Buck passing and the Indo-Lanka diplomatic row over radars

Air Force had one hour prior notice

Blake stumps Rohitha with a question on threat assessment

Wimal asks whether India gave faulty radar system deliberately

Radars were working but switched off

India dismisses air strike as one incident and calls to address root cause

While the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam opened a new frontier in their battle for a separate state with a telling air strike on the Katunayake Air Force Base last week, the government flew into a diplomatic hurricane by attempting to shift the blame for its gross negligence on India to avert a domestic political fall out, a move which may well prove costly.

They say you must never look a gift horse in the mouth but that exactly is what the high flyers in the government attempted to do with India in the aftermath of the LTTE air strike in Katunayake which shook the defence establishment at its very foundations in the full knowledge, the war against the Tigers have suddenly become an all together new ball game.

Neither down nor out

True, there have been reports of the LTTE acquiring air capability nine years back with even occasional sightings mentioned in intelligence circles and the media but the grim reality hit home only after the twin strikes, midnight, Sunday, March 25, signalling to the world the Tigers were neither down nor out.

This initiative the LTTE was able to seize yet again largely because of the incompetence and negligence emanating from the defence authorities who having prior intelligence on a possible air strike were ill-prepared to meet the challenge, hence the move to blame India for their failure.

That the government had prior intelligence of LTTE moves to launch an air strike was revealed unwittingly by President Mahinda Rajapakse no less on Tuesday, March 27, when he told media heads at Temple Trees, it was because of such threats that a presidential bunker was to be built. That begs the question from the Defence Minister then as to who should take the rap for the colossal security lapse? Is it the Defence Minister himself, Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse or Air Force Chief Roshan Goonetilleke?

Ironically, even as such a threat loomed large, it was also evident the government was busy politicking, using the full might of the CID and the Terrorism Investigation Division to probe the activities of SLFP dissidents Mangala Samaraweera and Sripathi Sooriyaarachchi and the Maubima media group.

Downplaying the impact

In this backdrop, understandably, the government tried to initially downplay the impact of the air strike fearing possibly a political fall out in the south considering the media hype generated that the LTTE was on the run in the face of offensives launched by the security forces but soon realised, such a strategy will not fly given the international interest generated over the incident with CNN and BBC too giving top billing for the story.

With international airlines reassessing the situation and countries like Australia and New Zealand quick off the boards with travel advisories, the government soon realised the economic consequences of the air strike could also be devastating and did a quick re-think of strategy.

The timing of the attack was particularly damning for the state coming days after Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse told foreign correspondents that the LTTE could be defeated in two to three years provided the funding kept coming from the Finance Ministry, a calculation which will now have to be revisited, signalling in the process to the people the prospect of a long haul and the resultant uncertainty in addition to the security and economic concerns as a whole.

This became all the more evident with reports that insurance agents will be taking a fresh look at Sri Lanka not to mention donors given the climate of uncertainty in the country, moreso with the government no less stating the LTTE air strike posed a regional and international threat.

Further, having already burnt his boats with an influential section of the international community over the growing humanitarian crisis, human rights violations and the failure to submit a viable political package to resolve the ethnic issue despite the assurances given the SLFP would do so by March 15, there was little sympathy from that quarter either for the President. This was evident from their deafening silence following the Tiger attack,  with India going a step further and delivering a telling message through External Affairs Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon.

Looking for support

It is possibly fearing such a response, the President looked for support from the political parties represented in parliament to show solidarity with the government even as the blame game started by adverting to the 2002 CFA as creating conditions for the LTTE to acquire air power.

And hardly had the spit dried in the mouths of SLFP's Jeyaraj Fernandopulle, JVP's Wimal Weerawansa and JHU's Champika Ranawaka on this charge, India's former Intelligence Chief B. Raman gave lie to it by writing that the LTTE had acquired air capability nine years back, which meant, it was under the PA government in which both Mahinda Rajapakse and Fernandopulle were senior ministers.

Tragically, even in trying to bring all the southern parties together at a time of crisis, Temple Trees could not rise above the fray and chose not to invite the main opposition UNP, opting instead to call the leader of the dissident group, Public Administration Minister Karu Jayasuriya, though for public consumption, it was stated, Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe was invited.

Seeds of discontent

Be that as it may, as the meeting got underway, the President invited Joint Operations Chief Donald Perera to brief the members present on what happened that fateful night and it was here the seeds of discontent were sown for a diplomatic hurricane with Weerawansa too making his own contribution to the entire exercise.

Weerawansa being a close confidant of the powers-that-be had by this time received a private briefing on what led to the Tiger attack going undetected and was all set to make his contribution at the meeting.

Perera initially explaining in Sinhala the circumstances under which the attack came to be launched said the aircraft were flying very low and it was difficult for the radar to pick up the signal. He said they appeared to have flown over tree tops making detection difficult.

Electronic defects

Speaking further Perera said, in any event the air force was not in a position to pick up the signal or engage the aircraft because of an electronic defect in the radar system and that it was to be sent for repairs to India. He added the radar was a gift from India to Sri Lanka.

Continuing, Perera said the problem was with the radar system which regularly gave trouble and needed to be repaired and even as he spoke Presidential Secretary Lalith Weeratunga moved across and whispered in his ear, following which the criticism against the Indian gift stopped.

But on cue came Weerawansa who asked whether the radar system could possibly have been a Trojan horse from India. Oblivious to the hornet's nest he was stirring, Weerawansa acting on well connected advise went on to question whether a faulty system was provided to Sri Lanka deliberately by India.

The JVP propaganda secretary, who is known to have the President's ear then  proceeded to provide inside information he was privy to on the whole issue charging that the Chinese had offered a 3D radar system to Sri Lanka which could not be availed of due to opposition by India.

Weerawansa went on to say, India having opposed Sri Lanka accepting the Chinese offer, had gifted a 2D radar system which was found to be faulty.

The President for his part did not rise to India's defence but deftly sidestepped the issue, leaving Joint Services Chief Perera to respond.

Continuing, Perera said the security forces have to now build up its defences, search the places where the Tiger aircraft may be hidden and destroy them, a point seconded by Defence Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse.

"Humiliating defeats"

The meeting ended finally with a statement issued that the party leaders which termed the attack an unsuccessful bid by the LTTE to 'diminish the strength of the air force in the face of humiliating defeats.'

"The air capability of LTTE which is a ruthless and senseless organisation is a threat not only to Sri Lanka but to all the countries in the entire South Asia region," the statement issued by the Presidential Secretariat said.

Added the Presidential Secretariat; "therefore we call upon the international community to focus on the LTTE's national and international strategies, understanding this risk posed by the LTTE."

But such was the petty politics at play, even in  the statement, there was an attempt to mislead the public by stating the meeting held at Temple Trees was attended by SLFP, PA, UNP, JVP, JHU, MEP, SLMC, CWC, EPDP, UPF, CP, LSSP and the Bhumiputra party, when in fact the only 'UNP' members present were defectors to the government, Rohitha Bogollagama, Karu Jayasuriya and Milinda Moragoda.

And to create the impression the legally constituted UNP was present at the meeting and endorsed the joint statement, it was stated, UNP Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe did not attend the meeting whilst conveniently omitting the names of those representing the several parties.

Such petty games of course was not lost on the UNP which promptly issued a statement the following day stating the  party was not invited for the meeting, once again showing off the President as a leader opting to play politics even in the face of a grave national crisis and once again queering the pitch further for co operation between the two major parties.

Appeal for support

It is having issued this joint party statement calling for international focus on the LTTE's strategies that Foreign Minister, Rohitha Bogollagama met the Co-Chair Ambassadors the following day and appealed for support albeit with little success.

Associated with Bogollagama amongst others was Foreign Secretary Palitha Kohona. The Co-Chairs were represented by Ambassadors Robert Blake (USA), Hans Brattskar, First Secretary Erik Nurenberg (Norway), Ambassador Juergen Weerth (Germany, representing the EU Presidency), Ambassador Julian Wilson (EU) and Deputy Ambassador N. Ito (Japan).

Explaining the serious threat both locally and internationally due to LTTE's acquisition of air capability, Bogollagama at this meeting called on the Co-Chairs to take appropriate action to deal with the situation, only to see some pointed questions posed by the diplomats.

Ambassador Blake for example was to ask the Foreign Minister whether the government had made a threat assessment on the military and civilian targets due to this latest development, which question Bogollagama sidestepped, possibly realising the ramifications of a direct answer.

Asking for a further date

For, if the Foreign Minister was to say there was only a threat on military targets, his whole argument of a regional and international threat falls flat, whereas, if he said there was a threat on civilian targets, it would seriously damage the investment climate, not to mention the struggling tourism industry, and so as any good lawyer would do, he asked for a further date to respond after consulting the defence authorities.

But what that response meant of course was that the government having summoned the diplomats for a meeting did not have all the answers, though projecting a serious international and regional threat by the LTTE.

Hoping to deflect the embarrassing situation the government found itself in following Blake's query, Kohona ventured to comment that the LTTE was in serious violation of Article 4 of the Ceasefire Agreement by launching the air strike, a point, the US Ambassador was once again to seize upon.

Thus, Ambassador Blake was to ask Kohona whether his statement meant the government was still considering the CFA a valid document that was on the table and this time, it was Bogollagama who chipped in to deflect the question.

Said Bogollagama, "It is not a question whether the CFA was violated or not but what is serious is that the LTTE has the capability for air strikes and have long range aircraft. It is a threat both regionally and internationally."

However, Bogollagama's comments in the absence of a threat assessment found little currency and the ambassadors once again probed this issue.

In fact, Blake, Brattskar and Ito, whilst stating they would convey the government's concerns to their respective administrations specifically asked Bogollagama to enlighten them on Sri Lanka's assessment on what exactly the international threat dimension is, so they could protect their civilians and investors, but no answer was forthcoming.

Colossal negligence

Replied Bogollagama, "We will give a briefing on it later after consulting the defence authorities."

But what the Foreign Minister did not tell the Co-Chair ambassadors was that the whole air strike came to be because of colossal negligence by the defence authorities prompting the administration to find a scapegoat in India.

In fact, around 11.45 p.m., Sunday night, Chief Inspector Sirimanne of the Special Task Force camp situated along the Vavuniya-Mannar road observed two light aircraft flying over the camp and he immediately brought it to the notice of the air force base in Vavuniya, and they in turn connected him to Air Force Headquarters straightaway.

Chief Inspector Sirimanne thereafter communicated to Air Force Headquarters what he observed giving them at least a 45 minute to one hour headstart before the Tiger aircraft could reach Katunayake or any other destination in or around Colombo.

Such advance notice would have given the air force sufficient time to not only activate the radar which was reportedly switched off but also to prepare the K-firs or other aircraft to engage the LTTE and blast them off the sky, though that was not to be.

The end result was a devastating air strike that had the defence authorities reeling though attempting to downplay the entire incident whilst also giving the LTTE a huge morale booster through its failure to thwart the attack.

Initial reports indicate, the LTTE had taken off from Iranamadu and flown over Mannar, onto Wilpattu and along the coast to Katunayake and taken the same route back.

It is significant to note here that the Tiger aircraft had flown 250 km undetected and flown back the same distance without any interception by the air force, raising serious questions of negligence and unpreparedness.

The great escape

The Sunday Leader is in possession of full details on why the interception failed but will refrain from going public in the interest of national security, but suffice it to say there was a total lack of co-ordination within the air force which resulted in the great escape of the Tiger aircraft.

It is in this context, attempts to blame India for the foul up is all the more shocking since the government was equipped with more than one radar and ironically, all the radars were switched off, details of which, once again are withheld due to national security considerations.

The fact remains, there was a lack of intelligence, failure of a proper organisational set up, and manpower training which led to the calamity despite the Indians having set up the radar system in June 2006.

Thus, when attempts were made to blame the foul up on India and draw China into the picture, the giant neighbour went ballistic and sent a strongly worded message to the government. India was particularly unhappy the government had exposed their role in setting up the radar, given the sensitivities in South India and considered it a breach of faith.

No thanks

It was for the Indians ironic that the government chose to blame their own failures on the radar system, whilst not extending any thanks for the gift of one ship and the refurbishment of another ship which helped destroy two suspected LTTE cargo vessels the previous week.

And giving vent to India's feelings on this issue was none other than External Affairs Ministry Secretary Shiv Shankar Menon who went public stating "as far as we know, there was no scope of the Indian radars failing."

More significant was the message which followed from Menon after the government projected the LTTE air strike as a regional and international threat.

Said Menon: "To pick on an individual incident of violence will not help solve the root cause of the problem. The root cause of the problem is the conflict that has escalated the violence in the last few weeks."

In effect, what India was telling the government was, it did not buy into the regional threat theory and that the air attack was an incident consequent to the recent escalation of violence.

Waiting for responses

Added Menon for effect - "We are very concerned at the escalation of violence in Sri Lanka in the last few weeks. The incident is one part of  the violent incidents that we have seen. The humanitarian consequences really worry us, when you see thousands of internally displaced people."

In so stating, India however refrained from going public on details of the radar  issue to avoid embarrassment to President Rajapakse and his government considering his visit this week to Delhi for the SAARC summit.

India as host obviously did not want any hiccup on the heads of state meeting since the absence of a single leader according to the SAARC charter will lead to its cancellation and decided on discretion at this point of time given the agenda it wanted pushed at that forum.

But no doubt, the President will be given some tough talking to once in India and it remains to be seen how Rajapakse will respond.

Mihin Air

Joining the fray on Friday was the UNP, which accused the government of mishandling the whole issue and spending monies from the consolidated fund to finance Mihin Air without buying the necessary equipment to meet the terrorist threat.

This position the UNP articulated through Kandy District MP, Lakshman Kiriella, where he also charged that it was a joke for the government to establish a hotline for the public to report on aircraft sightings when the hotline between the radar systems was inoperative during the air strike.

That apart, what the government has failed to inform the public is how it plans to counter possible LTTE air attacks on civilian targets in different parts of the country, if the LTTE seeks to respond to air strikes by the Sri Lanka Air Force in the north and east.

Thus rather than engaging in political witch hunts, the President and his advisors will do well even now to rise to the challenges confronting the country in a realistic manner rather than winning battles in the media.

For now, the LTTE not only has its own army and navy but also a fledgling air force and with the government having delayed submitting the political package which the international community has been pushing for, it has to once again deal with them from a position of weakness.

The other option of course is to wage war and with the Defence Secretary predicting a three year battle before the LTTE showed their air capability, there appears little hope of peace in Sri Lanka in the foreseeable future.