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29th  October, 2006  Volume 13, Issue 16

First with the news and free with its views                                     First with the news and free with its views                             First with the news and free with its views                                    

 Focus

Third time lucky?

Agreement with JVP - signed with the
presidential election in mind?

Agreement with JHU only on paper

MoU with the UNP - an end to confrontational 
politics at least temporarily

By Dilrukshi Handunnetti

Many would scoff at the speed with which Mahinda Rajapakse enters into agreements to garner political support from different political entities, both as presidential candidate and now as Executive President.

It is almost as if he does not pause to think. But analysts feel that there is a decidedly identifiable 'before and after presidency' rule applicable to an executive under tremendous domestic and international pressure to work towards peace and prosperity.

Nevertheless, Rajapakse has an undisputed history in relation to signing Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) with parties that have more disagreements than agreements with his party.

In exactly one year, he has entered into three  agreements with political forces significantly opposed to what his party represented.

But perhaps the one agreement that causes quiet content and smells of less politicking is the one signed on October 23 with the main opposition United National Party (UNP) through which both parties are expected to cooperate on five identified areas.

To sign such with his traditional political rival and the single largest political party and hence biggest detractor, to say the least, takes courage. Whether both parties would have the courage to live through the experience for three years however, remains to be seen.

In contrast, in September 2005, cornered by the feudalistic politics within his own folds and suppressed by the same, Mahinda Rajapakse had to literally gamble to secure victory. Victory to him meant forging unholy alliances, unholy simply because those agreements had little to do with ground realities. It is this unrealistic approach that caused Rajapakse to gently shed his former allies and earn their collective wrath when entering into a fresh agreement with the UNP last week.

Campaign time

The agreement only goes to prove that the allies during campaign time do not always hold good, particularly when a head of state is saddled with a protracted war, an economy that is taking a swift nosedive and an aggravating humanitarian crisis that keeps adding numbers to an ever- increasing number of refugees.

As far as the SLFP-UNP MoU goes, the actual difference in approach was spelt out in the preamble itself. It gave a firm commitment to replace the politics of confrontation with one of cooperation in the larger interest of the country.

What is more, in a legal and moral sense, it is also the more binding agreement replacing those that existed before. Significantly, this agreement is also between two leaders of political parties.

The earlier agreements differed.The contradictions in the three agreements produced elsewhere in this page give a clear view of how fexible Rajapakse is when it comes to policy. No doubt his sympathisers would interpret it to his advantage and say he is a practical man while the less kind would accuse him of being a rank opportunistThe first was signed with the JVP and the signatories being JVP General Secretary, Tilvin Silva and Presidential Candidate, Mahinda Rajapakse. The entire agreement was therefore hypothetical and full of hopeful conditions in the eventuality of a Rajapakse victory.

The same applied to the agreement with the JHU, signed between Rajapakse as presidential candidate and JHU Leader, Ven. Dr. Ellawala Medhananda Thero which was a mere attempt to muster political support in the south. With that agreement, Rajapakse also managed to sell well to the Sinhala Buddhist majority.

Immature and racial

However, a year later, Rajapakse is unable to continue with those agreements that portrayed him as an immature and racial political leader. It also caused a credibility crisis, as the forces behind him were completely against the UNP initiated peace process, though flawed, being the only significant pursuit of peace the island witnessed in many years.

Both previous agreements, seriously undermined the PTOMS agreement that sought to introduce a mechanism to share tsunami relief with the northeast, sought a revision in Norway's role as facilitator and urged the abrogation of the CFA, the very document upon which the Rajapakse administration resumed his peace dialogue last week.

What is more, the Rajapakse administration was being identified as a regime with a genocidal bent that showed scant respect for minority political rights, a concern aggravated by the Supreme Court decision that held the northeast's temporary merger invalid.

The pressures were too much for Rajapakse, and the only way out was to seriously look at the possibility of seeking a political solution. Such an exercise would require a majority in parliament and such could be mustered amongst the moderate parliamentarians only.

Worsening humanitarian crisis

This is why the October 23 agreement did not come easy. The President, unable to quell the worsening humanitarian crisis and increasing war conditions in the island had no choice but to strike a deal with a party that would happily remain bound to the resolution of the ethnic conflict through a negotiation process. The UNP, happier to devolve power than the SLFP, did not see the need to shy away from making a commitment for the greater good of thecountry.

In doing so, this agreement which was forged between the two leaders of respective political parties would have the backing of many millions. In the event they reach consensus on a formula for peace and this requires electoral reforms and constitutional overhauling, the two parties together can make it a reality without being held political prisoner by constituent parties threatening to withdraw support and topple the administration.

With the new union, President Rajapakse is also attempting some damage control as well toundo some of his imprudent political decision making a year ago that is costing him dearly in the present context.

Giving it the required stamp of legitimacy, the October 23 agreement was signed by General Secretary of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, Maithripala Sirisena and Chairman, United National Party, Malik Samarawickrama.

Historical agreement

While there is sufficient and justifiable speculation on the success of the new union, analysts do agree that this is a historical political agreement which has come 58 years after independence. The story of the nation has been one of divisive politics where attempts by governments to reach some settlement to the ethnic question has been opposed and finally thwarted by the opposition of the day.

This southern duplicity is a huge concern even today, despite the agreement. Yet, what the main political parties refused to acknowledge for decades, that their dishonesty has aggravated the crisis has finally sunk. And this is the result of such an acknowledgement and a desire to move forward.

In that sense, this agreement should hold. It has the legitimacy, the required cadre support, general public goodwill, the blessings of the minorities and the ability to overcome the constitutional blocks to find a lasting solution to the conflict. And to that extent, indeed this MoU is a fresh start, one upon which the story of this nation could be rewritten.

MoU with the JHU, September 2005

1. Sovereignty of the country shall be protected when seeking a solution to the conflict in the north and east.

2. No part of the Sri Lankan land shall be considered as the homeland of any racial group while the provincial, district and divisional secretariat boundaries would be re-demarcated to suit the new economic, social and political needs.

3. No racial group shall be granted self-governance in any part of Sri Lankan territory.

4. The Ceasefire Agreement shall be so revised as to ensure the prevention of terrorist activities since there is no purpose in continuing a unilateral Ceasefire Agreement.

5.  The talks based on a final solution to reach within a predetermined time frame shall be held with LTTE.

6. The P-TOMS shall be abolished and an efficient humanitarian rehabilitation plan in accordance with the Sri Lankan constitution shall be introduced instead.

7.  The present parliamentary election system shall be amended to reflect the correct public choice and to make the President answerable to parliament and judiciary.

8. Government's involvement in sectors with strategic importance including finance, energy and transport and improving the efficiency under a new management shall be ensured.

9. The quality of free education and free health services shall be empowered through an efficient management.

10. Country's natural and oceanic resources and assets under government ownership and management shall be protected.

11. Environment friendly strategies to improve the plantation and agriculture sectors and fixed price for local agro products.

12. Local entrepreneurs shall be promoted through providing financial and technical assistance and improving workers' conditions.

MoU with the JVP, September 2005

1.         It is hereby declared that the Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure which was signed between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (herein after referred to as the LTTE) on the 24 June 2005 the implementation of which has already been stayed by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka and also was subject much public criticism shall not reactivate, enforce or implement in whatsoever manner and for the purpose of accelerating, expediting and regularising the provision of the necessary relief services to all the people affected by the tsunami, a new programme shall be formulated as a priority task on reviewing the existing programme and to activate it forthwith through the assistance and intervention of the government.

2.         We believe that it is necessary to have negotiations not only with the LTTE but also with other relevant parties to resolve Sri Lanka's national question and that without being agreed on such lasting solution it is agreed hereby not to grant Interim Self-governing Authority,  or any such political or administrative structure to LTTE or to hold negotiations with LTTE on that basis.

3.         It is hereby agreed to protect, defend and preserve the unitary nature of the Sri Lankan State under any solutions to be presented, formed or formulated for the purpose of the resolution of Sri Lanka's national question.

4.         It is agreed hereby that in considering the harmful and prejudicial effects and other serious implications of the Ceasefire Agreement that as entered and signed by the then Prime Minister, Mr. Ranil Wickremesinghe and LTTE on 22 February 2002, the said agreement shall be reviewed and revised fully and the said agreement shall be completely redone on removing and eliminating al the clauses which are prejudicial and harmful to the national security and foster and nurture separatism and are inconsistent with the Constitution of Sri Lanka.

5.         As it is axiomatic that Norway has shown unprecedented bias and partiality towards the LTTE in her role as a facilitator in the negotiation process between the Government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE and in the monitoring mission of the Ceasefire Agreement and also as she has undoubtedly failed to act impartially in performing her obligations, it is agreed hereby to reconsider seriously whether the Norway should be allowed to engage in those activities further and the necessary actions shall be taken accordingly.

6.         It is agreed hereby that the re-establishment and restoration of human rights, democracy and law and order which have become completely non-existing phenomena due to the terrorist activities of the LTTE in the North and Eastern Provinces shall be considered as a prioritised task and also all the necessary and appropriate actions shall be taken to ensure to all democratic political parties to carry out their political activities without any impediments, to create an atmosphere for the Sinhalese, Tamil and Muslim peoples to live without any fears and perplexity and also to ensure that multi-party political system shall be restored in the said provinces.

7.         The Executive Presidential System being most destructive and harmful to the democracy of Sri Lanka and having accepted its abolition as an essential priory task, it is hereby agreed to terminate the Executive Presidential System before the need to tenure of office of the 6th Executive President which is to be commenced form the year 2005.

8.         No party shall accept the so-called liberal open economic policy as Sri Lanka's national economic strategy, nevertheless both parties shall agree that an economic policy aimed at strengthening and promoting national economy with equilibrium shall be adopted.

9.         The harbours, seaports, airports, State commercial banks, the Petroleum Corporation, Ceylon Electricity Board and all other government establishments and including water and mineral resources which re the nerve centers of the national economy shall not be privatised and also shall agree to abolish any such actions whatsoever taken so far toward privatisation of the aforesaid institutions, services and resources.

10.        The right to have free education shall be ensured and also any moves towards the privatisation of education vector including the 'White Paper' presented by the United National Party in 1981 shall be abolished after comprehensive review and carefully considering the views of intellectuals, academics, teachers and students.

11.        In resolving the problems faced by workers who contribute to the national production process, and the farmers, factory owners, entrepreneurs, business community and consumers who face hardships in view of soaring inflation, the proposals of the Peoples' Liberation Front (JVP) shall be accepted and shall agree to act in conformity with that proposals.

12.        Sri Lanka shall adopt non-aligned foreign policy and in particular shall be taken into account he regional and the Asian cooperation in revisiting the foreign policy.

MoU with the UNP, October 2006

Preamble: This Memorandum of Understanding between the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the United National Party represents the inauguration of a new political environment eagerly awaited by the public of this country, which replaces the hitherto existing politics of confrontation with the politics of active cooperation on national issues, in the interests of the nation.

On October 12, 2006, President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who is the Head of the Government and the Leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, and Ranil Wickremesinghe, Leader of the Opposition in Parliament and the Leader of the United National Party, after careful and sustained deliberation have agreed to collaborate in addressing the national issues in regard to peace, good governance and development.

The parties, recognise that the fundamental challenge that stands in the way of the realisation of the goals of peace, good governance and development is that of a just political solution acceptable to all communities.

In pursuance of the objectives referred to above, we, Maithripala Sirisena, General Secretary of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and Malik Samarawickrama, Chairman of the United National Party hereby declare our agreement to cooperate as set out below:

1.         The plenary meeting of the delegations of the two parties discussed the following papers submitted by the sub-committees for presentation to the two leaders: i. Conflict in the North and East, ii. Electoral reforms, iii. Good governance, iv. Social development, v. Proposed structure for collaboration.

2.         The two parties will cooperate with each other in the areas enumerated in clause (1) (i) to (iv) above. The issues referred to in Clause 1 (v) above, including the modalities for collaboration, will be implemented at an early date after further direct discussion between the two leaders and acceptance by the appropriate bodies of each of the two parties.

3.         The United National Party in Parliament will support the Government to implement the policies and programmes in the areas enumerated in Clause 1 (i) to (iv) above.

4.         The United National Party reiterates its commitment to extend support to the Government in the pursuit of a negotiated settlement to the on-going conflict while opposing terrorism in all its manifestations and upholding human rights.

5.         The United National Party in Parliament shall extend its support to the government to achieve a negotiated settlement to the on-going conflict.

6.         The Leader of the United National Party will nominate two members to the Representative Committee of the All Party Conference.

7.         Both parties agree to expedite the resolution of the present impediments to the effective operation of the 17th Amendment to the Constitution and to finalise the passage into law of the amendments under consideration to the 17th Amendment.

8.         Both parties will observe the accepted political and democratic norms applicable to governing good relations.

9.         The time frame during which this Agreement will remain operative will be two (02) years from the date of signing hereof.

10.        Both parties agree to the establishment of a high-level committee headed by His Excellency the President and the Leader of the Opposition (including an equal number of representatives of each of the two parties) to oversee the implementation of the above agreements arrived at between the two parties and to cooperate with each other in regard to the resolution of any disagreement which may arise in the course of implementation of this agreement and the policies and programmes set out in Clauses 1 to 8 above, and the fulfillment of the agreed national agenda, so as to achieve just and durable peace, good governance and sustainable development in Sri Lanka.


Limitations of the UNP- SLFP marriage

He was a precocious return from an American university and was at the 112-year-old water hole, asking all kinds of rude questions.

'Uncle, you gentlemen are all ga-ga about this new marriage. But what is the reason behind all this optimism? If the UNP has been Simon Pure as it is said now and the SLFP an unspoilt virgin all along, why couldn't they do it alone? What makes you think that coming together they could do the impossible?' he queried.

These young fellows are impossible. They think that politics is like chemistry. H2+ O must be H2O. They go against conventional wisdom. My grandfather, I remember, saying: DS and Banda should never have split up; my father holding forth that Dudley and Sirima should get together; our generation conservatives saying: The salvation is JR and Sirima uniting and later, Chandrika and Ranil should join hands.

New thinking

Nothing of the sort happened and when finally Mahinda and Ranil did it, fellows like this say, it won't work.

But this was refreshing thinking. We ordered a beer for him and the young man expanded his thesis. 'They have arrived at four areas of agreement, they say. And what are these agreements? Only they seem to know. Such wide expanses, covered by two committees in only two weeks or so. Something smells fishy,' the American oracle that had descended on us, concluded.

Made in New Delhi?

In retrospect it did seem to strike a chord. The JR-Rajiv Accord of 1987 was sprung on the people without any notice. The Indian Kautilyas had been twisting JRJ's arm unseen and unheard.

Then came the Memorandum of Understanding (Ceasefire Agreement) between Ranil and Pirapaharan obviously, the combined effort of Uncle Sam, Kautilyas in New Delhi, Akhito San & Co with Norwegian butler Solheim dishing it out.

Is the MOU of Mahinda and Ranil a similar product? Was and ugly American and/or lovely Indian behind it? Was this the reason for frequent dashes of Ranil to New Delhi?

We are by no means attempting to throw a wet blanket on the joy and hope expressed in most parts of the country. But we have to wait for this optimism to materialise.

Ethnic issue

A certain indication of progress would be on whether this political combine would result in any development in policy adopted so far towards the ethnic problem. The UNP has been consistent in its attitude in recent years openly promoting a federal solution - Mahinda Rajapakse as leader of the SLFP opposed any form of federalism and advocated a unitary constitution.

But it appears that this 'hardliner' has been softening his position since taking office. He has been avoiding specific description of the constitutional form he may push for and has not been using words such as 'federalism' and not speaking about a 'unitary state.'

Objective

The main purpose of this political association would be to find a solution to this vexed problem and on that would rest all the hopes and aspirations.

A quality not appreciated nor spoken very much about UNP Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe is that he is not prone to emotional outbursts and exaggeration. On Thursday at a press conference he poured much cold water on the rising expectations of the new agreement. The agreement should not be construed as an attempt to form a coalition government. The two parties under this agreement would collaborate for two years in resolving the north-south conflict, electoral reforms, good governance, and social development. Outside this framework the UNP would perform duties as a responsible opposition party, he had said.

Dampner

This would no doubt have dampened the rising expectations of UNPers who had been dreaming of ministerial perks and the exercise of power in the immediate future. Ranil's move will not be popular but a sensible and pragmatic move. It will bestow on the agreement some degree of credibility and not one of political chicanery hatched for mutual benefit of leading lights of the two parties.

The immediate challenge to both party leaders is to work out a reasonable and acceptable proposal to resolve the grievances of the Tamil people. There are some who argue that the Tamils have no real grievances but that would result in the continuation of the problem. The opinion of Tamil moderates like Anandasangari needs to be given the utmost consideration.

Dowry

This column is being written on the eve of the talks in Geneva and we have no doubt that the LTTE, whatever ruse they will adopt at the negotiating table will not and cannot forsake their basic demand: A separate Tamil state under their leadership. Why they have agreed for the current round of talks is because they cannot afford to ignore the international community forever.

A joint and reasonable proposal could stump all the LTTE pundits before the eyes of the world. If that could be achieved, the MoU would by and large have served its purpose.

A political marriage between the old feuding enemies would commence like many a Sri Lankan marriage: fights for the dowries. In this case it will be for ministerial posts.


That sour blot on the Paradisian  escutcheon

Darling Ma-hinder,

Of an evening m'dear I am sometimes inclined to put myself outside a gin and tonic and feel rather delightfully braced about the whole thing. But even the feeling of such sublimity cannot compel me to yearn for the cup that runneth over every waking day. You however dear seem to be stuck with it despite the fact that you rather distastefully have a gin and sour or Sour-gin constantly in your presence.

Not that you are well known for your taste dearie - especially when picking less than bright young fellows to work all around you. Well honey bump even water seeks its own level what! So why shouldn't you?

I refer sweetheart to that blot on the Paradisian escutcheon, that young pipsqeak you have folded so conveniently to your bosom. That indomitable spirit - Sour-gin. Some would even say that he is possessed with the spirit of a highway robber. And you should know. Since it was you who, for no rhyme or reason other than the fact that he knew a smattering of the Queen's lingo and you were rather deficient in that area, appointed him some big shot in your maga neguma project in order to construct - what was it now the road leading to the Palali airport or may be the path leading out of it. My memory fails me.

And isn't he also your chief procurement fellow procuring cars here, planes there and securing electoral defeat for you everywhere.

I may as well tell you dear Sour-gin is not an accessory I would wear if I were you. But then again you can't be accused of being the best dressed man in Paradise. That m'dear must undoubtedly go to Rakneel. Rather a nifty dresser me thinks, especially when it comes to picking out his human accessories. But then, the fellow has a better gene pool to pick from unlike you.

And the best things in life are not always liked by the boorish gallery. Ask Oscar Wilde dear. His Importance Of Being Earnest was boohed heartily while tomatoes and other moist objects flew willy nilly around the auditorium when first staged. And see it go now darling. Just see it go now.

Anyway dearie no wonder Sour-gin had a secret desire to be in the very teeth of the peace process darling. May be it is those early seeds you sowed into the Trico kid from Dubai letting him measure the width and breath of the Palali runway for your bally maga neguma that makes him yearn not only to travel but to be around heavy flying objects.

Not only does he now want to be your chief procurement chappie, but also your chief executive bloke. You've heard no doubt in your days of early learning, as you sat bow legged in your little blue shorts with your scuffed elbows on a tiny wooden classroom table at the Beliatta primary down the lane, the simple expression - those who can, do. Those who can't teach.

Well Sour-gin would have yearned as a young pup knee high to an Alsatian as it were, to fly. Not being able to, he would have thought what better way to be close to it all than start an airline himself and if he can't be a pilot he could always be a CEO and having heard somewhere that if he scratched your back you would scratch his, he rushed over and asked you to do the needful.

Pretty please may I have an airline all to myself even before those perishing Maktoums can leave Paradise he would have said and you thinking of all the procurements done on your behalf by your chief man Friday would have been ready to please prettily.

Anyway a little birdie tells me that Sour-gin has been turning the faces of the rest of the peace delegation sour with his childish pranks. Obviously the fellow hasn't Chapter 4, Verse 6 of the St. Luke's Gospel that talks rather heavily about the meek inheriting the earth. Perhaps the young and impatient fellow would like a piece of it before everybody else.

Well for that matter leave alone the good book, I don't think he has read any good book lately. Steal up behind him and of an afternoon and blurt out Archer, Brown or Menzies and see him go blank.

But what I wanted to tell you dear is that the fellow raised an admonishing finger at that senior diplomut Kahana and gave him a good telling off on whom to chat to and whom not to chat to. Perhaps he felt like you did recently when you hauled up 56 diplomats and gave them a good dressing down that there should be less of the protocol cholesterol and alcohol when it came to these mutts. But one look at the lissome and slight Kahana would make you realise that this is not a chap who too often indulges.

While your Sour-gin was calling the shots left, right and centre in the Swiss Alps this weekend I may as well tell you that Thelma just thinking about the foul chap was getting fragile and deficient in all sorts of vitamins especially A and D. Thellie reliably learns that Sour-gin on the other hand was fattening up himself as if he were a goose presenting himself at a Christmas dinner to the entire March family.

Be that as it may, as some would say this Sour-gin chap is a bit of a perisher dearie. There he is wallowing in Paradisian moolah, all over the bally Swiss Alps and not looking anything as sweet as an edelweiss either. A more tougher looking piece of cheese Thellie has yet to see.

Ah well m'dear as even Sour-gin would tell you if he thinks long enough, it's always a matter of taste.


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