Railway's locomotive dilemma

Sri Lanka has however, in the past, imported railway locomotives from reliable suppliers in Germany, the UK, North America, and even once from India, over the past 60 years without encountering any catastrophe of such magnitude.

New bidders

In the most recent tender for 15 locomotives, closed on May 9, there was a relatively new mix of bidders and great price differences between the bids which ranged between US$ 20 million and US$ 60 million.

Out of the seven accepted bids, four were from Chinese companies, one from India and two from the USA. The American bids were the most expensive totalling more than double the price of the Chinese offers, costing US$ 43.4 million and US$ 63 million respectively for 15 locomotives.

Of the four Chinese bidders, one, CSR Qishuyan Locomotive Company, had not provided a bid bond, and is slated to be rejected on that basis. The other three offers were quoted in Euros and range between 12.8 million and 14.8 million Euros.

Railway officials are apprehensive about the possibility of the tender's evaluation committee being fooled by a lower bidder into buying a poor quality engine that might not last more than a few years. One long time rail engineer pointed to the experience had by Pakistan at the hands of one of China's largest locomotive manufacturers, Dalian Locomotive and Rolling Stock Works.

Pakistan experience

Pakistan's Daily Times reported in March 2005 that the country's Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PAC) had investigated a US $98 million acquisition of rail locomotives from China's Dalian, in which it was found that the undercarriages of the locomotives were defective.

"Cracks were noticed on the welding seams on the under frames" of some of the locomotives," the Daily Times quoted the PAC as being told. The then Pakistani Railways Minister, Miam Shamim Haider in a statement to media said that the cracking undercarriages were a "major problem" and that "the Chinese suppliers have been advised to stop the delivery or the balance locomotives until the issue is resolved to the entire satisfaction of Pakistan Railways."

Other countries known to be using Chinese locomotives are Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan in the former Soviet Union, Sudan and Vietnam. The lack of access to media in these countries makes it difficult to uncover more about the experiences they have had with the Chinese engines.

The three Chinese companies which provided bid bonds for the recent Sri Lankan tender are listed as Zhengzhou Railcar Propulsion Engineering R&D Centre, China National Import and Export Corporation and the Loric Import and Export Corporation.

Out of these companies, Zhenghou was established in September 2002 according to its website, and thus does not fit into one of the tender criteria of having 15 years of experience in the railway locomotive manufacturing business.

Chinese expertise

The National Import and Export Corporation's website says that the company has, "in the recent decade" exported "nearly US$ 300 million" worth of "railcars, freight trains, container flat trail cars, cement tank cars, steam locomotives" and maintenance machinery. It does not indicate any expertise in the supply of diesel electric locomotives as required in the tender.

The Sunday Leader was unable to unearth any information about the experience of the third bonded Chinese bidder, Loric Import and Export Corporation, which was incidentally the lowest of all the bids received, with the cost of spare parts included.

Another worrying factor about the Chinese bids in general, is the fact that the Chinese government has signed a contract with America's Electro-Motive Diesel (EMD) for the supply of 300 diesel electric locomotives. This move indicates that even the Chinese government was wary of the technical expertise of its own local manufacturers, even though these companies are eager about exporting their products.

The Indian bidder, government owned RITES was in the middle of the pack in terms of pricing, being half the price (US$ 33.3 million) of the most expensive offer, from American GMD. RITES is however, a project consultancy firm in principle, and its publicised railway services consist mainly of designing for wagons and other rail equipment as well as assistance for rail road repairs.

The engine being offered by RITES, is of a model called 'ALCO,' manufactured by the North American 'ALCO Bombadier' company, that has since split up, and thus the ALCO engines are no longer in production. Sri Lanka Railways already uses some ALCO engines, whose design is considered solid by railway officials in principal.

However SLR engineers lament at the difficulty in obtaining service training and spare parts for maintaining the now obsolete engine. It is unknown how the Indians have addressed this problem in their tender submission.

Workhorses

Most railway officials we spoke to indicated a clear bias towards the most expensive offer from America's EMD, despite it costing twice as much as the Indian offer, and up to three times as much as some of the Chinese offers.

Several articles have already appeared in local newspapers quoting railway engineers and former officials in strong advocacy of favouring the pricey American bid. Their main argument is centred around the fact that all the engines supplied by EMD in the past, including a batch of 14 supplied in 1954, are still operational and form the "mainstay" of the Sri Lankan railway fleet today.

The one EMD engine that is non-operational, the company's advocates in the Railway Department boast, is one that was destroyed in an LTTE bomb blast. However loyal the employees of the Railway Department may be to the American rail giant, it is unlikely that on the occasions that EMD engines were purchased in the past, that there were viable bids that so severely beat the company on price.

Whether the government can afford to spend over US$ 60 million on just 15 rail engines, given the current state of the national coffers, must also be called into question. A former SLR engineer took the view that "with EMD, worldwide their engines do not fail, so there will be a saving in the long run."

Fuel factor

However a person who served on a Technical Evaluation Committee for a previous rail tender said that the current situation requires "a close look at the priorities and what the country can afford." He said that whatever SLR's faith in a particular contractor, the TEC must use all the information at its disposal to ascertain whether any of the cheaper bids would be able to match EMD on reliability.

"It is up to them to scrutinise all the bids carefully and make the right choice. The problem is that they can't be held accountable if these things break down after 10 years, and the problem will be for the Railway Department," he said.

Apart from total price, reliability and spare parts, one official in the Railway Department told The Sunday Leader that almost Rs 3 billion in diesel fuel was consumed by the trains in 2007. "With the price of fuel going up so much now, we have to also look at this as a factor. Even if a bidder can deliver a 10% reduction in fuel consumption from the engines we use now, that would make the trains a lot more profitable as this is the main cost incurred," he proposed.

With all the information required to take the most prudent decision - balancing the chequebook of today with the risk of problems in later years - already before the railway tender's Technical Evaluation Committee, we can only offer them an old Chinese adage: "Good things no cheap, cheap things no good."

Ethnic tension spills over in the east

By Amantha Perera

The newest minister in the eastern provincial administration, M.L.A.M. Hisbullah was faced with a major crisis as soon as he took oaths on May 22 in Colombo.

Ethnic tensions had boiled over in his native Kathankudi that morning and five bodies were already at the Batticaloa Hospital mortuary even before he was to address his first press conference after taking oaths. Among the dead were Kumar Sathisaran alias Shanthan, the head of the TMVP office in Ariyampathi, close to Kathankudi.

Shot at

He was shot near the Kathankudi bus stand while travelling on a motorcycle with an associate later identified as Tharasan. He was on his way to Ariyampathi, south of Batticaloa when his assassins moved in front of the motorcycle near the Kathankudi bus stand on the main road and shot him with a T56 weapon. According to the TMVP the two were unarmed at the time of the attack.

As news of the attack spread, armed TMVP cadres from the Ariyampathi camp began arriving in Kathankudi terrorising the Muslim population. Three Muslims had been shot and killed, and at least seven others were injured. One was a businessman who ran a travel agency. The Muslim victims had been shot in Ariyampathi which is where the TMVP camp is located.

Muslims in fear

Even Muslims in Batticaloa town feared for their lives and closed their shops. Some even gathered in mosques for safety.

Two Muslim shops had been damaged in Batticaloa town including a hotel when TMVP cadres stormed in and threatened them to close the shops. A lorry was also damaged. The STF was moved into Kathankudi on May 22 afternoon after a police curfew was imposed. But tension prevailed.

Later that evening, two meetings were held - one presided over by the Catholic Bishop of Batticaloa, Kingsley Swamipillai where Muslim religious leaders  and security officials devised a plan to quell the violence and the tension.

Work together

Another meeting was held between high ranking officials of Sivasuntharai Chanthrakanthan's (Pillayan) office including TMVP Spokesperson, Azad Moulana and Sivasuntharai's coordinator, Ragu and representatives of the Mosque Federation in Kathankudi where they reached an agreement to work together and ensure that no violence  will take place.

On May 23 morning the new Chief Minister and Hisbullah met at the main TMVP office down Lake Road in Batticaloa. The TMVP leader released a statement condemning the murders.

"The Chief Minister has now given orders to the police and other security forces to make sure that no more attacks take place," Moulana said.

Ariyampathi was one location where there was tension even during the March 10 local government elections. Shanthan was the head of the office and his wife Christina contested the election on the TMVP ticket and is now the chairperson of the Ariyampathi local government.

Former paramilitary

During a meeting with a group of visiting journalists just prior to the March 10 election Shanthan revealed that he had never been a member of the Tigers or fought against government forces. He said that before he rose to prominence within the TMVP he was linked to the Rasik Group - a paramilitary group that operated in Batticaloa before its head was killed in 1999. He is a native of Ampara.

There was also unease between the large Muslim community and Shanthan who had been involved in a land dispute and who the Muslims blamed for promoting a new Tamil settlement in the Muslim area referred to as Kabala.

TMVP sources said that they were equally suspicious of the Tigers and Muslim extremists in the area over the Shanthan murder.

Kathankudi was also one of the divisions where poll monitors reported irregularities during the May 10 poll. However there were also reports of police officers preventing attempts to rig.

Police officers killed

Two police officers attached to Kathankudi have been killed after the elections raising fears of a link between the murders and polling day incidents in Kathankudi.

One police officer was killed when  he and another were shot at Arazadi junction in Batticaloa, two days after the election. Another had been killed on May 16.

The forgotten lot

Inside the Kaliyakadhu camp and Map depicting IDPs — Source UNOCHA

By Amantha Perera

Just outside Batticaloa town, away from the bustle of the town, 365 families have waited for the chance to go home for the first time in almost two years. And they are still waiting.

These are the residents of the Kaliyakadhu IDP centre where the families call the massive former food storage warehouses home. Their journey to Batticaloa traced the footsteps of government military advances into the Tiger held areas in the east. The military objective has been achieved, but the civilians far from home, don't have the faintest idea when they will see home.

Ironically these people were among the first to flee the fighting in late 2006 when government troops began advancing beyond Mawilaru and into Tiger areas of Sampur and south of the former Tiger stronghold.

Between July and August of 2007, when the closure of Mawilaru triggered the fighting, the IDP count jumped from 98,000 to 208,000.

Running away

They first fled to Kiliveddi and as the fighting intensified to Kathiraveli, then further south along the volatile A 15 Muttur-Valachchenai highway. Government forces were moving into Tiger held areas from both south and north of the highway and the IDPs finally moved out of Tiger held areas and into government controlled areas at Mankerni just north of Valachchenai in March 2007. Their journey through Tiger held areas itself was over 50 km and the longest took over six months.

Along the way some of them fell victim to the fighting and now a year and quarter later they languish still in IDP centres unable to go home. In March 2007 when most of them reached government areas, hundreds of thousands of others like them were also fleeing the fighting. Between January  and March end 2007 the IDP count jumped again, from 203,000 to 308,000. But most of them unlike the residents of Kaliyakadu have returned home.

According to government and UN figures between 2007 March and now over 144,000 have returned to their homes, the bulk of over 100,000 in the Batticaloa District.

But some of those like in Kaliyakadu whose homes were in areas now demarcated as high security zones in Muttur and Sampur have languished in the IDP centres unable to return.

There are around 20,000 such IDPs scattered in the Batticaloa District.

Forgotten

As elections came and went they found that they were right on the margins of civil society, almost forgotten. Around 300 persons in the Kaliyakadu camp applied for voting and 100 of them were accepted. Most of the 'accepted cases' had not received their polling cards even the day before the May 10 election.

Another lot similar to those at Kaliyakadu moved to the transit centre at Kiliveddi, closer to their homes. They still remain there till new areas are made available for them to relocate.

Aid agencies have said that while the double election could return stability to the province and more development, before mass scale projects, the fate of the remaining refugees in the province should be looked in to.

Even in areas where the mass returns took place life is not back to normal. Assessments carried out by UN agencies show that large portions of the returnees are still trying to get back to some sort of normalcy.

An Emergency Food Security Assessment among the returnees in the Trincomalee District carried out by the World Food Programme in March found that over 60% were still coping with income related insecurities. "The total percent of households in the sample who were at risk to lives was 17.1 percent, while those who faced a risk to livelihoods was 61.5 percent. 21.4 percent were not at risk," it said.

Among the poorest

The prevalent economic conditions in the Eastern Province that has been classified as one of the poorest in the nation have added to the woes.

"Food insecurity in the resettled areas in Trincomalee is mainly caused by chronic factors. The main factor is poverty combined with impact of protracted conflict, earlier isolation and displacement (s). Income generation has been affected and the lack of labour opportunities, other than in the fishing and agriculture sectors, put households in a vulnerable situation if these activities are affected by any other cause, such as erratic climate or fishing restrictions. Both chronic and transitory factors coexist."

At least the 30,000 IDPs scattered in the Eastern Province can now hope for a better future - politicians have lined up to make the pledges in the last three months, and there is no harm in dreaming. There are a lot of others who can't even do that.

By end of April there were still 108,000 IDPs in the country, the majority in the north east. Of that 32,000 were in Mulaithivu, 48,000 in Kilinochchi and 25,000 in Mannar. An additional 31,000 remained in Jaffna and 28,000 had fled to India.

Agencies have been faced with multiple problems hampering them assisting the IDPs in the country. They have had to deal with access difficulties to the newest devil - skyrocketing food prices.

Locked in battle

Of the 25,000 IDPs in the Mannar District around 16,000 remain in the Mantai West Division where along the line of control government forces and Tamil Tigers have been locked in pitched battles almost for an year now, since the fall of Toppigala in July 2007. Intense clashes have been recorded since December 2007.

Even last week the Tigers and government forces clashed in the area around Adampan where over four dozen combatants were killed in fighting during the Vesak holidays. Most of the areas of the fighting remain out of bounds for relief agencies, but UN and ICRC does have some access.

The WFP has faced problems with trucks to transport food into Mantai West. The Tigers have allowed three trucks to move food and other supplies into the Mantai West area with the government agent's office in Kilinochchi also pitching in. However according to WFP representatives and records only 50% or between 150 and 200 metric tonnes of the food requirement of the Wanni is moved every week raising fears of shortages.

The WFP has its own fleet to move the food - it acquired it last year and has said that the military personnel at Omanthai and at the Medawachchiya checkpoints have been cooperative to ensure efficient movement of supplies though there are still sometimes delays due to lack of personnel at the checkpoints to check consignments.

UN reports also indicated more civilians had started moving north from Mantai West in May as fighting intensified.

Access issues

The UN agencies have also faced problems of access in Mulaithivu and parts of Kilinochchi District. Only the areas on either side of the A9 now remain freely accessible and some parts of Mulaithivu are totally out of bounds.

When fighting increased in the Welioya sector earlier this year in February the Tigers informed agencies through the GA in Mulaithivu that they could not guarantee the safety of staff members forcing a pullout. Now agencies go in for the day and return by nightfall.

Far more devastating to the IDPs and the country in general would be the escalating food prices. The WFP now pays US $ 800 for a tonne of food supplies that cost US $ 500 at the beginning of the year. It is already saddled with a budgetary shortfall of US $ 36 million, but even if it raises similar amounts as it did in 2007 it would only be able to feed 170,000 of the 300,000 most needy it cares for.

Already cut backs and reduction of rations have had its effects. WFP has suspended the work for food programnme that benefited 175,000 and food supplements have reduced to 1665 kilo cals per person per day.

It is far below the national average need of 2020 kilo cals per day set by the Department of Census and Statistics and is precariously close to the 1500 kilo cal minimum international requirement.

Rising prices

Rice prices have shot up by 80% in the last six months and in April a WFP supplier defaulted. The UN agency also found that local suppliers were not selling rice to it in March and April due the price vagaries and had to resort to wheat flour to supplement its rations.

True to Sri Lankan style, in Echchilampaththu in the Trincomalee District the WFP found that seven tonnes of wheat had gone missing. Theft was suspected at Cooperative level and food distribution was suspended till either the losses were reimbursed or until there was a valid explanation.

The food price situation is such that the WFP has been consulting government authorities and is also convening weekly meetings with other agencies to keep abreast of the latest situation.

The agency has also carried out a rapid assessment of the impact of the food crisis in eight districts in the north east and is to also brief the donor community on its findings shortly.

The vicious combination of fighting, access difficulties and now escalating prices gives little hope to those at Kaliyakadhu IDP centre. They have spent almost two years on the run that they now know how to live in a world of make believe.

They have demarcated living spaces by lining up their 'valuables' and other possessions inside the steamy bellies of the warehouse with its tin roof meant to only keep nature away from the items stocked and not meant for human habitation.

Living space

From a distance, the inside of storage facilities appear like giant maps with square shaped properties spreading out in even manner.

Some of the little 'plots' are kept immaculately clean; women sweep them diligently like they were their little houses and scold kids who litter the place.

There is the semblance of normalcy - men hang around, smoking beedi and eyeing the girls and any outsider who walks in through the beedi smoke. Young girls apply talcum powder, set their earrings and comb their hair looking through small handheld mirrors.

Sonar story and the unanswered issues

The navy, in response to our article last week titled "Karannagoda's Sonar Story and the Invincible Blast" sent us a lengthy reply titled "The Correct Position," which further confirms our story in its attempt to distort the core facts. Following is the full reply from the navy:

Enclosure to SLN Media Coordinator's letter No. DNO.72 dated  May 21, 2008.

Karannagoda's sonar story and the Invincible Blast.

The correct position

 The above mentioned newspaper article which appeared in The Sunday Leader of May 18, 2008, while purporting to investigate irregularities in a tender process with the help of several incorrect facts and fallacies appear to promote an underwater intruder detection system that has completely failed in the tender and demonstration / trial process.

In 2004 tenders were called to acquire underwater detection systems and 10 tenderers forwarded quotations. Since none of the tenderers had fulfilled all tender specifications, Standing Cabinet Appointed Procurement Committee (SCAPC) approved Technical Evaluation Committee (TEC) rejected all tenders and recommended to recall fresh tenders. However the Sri Lanka Navy (SLN) had obtained SCAPC approval to re-evaluate the tenders in view of urgency of systems and to avoid time taken for re-tendering.

The TEC re-evaluated and had short listed three tenderers. TEC had invited these three tenderers to conduct practical demonstration in Sri Lanka. It is pertinent to mention here that M/S QinetiQ offer had been set aside by the TEC during the re-evaluation process due to non submission of a bid bond and adequate information at the time of submitting the offer but not due to QinetiQ being an inferior system.

Among these systems short listed, one tenderer namely M/S C. Tech declined to conduct demonstration in Sri Lanka due to security reasons.

M/S Ocean Scan and M/S ELBIT were the two tenderers who agreed to conduct field trials in Sri Lanka. Both tenderers failed to meet the required performances. In these trials, the performance of M/S Ocean Scan was far below the performance of the other tenderer although both have not been able to meet SLN performance criteria. Hence TEC recommended again recalling tenders in June 2006. It is to be noted that these trials were conducted inner harbour by both tenderers.

In August 2006 another opportunity was provided for both tenderers to re-demonstrate since both had indicated that they have improved their systems and would be able to meet SLN performance criteria. A deadline was given for the trials.

This concession for both tenderers was granted purely due to the urgency of acquiring a system. During the re-demonstration, M/S Ocean Scan failed to meet the deadline and the M/S ELBIT demonstrated with improved performance. Yet failed to meet SLN performance criteria. M/S Ocean Scan was given further time extension but it failed to perform within extended time frame. Therefore, based on SCAPC appointed TEC recommendations and considering the importance/urgency of having an underwater intruder detection system in protecting Colombo harbour, SLN recommended to award tender to M/S ELBIT in installing one complete system initially to secure Colombo harbour after price negotiations.

It is at this stage M/S QinetiQ of United Kingdom made an offer through the British High Commission in Sri Lanka and Ministry of Defence (MOD).  Since SLN could not consider this offer as it is out of the tender, SLN recommended to MOD to pursue this offer concurrently with the existing tender, through Lanka Logistics (Pvt) Ltd (the newly-formed Government Procurement Agency) as a fallback measure due to the urgency. However, subject to M/S QinetiQ meeting SLN performance criteria and field trials at no cost and no obligation to SLN over a period of one month, and determining the price as reasonable after market survey. The reason for such fall back measure was due to the fact that the two short listed tenderers in the tender were not able to meet the performance criteria.

In the meantime M/S Ocean Scan who failed in the tender too, has submitted a separate proposal to SLPA while M/S QinetiQ has submitted a Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) supported proposal through the British High Commission in Colombo to MOD through the LLTL.

At a subsequent meeting held at MOD chaired by Secretary Defence with reps from SLN and SLPA, it was decided to extended fair/just opportunity to both parties to do a demonstration/live trial on the systems offered by M/S Ocean Scan and M/S QinetiQ in order to select the best suitable system. Thereafter, to conduct above demonstration and trials. National Procurement Agency (NPA) appointed a FEC with members from MOD, SLN, SLAF, SLPA, University of Moratuwa and Treasury. The TEC unanimously decided M/S QinetiQ system as the best system out of the two systems demonstrated.

Following points raised in your article are either incorrect or without any base according to documents available with SLN. The factual positions with regard to each of those points are shown against to the inaccurate and misleading points appeared in your article.

a. "The Ocean Scan 'X' type was one of three systems short listed by the navy under former, Navy Commander Vice Admiral Daya Sandagiri before the tender was scrapped in 2007";

The basis of short listing was done on documents submitted by respective tenderers followed by live demonstration/trials. Finally TEC recommended M/S ELBIT on the performance by the participants subjected to price negotiation and M/S Ocean Scan was not recommended by the TEC at any stage of the above referred ("Scrap") tender.

b. "SLPA had leased a sonar system from them at a cost of 157,000 sterling pounds last April but declined to elaborate on why it has been installed nearly two weeks after it arrived in Sri Lanka";

"Sources within the Ports Authority told us on condition of anonymity that the installation in the Colombo Harbour has been blocked by the navy citing security reasons."

SLN being the Competent Authority declared as per Government Gazette Notification No. 1468/7 dated  October 25, 2006 and No. 1472/27 dated November 25, 2006 is responsible for Colombo Harbour security. Hence SLN sought Cabinet approval on December 25, 2007 to procure the system offered by M/S QinetiQ as recommended by  the SCAPC appointed TEC which included a member from SLPA. On  January 16, 2008, the Cabinet approved to procure QinetiQ system using SLPA funds. However, it is surprised to note that SLPA has leased a system that was rejected by SCAPC appointed TEC.

c. "The  Defence Ministry and Navy are applying pressure on the Ports Authority to force them in to buying another sonar system selected by the navy";

SLN had been persuading the purchasing process considering urgency and importance of  having a proven system in protecting Colombo Harbour as approved by the Cabinet on January 16, 2008 and until such time the funds were released/LC opened by SLPA on May 9, 2008.

d. "Even after the MV Invincible was sunk, the navy continued to block the installation of the Ocean Scan Sonar System";

SLN repeatedly insisted in expediting the proven system recommended by SCAPC appointed TEC and approved by the Cabinet.

e. "Decision to procure the Ocean Scan X-type system was taken after trials conducted in August in collaboration with the navy. Wherein at least two systems were tested and evaluated along with the X-type systems, a turnkey sonar solution called Cerebrus from British Defence giant QinetiQ was also evaluated":

As explained before after termination of the tender by MOD, the decision was taken to conduct demonstration and trials to select the best system amongst M/S Ocean Scan and M/S QinetiQ. The SCAPC appointed TEC (including a member from SLPA) recommended M/S QinetiQ rejecting M/S Ocean Scan.

f. "The Ocean Scan X-type passed the trials by being attached to the outer wall of the harbour but a spat broke out between the navy and SLPA when the former asked that the X-type also be tested for its performance inside the harbour, by the item TEC was appointed SCAPC/NPA, M/S Ocean Scan had their system installed at the outer side of the harbour whereas M/S QinetiQ had their system inner side of the harbour."

The SCAPC appointed TEC informed both parties to conduct trials inner and outer side of the Colombo harbour but both parties did not want to do the trials vice versa. Therefore TEC decided to evaluate system installed at inner and outer harbour by respective manufacturers. Based on performance the TEC recommended the systems offered by M/S QinetiQ who had their system inner side of the harbor subject to further trial period outer side of the harbour prior acceptance.

g. "In the end the SLPA chose to acquire the Ocean Scan system for its better performance in the harbour's outer perimeter and also citing the company setting up an office in Sri Lanka:"

However, SCAPC appointed TEC recommended M/S QinetiQ system over the system offered by M/S Ocean Scan due to Superior Performance User Friendliness and Better Detection Range, subject to M/s QinetiQ performs satisfactory out side the harbor prior final acceptance.

h. "Meanwhile navy has brought down the QinetiQ systems to Colombo once again despite it having being rejected by the last tender's Technical Evaluation Committee in a series of bamboozling, and obnoxious manoeuvers the navy is trying to force the SLPA not only to throw out a certified system that it has procured and paid for but also to get the SLPA to foot the bill for their new toy be tested for its performance inside the harbour."

At the initial tender ("Scrap") M/S Ocean Scan offer was not selected due to lesser performance/ non participation at re-demonstration. The QinetiQ offer was rejected due to non provision of bid bond/ certain information.  Subsequently this tender was cancelled and decision was taken to select the best system out of` two submitted through SLPA (M/S Ocean Scan) and LLTL (M/S QinetiQ. The best system was to be selected by TFC appointed SCAPC/NPA after conducting a line demonstration/ trial.

j. "Navy Commander Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda had vested interest in the QinetiQ system. The Admiral has not taken much interest in securing his harbours."

It is evident the Commander of the Navy has no vested interest whatsoever by the simple fact that he has always respected the decision of SCAPC/ NPA appointed TEC which included members from MOD, SLPA, SLN, SLAF, University of Moratuwa and Treasury. Also he has taken many steps to enhance harbour defences in all the harbours without waiting for receiving of Sonar systems and the measures taken were never attempted or done before. The details of which cannot be elaborated due to security reasons.

k. "The final question is why this system was not purchased through Lanka Logistics and Technology Limited and why it was landed on the Ports Authority:"

This proposal was initially handled by Lanka Logistics and Technology Ltd. However. the decision was subsequently taken by the cabinet to procure system using SLPA funds.

The Sunday Leader states: The navy in its reply has gone so far as to admit that the Qinetiq offer was solicited via the Defence Ministry's Lanka Logistics and Technologies Limited, and yet that the bill was to be footed by the SLPA who were trailing their own system.

The navy did not refute our allegation that the Qinetiq system failed miserably to even operate outside the harbour walls, and so we ask them what is the point in detecting divers once they have already entered the harbour waters.