The presence of the LTTE was the greatest deterrent against state-aided violence targeting Tamils in Sri Lanka. Would-be perpetrators of such violence feared LTTE retaliation. Even the grudging acceptance by the state that there are legitimate Tamil grievances is a direct outcome of LTTE militarism. Now that there is no LTTE, the state will see no grievances to address.” A common Tamil pro-LTTE perspective.

“The so-called ethnic problem is over. Even the 13th Amendment was adopted as a result of the pressure of terrorism, which has now been resoundingly defeated. There is nothing to be afraid of now, so no concessions need to be given to the Tamils or any other minority in Sri Lanka.” A widespread Sinhala nationalist majoritarian argument.

Both these extreme viewpoints have achieved a new lease of life in the current post-LTTE phase of Sri Lankan politics. The two groups hardly ever meet on any common ground, and they see each other as the archetypal enemy. Their analysis of the present conjuncture cannot be more different than it is. Yet, the nature of the two perspectives is disturbingly similar, demonstrating that they share a respect for violence and jointly support its role in shaping political agendas.

Credit terror

Though antithetical on the surface, both the pro-LTTE stance and the version of Sinhala majoritarianism described above credit terror and violence with the ability to ensure respect. In the first statement, the LTTE’s brand of military strategy is seen as the reason for Tamils being taken seriously and not arbitrarily dismissed. In the second, this theme is echoed because there is a refusal to consider Tamil grievances purely because no coercion can be brought to bear. The underlying premise is that might delivers rights and enables protection.

Thus, coercion, fear and force are the key factors admitted in both cases to be instrumental in determining law and public policy. There is no ethical or moral imperative, simply the desire to get away with whatever one can. Yet, surely, the rationale for devolution of power and the ensuring of basic rights to all communities requires no further justification than its own obvious merit? Similarly, providing constitutional guarantees to provide equal protection and representation to all ethnic, religious and linguistic groups in the country should not be the consequence of military might.

Both the arguments presented at the beginning of this column are fundamentally cynical and, in this respect as well, they mirror each other’s worldview. The first holds that the Sinhala State has to be coerced and embarrassed by brute force into providing redress to Tamils. The second confirms that without the brute force of the LTTE no real change will take place. The logic is the same, and such thinking was, in fact, the LTTE’s raison d’être, which in turn confirms that these extremes not only give the LTTE credence, but also will contribute towards the creation of yet another incarnation of the same or worse because the LTTE’s failure becomes a military one, not an ethical or political one.

Bigger slice

Based on this argument one can say had the LTTE been stronger, more brutal, more violent, then the Tamils would have had greater chances of a slice of the pie. Thus, together these positions acknowledge the advantage of violence: one group saying it is the only language that is understood by the state, and the other agreeing that in the absence of the threat of violence no remedies are necessary. Violence is not a symptom or a consequence, but the most effective means to achieving one’s ends.

The LTTE’s so-called deterrent violence, more appropriately termed terrorism, brutality and fascism, directed even against it own people, has helped establish the ground rules of the state’s engagement with the Tamil population. It has provided alibis for state-sponsored terrorism on the one hand and systemic suspicion against Tamils amounting to the criminalisation of an entire ethnic group on the other. Now that the LTTE is no longer a force to be reckoned with, this suspicion is leavened with a patronising sympathy, while elements of the state-sanctioned violence continue in various forms and garbs.

To put it bluntly, the continued incarceration of 250,000 IDPs in the Wanni, subjecting them to gratuitous physical and mental hardship, would not have been so easy had the LTTE been around, because they would have found a poor remote Sinhala village in the border areas to decimate, or they would have activated a suicide bomber in an urban crowd, as “retaliation.”

Let’s not fool ourselves for a moment that either side cared a hoot for the civilians; what they worried about was public perception, especially relating to military strength and machismo. The fact that now the state hasn’t a care in the world, hasn’t a single scruple about what it does or does not do in the camps and elsewhere, is evidence that they too belong, intellectually at least, in the LTTE camp!

Replacement

The point is that when violence is justified as a legitimate means to achieve a cherished objective, when it replaces democratic modalities as the modus operandi of agitating for rights and freedoms, then military logic prevails over ethical imperatives. The demand for justice becomes irrevocably contaminated by the ever-increasing degradation that such violence carries with it.  By the time one side wins, invariably through raising brutality to new heights, claims for redress and equality have also lost their credence.

As citizens of this country – representing diverse political, social, ethnic, linguistic, religious, gender, locational and economic perspectives – we must unite to reject this vindication of the LTTE’s rationale through the state’s endorsement of its fundamental tenet that the practice of violence is the only way to ensure respect and influence outcomes.

We must not only reject the use of force to create terror, from whatever quarter it derives, we must also actively refute the dominant view of the government and its allies today that Tamil grievances have no platform and hence no credibility anymore.

This is the logic that the military victor shares with the vanquished in these (ugly and inhuman) wars, which paradoxically provides the greatest impetus for the birth of new forms of organised violence. Even instrumentally, to suggest that there is no power-sharing, no traditional homelands, no legitimate grievances, no safe space, and finally no fundamental rights for Tamils now because there is no LTTE, is to incite and facilitate an option which may even be worse than the LTTE in the long-term future.

Brutality

Similarly, to drag our feet about these issues, to lose any sense of urgency or commitment because there is no vile military force backing the arguments for equality and the aspirations of Tamils in this country is to admit that it was only the brutality that forced us to consider these issues in the first place.

Sadly, inevitably, we see that the government and its apologists need their LTTE, just as the LTTE and its apologists needed their government. We are beginning to see just how inseparable this relationship has become for the current regime which needs the LTTE as bogey to take this country along the course that best serves its own self-interest.

Do we too join in the chorus that violence begets respect and ensures parity, or do we try to break out of this pernicious and debilitating logic that legitimises ever greater brutality and impunity?