|

Piyasena Ranasinghe
and Mahinda Rajapakse |
Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL)
released a position paper for public
awareness and debate on the recent removal
by President Rajapakse of the Director
General of the Bribery Commission Piyasena
Ranasinghe. We reproduce the report:
Transparency and good governance are key
to the progress of any country. In today’s
context, growth and prosperity of a nation
are strongly linked to an anti corruption
environment. It is now globally accepted
that the establishment of an strong and
independent anti corruption commission is
one of the strongest tools of establishing
good governance and minimising corruption.
The present crisis created as a result of
the removal of the director general of the
Commission to Investigate Allegations of
Bribery or Corruption (hereafter the
Commission) is extremely relevant to the
debate on good governance and anti
corruption discourse in the country and thus
Transparency International Sri Lanka (TISL)
releases this position paper for public
awareness and debate.
Background
The present Commission was the successor
to the previous Department of Bribery
established in 1954.
The Commission was established under Act
No.19 of 1994, having been unanimously
passed by parliament consequent to a series
of events leading to a change of government
in 1994. The discussions of having an
independent commission was mooted following
the then bribery commissioner, Nelum Gamage,
being removed arbitrarily by the then
president in late 1993. The then opposition
in its election manifesto for the 1994
general election pledged that Gamage would
be reinstated after they came to power and
that an independent anti corruption
commission would be established within six
months of assuming office, to freely
investigate corruption in the public sector.
After assuming office, the Chandrika
Bandaranaike government presented two Bills
(titled "Commission to Investigate
Allegations of Bribery or Corruption" and
"Bribery Act Amendment") which were
unanimously adopted by parliament. The
significant changes brought by these two
statutes could be summarised as follows:
(a) A special commission was
established to investigate allegations of
bribery or corruption, headed by three
commissioners, two of them being retired
Supreme Court/Court of Appeal judges and
one from the investigative branch. (After
the 17th Amendment to the Constitution,
these commissioners were to be appointed
by the president only after approval by
the Constitutional Council.)
(b) Investigations and prosecutions of
bribery and corruption were removed from
the Attorney General’s Department and
vested with the Commission.
(c) A new offence of corruption was
introduced.
(d) Definition of a public servant was
broadened to include Ministers, Deputy
Ministers, Members of Parliament and other
political authorities.
(e) The Director General of the
Commission enjoys a certain level of
independence and the salary shall be a
charge on the Consolidated Fund assuring a
certain level of independence in the
position. The Director General is the
administrative head of the Commission.
The operation of the Commission was not
without challenges from its inception. One
of the first commissioners, P.M.W.
Wijesooriya resigned on July 14, 1995 due to
a lack of skilled personnel for the
Commission to carry out its work and the
delay in the submission of the first report
of the Commission to parliament.
The government is reported to have turned
down the request of the Commission for funds
to send a team for investigations abroad in
1995. An apparent rift between the remaining
commissioners were subsequently used by the
President to send a letter dated November
26, 1997 requesting the remaining
commissioners to resign, which was however
turned down by the commissioners.
The Kumaratunga government also withdrew
the entire strength of police officers
attached to the Commission thus crippling
the entire Commission. After the retirement
of the then secretary, S. Ganepola, the
government did not replace him with a fresh
appointment. Another issue always raised was
the lack of clarity of the role of the
director general, especially in regard to
the powers of decision making.
The experience since 1994 proves beyond
doubt that the applicable law was not
properly understood at the stage of the
enactment (instead it was hurriedly passed).
However an examination of the statues,
annual reports of the Commission and the
observations of the working of the
Commission would no doubt reveal the
following major systemic issues which
negatively impact the effective functioning
of the Commission.
The present Commission has in fact done a
great deal to draw the attention of the
authorities to address these issues in
numerous ways.
(1) The Commission does not have
specific powers to initiate corruption
investigations on their own without a
complaint. It was suggested that this
mandate be changed to permit proactive
investigation by the Commission.
(2) The members of the Commission are
chosen among the retired judges and
investigative branches such as police. It
has been suggested that these appointments
should not be limited to retired judges
and others, who retire at age limits over
60 years.
This has excluded many other
professionals and anti corruption fighters
serving in the main anti corruption
commission. In fact, another suggestion is
to formulate a commission comprising a
single commissioner, modelled after the
anti corruption commissions in Singapore
and Hong Kong. The head of the Commission
should be a person with high integrity who
holds office for a fix term, and appointed
by the Constitutional Council.
(3) The Commission does not have
sufficient financial independence and
hence it has to depend purely on the
Treasury releasing funds on a timely basis
and to the extent required, even after
Parliament approves it’s budget. It was
suggested to have a finance committee in
parliament that will decided on the budget
of the independent commissions including
this Commission.
(4) The investigations are conducted
only by police officers released by the
Police Department on a temporary basis to
serve in the Commission. The Commission
does not have a competent team of
investigators (such as audit officers,
accountants, forensic accountants,
engineers, banking or IT experts). It is
recommended that the Commission should
have sufficient finances and
administrative independence to employ
people from different professional
backgrounds with requisite experience.
Since the inception of the first
Commission, its operation was not continuous
as pointed out below:
• The first Commission consisting of
Justice T.A.D. Wijesundara, Justice Siva
Selliah and C. Wijesuriya was appointed on
December 15, 1994 and the Commission had
to be reconstituted after the resignation
of Justice Wijesuriya on July 13, 1995.
Rudra Rajasingham was appointed to fill
the vacancy. Justice Selliah expired on
January 9, 1997 but the vacancy was not
filled for almost three years until the
five year term of the first Commission
expired on December 14, 1999.
• The second Commission comprising
Justice Ananda Coomraswamy, Justice T.N.
Abeyweera and Dr. Kingsly Wickramasuriya
was appointed on December 15, 1999.
Justice Abeyweera expired on February 2,
2003 and after about one year and five
months Justice K. Viknarajah was appointed
in his place on July 12, 2004. The third
Commission is the present Commission
comprising Justice Ameer Ismail, Justice
P. Edussuriya and Indra de Silva who were
appointed on March 29, 2005 for a term
ending on March 28, 2010.
Notwithstanding the systemic problems,
with the appointment of the present
commissioners in March 2005 the Commission
became more visible in the public eye. The
Commission has also established strong links
with regional anti corruption bodies such as
OECD-ADB anti corruption initiative and the
world renowned national anti corruption
commission of Hong Kong known as Independent
Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). The
last annual report of the Commission states
that there is certainly an upward trend in
successful investigations and number of
prosecutions.
The Commission has to some extent
developed necessary infrastructure and given
vital exposure to some of the staff members
specially those in the legal branch.
Following the global experience, the
Commission has also linked with civil
society organisations and other professional
bodies with a view to minimising corruption
in Sri Lanka thus seeking wider support for
its anti corruption efforts from various
segments of society. The Commission has also
participated in many important national and
international anti corruption events.
Present crisis
In an unprecedented move, on November 15,
2007, C.A. Premashantha, (a police officer)
who was the officer in charge of the Asset
Division was transferred out of the
Commission without any consultation with the
Commission. It appeared later that
the director general had objected to this
move.
It is reported in media that on February
18, 2008, the Secretary to the President had
summoned the Director General of the
Commission and requested him to resign,
which he had refused to do. The very next
day, he was transferred to the Presidential
Secretariat by a letter signed by the
President himself. This has raised the
attention of the media whilst being also
raised in parliament. However, neither the
President nor the government has so far
disclosed to the public any reasons for the
transfer.
The Chairman of the Commission has been
reported to have (report in the Sunday
Times) stated that the Commission had
not been consulted by the President prior to
the removal of the Director General.
The letter of removal dated February 19,
2008 signed by the President himself states
that the Director General is transferred out
of the Commission in order to facilitate
restructuring of administration of the
Commission and that Piyasena Ranasinghe is
transferred to the Presidential Secretariat
with immediate effect.
In a separate letter on the same date,
signed by the Secretary to the President, a
deputy DG, Luxmi Jayawickrama has been
appointed as acting director general until a
permanent director general is appointed.
Legality of the removal
The legal provisions contained in Act
No.19 of 1994 relating to appointment and
removal of the Director General are set out
below.
S. 16(1) The President may, in
consultation with the members of the
Commission, appoint a Director General for
the Prevention of Bribery and Corruption, to
assist the Commission in the discharge of
the functions assigned to the Commission by
this Act.
16(2) The salary of the Director
General appointed under sub-section (1)
shall be determined by Parliament, shall be
charged on the Consolidated Fund and shall
not be diminished during his period of
service with the Commission.
In fact the question as to whether the
President is required mandatorily to consult
the Commission prior to appointment was
resolved previously and a convention was
created since the inception of the
commission, when the first Director General,
Nelum Gamage was appointed. There are no
specific provisions in the said statute on
removal of the director general. There are
no specific provisions in the said statute
on removal of the director general. However
the Interpretation Ordinance states as
follows:
"Where in the case of any appointment
authorised by any law, provisions is not
made by the Constitution of the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, 1978, or by
any other law, as to the authority by whom
the appointment is to be made, such
appointment may be made by the Minister or
by an officer authorised in that behalf by
the Minister."
However, the appointment of the Director
General is not made by a Minister but by the
President and ex facie, this
provision has no application to the office
of the Director General. Even assuming that
the President is considered a minister for
the purpose of argument, then the same
procedure must be followed — i.e. any
removal must be only after consultation with
the Commission. In fact in all previous
cases of removal of the DGs, the commissions
have requested the removal of DGs and never
before was a DG removed by the President
unilaterally.
The question then arises as to how a
corrupt director general is removed? The
Commission is however not precluded from
investigating into the conduct of the
director general. The current issue is an
eye opener for the policymakers to examine
without delay the necessary remedial
measures, having regard to well established
global practices.
The Secretary to the President is
reported to have said that the President
does not have to give reasons to remove any
one in the Commission. This is
perhaps as dangerous as the removal itself.
Does it mean that, for bad or mala fide
reasons a director general can be removed?
This is certainly not the legal position. In
the leading case of Nethsinghe vs.
Wickramanayaka Justice Mark Fernando has
extensively dealt with the law governing the
removal of public officials including the
board members of corporations. The court
held that the removal is reviewable by
courts and no one can be removed without
assigning reasons or following natural
justice.
Is transfer mala fide?
The absence of contemporaneous public
statement from the President’s office
suggests that there may not be sufficient
grounds to remove the Director General.
Pointing the finger at the President by the
public in these circumstances is unavoidable
and that may not be healthy both for the
President as well as for the Commission.
The transfer letter has indicated that
the transfer is to facilitate restructure of
the Commission and that Luxmi Jayawickrama
has been appointed to act as director
general. If the restructure of the
Commission was legitimate the Commission
should have played a key role in this regard.
This reminds us that even in November
1997 when President Kumaratunga wanted to
remove the commissioners, she wrote a letter
addressed to them stating inter alia
"a complete overhaul of the Commission is a
necessity in order to make a fresh start."
As far as TISL is aware there is no move to
restructure the Commission immediately. TISL
is however not aware whether there was in
fact any breakdown in the Commission due to
internal administration. Secondly, (Ms)
Jayawickrama is the second senior officer in
the grade of Deputy Director in the
Commission. (Ms) Mallika Liyanage is the
most senior Deputy Director General. The
basis of selection of Jayawickrama by the
President’s office is yet another mystery.
Adverse effects of the removal
There are serious repercussions following
the removal of the Director General. They
include the following:
• In terms of s.12 (1) of the Act, it
is the Director General who has the sole
authority to serve indictments in the same
manner as it is done by the Attorney
General. There are no provisions to
delegate these powers to any other officer
or to discharge these powers through any
other officer. The present acting
appointment lacks legislative authority to
replace the Director General.
• The worst consequence of the whole
episode is the bad precedence created with
this transfer. Unless the situation is
remedied immediately, there is no
guarantee that the Commission would ever
function with expected independence, free
from executive interference in the future.
Globally there is a strong movement to
prevent corruption in all sectors —
particularly in the public sector. Though
Sri Lanka can be proud of ratifying the UN
Convention against Corruption (known as
UNCAC), nothing much has been done to fall
in line with international standards.
Transparency International’s Corruption
Perception Index (CPI), ranked Sri
Lanka quite low giving a score of only 3.2
out of 10. This means that Sri Lanka has
lot more to do to minimise corruption in
the country. Interference with the anti
corruption Commission is certainly a
negative aspect which will add to this
perception in the eyes of the investors
and global community.
• Without effective anti corruption
initiatives including a strong and
independent anti corruption commission,
socio economic or political dreams such as
Mahinda Chinthana cannot be
realised. It is to the best interest of
any government to restore independence of
the Commission which is perceived to be
interfered with in this instance.
TISL’s position
In the absence of a specific procedure to
remove the Director General, the
policymakers must consider the global good
practices in similar situations with the
sole objective of preserving the credibility
and integrity of the anti corruption
Commission rather than individuals holding
positions. TISL believes and suggests that
if the present structure is to continue,
both the appointment and removal of the
Director General and other key officials
should be done by the President upon the
recommendation of the Constitutional Council
in consultation with the Commission.
The provisions must be designed to
prevent firstly, the possible manipulations
by corrupt elements to rid a good and
effective Director General and secondly, to
make sure that no person with any
allegations holds this position. Until such
provisions are incorporated in the law, the
appointing authorities should respect
fundamental principles of good governance in
such appointments — hence to create a
healthy practice.
TISL firmly believes that the present
course of action followed by the President’s
office does not build confidence either on
the President, his government or on the
Commission itself. It has already created
irreversible bad precedence. Thus the onus
is on the President to restore the status
quo.
Sri Lanka is a party to the United
Nations Convention against Corruption under
which Sri Lanka is required to strengthen
the independence of the anti corruption
Commission. Sri Lanka has also ratified the
regional anti corruption initiative called
OECD-ADB Anti Corruption Initiative, which
was ratified by almost all the countries in
the Asian region. The act of removal of the
Director General may be perceived by the
public as interference by the President on
the independence of the Commission and
therefore there is a heavy burden on the
President to dispel such interpretations.
If the President or any other person has
in his/her possession material to
substantiate allegations against any
official of the Commission, those materials
should immediately be submitted to the
Commission by the President or any outsider
deciding on the issue following the rules of
natural justice. Thus, following good global
practices, a transparent and accountable
internal complaint and inquiry mechanism
should be introduced to the Commission. In
such instances, some countries have
introduced strong internal disciplinary
mechanisms.
At present the absence of a review on
operational aspects of the Commission is a
major lacuna. Had there been a transparent
review mechanism of the operational aspects
within the Commission, both to review its
operations and efficiency, there would not
have been any room for false allegations by
political authorities or any other source.
Thus TISL believes that it is time that the
Commission considers a suitable review
mechanism, similar to that is accepted by
the Independent Commission Against
Corruption in Hong Kong.
TISL concludes that many of the issues
raised here sufficiently stress the need to
reconsider the structure and the mandate of
the Commission while ensuring the financial
support to generate independence of its
operations without being dependent on any of
the branches of the Executive. However,
there is no alternate to the political will
or to the need of officers with integrity to
function in the Commission effectively.
