POLITICS

Kissing goodbye to US$ 4.5 billion

By Suranimala 

While President Chandrika Kumaratunga continued her search for a simple majority in parliament to push through the constituent assembly with a view to abolishing the executive presidency, Sri Lanka faced the prospect of losing US$ 4.5 billion in aid due to the peace process being stalled.

There is no gainsaying that former Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe effectively put together a grand international coalition to push the peace process forward whilst also providing a safety net for Sri Lanka culminating in the June 2003 Tokyo donor conference which saw pledges to the tune of US$ 4.5 billion being pledged for the reconstruction and development of Sri Lanka as a whole.

Political consequences

Though the monies pledged were directly linked to progress in the peace process, it was not just the north east that was to benefit from the pledges but also the south, which of course would have had far reaching political consequences for the President in particular and the opposition in general.

It was also a time the LTTE had temporarily withdrawn from the negotiating table and commenced pushing for an interim administration, which itself saw both the then government and the LTTE forwarding proposals which were to be the basis for the resumption of negotiations.

Finally after much hemming and hawing, the LTTE submitted its proposals for an interim administration in response to the government's on October 30 and the stage was being set for the resumption of talks and with it the inflow of the US$ 4.5 billion pledges made when the President egged on by an irritable Indian High Commissioner, Nirupan Sen decided to strike.

Yes, it is in this backdrop, President Kumaratunga upset the apple cart with the takeover of three ministries on November 4 and the rest is history. The Norwegians withdrew from the process until such time there was clarity in the south and the SLFP together with the JVP launched a massive public agitational campaign against the LTTE's interim administration proposal calling for it to be consigned to the dustbin and in the process urging for greater Indian involvement in the peace process.

Then came the general election of April 2 and the task of reviving the peace process fell once again on the President, who saddled with a hung parliament not only had to re-invite the much harangued Norwegians as facilitators but also agree to recognise the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamils.

But of course, given the role played by Nirupan Sen and his chief lieutenant in the High Commission, Taranjith Singh in putting together the anti-UNF coalition, a more direct role for India in the process was also called for by the likes of Foreign Minister Lakshman Kadirgamar and the JVP.

At the same time, the President agreed to honour the much criticised ceasefire agreement to the letter and resume negotiations on the strength of the LTTE's interim administration proposals to boot in a complete reversal of the position taken by the Freedom Alliance in its manifesto.

For Kumaratunga, it was of paramount importance to get the show on the road somehow because that was the only way to keep the government afloat in parliament in addition to attracting the much needed US$ 4.5 billion pledged in aid and had no qualms in getting about this task notwithstanding the immense contradictions in the overall approach due to a lack of clear strategy.

Kumaratunga of course despised the idea of having to call back the Norwegians given her dealings with Sen but was left with no option after failing to obtain the anticipated result at the election with the LTTE through the TNA holding the whip hand. And as far as the LTTE was concerned, the only way they were going to return to the table was if the Norwegians were involved.

Contradictions

And true to form, before long the internal contradictions within government began surfacing with the JVP making it clear the party will not in any way support the commencement of negotiations on the basis of the interim administration proposals or for that matter recognise the LTTE as the role representative of the Tamils.

The JVP, notwithstanding the dilemma faced by the President, was anxious to please Sen who after all helped facilitate Party Leader, Somawansa Amarasinghe doing the disappearing act during the JVP terror era and wanted to keep its end of the bargain come what may. Accordingly, the Marxists continued to agitate the involvement of the Norwegians and the increasing influence of the West in the Sri Lankan peace process in answer to Sen's call.

The JVP went even further and insisted the role of Norway be confined to facilitation with no role to play at the negotiating table, all conditions which were anathema to the LTTE.

By this time, given the initial responses of the President and the publicly displayed confusion in government ranks, LTTE's Chief Negotiator, Anton Balasingham went on record stating the Norwegians would fix the dates for the talks "in a day or two," giving the impression Kumaratunga had conceded to all points raised by the Tigers.

But with days ticking by and no announcement forthcoming, it became evident, Kumaratunga was retracing her steps and despite the positive spin attempted to be given by the Norwegians, the process was hopelessly stalled.

Not only was Kumaratunga by this time unable to agree for negotiations on the ISGA without having the core issues on the agenda but also to put together a sound macro economic policy for donor assistance because of the welfarist approach of the JVP, which was insisting on going by the pledges made in the UPFA manifesto.

Optimistic

However, in a bid to break the deadlock over the peace process agenda, Norway's Special Envoy, Erik Solheim flew back into Sri Lanka the previous week sounding optimistic the two parties could be brought to the table at least for exploratory talks sometime late July or early August.

And just as much as the JVP was doing its darndest to edge the Norwegians out, the Vikings were equally adamant to stick in there and fly the Western flag, not oblivious to Sen's manipulations though a picture of camaraderie was maintained for good diplomatic relations with regular briefings also given.

But try as he might to get the show on the road, Solheim had little success with the LTTE insisting on the institutionalisation of the ISGA before commencing talks on the core issues and the President egged on by the JVP and Kadirgamar equally adamant there must be parallel discussions on the core issues.

By now the President was also faced with the reality of the provincial council polls and with the JVP coming out publicly against the ISGA proposals, she was just not in a position to face the hustings on a divided platform.

The election was doubly important for the President since she wanted to use the mandate received as an endorsement for her proposal to change the constitution through the mechanism of a constituent assembly and could not leave anything to chance on that score.

And the gulf between the government and the LTTE to get the peace talks revived, further to the dilemma faced by Kumaratunga, was best explained by Solheim when he met the 13 nation donor community inclusive of the four co-chairs and the six funding agencies at Ambassador Hans Brattskar's residence on Friday, May 28.

By this time, Solheim's mission to Sri Lanka had not borne fruit with both sides not relenting on their positions and his frustration was evident when he commenced his briefing with a subtle threat to the diplomats present.

Details of the last briefing given to the diplomats in Colombo by Solheim was reported in this column and the Norwegians obviously not wanting the people of Sri Lanka to be privy to how an issue of vital importance to the country was progressing struck a warning note at the outset.

Solheim said details of his last briefing to them was reported in the media extensively and if it was to be repeated on this occasion there would be no more briefings.

Having given that warning, Solheim explained to the diplomats present the respective positions taken by President Kumaratunga and the LTTE on the all important interim administration proposals.

He said the LTTE wants the negotiations to commence on the ISGA and after its institutionalisation, move on to discuss the core issues.

Continuing, Solheim said, President Kumaratunga on the other hand while agreeing to commence negotiations on the ISGA is insisting the core issues be discussed parallel to it.

Problem

Solheim went on to say a further problem was the lack of chemistry and goodwill between the LTTE and the new government. He said there was a good rapport between the LTTE and G.L. Peiris and Milinda Moragoda which was not there with the present set up.

Not stopping at that, Solheim explained that the LTTE had strong doubts about the government's commitment to the process due to the diverse opinions expressed by different sections of it, viz a viz the JVP and Lakshman Kadirgamar.

The irony, however, Solheim said, is that both parties want to resume talks as soon as possible and expressed the hope some progress could be made if the two parties could be brought to the table even for exploratory talks.

Explaining further, Solheim said with regards to the venue of the meetings, the government's tendency was to choose one location whereas the LTTE wanted to move around.

He said the government wants to avoid criticism by moving from venue to venue whereas the LTTE wanted to move around for purposes of fund raising. There was however consensus the first meeting would be in Oslo, Norway.

Solheim further said the LTTE will organise a workshop in Europe with the participation of Balasingham end June to work out its strategy whilst the government of Sri Lanka must formulate its negotiating team and the principles of negotiation.

Interestingly, Solheim also threw light on Kumaratunga's mindset, stating in view of the upcoming provincial council elections, the government would find it difficult to put out a detailed economic policy and in that situation, the policy statement to be released mid June might be a little vague.

It is in the backdrop of this overall assessment and briefing on the ground realities that the co-chairs, USA, Norway, European Union (EU) and Japan met in Brussels on Tuesday, June 1, to assess and consider the disbursement of the US $ 4.5 billion secured by the Wickremesinghe government to the newly elected UPFA administration. The co-chairs were represented by US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, Deputy Foreign Minister, Vidar Helgessen, Commissioner, Chris Patten and Special Envoy, Yasushi Akashi.

By the time the co-chairs met, a draft statement prepared by the EU was already in circulation and a team of specialists worked on it and provided a final draft for the consideration of the high powered delegation which stamped approval without amendments of any significance.

Clear signal

The significance in the statement however was in the very first paragraph which for effect was in bold print sending out a clear signal to both the government and the LTTE, that unless they got their act together, the money would be gone forever.

"In a world of competing crises, Sri Lanka's donor co-chairs came together today and urged in the strongest possible terms a rapid resumption of the peace negotiations so that Sri Lanka can benefit from the generosity of the international community. They noted that, with so many other demands on donors, donor attention and funding might go elsewhere unless the peace process makes progress."

It is also pertinent to note here the reference to the "peace process makes progress," as opposed to a mere resumption of talks for the monies to start trickling in.

Equally significant is the fact, the co-chairs chose not to fix another date for their next meeting, clearly indicative they will now wait for the government and the LTTE to get their act together before taking any further steps in coming to Sri Lanka's aid.

And on Wednesday, June 2, Patten telephoned Foreign Minister Kadirgamar and briefed him on the outcome of the meeting, details of which would not have been music to his ears.

In the overall context, the pressure will now be on President Kumaratunga to recommence the process, with the LTTE well expected to sit back and wait for her to come to the table on the terms set by them.

The LTTE knows only too well Kumaratunga is fighting a battle for survival and not only needs the funding desperately but also to get the process started soon after the provincial polls to get breathing space in parliament for her constitutional manoeuvre.

Standing firm

And despite Solheim putting pressure on Balasingham in London to compromise with regard to the agenda, the LTTE is standing firm on the basis of the mandate it received from the Tamil people, obviously not too keen to be tied down to the Tokyo Declaration either.

The LTTE after all was not party to the Tokyo confab and is already on record distancing itself from the caveats therein including 18 (d) which calls for "parallel progress towards a final political settlement based on the principles of the Oslo Declaration."

Even the government though on track with regard to parallel progress towards a final political settlement is hard put to do so on the basis of the Oslo Declaration, which calls for a federal solution recognising the rights of the Tamil people for internal self determination, the JVP simply would not hear of it.

That the LTTE is prepared to play hard ball on this issue was also evident when World Bank's Country Director, Peter Harold went to Wanni on Tuesday to discuss funding for urgent humanitarian needs in the north east.

Harold possibly hoped he could convince the LTTE to agree to a funding mechanism on the lines of the North East Rehabilitation Fund (NERF) but Political Wing Leader, S.P. Tamilselvan stuck to his guns insisting on the institutionalising of the ISGA in keeping with the mandate received by the Tamil people at the general election.

Said Tamilselvan - "In the absence of an effective interim administration as democratically mandated by the Tamil people, any other mechanism cannot cope effectively to address the urgent humanitarian needs of nation of people affected by two decades of war."

For, the LTTE knew only too well, if they agreed to a financial mechanism and the funds started trickling in, Kumaratunga would not be too concerned over a delay in getting the talks started.

Thus, the LTTE position is clear and the snap election called by Kumaratunga has only strengthened its case because it is the mandate received at that election the LTTE is now citing as justification for sticking to the ISGA demand as the basis for negotiations.

Weakened government

These factors were not lost on Kumaratunga when she called a snap poll in April 2004 to satisfy her personal political agenda at the expense of the nation and this column specifically pointed out at the time the result would be a hung parliament irrespective of the winner forcing a weakened government to negotiate with a much stronger LTTE.

That has now come to pass and apart from the government having to negotiate from a position of weakness it has also put the US$ 4.5 billion aid package in jeopardy.

And given the government's inability due to policy differences to come up with a macro economic policy, even the funding pledged by the IMF under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGFP) is now on hold and Sri Lanka is looking once again at the bottom of the barrel.

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