No lack of options for the military

By Amantha Perera

The focal point of the fighting between government forces and the Tigers appears to be shifting on a weekly basis. One week, heavy fighting would be reported on the Muhamalai front, as was the case in the last week of January when troops attacked the Tiger frontlines on January 30 following a barrage of Tiger 130 mm artillery on the Palaly High Security Zone two days before.

Troops backed by T55 tanks attacked Tiger bunker lines but moved back to their original positions  after six hours. A similar foray was reported the week after as well. In the next couple of weeks there was an obvious decrease in the intensity of the fighting along the front now named by troops as the Jathika Peramuna (national front).

The fissure points at the western corner of the southern line of control just before the Wanni has been in a state of flux since last July when Thoppigala was gained by government forces. Fighting has been reported south of Adampan, west of Giant Tank, on the access road to Madhu and even in areas closer to the A9. In fact, government troops first showed their intent along the front in areas about 10 to 15 km west of Omanthai.

They recorded their first gains in Periyatampanai and the Irani Illapaikulam areas, that lie east of the Madhu sanctuary. However, though troops are present in these locations, now the major push appears to be more closer to the western coast with Adampan firmly within the cross-hairs of the troops.

Gained access

Last week the military said that troops had gained access to the northern bank of Giant's Tank. Troops had reached the Sinnaodaippu area where an important sluice is also located. The last time government troops gained control of a sluice it was big news - that was when troops reached Mavil Aru in end August 2006.

Intercepted communications last week revealed that the fighting in the Giant Tank area had been led by Bhanu and Laxman. Bhanu last played a significant role in the east when he and Balraj were stationed there in late 2004 into mid-2005.

After troops reached the northern banks of Giant Tank, Tigers had counter attacked. But the military said that the troops were not dislodged.

The importance the Tigers have placed on holding the Adampan/ Madhu line is clear by the presence of top commanders in the area. Two weeks ago, Swaranam, another eastern leader (the Trincomalee military commander at one time) led counter attacks along the Uliyankulam- Adampan road that lies just west of Giant Tank.

Military ring

Now the government military, namely, divisions of the 57th and 58th brigades are ringed around Madhu and Adampan from the west, the south and the east.

In the last fortnight clashes have intensified in the Welioya sector as well, an area that many kept an eye on when fighting began to be reported from areas west of Omanthai.

Unlike on past occasions when the movement of government forces was predominantly on one front, like during operations Jayasikurui or Rivirasa, so far there has been no large scale deployment or thrust. Even during operations to flush the Tigers out of the east, it was clearer as to where the troops were heading. On most occasions the movement ran parallel or along main access roads like the A15 that links Valachchenai with Muttur running through Vaharai and the A5 that links Chenkaladi with Maha Oya running through Karadiyanaru.

Vindalathivu, the main Tiger sea base on the north western coast and areas that lie north along the coast that faces South India are now even more important for the Tigers, according to government military sources. This is in the backdrop of heavy casualties suffered by its deep sea going vessels last year. The vessels were not only the main means of transport for the Tigers for weapons and supplies - they were also mid-sea storage depots.

Now with their loss, the Tigers are relying heavily on supplies from India, according to the navy.

LTTE launching pad

"According to defence intelligence sources, Kiranchi (on the north western coast, west of Kilinochchi) has been a pivotal area for the sea borne operations of LTTE terrorists for many years. They have been using the area as a launching pad for its boat movements and also for unloading its supplies smuggled via sea. Having lost its floating armouries to the Sri Lanka Navy recently, the LTTE has been depending heavily on the north western coast of the island for its supplies. This is mainly due to the fact that the narrow sea stretch between India and Sri Lanka, and the presence of a large number of Indian fishing vessels in the Gulf of Mannar have made it extremely difficult to have a firm hold over clandestine sea movements in those areas. Against this backdrop, the 'Kiranchi Sea Tiger Base' as the terrorists termed it, became one of the most important strategic locations for the terror outfit," the Defence Ministry said referring to the February 25 air raid on Kiranchi.

The Tigers said that eight civilians were killed in the raid. The military dismissed that civilian areas were hit and said that after Kiranchi was bombed in November 2006, and last April, the base had been relocated within the same area.

Major encounters

In the last two months the navy has  had major sea encounters with the Sea Tigers or smugglers in the seas north-west of Mannar island, twice.

The first was on December 22 when a large flotilla of suspected Sea Tiger craft, including suicide craft providing cover to large vessels was encountered off seas south of Delft and north of Mannar. In the encounter with the flotilla of around 16 boats the navy lost the locally manufactured Dvora P-413 in a suicide attack.

The boats were suspected to have been smuggling supplies and had reached the shores south of Kiranchi.

On February 4 night a naval speed jet was lost when two such craft ventured close to a cluster of around 300-400 Indian vessels poaching off the seas, north of Mannar. The navy boats were fired upon and one of survivors said that there was even RPG fire directed from one of the craft.

Some observers feel that the military top brass have adopted a strictly 'need to know' approach to the dissemination of information, sometimes even within establishments. Great care has been taken to minimise the flow of information, especially from the battle front to the media.

The northern battle theatre is being prepared for anticipated clashes. Areas that were free to travel have been made inaccessible to outsiders inside the Wanni since December, especially where fighting has been reported, like the Adampan, Madhu, Periyatamapanai and Irani Illapaikulam lines.

No go zones

Access into areas of fighting is strictly monitored on both sides of the FDL. In the Wanni, there now exists  a fat 'no go' zone, just outside the FDL, within which no agency travels, not even the Red Cross.

Along the southern line, from Adampan to Kokillai, it is as wide as 15 km, and along Muhamalai, Nagarkovil and Pooneryn in the north it is about 10 km. The unofficial no go zones also result in information coming out, dependent on second hand accounts most of the time. Most of the times in the east last year, agencies  could at least travel to the fringes of where the fighting was taking place; that has obviously changed.

This is partly due to the Wanni FDLs and areas that lie immediately on either side being sparsely populated. Even those civilians who remained, like those in the Adampan area, have moved well in to the interior, the Wanni rather than try to make it to government held areas, intentionally or otherwise.

Large swathes of land in the Wanni also have been demarcated as areas with no access to outsiders. The most recent access maps prepared by the UN OCHA office in Colombo have them in red. Most of the areas are where the recent bouts of fighting have been reported from and are in red; like the areas around Adampan and Madhu, all areas north of Chemmankundu and Nallur just before the Pooneryn sector are listed as 'no go' zones. So is everything north of the Paranthan Junction. Even some of the main roads are demarcated in the maps as 'limited access.'

No access

The entire area northwest of Omanthai is demarcated as no access; same is the case with all areas south-west of Oddusudan leading to the FDLs at Kokilai and Kokkuthuduwai. No access is allowed into a large area in Mallavi, west of Kilinochchi.

No access is also allowed on the main roads like the Mankulam-Oddusudan-Mulaithivu road and the Paranthan-Pooneryn road.

The locations where two claymore attacks took place last week (on February 27), Panankamam and Maruthumadhu, both lie within areas where outsiders now don't travel. The Tigers said that eight civilians who were travelling in tractor trailers were killed while on their way to work in paddy fields.

A week before the attack the Tigers said that farmland along the southern FDLs had been abandoned due to artillery fire and other attacks by the government forces. They said that thousands of families had been displaced due to government military activity.

If anyone, it was either hardcore Tigers or members from its civilian unit, Makal Paddai who were in the trailers, according to military sources who say no attack took place and that the areas have been devoid of a large civilian population.

In December, the Tigers informed relief agencies working in the Mulaithivu District that they could not guarantee their safety. All agencies pulled staff out after this was conveyed to them through the Mulaithivu GA, Imelda Sukumar. No one stays in the district and all staff return to Kilinochchi by night fall. The Tiger restrictions came as fighting intensified on the Welioya area that borders Mulaithivu.

Source of info

The relocation was also due to Tiger fears that intelligence and other information on the organisation and its leaders was being gleaned by government forces through outsiders who travel in and out of the Wanni regularly.  One thing  that has been clear is that the pressure has been kept on the Tigers on different fronts spread across the length and breath of the Wanni defence lines.

"The government's northern campaign will slowly advance, seeking to bleed the LTTE by retaining artillery pressure on the FDLs and capturing portions of uncleared territory where it can, the Sri Lanka Army  may look to advance north along the A32  (linking  Mantota (Mannar with Pooneryn) in early to mid 2008," the international defence magazine - Jane's Intelligence Review said last week.

"Any push south from the Muhamalai and Nagarkovil FDLs in Jaffna would be dependent on the campaign in the southwestern Wanni, but this is an unlikely option within the next year given the SLA's experiences at Muhamalai in October 2006, and may not occur at all in the northern campaign. Under General Fonseka, a veteran of the failed Jayasikurui offensive, it is unlikely that a similar high profile land offensive to that of 1997-1999 will take place in 2008, despite the short-term political benefits that would accrue to the Rajapakse administration."

If anything, the military does not have a lack of options.