By D. B. S. Jeyaraj 

In what may perhaps be a remarkable development in the evolutionary process of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) organisation, it is now, for the first time, planning out an electoral strategy for the forthcoming elections in April.

Though the Tigers are not planning to face the hustings direct, meetings have been held in Kilinochchi, Jaffna andÿBatticaloa among Tiger leaders and representatives of north-eastern and up-country Tamil political parties over the past few weeks to discuss forming a broad alliance to contest elections in all parts of the island where Tamil people are living in sufficient concentrations.

Solid bloc

The idea is to ensure that a solid bloc of around 33-36 Tamil parliamentarians is elected from the north-east, up country, Colombo and on the national list. The LTTE has been discussing the framework of such a grand alliance with the Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), All Ceylon Tamil Congress (ACTC), Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF) (Suresh faction), Up Country People's Front (UCPF) and the Western Province People's Front (WPPF) at different meetings held jointly and separately in the recent past.

The LTTE has been known in the past for its opposition to elections being held in the north-east and hasÿengaged in violence to prevent it or minimise voter turn out. It has also not encouraged people living in their areas of control to vote at the cluster booths set up for voting. This time the Tigers are promoting elections and plan on backing a grand Tamil alliance that will espouse their cause in parliament and elsewhere.

For an organisation that treated those following the parliamentary path as traitors andÿassassinated severalÿparliamentarians this new approach is no doubt path breaking. The fact that the LTTE is now thinking of forging a 'parliamentary front' by itself is a progressive act when contrasted against its previous conduct. This shift however should not lead to misplaced euphoria as the LTTE is merely playing a parliamentary game to enhance representation for a Tamil political front whose primary perhaps solitary task would be to pay pooja to the Tigers.

The firstÿsigns of a Tiger thaw in this sphere came two years ago. Four Sri Lankan Tamil parties came together in a loose coalition named the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) at the 2001 elections and contested on a distinctly pro-Tiger platform. The TNA won 15 seats. The LTTE extended tacit support by allowing TNA politicians to canvass freely and not opposing polls in any way.

The TNA has been functioning thereafter as a mouthpiece of the Tigers and has had no qualms about being dictated to by the LTTE in political matters. The only sign of dissent to this practice has come from the veteran TULF President Veerasingham Anandasangarie who has at the behest of the LTTE been progressively isolated within his party and alliance for this "offence."

This time however the LTTE and pro-Tiger Tamil media have been quite open about the need to form an alliance supportive of the Tigers. According to Tamil politicians who were involved in discussions with the LTTE over this issue the Tigers seemed keen that Tamils contest the next polls as a solid alliance and win around 30-38 seats. The Tiger's desire a broad coalition embracing both Sri Lankan and Indian Tamil political parties in order to maximise Tamil electoral gains.

A senior TNA parliamentarian told this correspondent by telephone that according to LTTE calculationsÿa breakdown of seats to be won would be on the following basis-:

All nine seats from Jaffna District; five out of six in the northern Wanni District; two out of four in Trincomalee District; four out of five in Batticaloa District; one out of seven in Amparai District. The total will be 21.

New approach

Apart from these 21 seats in the north-east the LTTE was optimistic of gains from the other seven provinces too. If Tamils voted en masse the Tamil 'front' could get three seats each from the Colombo and Nuwara-Eliya Districts, one each from Badulla, Kandy, Matale, Ratnapura and Gampaha Districts totaling 11. This meantÿ32 elected seats comprising 21 plus 11.

In addition to these the LTTE also hopes to get some more seats on the national list to be allocated according to the proportion of votes polled by each party. The idea is to field candidates in districts like Puttalam, Kurunegala, Kalutara, Galle and Kegalle where there are Tamil concentrations. Though an MP being directly elected is unlikely the votes garnered would help enhance the overall aggregate of votes polled. This could enable about two or three MPs being elected on the national list too. Thus the overall tally at its optimum could be 33 to 35 in a legislature of 225. A minimum  could be 22-25 seats.

The TNAÿgot 14 elected and one national list in 2001. The same four TNA parties in 2000 had got nine seats among themselves. The combined vote too increased by around 40%. Thereafter the Tigers claimed that the TNA owed its victory to the pro-LTTE platform. The TNA was reduced to a subservient status.

The LTTE however found this new approach of propping up and backing a Tamil parliamentary front to its liking and advantage. The LTTE itself would not contest any election as long as the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution that disavows separatism remained valid. Besides its authoritarian structure was not conducive for democratic politics.

Another point was that the LTTE claiming sole hegemony over the entire Tamil people could not afford to let other parties win Tamil seats in an election. That would undermine the sole representative claim.

In the current electoral system of proportionate representation at a district level it would be practically impossible for any party to win all seats. Also the ethnically heterogenous mix of the east and some regions of the north would have prevented a Tamil 'monopoly' of seats.

Under these circumstances the LTTE has resorted to the present stratagem of supporting a political conglomerate of Tamil parties to endorse its supremacy on an electoral platform and then interpret the success achieved as recognition of its sole representative status.

The LTTE also manipulates inter and intra-party relations among its supporters to its advantages. Inner divisions are subtly promoted and the front parties are not permitted to structurally unite. The functional unity allowed is in promoting Tiger interests alone.

D‚j… vu

The Tigers now seek to expand and extend this approach further. By incorporating upcountry and Colombo Tamils into a joint front with the north-east Tamils the parliamentary strength of the Tamils and by extension the LTTE is to be further enhanced. The LTTE rationale for such a move revives feelings of d‚j… vu in Tamil politics.

The Sri Lankan Tamil political parties that led the Tamil democratic struggle in the '50s, '60s and early '70s wanted Tamils to ensure their victory so that a Tamil bloc of 10 to 15 seats could be formed. Given the Sinhala political divisions the Tamil bloc could make and unmake governments it was argued. Thus a sold Tamil bloc in parliament could wield great bargaining clout and extract concessions in exchange for parliamentary support to the government in power it was said.

This strategy however became worthless in the 1970 and 1977 elections where the United Front (UF) and United National Party (UNP) governments were elected with two thirds and five sixths majorities respectively. The Tamil militants later criticised this moderate political strategy as being incapable of achieving Tamil rights.

The wheel has now turned full circle and the LTTE is now arguing that a Tamil bloc of seats is necessary to "determine the politics of the south." Given the current voting system and the bitter political strife between the major Sinhala parties it is expected that it would be a hung parliament again. So the minority parties could again be the deciding factor in government formation. In short, the LTTE that spurned southern politics at one stage now sees itself as a 'king or queen maker' via the envisaged Tamil parliamentary front.

Tamil unity

According to some analysts, the LTTE sponsored Tamil front in the north-east will sweep to success because the "Tamil unity" call will be hard to resist. Also the Tamils in Tiger controlled areas of the Wanni and East will be allowed to vote en masse this time. In addition to this there is the realpolitik of the LTTE's coercive power in the Tamil areas. It is capable of vote tampering at both polling booths as well as counting stations to generate an avalanche of votes in support of its preferred candidates. Furthermore, the Tamil nationalist euphoria is supposed to help garner Tamil votes in the upcountry and Colombo too.

Incidently the LTTE vision of Tamil unity does not include the EPDP or the EPRLF faction headed by ex-chief minister of the north-east Annamalai Varatharajaperumal. These parties are not to be included in the proposed umbrella front. TNA leaders have been asked to entice the People's Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) and Shankar Raji faction of the Eelam Revolutionary Organisation (EROS) if possible.

The Tiger inspired project in enticing Indian Tamil parties into a grand alliance does not seem to be working as expected. The LTTE catspaw in attracting up country voters is the Up Country People's Front (Malaiaha Thamilar Munnani). Its Leader Periyasamy Chandrasekeran is a cabinet minister in the Ranil Wickremesinghe government. Chandrasekeran is reportedly close to the LTTE and was even jailed for several years in the '90s for allegedly harbouring Tigers. In recent times he has been addressing several overseas rallies on behalf of the LTTE. Chandrasekeran also visits Kilinochchi regularly.

Chandrasekeran has been propounding a Tamil united front after meetings with Tiger leaders in the Wanni. Colombo District Parliamentarian and Democratic Worker's Congress Leader Mano Ganesan was initiallyÿ supportive of Chandrasekeran in this venture. Both were active participants in a Pongu Thamil (Tamil upsurge) rally in Batticaloa recently.

The crucial factor in the plantation Tamil sector is the Ceylon Worker's Congress now led by Arumugam Thondaman, the grandson of the legendary plantation patriarch Saumiyamoorthy Thondaman. Arumugam too is a cabinet minister.

Both Arumugam and Chandrasekeran buried their long standing differences and contested on the common UNP ticket at the last elections. This new found unity has disappeared in recent times. The CWC is also not happy with the preferential treatment given to Chandrasekeran by the LTTE in many respects. In Colombo the CWC rival for Tamil votes is Mano Ganesan.

Sole Tamil platform

Against this backdrop Arumugam Thondamanÿhad no choice other than to reject Chandrasekeran's invitation to join a common front. Besides, given the volatile nature of southern politics the CWC feltÿ that aligning with the separatist Tigers could have drastic consequences for the Tamils living amid Sinhalese. Also, the CWC feltÿthat maximising representation through aligning with national parties would be better than going it alone on a sole Tamil platform.

The CWC later decided to support the United National Front (UNF) and contest along with it. A splinter organisation from the CWCÿthe Ceylonÿ Worker's Congress has also rejected the unity call and is very likely to back the SLFP-JVP front. In a further development, Mano Ganesan too changed his stance and opted to throw in his lot with the UNF on whose ticket he won in Colombo last elections.

This places Chandrasekeran in an unenviable position and he too is having second thoughts about the grand Tamil alliance. He is currently trying to negotiate with the UNF leaders about accommodation on their list for himself and other party men. The UCPF leader has not rejected the Tamil alliance prospect too and is involved in parallel discussions there. What his ultimate decision will be is yet to be seen.

Given the CWC's refusal to play ball with the pro-Tiger elements and other parties following suitÿthe grandiose LTTE vision of getting more than 30 seats is bound to be shattered.

It is also a moot point as to whether the envisaged Tamil sweep would materialise even in the north-east. The ethnic mix in the east and the PR system would be a deterrent to any monopolisation of seats by a single ethnic entity. Also, if the polls are free and fair the LTTE backed front cannot take Tamil voters too for granted. Both the EPDP and PLOTE have pockets of support.

Moreover, the intra and inter conflict within and among parties of the Tamil alliance is making a mockery of the Tamil unity call. All parties are having inner party dissension. The most notable is within the TULF where its President Anandasangaree may be compelled to field an independent list. There are inter-party tensions too like in Trincomalee where the TULF's Sampanthan is trying to block the TELO's Sri Kantha from contesting.

Final result

In the final analysis everything depends on how free and fair the north-eastern polls will be and how alluring the call for Tamil unity is going to be. If a reasonable degree of legitimacy in the elections is assured then the final results could reflect an unpleasant verdict for the LTTE.

Even though the TNA will get to be the single largest Tamil grouping the number of seats it gets may not be the figure as estimated by the LTTE. Furthermore, if the TNA comes up with a less number of seats than in the last election then the Tiger assertion of sole representative will be undermined.

Given this reality the LTTE will most likely strain every sinew  to ensure a large tally for its proxy. The predicamentÿ of those Tamils opposing the TNA will indeed be precarious in such a scenario.

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