymoon) between the government and LTTE was over. "In future we will adopt a rigid position in negotiations," he said then. This statement has been proven right .

In the light of all these facts it is possible to discern the LTTE mindset towards current events and gauge to some extent what the Tiger game plan is. What is important here is to take into account the LTTE perception of the Tokyo Conference and its aftermath. There is a great hiatus between the pro-Tiger viewpoints articulated in the Tamil media and the assessments reported in the non-Tiger mainstream media, both nationally and internationally. The Tigers seem to think that boycotting Tokyo was a great victory and that by doing so they have prevented the Colombo government laying hands on the massive amount of aid pledged there.

The LTTE feels that the government tried to derive financial mileage by exploiting the peace process. Colombo sought to project an impression that everything was hunky dory with the talks and wanted to get money for reconstruction and rehabilitating the north east without setting up appropriate structures to handle and utilise the aid. By boycotting the Tokyo Conference, the Tigers had aborted that move in practical terms, it is argued. The pledged US $ 4.5 billion will be given only if the peace process progresses. The suspension of peace talks has effectively demonstrated that something is  rotten: in the state of  Sri Lanka. Thus, disbursement of pledged aid is put on hold. Money will be forthcoming only when both sides recommence talks and exhibit sustainable momentum.

Government desperate

By this logic, the LTTE feels that the government is desperately seeking to revive talks or at least create an illusion of a revival in peace talks to convince the international community that  talks are progressing and so get the promised financial aid. For this even the facade of dialogue recommencement about the interim administration will suffice, it is felt. At the same time, the Wickremesinghe government is unwilling and unable to deliver on a full fledged interim administration, it is felt. So it would simply like to revive talks and prolong it as long as possible without achieving any firm result. In the meantime it would start receiving aid pledged in Tokyo. Since the interim administration will not be in place, the north east will be neglected. The government will develop the south at the expense of the north east, while keeping up the pretence of peace talks

There are several flaws in this Tiger line of reasoning. It also displays a lamentable lack of insight into international relations and the contours of international involvement in Sri Lanka. The important point to grasp is that the LTTE is being governed by this perception and is planning all moves accordingly. In terms of this argument the government invitation to resume talks on the question of an interim administration on the basis of the discussion document is a trapping device. Accepting it would mean the LTTE acknowledging a desire to work within the current constitutional framework of Sri Lanka. It could be depicted as a betrayal of the Tamil Eelam struggle, even before a viable alternative is formulated. Furthermore, the whole exercise could drag on endlessly given the intricate complications involved.

On the other hand the Tigers stand the risk of alienating international opinion further, if the recent proposals are rejected out of hand. Many of  the proposals are clearly unacceptable. How can people be resettled and rehabilitated if there is no control over land, is one query. Another misgiving is about the provision where proposals affecting Sinhala and Muslims being vetoed. There is no clear definition here and carries with it the power to negate almost all matters in the future. Since the government says nothing is final and can be discussed later on, the LTTE cannot dismiss the proposals immediately.

Horns of a dilemma

The LTTE is now in the horns of a dilemma. The Tigers as well as other Tamil militant outfits and also the Tamil United Liberation Front were all in the same situation 18 years ago. This was in 1985 when an overenthusiastic Rajiv Gandhi and an unscrupulous Romesh Bhandari  pressurised the Tamil side into going for direct talks with the Sri Lankan government in  the Bhutanese capital - Thimpu. None of the Tamil organisations including the TULF were prepared then to abandon Tamil Eelam and engage in direct talks with Colombo. At the same time they were not prepared to defy or displease India too. As a result the Tamil organisations in a rare display of unity and solidarity - never seen thereafter - formulated the famous "four Thimpu principles."

The idea was to forge a set of proposals that could not be accommodated in full by the Sri Lankan government at that point of time. Concepts like nationhood, self-determination, homeland etc. were unpalatable to Colombo then, and presumably even now. By emphasising acceptance of these principles as prerequisites for further talks, the Tamils expected Colombo to reject them outright and thereby provide cause for disrupting the Indian sponsored talks. This they thought would prevent irritating New Delhi. This ruse however succeeded only partially and eventually the Tamil side withdrew citing massacres of civilians in Vavuniya and Muttur. Furthermore, the Indian government saw through the move and expressed its annoyance in other ways.

Today the Tigers are placed in a similar predicament. They do not want to enter into direct talks with the government and help the government procure aid. They also know that the type of interim administration they desire outside the constitution is virtually impossible. All negotiations therefore can only end in failure. At the same time they do not want to  irk the international community and alienate itself further

Under these circumstances, the LTTE is now trying to do a replay of what transpired at Thimpu. The Paris conclave of its experts and lawyers will be directed to draft a comprehensive document. It will present the history of the island and development of the ethnic crisis from a Tamil perspective; It will invoke the doctrine of necessity in arguing for an interim administration outside and hopefully not ultra vires the constitution; It will present a case for wide powers and will demand dismantling most areas within high security zones and bring it under the interim structure; It will also require recognition of the core principles of self-determination, nationhood and homeland so famously enunciated at Thimpu. Attempts will also be made to garner the support of all shades of Tamil political opinion for these counter proposals.

The innovative structure as envisaged by the LTTE will be most difficult for the government to accommodate. Meaningful attempts to do so will result in possible judicial intervention, civil unrest in the south, discontent within the security forces and above all, a head on confrontation with President Kumaratunga with attendant risk of parliamentary dissolution. All this is beneficial from a Tiger point of view as the movement could now evade getting entangled in the 'peace net' without alienating the international community. If the government is able to deliver what the Tigers want, then the LTTE will have nothing to complain about. It can run the north east as its own fiefdom while maintaining the optics of a unitary state.

After more than two decades of fighting and losing nearly 17, 000 cadres, the LTTE is not going to be lured into talks on an interim structure that easily. What the Tigers propose to do is to emulate Thimpu at Paris. Optimism in government circles therefore is unwarranted. The set of LTTE counter proposals will pose a severe constitutional challenge to Colombo in the future.

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